June 2, 2021


Full Reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A..,Rights, primary and natural Compliance Tools, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, series "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2021, p. 319-342




Article Summary: In the traditional conception of the architecture of the sectors regulated by Law, and in Compliance Law which extends the regulatory techniques, rights have little place. But this configuration no longer takes place; on the contrary, rights are at the center of Regulatory and Compliance systems, and will be more and more so. They are and will be the primary tools of Compliance Law because they constitute a very effective "tool" to ensure the entire functioning of a system whose goals are so difficult to achieve. Because every effort must be done to achieve these goals, the public authorities not only rely on the power of crucial operators, but also distribute prerogatives to people and organizations who, thus encouraged, activate the Compliance system and participate in the achievement of the "monumental goal". Rights can prove to be the most effective tools for actually achieving the goals set, so much so that they can be seen as "primary tools".

But it is pertinent to have more pretension and to conceive rights as the most "natural" tools of Compliance Law. Indeed because all the Monumental Goals by which Compliance Law is defined can be expressed by the protection of persons, that is to say to the effectiveness of their prerogatives, by a mirror effect between rights. given as tools by Law by to persons and rights which constitute the very goal of all Compliance Law, in particular the protection of all human beings, even if they are in a situation of great weakness, rights becoming a "natural tool" of Compliance Law.

We are only at the beginning of their deployment and it is undoubtedly on them that Digital space in which we now live would be regulated, so that we will not suffocated there and that it will constitute for people a civilized space.



Read the bilingual working paper, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks, on which this article is based 


Read the General Presentation of the book in which this article has been published



Updated: Dec. 24, 2020 (Initial publication: July 15, 2020)


This Working Paper has been the basis for the first conference of the two conferences in the colloquium in Toulouse (France) under the scientific direction of Lucien Rapp, about Les incitations, outils de la Compliance ("Incitations, as Compliance Tools"), on December 12, 2019, the first one about The sanction as incitation and the second one about Incitations and Compliance Law (synthesis of this colloquium). 

Then, it has been the basis for the article, to be published in the books Les outils de la Compliance and Compliance Tools in the Series Régulations & Compliance.

Read a general presentation of this book.  


Summary and Introduction of this Working Paper: At first glance, Compliance and Incentives appear to be totally opposite. For two major reasons. In the first place, because the sanctions have a central place in the Law of Compliance and the incentives suppose an absence of constraint on the operators. Secondly, because the incentives are linked to self-regulation and that Compliance Law assumes a strong presence of public authorities. Taking the first reason, one should choose: either Compliance or Incentives! Either the effectiveness of one or the effectiveness of the others; either the techniques of one or the techniques of others; either the philosophy of one or the philosophy of the others. Resign oneself to the loss that such a necessary choice would involve. But to put the terms thus amounts to think poorly about the situations and reduce the fields of the solutions which they call for. If we take a rich definition of Compliance Law, it is possible on the contrary to articulate Compliance and Incentives. From this perspective, sanctions can no longer become what blocks the use of incentives but, on the contrary, what constitutes them. Even more, the coupling between Incentives and the requirements of Compliance Law must be strongly encouraged, as soon as the public authorities supervise in Ex Ante all the initiatives taken by the "crucial operators". 

This working document deals with the first issue!footnote-2045. Indeed, the so-called incentive theory targets mechanisms that do not directly use coercion. They would therefore have little place in Compliance Law. But Compliance seems saturated with sanction procedures. We can even say that it seems to put them at the center, the public authorities presenting the number of sanctions as a sign of success, while the companies seem obsessed with their prospects, the two concerns ending in such a strange convergence that are the D.P.O...

An honest observer can only feel immediately uneasy. Indeed, he can only raise the definition of the sanction as a "constraint" triggered Ex Post, at the very heart of Compliance Law which is presented as a set of Ex Ante mechanisms. Based on this contradiction in terms, should we give up the association and think that it would be wrong against the spirit to think of the sanction as an incentive?

It is undoubtedly in this connection that one perceives most clearly the clash of two cultures, which do not communicate, while technically they apply to the same situations. Indeed, because Compliance was firstly designed by Finance, everything is a tool for it. Therefore, the tendancy to think about the sanction only as an incentive is very strong in Compliance Law. It manifests itself continuously and will not stop (I). But whatever the reasons are to conceive it this way, the principles of the Rule of Law cannot disappear and if we do not want them to be erased, then they must be articulated (II). It’s an essential adjustment.

This is why we can literally say that Compliance has set Criminal Law on fire by its conception, logical but closed in on itself, of sanctions as simple incentives. For Law to remain, however, it is necessary to hold a very firm definition of Compliance Law centered on its Monumental Goal, which is the protection of the person.


La seconde problématique est analysée in "Compliance et Incitation : un couple à propulser", 2020.

March 5, 2020


Référence : Frison-Roche, M.-A., La mesure de l'effectivité et de l'efficacité des outils de la compliance (conception, présentation et modération des débats), in Les outils de la Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance.

Voir les autres thèmes, autres dates et autres manifestations particulières du cycle dans son ensemble. 


Cette conférence sert d'appui à la réalisation d'un ouvrage plus global portant d'une façon générale sur Les outils de la Compliance.

 L'ouvrage Compliance Tools sera publié en même temps. 


Présentation de la Conférence : Après avoir examiné différents outils spécifiques, comme La cartographie des risques ou Les incitations, et avant d'en aborder d'autres comme ceux relevant de la a Compliance by Design, celle-ci méritant  aussi d'être examinée avec quelque distance dans sa prétention à être la solution à tout enjeu de compliance, il convient de regarder comment l'on mesure l'efficacité de tous ces outils de Compliance. En effet, puisque toutes les techniques sont des "outils", ils ne prennent sens qu'au regard d'une finalité qu'ils doivent atteindre effectivement. Cette effectivité doit être mesurée, et cela dès l'Ex Ante, l'entreprise devant en permanence donner à voir l'effectivité de la performance des outils de la Compliance.

