Food for thoughts

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

The procedural safeguards enjoyed by a person whose situation may be affected by a future judgment are principally the right to bring proceedings before the court, the rights of the defense and the benefit of the contradictory principle.

The legal action was for a long time considered as a "power", that is to say, a mechanism inserted in the organization of the judicial institution, since it was by this act of seizure, access by which the person enters the judicial machine, through the latter starts up.

But in particular since the work of René Cassin and Henri Motulsky, legal proceedings are considered as a subjective right, that is to say, a prerogative of any person to ask a judge to rule on the claim that the plaintiff articulates in an allegation, that is a story mixing the fact and the law in a building and on which he asks the judge to give an answer, such as the cancellation of an acte, or the award of damages, or the refusal to convict him (because the defense is also the exercise of this right of action).

The legal action is now recognized as a "right of action", the nature of which is independent of the application made to the court, a subjective procedural right which doubles the substantive subjective right (eg the right to reparation) and ensures the effectiveness of the latter but which is autonomous of it. This autonomy and this uniqueness in contrast with the variety of the sort of disputes (civil, criminal or administrative) makes the right of action a pillar of the "Procedural Law" on which a part of European and Constitutional Law are built. In fact, Constitutional Law in Europe is essentially constituted by procedural principles (rights of defense, impartiality, right of action), since the principle of non bis in idem is only an expression of the right of action. Non bis in idem is a prohibition of double judgment for the same fact which does not prohibit a double trigger of the action (and criminal, civil and administrative). This unified due process of Law has helped to diminish the once radical separation between criminal law, administrative law and even civil law, which are clearly separated from one another in the traditional construction of legal systems and which converge today in the Regulatory and Compliance Law.

Moreover, the subjective right of action is a human right and one of the most important. Indeed, it is "the right to the judge" because by its exercise the person obliges a judge to answer him, that is to say to listen to his claim (the contradictory resulting therefore from the exercise of the right of action ).


Thus the right of action appears to be the property of the person, of the litigant, of the "party". This is why the attribution by the law of the power for the Regulators to seize itself, which is understood by reason of the efficiency of the process, poses difficulty from the moment that this constitutes the regulatory body in "judge and party", since the Regulator is in criminal matters regarded as a court, and that the cumulation of the qualification of court and of the quality of party is a consubstantial infringement of the principle of impartiality. In the same way, the obligation that Compliance Law creates for operators to judge themselves obliges them to a similar duplication which poses many procedural difficulties, notably in internal investigations.

There is a classical distinction between public action, which is carried out by the public prosecutor, by which the public prosecutor calls for protection of the general interest and private action by a person or an enterprise, which seeks to satisfy its legitimate private interest. The existence of this legitimate interest is sufficient for the person to exercise his or her procedural right of action.

In the first place, the person could not claim the general interest because he or she was not an agent of the State and organizations such as associations or other non-governmental organizations pursued a collective interest, which could not be confused with the general interest. This procedural principle according to which "no one pleads by prosecutor" is today outdated. Indeed, and for the sake of efficiency, Law admits that persons act in order that the rule of law may apply to subjects who, without such action, would not be accountable. By this procedural use of the theory of incentives, because the one who acts is rewarded while and because he or she serves the general interest, concretizing the rule of law and contributing to produce a disciplinary effect on a sector and powerful operators, procedural law is transformed by the economic analysis of the law. The US mechanism of the class action was imported into France by a recent law of 2014 on "group action" (rather restrictive) but this "collective action" , on the Canadian model, continues not to be accepted in the European Union , Even if the European Commission is working to promote the mechanisms of private enforcement, participating in the same idea.

Secondly, it may happen that the law requires the person not only must have a "legitimate interest in acting" but also must have a special quality to act. This is particularly true of the various corporate officers within the operators. For the sake of efficiency, the legal system tends to distribute new "qualities to act" even though there is not necessarily an interest, for example in the new system of whistleblowers, which can act even there is no apparent interest.

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Complete reference : Archives de Philosophie du Droit (APD), Le procès, tome 39, ed. Sirey, 1995, 545 p. 

 

Read the forth of cover.

Read the table of contents.

Read the summaries of the articles in English. 

 

See the presentation of other volumes of Archives de Philosophie du Droit.

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

The procedural guarantees enjoyed by a person whose situation may be affected by a forthcoming judgment are mainly the right of action, the rights of defense and the benefit of the adversarial principle.

The rights of the defense have constitutional value and constitute human rights, benefiting everyone, including legal persons. The mission of positive Law is to give effect to them in good time, that is to say from the moment of the investigation or custody, which is manifested for example by the right to the assistance of a lawyer or the right to remain silent or the right to lie. Thus the rights of the defense are not intended to help the manifestation of the truth, do not help the judge or the effectiveness of repression - which is what the principle of adversarial law does - they are pure rights, subjective for the benefit of people, including even especially people who may be perfectly guilty, and seriously guilty.

The rights of the defense are therefore an anthology of prerogatives which are offered to the person implicated or likely to be or likely to be affected. It does not matter if it possibly affects the efficiency. These are human rights. This is why their most natural holder is the person prosecuted in criminal proceedings or facing a system of repression. This is why the triggering of the power of a tribunal or a judge offers them in a consubstantial way to the one who is by this sole fact - and legitimately - threatened by this legitimate violence (one of the definitions of the State ).

The rights of the defense therefore begin even before the trial because the "useful time" begins from the investigation phase, from the searches, even from the controls, and continues on the occasion of appeals against the decision adversely affecting the decision. The legal action being a means of being a party, that is to say of making arguments in its favor, and therefore of defending its case, shows that the plaintiff in the proceedings also holds legal defense rights since he is not only plaintiff in the proceedings but he also plaintiff and defendant to the allegations which are exchanged during the procedure: he alleged to the allegation of his opponent is not correct.

They take many forms and do not need to be expressly provided for in texts, since they are principled and constitutionally benefit from a broad interpretation (ad favorem interpretation). This is the right to be a party (for example the right of intervention, the right of action - which some distinguish from the rights of the defense - the right to be questioned, such as the right to be brought into question (or examination), right to be assisted by a lawyer, right to remain silent, right not to incriminate oneself, right of access to the file, right to intervene in the debate (the rights of the defense thus crossing the adversarial principle), right to appeal, etc.

It is essential to qualify an organ as a tribunal because this triggers for the benefit of the person concerned the procedural guarantees, including the rights of the defense, which on the basis of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights man was made about the Regulators yet formally organized in Independent Administrative Authorities (AAI). This contributed to the general movement of jurisdictionalization of Regulation.

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

The procedural guarantees from which the person benefits are mainly the right of action, the rights of defense and the benefit of the adversarial principle.

While the rights of the defense are subjective rights which are advantages given to the person at risk of having his situation affected by the decision that the body which is formally or functionally legally qualified as a "tribunal", may take, the adversarial principle is rather a principle of organization of the procedure, from which the person can benefit.

This principle, as the term indicates, is - as are the rights of the defense - of such a nature as to generate all the technical mechanisms which serve it, including in the silence of the texts, imply a broad interpretation of these.

The adversarial principle implies that the debate between all the arguments, in particular all the possible interpretations, is possible. It is exceptionally and justified, for example because of urgency or a justified requirement of secrecy (professional secrecy, secrecy of private life, industrial secrecy, defense secrecy, etc.) that the adversarial mechanism is ruled out. , sometimes only for a time (technique of deferred litigation by the admission of the procedure on request).

This participation in the debate must be fully possible for the debater, in particular access to the file, knowledge of the existence of the instance, the intelligibility of the terms of the debate, not only the facts, but also the language (translator, lawyer , intelligibility of the subject), but still discussion on the applicable legal rules). So when the court automatically comes under the rules of Law, it must submit them to adversarial debate before possibly applying them.

The application of the adversarial principle often crosses the rights of the defense, but in that it is linked to the notion of debate, it develops all the more as the procedure is of the adversarial type.

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

The Independent Administrative Authority (IAA) is the legal form that the legislator has most often chosen to build regulatory authorities. The IAA is only its legal form, but French law has attached great importance to it, following the often formalistic tradition of public law. They are thus independent administrative authorities, especially in the legal systems of continental law like France, Germany or Italy.

The essential element is in the last adjective: the "independent" character of the organism. This means that this organ, which is only administrative so has a vocation to be placed in the executive hierarchy, does not obey the Government. In this, regulators have often been presented as free electrons, which posed the problem of their legitimacy, since they could no longer draw upstream in the legitimacy of the Government. This independence also poses the difficulty of their responsibility, the responsibility of the State for their actions, and the accountability of their use of their powers. Moreover, the independence of regulators is sometimes questioned if it is the government that retains the power to appoint the leaders of the regulatory authority. Finally, the budgetary autonomy of the regulator is crucial to ensure its independence, although the authorities having the privilege of benefiting from a budget - which is not included in the LOLF - are very few in number. They are no longer referred to as "independent administrative authorities" but as "Independent Public Authorities", the legislator making a distinction between the two (French Law of 20 January 2017).