Mais autant les normes prolifèrent, les discours se multiplient, les engagements sont pris, autant les techniques de mesure de l'effectivité de l'ensemble semblent assez faibles. Non pas que les sujets de droit astreints aux obligations de Compliance ou désireux de réaliser les buts systémiques ou de bien commun visés par la Compliance ne désirent pas en avoir, mais ces instruments de mesure semblent encore les moins construits, souvent déclaratifs ou de type discursifs, ou trop mécaniques. Dès lors, est-ce en partant du but que l'on cherche à atteindre que l'on doit mesurer l'efficacité des outils de Compliance, sans que cela transforme les tâches qui pèsent de grè ou de force sur les opérateurs en obligation de résultat ? Ou est-ce en demeurant en amont, par une seule "conformité" à ce qui leur est demandé, comme comportement et comme organisation structurelle, que les entreprises donnent à voir qu'elles ont effectivement rempli leur tâche, sans plus se soucier des effets produits sur la réalité des choses, cette réalité que ceux qui ont conçu la norme avaient en tête ?

Cette question a des implications majeure en terme de charge de preuve et de responsabilité, impliquant des organisations plaçant la confiance, coeur de la Compliance, plutôt dans des instruments technologiques connectant des data ou plutôt dans des personnes ayant le sens du bien commun. Cette question est aujourd'hui ouverte.





Dec. 18, 2019


Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Le maniement de la propriété intellectuelle comme outil de régulation et de compliance, in Vivant, M. (dir.), Les Grands Arrêts de la propriété intellectuelle, 3ième éd., 2019, 9-11, p.43-53.

This contribution is written in French.


Intellectual Property, which comes from the State and is incorporated into public policy, can be designed not to reward the creator a posteriori, but to encourage others to innovate. It is then an Ex Ante regulatory tool, an alternative to the subsidy. If private copying is an exception, it is not in relation to the principle of Competition but in an insertion into a system of incentives, starting from the costs borne by the creator of the first innovation: the rights holder is then protected , not only according to a balance of interests involved but in order not to discourage innovative potentials and the sector itself. (1st decision) ;

The sectoral policy then permeates Intellectual Property, used to regulate a sector, for example that of the drug. While it is true that a laboratory wishing to market a generic drug did not wait for the expiration of the patent for the original drug to do so, it is however not relevant to sanction this anticipation by a few days because the investments made by the holder of the Intellectual Property right have been made profitable by this one and because the public authorities favor the generics in a concern of public health (2nd decision).

Systemic interest prevails and therefore Internet service providers have to bear the costs of blocking access while they are irresponsible because of the texts. This obligation to pay is internalized by Compliance Law because they are in the digital system best able to put an end to the violation of Intellectual Property rights which the ecosystem requires to be effective. (3rd decision).


Read the contribution (in French).


Read the Working Paper written in English having served as a basis for this contribution and endowed with additional developments, technical references and hypertext links


Nov. 16, 2019


The Finance Bill has proposed to the Parliament to vote an article 57 whose title is: Possibilité pour les administrations fiscales et douanières de collecter et exploiter les données rendues publiques sur les sites internet des réseaux sociaux et des opérateurs de plateformes (translation: Possibility for the tax and customs administrations to collect and exploit the data made public on the websites of social networks and platform operators).

Its content is as is in the text voted on in the National Assembly as follows:

"(1) I. - On an experimental basis and for a period of three years, for the purposes of investigating the offenses mentioned in b and c of 1 of article 1728, in articles 1729, 1791, 1791 ter, in 3 °, 8 ° and 10 ° of article 1810 of the general tax code, as well as articles 411, 412, 414, 414-2 and 415 of the customs code, the tax administration and the customs administration and indirect rights may, each as far as it is concerned, collect and exploit by means of computerized and automated processing using no facial recognition system, freely accessible content published on the internet by the users of the online platform operators mentioned in 2 ° of I of article L. 111-7 of the consumer code.

(2) The processing operations mentioned in the first paragraph are carried out by agents specially authorized for this purpose by the tax and customs authorities.


(3) When they are likely to contribute to the detection of the offenses mentioned in the first paragraph, the data collected are kept for a maximum period of one year from their collection and are destroyed at the end of this period. However, when used within the framework of criminal, tax or customs proceedings, this data may be kept until the end of the proceedings.

(4) The other data are destroyed within a maximum period of thirty days from their collection.

(5) The right of access to the information collected is exercised with the assignment service of the agents authorized to carry out the processing mentioned in the second paragraph under the conditions provided for by article 42 of law n ° 78-17 of January 6, 1978 relating to data processing, the files and freedoms.

(6) The right to object, provided for in article 38 of the same law, does not apply to the processing operations mentioned in the second paragraph.

(7) The terms of application of this I are set by decree of the Council of State.

(8) II. - The experiment provided for in I is the subject of an evaluation, the results of which are forwarded to Parliament as well as to the National Commission for Data Protection at the latest six months before its end. "


This initiative provoked many comments, rather reserved, even after the explanations given by the Minister of Budget to the National Assembly.

What to think of it legally?

Because the situation is quite simple, that is why it is difficult: on the one hand, the State will collect personal information without the authorization of the persons concerned, which is contrary to the very object of the law of 1978 , which results in full disapproval; on the other hand, the administration obtains the information to prosecute tax and customs offenses, which materializes the general interest itself.

So what about it?

Read below.

June 28, 2019


 It is often observed, even theorized, even advised and touted, that Compliance is a mechanism by which public authorities internalize political (eg environmental) concerns in big companies, which accept them, in Ex Ante, because they are rather in agreement with these "monumental goals" (eg saving the planet) and that this shared virtue is beneficial to their reputation. It is observed that this could be the most successful way in new configurations, such as digital.

But, and the Compliance Mechanism has often been brought closer to the contractual mechanism, this is only relevant if both parties are willing to do so. This is technically true, for example for the Deferred Prosecution, which requires explicit consent. This is true in a more general sense that the company wants to choose itself how to structure its organization to achieve the goals politically pursued by the State. Conversely, the compliance mechanisms work if the State is willing to admit the economic logic of the global private players and / or, if there are possible breaches, not to pursue its investigations and close the file it has opened, at a price more or less high.

But just say No.

As in contractual matters, the first freedom is negative and depends on the ability to say No.

The State can do it. But the company can do it too.

And Daimler just said No.



Publicly, including through an article in the Wall Street Journal of June 28, 2019.

The company sets out in a warning to the market that it is the object of a requirement on the part of the German Motor Authority (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt)  of an allegation of fraud, by the installation of a software, aimed at misleading instruments for measuring emissions of greenhouse gases on cars using diesel.