The second point concerns the second adjective: that it is an "administrative" body. This corresponds to the traditional idea that regulation is the mechanism by which the State intervenes in the economy, in the image of a kind of deconcentration of ministries, in the Scandinavian model of the agency. If we allow ourselves to be enclosed in this vocabulary, we conclude that this administrative body makes an administrative decision which is the subject of an appeal before a judge. Thus, in the first place, this would be a first instance appeal and not a judgment since the administrative authority is not a court. Secondly, the natural judge of the appeal should be the administrative judge since it is an administrative decision issued by an administrative authority. But in France the Ordinance of 1 December 1986 sur la concurrence et la libéralisation des prix (on competition and price liberalization), because it intended precisely to break the idea of ​​an administered economy in order to impose price freedom on the idea of ​​economic liberalism, required that attacks against the decisions of economic regulators taking the form of IAA are brought before the Court of Appeal of Paris, judicial jurisdiction. Some great authors were even able to conclude that the Paris Court of Appeal had become an administrative court. But today the procedural system has become extremely complex, because according to the IAA and according to the different kinds of decisions adopted, they are subject to an appeal either to the Court of Appeal of Paris or to the Conseil d'État (Council of State) . If one observes the successive laws that modify the system, one finds that after this great position of principle of 1986, the administrative judge gradually takes again its place in the system, in particular in the financial regulation. Is it logical to conclude that we are returning to a spirit of regulation defined as an administrative police and an economy administered by the State?

Finally, the third term is the name itself: "authority". It means in the first place an entity whose power holds before in its "authority". But it marks that it is not a jurisdiction, that it takes unilateral decisions. It was without counting the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the judicial judge! Indeed, Article 6§1 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that everyone has the right to an impartial tribunal in civil and criminal matters. The notion of "criminal matter" does not coincide with the formal traditional concept of criminal law but refers to the broad and concrete factual concept of repression. Thus, by a reasoning which goes backwards, an organization, whatever the qualification that a State has formally conferred on it, which has an activity of repression, acts "in criminal matters". From this alone, in the European sense, it is a "tribunal". This automatically triggers a series of fundamental procedural guarantees for the benefit of the person who is likely to be the subject of a decision on his part. In France, a series of jurisprudence, both of the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation), the Conseil d'État (Council of State) or the Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) has confirmed this juridictionnalization of the AAI.

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

Paradoxically, the notion of conflict of interest seems to be at the center of Economic Law only recently in Economic Law, in both Corporate and Public Law. This is due to the philosophy which animates these two branches of Law, very different for each, and which has changed in each.

In fact, and in the first place in Public Law, in the Continental legal systems and especially in French legal tradition, on the side of the State, the one who serves it, by a sort of natural effect,, makes the general interest incarnated by the State pass before its personal interest. There is an opposition of interests, namely the personal interest of this public official who would like to work less and earn more, and the common interest of the population, who would like to pay less taxes and for example benefit trains that always arrive on time and the general interest which would be for example the construction of a European rail network.

But this conflict would be resolved "naturally" because the public official, having "a sense of the general interest" and being animated by the "sense of public service", sacrifices himself to serve the general interes. He stays late at his office and gets the trains on time. This theory of public service was the inheritance of royalty, a system in which the King is at the service of the People, like the aristocracy is in the "service of the King." There could therefore be no conflict of interest, neither in the administration nor in the public enterprises, nor to observe, manage or dissolve. The question does not arise ...

Let us now take the side of the companies, seen by the Company Law. In the classical conception of corporate governance, corporate officers are necessarily shareholders of the company and the profits are mandatorily distributed among all partners: the partnership agreement is a "contract of common interest". Thus, the corporate officer works in the knowledge that the fruits of his efforts will come back to him through the profits he will receive as a partner. Whatever its egoism - and even the agent must be, this mechanism produces the satisfaction of all the other partners who mechanically will also receive the profits. Selfishness is indeed the motor of the system, as in the classical theory of Market and Competition. Thus, in the corporate mechanism, there is never a conflict of interest since the corporate officer is obligatorily associated: he will always work in the interest of the partners since in this he works for himself. As Company Law posits that the loss of the company will also be incurred and suffered by all partners, he will also avoid this prospect. Again, there is no need for any control. The question of a conflict of interest between the mandatary and those who conferred this function does not structurally arise...

These two representations both proved inaccurate. They were based on quite different philosophies - the public official being supposed to have exceeded his own interest, the corporate officer being supposed to serve the common interest or the social interest by concern for his own interest - but this was by  a unique reasoning that these two representations were defeated.

Let us take the first on Public Law: the "sense of the State" is not so common in the administration and the public enterprises, that the people who work there sacrifice themselves for the social group. They are human beings like the others. Researchers in economics and finance, through this elementary reflection of suspicion, have shattered these political and legal representations. In particular, it has been observed that the institutional lifestyle of public enterprises, very close to the government and their leaders, is often not very justified, whereas it is paid by the taxpayer, that is, by the social group which they claimed to serve. Europe, by affirming in the Treaty of Rome the principle of "neutrality of the capital of enterprises", that is to say, indifference to the fact that the enterprise has as its shareholder a private person or a public person, validated this absence of exceeding of his particular interest by the servant of the State, become simple economic agent. This made it possible to reach the conclusion made for Company Law.