It is therefore an environmental compliance mechanism that would have been intentionally countered.

On this allegation, the Regulator both warns the company of what it considers to be a fact, ie compliance fraud, and attaches it to an immediate measure, namely the removal of the circulation of 42,000 vehicles sold or proposed by Daimler with such a device.

And the firm answers : "No".



Which is probably only beginning, since a No ends the dialogue of Ex Ante to project in the Ex Post sanction procedures, calls 6 observations:


  • 1. No doubt Daimler, a German car manufacturing company, has it in mind in this allegation of fraud calculating pollution of its diesel cars what happened to his competitor Volkswagen: namely a multi-billion dollar fine, for lack of compliance in a similar hypothesis (so-called dieselgate). The strategic choice that is then made depends on education through the experience of the company, which benefits as such from a previous case that has had a very significant cost. Thus educated, the question is to measure the risk taken to refuse any cooperation, when the company can anticipate that it will still result in such an amount ....


  • 2. In addition, we find the difficulty of the distinction of Ex Ante and Ex Post. Indeed, saying No will involve for the company a cost of confrontation with the Regulator, then the peripheral jurisdictions or review courts. But in Germany, the Government itself, concerning a bank threatened with compliance proceedings and almost summoned by the US regulator to pay "of its own free will" a transactional fine, felt that this was not normal, because it must be the judges who punish, after a contradictory procedure with due process and after established facts. 


  • 3.  However, this is only an allegation, of probable assertions, of what legally allows to continue, but which does not allow to condemn. The confusion between the burden of proof, which presupposes the obligation to prove the facts before being able to sanction, and the burden of the allegation, which only supposes to articulate plausibility before being able to prosecute, is very damaging, particularly if we are committed to the principles of Repressive Law, such as the presumption of innocence and the due process. This distinction between these two probationary charges is at the heart of the probatory system in the Compliance Law. Because Compliance Law always looks for more efficiency, tends to go from the first to the second, to give the Regulator more power, since businesses are so powerful ....


  • 4. But the first question then arises: what is the nature no so much of the future measure to be feared, namely a sanction that could be taken later, against Daimler, if the breach is proven, or which will not be applied to the firm if the breach is not established; but what is the nature of the measure immediately taken, namely the return of 42,000 vehicles?


  • This may seem like an Ex Ante measurement. Indeed, the Compliance assumes non-polluting cars. The Regulator may have indications that these cars are polluting and that the manufacturer has not made the necessary arrangements for them to be less polluting (Compliance) or even organized so that this failure is not detected ( Compliance fraud).


  • This allegation suggests that there is a risk that thiese cars will polluting. They must immediately be removed from circulation for the quality of the environment. Here and now. The question of sanctions will arise after that, having its procedural apparatus of guarantees for the company that will be pursued. But see the situation on the side of the company: having to withdraw 42,000 vehicles from the market is a great damage and what is often called in Repressive Law a "security measure" taken while the evidence is not yet met could deserve a requalification in sanction. Jurisprudence is both abundant and nuanced on this issue of qualification.


  • 5. So to withdraw these cars, it is for the company to admit that it is guilty, to increase itself the punishment. And if at this game, taken from the "cost-benefit", as much for the company immediately assert to the market that this requirement of Regulation is unfounded in Law, that the alleged facts are not exacts, and that all this the judges will decide. It is sure at all whether these statements by the company are true or false, but before a Tribunal no one thinks they are true prima facie, they are only allegations.
  •  And before a Court, a Regulator appears to have to bear a burden of proof in so far as he has to defend the order he has issued, to prove the breach which he asserts exists, which justifies the exercise he made of his powers. The fact that he exercises his power for the general interest and impartially does not diminish this burden of proof.


  • 6. By saying "No", Daimler wants to recover this classic Law, often set aside by Compliance Law, classic Law based on burden of proof, means of proof, and prohibition of punitive measures - except imminent and future imminente and very serious damages  - before 'behavior could be sanctioned following a sanction procedure.
  • Admittedly, one would be tempted to make an analogy with the current situation of Boeing whose aircraft are grounded by the Regulator in that he considers that they do not meet the conditions of safety, which the aircraft manufacturer denies , Ex Ante measurement that resembles the retraction measure of the market that constitutes the recall request of cars here operated.
  • But the analogy does not work on two points. Firstly, flight activity is a regulated activity that can only be exercised with the Ex Ante authorization of several Regulators, which is not the case for offering to sell cars or to drive with. This is where Regulatory Law and Compliance Law, which often come together, here stand out.Secundly, the very possibility that planes of which it is not excluded that they are not sure is enough, as a precaution, to prohibit their shift. Here (about the cars and the measure of the pollution by them), it is not the safety of the person that is at stake, and probably not even the overall goal of the environment, but the fraud with respect to the obligation to obey Compliance. Why force the withdrawal of 42,000 vehicles? If not to punish? In an exemplary way, to remind in advance and all that it costs not to obey the Compliance? And there, the company says: "I want a judge".




June 23, 2019


The European Banking Union is based on supervision as much as on regulation: it concerns the operators as much as the structures of the sector, because the operators "hold" the sector.

This is why the "regulator - supervisor" holds the operators by the supervision and is close to them.

He meets them officially and in "soft law" relations. This is all the more necessary since the distinction between the Ex Ante and the Ex Post must be nuanced, in that its application is too rigid, in that it involves a long time (first of all the rules, then to apply them, then to notice a gap between rules and behaviors, then to repair it) is not appropriate if the system aims at the prevention of systemic crises, whose source is inside the operators.

This is why the body in charge of solving the difficulties of the systemic banks for the salvation of the systeme meets the banking sector itself, to ensure that they are permanently "resolvable", so that the hypothesis of their resolution never arises. This is the challenge of this system: that it is always ready, for never be applying.


In the European Banking Union, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) is in charge of "resolve" the difficulties of European systemic banks in difficulty. It is the public body of the second pillar of the Banking Union. The first pillar is the prevention of these difficulties and the third is the guarantee of deposits. The resolution is therefore more like an Ex Post mechanism.

But in this continuum through these three pillars between the Ex Ante and the Ex Post, the SRB does not wait passively - as would a traditional judge do - that the file of the troubled bank reaches it. Like a supervisor - which brings it closer to the first public in the system (Single Supervisory Board -SSB), which supervises all the banks, it is in direct contact with all the banks, and it approaches the hypothesis of a bank in trouble by a systemic perspective: it is therefore to the entire banking system that the SRB addresses itself.

As such, it organizes meetings, where he is located: in Brussels.

Thus, on June 18, 2019, all banks came to discuss with the Single Resolution Board to know what it wants from the banks and for the banks, in what is called a "dialogue meeting".

To resolve in Ex Post the difficulties of a bank, it has to present a quality (a little known concept in Bankruptcy Law): "resolvability". How build it? Who build it ? In its very design and in its application, bank by bank.

For the resolution body vis-à-vis all players in the banking and financial sector, it's clear: "Working together" is crucial in building resolvability ".

In the projection that is made, it is affirmed that there can be a successful resolution only if the operator in difficulty is not deprived of access to what makes to stay it alive, that is to say the banking and financial system itself, and more specifically the "Financial Market Infrastructures", for example payment services.

Does the Single Resolution Board expect spontaneous commitments from the FMIs for such a "right of access"? In this case, as the Single Resolution Board says, this right of access corresponds to "critical functions" for a bank, the resolution situation can not justify the closure of the service.

By nature, these crucial operators are entities that report to regulators who oversee them. Who enforces - and immediately - this right of access? When one can think that it is everyone, it risks being nobody .... That is why the resolution body, relaying in this a concern of the Financial Stability Board, underlines that it is necessary to articulate the supervisors, regulators and "resolvers" between them.


To read this program, since it is a proposed program of work for the banking sector, four observations can be made:

1. We are moving more and more towards a general "intermaillage" (which will perhaps replace the absence of a global State, but it is an similar nature because it is always to public authorities that it refers and not to self-regulation);

2. But as there is no political authority to keep these guardians, the entities that articulate all these various public structures, with different functions, located in different countries, acting according to different temporalities, these are the companies themselves that internalize the concern that animates those who built the system: here the prevention of systemic risk. This is the definition of Compliance, which brings back to companies, here more clearly those those which manage the Market Infrastructures, the obligations of Compliance (here the management of systemic risk through the obligation of giving access).

3. Even without a  single systemic guard, there is always a recourse. That will be the judge. There are already many, there will probably be more in a system of this type, more and more complex, the articulation of disputes is sometimes called "dialogue". And it is undoubtedly "decisions of principle" that will set the principles common to all of these particular organisms.

4. We then see the emergence of Ex Ante mechanisms for the solidity of the systems, and the solidity of the players in the systems, and then the Ex Post resolution of the difficulties of the actors according to access to the solidity of the infrastructures of these systems, which ultimately depend on judges (throughout the West) facing areas where all of this depends much less on the judge: the rest of the world.



Jan. 2, 2019


This working paper has served as a basis for an article published in French in the collective publication Pour une Europe de la Compliance in the serie Regulation & Compliance.



Compliance is often presented as a complex, technical, almost incomprehensible set, in that it consists only of empty and moving procedures, mechanical corpus about which the goal would be a question that would not arise.

The question of the purpose of these huge compliance devices might not even have to be asked. And this for two reasons.

Firstly it would only be a matter of following "processes", that is, mechanical and endless procedures. This conception of compliance is often called "kafkaes". Closer to closer, one thinks first of all of the book written by Kafka's The trial l and Welles' adaptation to the cinema in which the charcters are surrounded by walls that are narrowing around them, but it is rather to his novel In the penal colony that must be thought, that is to say to a procedural system of isolation which we do not understand the foundation, which makes it without foundation and without end but also which takes mainly the form of a machine in which the person is placed and which mechanically writes the Law on and under the skin of his back. This internalization of the rule in the body of the condemned - that the French legal system before the French Revolution associated only with "enormous crimes" - being the ordinary way of actual and ordinary application of the rules can correspond to a certain vision of the Compliance, detached from any purpose.

The question of the purpose of Compliance may also not have to arise for a second reason, almost the opposite: they would always be devices that are specific to particular sectors. Thus, the banking sector, the insurance sector, the drug sector, the agri-food sector, the telecommunications sector, the energy sector, etc. Then the opposite happens: too many goals! Since each of these sectors has specificities such that it includes purposes that are specific to each of them. For example continuity for energy, access information for telecommunications, control of systemic risk for banking and finance, protection and secret for private information, etc. Now, either these ends so diverse are indifferent to each other, or they can contradict each other. Therefore, to ask the question of the purpose of compliance mechanisms would be to move to the stitution of not even trying to understand "processes" to be exceeded by too many substantial purposes pursued at the same time and in contradictorily senses ... .

This is why the question of the purpose of the Compliance is not asked in a main way. Even less if it is superimposed with another goal that is the European construction ....

But on the contrary, if we confront this question of the aims of the Compliance Mechanisms by crossing it with another issue, older but also under construction, namely the question of Europe, it is possible to make an alliance of these two difficulties to transform them as an asset. That one can help the other. Indeed, both Europe and Compliance in their current states are two constructs with uncertain goals or behaviors most often only "reactive" (I). If we do not want to mobilize all our strength to limit our weakness, which leads rather to feed it, we can go draw on the unity of this Europe so diverse but which finds it unity in the protection of the human being by the very idea of ​​"person". However, Compliance Law can have the same unity, despite the diversity of sectors, and thus fill the meaning of these multiple procedures, providing the balance between information and secrets, circulation of data and conservation of that they concern, common and dialectic purpose that this European Compliance Law. in the process of being constituted can give the world an example in relying on the European tradition  (II)

Nov. 5, 2018


Référence générale : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Banque et concurrence, in "Mélanges en l'honneur du professeur Claude Lucas de Leyssac", LexisNexis, 2018, pp.165-180.


Résumé : Banque et concurrence ne font pas bon ménage. Ce n'est pas tant que les banques feraient figure de récidivistes à propos desquels les autorités de concurrence devraient hausser le ton par des sanctions toujours plus lourdes afin que la leçon concurrentielle soit enfin entendue. Ce sont plutôt deux ordres qui s'affrontent, deux incompréhensions face à face. En effet les banques trouvent adéquat de s'entendre pour que le système bancaire fonctionne. Plus encore, les pouvoirs publics leur demandent un comportement politique en finançant l'économie lorsque celle-ci ne s'appuie pas sur les marchés financiers, voire de lutter contre l'exclusion sociale en pratiquant « l'inclusion bancaire », bastion avancé de la conception de l'entreprise promue par le Plan très politique d'Action pour la Croissance et le Transformation des Entreprises (PACTE). dès lors, comment elles-mêmes auraient-elles un comportement de marché consistant dans un comportement égoïste et d'agression envers leur homologue ?

Si l'on plonge dans ce creuset de l'incompréhension qui engendre le heurt violent entre les banques, qui évoquent leur mission, et les autorités de concurrence, qui se prévalent de la leur, on bute sur l'écueil de la définition même de ce qu'est une banque. L'on peut estimer qu'une banque est un prestataire de services divers, agissant sur des marchés en concurrence ; le droit assure le bon fonctionnement de ceux-ci, les autorités qui gardent l’efficacité des marchés se saisissant des banques qui y exercent leurs activités. Mais si l'on choisit d'insister sur le fait que les banques sont ce qui fait fonctionner l'économie et consolident le lien social, elles sont alors partie  intégrante d'un système propre : le système bancaire, lequel est un élément essentiel de la société. La concurrence n'y est plus qu'adjacente.


Lire l'article.

Lire le document de travail, doté de nombreuses notes de bas de page et de nombreux liens hypertextes, ayant servi de base à cet article

Nov. 5, 2018


Sous l'égide de la Banque Mondiale, tous les deux ans, se réunit l' "Alliance des chasseurs de la corruption".

Les 25 et 26 octobre 2018, la rencontre se déroulait à Copenhague. 

L'on pouvait suivre en direct les travaux de cette rencontre, qui demeurent ainsi disponibles. 

L'on peut faire trois observations.

1. Tous stakeholders ! Sur le fond, l'on soulignera que, comme y a insisté au nom de la Banque Mondiale Pascale Dubois, elle-même en charge des politiques d'intégrité lors de la mise en place des programmes dans les pays, les actions contre la corruption bénéficient de plus en plus de l'action des entreprises, qui aujourd'hui voient leur réputation impliquée, réputation qu'elles perçoivent comme un actif à préserver ce qui justifie leur participation active à cette "Alliance". Cela renvoie à l'idée d'un "cercle de confiance" sur lequel repose la Compliance, même lorsqu'il y a contrainte exercée sur les entreprises, l'oratrice ayant abondamment parlé des programmes de compliance. 

2. Une "Alliance" plutôt qu'un Ordre international inefficace !  Entre la forme et le fond, et bien que l'on puisse trouver grâce aux sites les précédentes rencontres biennales, le terme commun d' "Alliance" dans l'intitulé même d' International Corruption Hunters Alliance a de quoi retenir l'attention. En effet, dans l'ordre international ce sont les institutions internationales qui se rencontrent selon des formes codifiées, avec des textes, voire des accords, qui en résultent. Ici, nous avons des personnes "impliquées", à tous les titres : Etats, organisations publiques mais aussi entreprises et organisations non-gouvernementales. Comme le reflètent ce terme sans cesse utilisé par ces travaux de stakeholders, terme qui a la caractéristique pratique de pouvoir inclure tout le monde.

Il est vrai que la corruption est un fléau mondial qui concerne le particulier, les entités et les systèmes dont les institutions sont gardiennes : chacun peut donc à la fois en dire quelque chose et agir. Cette "Alliance" marque simplement le recul assumé d'un "ordre international" qui sans doute n'a pas pu se constituer à temps, alors que la criminalité trouve dans la globalisation un espace naturel, utilisant la fragmentation territoriale des Droits comme un bouclier que l'impératif de lutte ne semble plus pouvoir tolérer...

3. Tous "chasseurs" ! ou l'archaïsation du Droit de la Compliance. Le terme de "chasseurs" (hunters) est sur la forme plus encore remarquable. Cela rappelle le temps des "chasseurs de prime". Et c'est d'ailleurs parfois à ceux-ci que l'on compare les "moniteurs" dont l'efficacité est requise dans les techniques de programmes de compliance, leur exploits qu'ils relatent sur leur site étant parfois comparés à un "tableau de chasse" à la vue des entreprises terrassées. Cela n'est pas critiquable en soi. L'idée est qu'il faut pourchasser un fléau (la corruption étant implicitement comparée à une sorte de bête sauvage qui ravage tout).

Face à ce but, chacun est chasseur, l'entreprise comme l'ONG comme le tribunal comme le Gouvernement. Cela est de fait d'autant plus pertinent que sous un angle mondial la corruption s'étant infiltrée dans chaque catégorie, il convient sans doute de revenir à un tableau plus simple et plus archaïque : un fléau bien identifié (la corruption) et tout intéressé à l'éliminer dans une chasse "collective" (les intervenants ayant tous insisté sur ce caractère collectif). 

Si on l'analyse du point de vue du droit, cela signe une nouvelle fois le mouvement d'archaïsation très fort du Droit de la Compliance, puisque les catégories juridiques s'effacent (par exemple la distinction entre l'entreprise privée et l'Etat) pour privilégier l'efficacité au regard d'un but.  

Dans ce droit, dont Alain Supiot souligne notamment le caractère régressif et guidé par le principe de l'efficacité (qui n'est qu'un principe procédurale), pondéré par le principe de proportionnalité (qui n'est lui-aussi qu'un principe procédural), le Droit de la Compliance apparaît comme un Droit nouveau, dont il ne faut sans doute se contenter de viser comme seul principe l'efficacité.  

En effet, et comme cela a été bien exposé à Copenhague, les criminels corrupteurs et corrompus ne connaissent plus les frontières dans leur activité mais les redécouvrent, utilisant la territorialité du Droit en défense lorsque des comptes leur sont demandés. La réponse du Droit est pour l'instant dans l'extraterritorialité des règles, les Etats se disputant alors, tandis qu'ils ne semblent s'accorder que dans l'informel des "alliances". 

Tout cela montre l'urgence technique de concevoir d'une façon plus substantielle un Droit de la Compliance. 




July 3, 2018


Référence complète :  Frison-Roche, M.-A., Dessiner les cercles du Droit de la Compliance, in Études en l'honneur de Philippe Neau-Leduc, Le juriste dans la cité, coll. « Les mélanges », LGDJ- Lextenso,  2018, pp. 483-496.


Cet article  s'appuie sur un document de travail. Celui est doté de notes de bas de pages, de références techniques et de liens hypertextes.

Il est accessible en langue française par le lien suivant  Tracer les cercles du Droit de la Compliance.

Il est accessible en langue anglaise par le lien suivant : Drawing the circles of Compliance Law. 


Résumé : Le Droit de la compliance participe du même fonctionnement téléologique que le Droit économique auquel il appartient, consistant à placer la normativité des règles, décisions et raisonnements, dans les buts poursuivis. Une fois que l'on sait quels sont les buts poursuivis par les techniques de compliance, alors on sait qui doit en avoir la charge, qui doit y être soumis, qui doit activer les règles : les règles de compliance doivent être activées par ceux qui sont les mieux placés pour aboutir au résultat concrétisant le but recherché par celui qui a conçu le mécanisme de compliance. Les "cercles" sont ainsi tracés d'une façon rationnelle et pragmatique. Cela, tout cela ("effet utile"), mais pas au-delà de cela. La notion d'efficacité n'implique pas toujours une mise en balance : elle peut au contraire impliquer  de dessiner des cercles qui désignent ceux qui sont "placés" pour porter la charge des règles car ils sont aptes à leur faire produire les effets recherchés. A l'intérieur de ces cercles, les règles doivent s'appliquer sans restriction et sans compromis, mais elles ne doivent pas s'appliquer au-delà de ces cercles.

Dessiner de tels cercles nécessite de définir le Droit de la compliance lui-même, puisque d'une part le choix de ceux qui doivent concrétiser la Compliance dépend des buts de celle-ci et que d'autre part la définition du Droit de la Compliance est elle-même de nature téléologique . C'est pourquoi, à l'inverse de l'affirmation comme quoi l'exercice de définition serait inutile dans ces matières, qui seraient avant tout du cas par cas, cet effort de définition et cette détermination des finalités sont au contraire déterminants pour savoir en pratique qui doit porter les obligations de compliance et qui ne le doit pas.

Or il suffit d'avoir posé cela pour qu’apparaisse la difficulté majeure de la matière, difficulté qui explique les résistances, voire donne l'impression que l'on se heurte à une aporie. En effet, si par principe ce que l'on attend de la part des "usagers" des mécanismes doit s'articuler au but qui est affecté par les auteurs des mécanismes de compliance à ceux-ci, encore faut-il qu'il y ait une correspondance minimale entre les buts visés par ces auteurs (Législateurs et Régulateurs) et les buts poursuivis par ceux qui en sont chargés de les mettre en œuvre : les entreprises. Or, cette correspondance n'existe pas à première vue, parce que les mécanismes de compliance ne trouvent leur unicité qu'au regard de "buts monumentaux" dont les autorités publiques ont le souci légitime, alors que les entreprise ont pour but leur intérêt propre. Les deux cercles ne correspondent pas. L'internationalisation du souci de ces buts dans les entreprises ne serait donc qu'un mécanisme de violence dont les entreprises sont l'objet, violence ressentie comme telle. (I).


Lire l'article.



May 22, 2018

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Full reference : Augagneur, L.-M., L'efficacité des programmes de compliance : l'exemple du droit de la concurrence, in Borga, N., Marin, J.-Cl. et Roda, J.-Cl. (dir.), Compliance : l'entreprise, le régulateur et le juge, Série Régulations & Compliance, Dalloz, 2018, pp. 137-142.


Read a general presentation of the book in which the article is published

Read the other titles of the série in which the book is published

Feb. 22, 2018

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Malaurie-Vignal, M., Concurrence - Efficacité économique v/ politique de concurrence ? Réflexions à partir du marché du numérique, Contrats Concurrence Consommation n° 2, février 2018, repère 2.

L'article peut être lu par les étudiants de Sciences po via le Drive dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation & Compliance"

Oct. 5, 2017

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Full reference : Augagneur, L.-M., La compliance a-t-elle une valeur ?JCP E, n° 40, 5 octobre 2017, p. 1522.

Sciences Po students can read the article via the drive, folder "MAFR-Régulation & Compliance".

June 30, 2017


This working paper is the support for the article to appear in the collective book  dedicated to our very dear friend and colleague Philippe Néau-Leduc.

It uses the Bilingual Dictionary of the Regulatory and Compliance Law.

Compliance Law has the same teleological functioning as the Economic Law to which it belongs, which consists in placing the normativity of rules, decisions and reasoning in the aims pursued. Once we know what the goals of compliance techniques are, then we know who should be responsible for them, who must be subject to them, who must activate the rules: compliance rules must be activated by those who are in the best position to achieve the outcome in order to achieve the goal sought by the authority which designed the compliance mechanism. The "circles" are thus plotted in a rational and pragmatic way. That, all of it ("useful effect"), but not beyond that. The notion of efficiency does not always imply balancing: on the contrary, it can involve drawing circles which designate those who are "placed" to carry the burden of the rules because they are capable of producing them the desired effects. Within these circles, the rules must apply without restriction and without compromise, but they must not apply beyond these circles.

Drawing such circles requires defining the Law of Compliance itself, since on the one hand the choice of those who must implement the Compliance depends on the aims of the Compliance and on the other hand the definition of the Law of Compliance is itself teleological in nature. This is why, contrary to the assertion that the exercise of definition would be useless in these matters, which would be above all on a case-by-case basis, this effort to define and determine the purposes is, on the contrary, necessary in practice to show which enterprise must bear the obligations of compliance and which must not.

But it is enough to have posed this to reveal the major difficulty of the Compliance, that explains resistances, and even gives the impression that one is confronted with an aporia. If, as a matter of principle, what is expected of the "users" of the Compliance mechanisms must be articulated to the aim that is affected by the authors of the compliance mechanisms to them, we must have a minimum correspondence between the aims of these authors (Legislators and Regulators) and the aims pursued by those who are responsible for implementing them: companies. However, this correspondence does not exist at first sight, because the compliance mechanisms are found to be uniquely based on "monumental goals" which the public authorities have a legitimate concern, whereas companies have for their own interest . The two circles do not match. The internationalization of concern for these aims in companies would therefore be only a mechanism of violence of which enterprises are the object, violence felt as such. (I).

To resolve this violence, it is better to stop confusing the State and enterprises, whose goals are not the same, and draw the circle of subjects of law "eligible" for Compliance. It is highly legitimate to target certain entities, in particular this category of companies, which are the "crucial operators", in a binding way, as it is legitimate to govern companies that have expressed a desire to surpass their own interests. These circles of a different nature can overlap on a concrete operator: for example, if a bank - alway a crucial operator that is structural because it is systemic - is also international - a crucial operator because of its activity - decides to worry about others by commitments verified by the authorities to overcome their own interest (social responsibility), but these different circles are not confused. In any case, companies may belong to only one circle, or even belong to none. In the latter case, they must therefore remain beyond the reach of the pressure and cost of Compliance Law, in particular because they are not objectively required to realize the "monumental goals" aimed at effectiveness and do not want it: in a liberal system, it is for the public authorities to aim at the general interest, the ordinary people indirectly participating in it by paying the tax. (II).

It is by making these "Compliance Circles" of eligible subjects of this specific Law to implement the heavy but justified and controlled burden of Compliance with regard to the monumental goals that this new system  aims, that then opens a royal way in order to find a uniqueness and to increase the "monumental function" of the Compliance Law by a relation of Trust towards the global general interest, rather than the mechanical application of rules whose meaning is not understood and whose perception is no longer perceived than violence.

May 20, 2017


Aucun film ne reprend mieux la description que Sade fait dans son œuvre, et plus particulièrement dans Justine ou les infortunes de la vertu , du rapport désespéré entretenu par ceux qui expriment et appliquent la Loi ont avec celle-ci.

Ce film d'Elio Petri, réalisé en 1969, sorti en 1970, qui reçut le prix spécial du Jury au Festival de Cannes, a retenu l'attention de tous, notamment pour sa dimension dramatique, esthétique et politique!footnote-919. Et qui ne se souvient de sa musique, signée par Ennio Morricone.

Si on le prend davantage du côté du Droit, on observera que le titulaire de l'expression du Droit, celui qui doit concrétiser le Droit dans la société, ici le "chef" de la police, exprime ce qu'est pour lui la règle.

On se souvient que Carbonnier pose qu'à chacun d'entre nous le Droit d'une façon première et immédiate apparaît sous la forme d'un képi du gendarme. A cette formulation sociologique bienveillante correspond ainsi la forme terrifiante d'un commissaire, grand chef qui tue et punit, sans jamais porter d'uniforme.

Lorsqu'il veut être puni du crime qu'il a commis parce que la femme a dit la vérité, à savoir le caractère enfantin de la règle qui le gouverne et donc du caractère infantile de sa propre stature, sa mise en scène s'écroule, lui qui ultérieurement se déguisera en metteur en scène.

François Ost a consacré un ouvrage à la conception sadienne de la Loi. On la retrouve ici, car le personnage principale des fables de Sade, c'est la Loi et son auteur, Dieu. Si les titulaires de la loi, à savoir les juges, les évèques, les parlementaires, qui sont légions dans l'oeuvre de Sade, ceux qui l'expriment, ne peuvent que torturer l'innocent, comme le fait le personnage dans le film d'Elio Petri de la femme et du jeune homme, afin qu'ils avouent leur innocence, qu'ils la dégorgent, qu'ils n'aient pas à reconnaître que la Loi est vide, c'est-à-dire que ce Dieu dont ils appliquent la norme n'existe pas.

La provocation de ce Dieu, afin de le voir surgir, la provocation de la Loi afin de la voir apparaître, les héros sadiens l'opèrent en s'exténuant de torture en torture, de meurtre en meurtre. Dans le film d'Elio Petri, la méthode est plus juridique et revêt la même dimension probatoire : il organise la démonstration de sa culpabilité, afin de donner consistance à la Loi pénale dont il assure l'effectivité par la répression, pour que cette répression ne soit pas vide, pour que sa vie ait un sens.

Mais, comme dans Sade, cela n'adviendra pas.

Oui, il n'y a pas eu de meilleure adaptation au cinéma de Sade que par ce film-là.



Pour une analyse faite dans le festival du film d'Enghien, présentant ce film comme le "film le plus emblématique" des films politiques italiens des années de plond.

Jan. 2, 2017

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Toth, A., How Could Competition Authorities Reward Competition Compliance Programmes, European Competition & Regulation Law Review, 2017, n°1, pp. 4-10.

Les étudiants de Sciences Po peuvent lire cet article via le drive dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation & Compliance"

Dec. 20, 2016

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Lehaire, B., The Juridicity of Compliance Programs in Canadian Competition Law: A Cross Analysis of Corporate Criminal Liability and Competition Law, R.J.T., n°50, 2016, pp. 694-743.


Les étudiants de Sciences Po peuvent lire cet article via le drive dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation & Compliance"

Dec. 1, 2016

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Souty, F., Entreprises, concurrence, conformité : définition empirique de la compliance, RLC, 2016, n°55.


Les étudiants de Sciences Po peuvent lire cet article via le drive dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation & Compliance"

Nov. 1, 2016

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Durand, W., L’entreprise face au droit de la concurrence : comment réduire le risque, Revue Lamy de la concurrence, No 55, 1 nov. 2016.

Les étudiants Sciences Po peuvent consulter l'article via le drive, dossier "MAFR-Regulaiton & Compliance".


June 16, 2016

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Fasterling, B., Criminal compliance - Les risques d'un droit pénal du risque, in Eeckhoudt, M. (dir.), Les grandes entreprises échappent-elles au droit, Revue Internationale de Droit Économique (RIDE), 2016/2,De Boeck, p.217-237.


Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent lire l'article via le drive dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation"


Cet article montre tout d'abord que le droit pénal vise maintenant à convaincre les entreprises à prendre des dispositions via la "compliance" pour "optimiser le risque juridique" en se mettant en mesure de ne pas commettre d'infractions. Mais l'auteur souligne qu'il n'y a pas d'études concrètes montrant la causalité entre cette compliance mise en place et la diminution des infractions. Il en conclut que les instruments de mesure de "l'efficacité" de la compliance.

L'article est très critique à la fois sur la notion même, parlant d'une "autorégulation réglementée" et sur la façon dont la compliance fonctionne, évoquant une "perversion de la compliance", puisque cela ne marche pas, et concluant sur la "vanité" de la criminal compliance....


Dans ce dossier voir aussi :

EECKHOUDT Marjorie, Propos introductifs.

BONNEAU Thierry, Les conflits d'intérêts dans le règlement Agence de notation du 16 septembre 2009.

KRALL Markus, Gouvernance et conflits d'intérêts dans les agences de notation financière.

GARAPON Antoine et MIGNON Astrid, D'un droit défensif à un droit coopératif : la nécessaire réforme de notre justice pénale des affaires.

GARRETT Brandon L., Le délinquant d'entreprise comme bouc émissaire.

May 26, 2016

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Le Fur, A.-V., La rationalité des sanctions, une exigence démocratique en faveur de leur efficacité, D.2016, chron., p.1091-1101.

Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent accéder à cet article via le drive dans le dossier MAFR - Régulation


Feb. 3, 2016

Thesaurus : 03. Conseil d'Etat

Référence complète : C.E., sous-section 6 et 1 réunies, Président de l'Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF).


Lire l'arrêt.

April 5, 2015


Droit et Marché à première vue ne sont pas sur le même plan, l'un étant une construction, une invention humaine, l'autre étant des marchés. Mais depuis le XVIIIième en Europe, l'on a pareillement institué, donc inventé le "Marché".

Ces deux institutions ont un rapport dialectique, puisque c'est par le droit que le Marché a été construit. La puissance des institutions dépend de ceux qui les construisent mais surtout de la foi de ceux qui les contemplent. Or, si le Droit a construit le Marché, aujourd'hui la foi se tourne vers le Marché et la croyance d'une loi qui lui sera proche et naturelle le rend universel, transportant avec lui sa "petite loi" juridique qu'est le contrat et le juge qui y est inclus, l'arbitre.

Plus encore, parce tout cela n'est qu'affaires humaines et donc affaires de pouvoir, la place de l'Institution qui fût celle de la puissance, tirée de sa source, par exemple le Peuple Constituant, est en train de descendre en-dessous de ce qui est là, c'est-à-dire le fait. En effet, que peut-on contre un fait ? Seul Dieu, et donc une Assemblée parlementaire par exemple qu'il est aisé de destituer, peut prétendre lutter contre un fait. Or, le Marché est aujourd'hui présenté comme un fait, tandis que ce qui le gouvernent seraient des phénomènes naturels, comme l'attraction entre l'offre et la demande, le fait d'offre ce qui attire, le fait de demander ce que l'on désire. Dès lors, seul Dieu, souvent brandi avec grande violence, peut prétendre encore dire quelque chose contre cela.

Aujourd'hui, Droit et Marché sont face à face. Curieusement les juristes sont assez taisant, peut-être sidérés de la destitution du Droit. Mais c'est la question de la Loi première qui est en jeu. Dans l'esprit occidental, depuis la pensée grecque l'on a pensé le sujet et la personne comme étant première, c'est-à-dire posée sans condition. Si on pose comme loi première l'efficacité de la rencontre des offres et des demandes, le monde a changé. Un monde sans Personne, avec des êtres humains plus ou moins attrayant, plus ou moins demanding , le monde des puissances ayant remplacé le monde de la volonté égale de tous. La technique devient la préoccupation première. Le droit qui était "art pratique" et les lois faites pour l'homme, devient une technique et les juristes se devront alors d'être neutres.

Depuis quelques décennies, Droit et Marché sont donc face-à-face (I), mais le Marché semble en passe de dominer parce qu'il est en train de quitter le statut inférieur d'institution pour accéder à celui, universel, de fait (II). L'enjeu devient alors de mesurer les effets d'une telle évolution et de déterminer, si le Droit devait s'effacer, quelles normes viendrait le remplacer (III). 

March 27, 2015


The cost issue of regulation is a recurring issue.

One can complain specifically, when companies are protesting about the "cost of regulation" or when the topic is taken as an object of study, through the cost / benefit calculation.

A practical question of importance is whether there is a "legal question" or not.

The "juridicity" of a question is defined by the fact that discussing about this question has an effect on the outcome of a case before a judge. This concrete definition, leaving the judge's power, binding nature of the rule (here the balance between cost and benefit) the effectiveness of its decision before the judge, its consideration by him in the decision he makes, has been proposed in France by Carbonnier. It is opposed to a definition of Law by the source, the author of the rule, which identifies law for example through Parliament Acts, because the text is adopted by the legislator, listed source of law.

The first definition, more sociological, more flexible, giving the spotlight on judge better corresponds to a legal system which gives more room for ex post and for the judge. It is logical that we find more demonstrations of this conception in the common law systems.

However, the issue of cost / benefit is being debated before the Supreme Court of the United States, about the latest environmental regulations, adopted by the Environment Protection Agency (EPA). It is a question of law. It is under the empire of the judge.

For it is in this light that President Barack Obama in November 2014 asked a very costly regulation, and it was under his leadership that the Environmental Protection Agency has developed texts. Indeed, pollution of certain plants are the cause of asthma and laid in public health imperative to fight a regulation that results in a direct cost on firms. Indeed, some plants pollution is the cause of asthma and President Obama has asked public health imperative to combat by a regulation that results in a direct cost on the industry. The regulations adopted in 2012 they cost a $ 9 million, some claiming that future ones could result in billions of costs directly related to business The President emphasized by stating that the health of children was priceless.

By challenging those of 2012 before the Supreme Court, in the case Michigan v. EPA, this is the other texts that conservative states and companies have in mind because it is the principle that is posed: : does A regulator have the right to take regulations very "expensive" when the advantage, however legitimate it is, is small-scale in terms of costs? The Supreme Court, having chosen to handle the case, listened to March 25, 2015, the arguments of each other and discussed the case.

The question is the integration or not into the constitutional notion of "necessity of the law" of the "cost / benefit" calculation. This is a crucial point because the concept of "necessity of the law" is a common notion to the constitutions of many countries.

However, not only the so-called judges "conservatives" as Justice Antonio Scalia, took position felt it was crazy not "consider" the cost of new regulations from the expected health benefits, but also Justice Stephen Breyer called "progressive," said "irrational" the environmental regulator has not taken in consideration such an imbalance between cost and benefit.

It is true that Justice Breyer was formerly professor of competition law at Harvard.

Judgment will be given in June.