Disillusionment was of the same magnitude. It has been observed that the corporate officer, ordinary human being, is not devoted to the company and does not have the only benefit of the profits he will later receive as a partner. He sometimes gets very little, so he can receive very many advantages (financial, pecuniary or in kind, direct or indirect). The other shareholders see their profits decrease accordingly. They are thus in a conflict of interest. Moreover, the corporate officer was elected by the shareholders' meeting, that is to say, in practice, the majority shareholder or the "controlling" shareholder (controlling shareholder) and not by all. He may not even be associated (but a "senior officer").

The very fact that the situation is no longer qualified by lawyers, through the qualifications of classical Company Law, still borrowing from the Civil Contract Law, the qualifications coming more from financial theories, borrowing from the theory of the agency, adically changed the perspective. The assumptions have been reversed: by the same "nature effect", the conflict of interest has been disclosed as structurally existing between the manager and the minority shareholder. Since the minority shareholder does not have the de facto power to dismiss the corporate officer since he does not have the majority of the voting rights, the question does not even arise whether the manager has or has not a corporate status: the minority shareholder has only the power to sell his securities, if the management of the manager is unfavorable (right of exit) or the power to say, protest and make known. This presupposes that he is informed, which will put at the center of a new Company Law information, even transparency.

Thus, this conflict of interests finds a solution in the actual transfer of securities, beyond the legal principle of negotiability. For this reason, if the company is listed, the conflict of interest is translated dialectically into a relationship between the corporate officer and the financial market which, by its liquidity, allows the agent to be sanctioned, and also provides information, Financial market and the minority shareholder becoming identical. The manager could certainly have a "sense of social interest", a sort of equivalent of the state's sense for a civil servant, if he had an ethics, which would feed a self-regulation. Few people believe in the reality of this hypothesis. By pragmatism, it is more readily accepted that the manager will prefer his interest to that of the minority shareholder. Indeed, he can serve his personal interest rather than the interest for which a power has been given to him through the informational rent he has, and the asymmetry of information he enjoys. All the regulation will intervene to reduce this asymmetry of information and to equip the minority shareholder thanks to the regulator who defends the interests of the market against the corporate officers, if necessary through the criminal law. But the belief in managerial volunteerism has recently taken on a new dimension with corporate social responsability, the social responsibility of the company where managers express their concern for others.

The identification of conflicts of interests, their prevention and their management are transforming Financial Regulatory Law and then the Common Law of Regulation, because today it is no longer believed a priori that people exceed their personal interest to serve the interest of others. It is perhaps to regain trust and even sympathy that companies have invested in social responsibility. The latter is elaborated by rules which are at first very flexible but which can also express a concern for the general interest. In this, it can meet Compliance Law and express on behalf of the companies a concern for the general interest, if the companies provide proof of this concern.

To take an example of a conflict of interest that resulted in substantial legal changes, the potentially dangerous situation of credit rating agencies has been pointed out when they are both paid by banks, advising them and designing products, While being the source of the ratings, the main indices from which the investments are made. Banks being the first financial intermediaries, these conflicts of interest are therefore systematically dangerous. That is why in Europe ESMA exercises control over these rating agencies.

The identification of conflicts of interest, which most often involves changing the way we look at a situation - which seemed normal until the point of view changes - the moral and legal perspective being different, Trust one has in this person or another one modifying this look, is today what moves the most in Regulation Law.
This is true of Public and Corporate Law, which are extended by the Regulation Law, here itself transformed by Compliance Law, notably by the launchers of alerts. But this is also true that all political institutions and elected officials.

For a rule emerges: the more central the notion of conflict of interest becomes, the more it must be realized that Trust is no longer given a priori, either to a person, to a function, to a mechanism, to a system. Trust is no longer given only a posteriori in procedures that burden the action, where one must give to see continuously that one has deserved this trust.

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Lebovici, S., C'est pas juste, in Baranès, W. et Frison-Roche, M.-A., La justice. L'obligation impossible, coll. " Nos valeurs", Éditions Autrement, 1994, p. 16-27.

 

Consulter la présentation générale de l'ouvrage.

Consulter une analyse dans laquelle cet article est cité.

 

« Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent lire l’article via le Drive de Sciences po en allant dans le dossier « MAFR – Régulation ».

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

Legally, the State is a public law subject defined by territory, people and institutions. It acts in the international space and emits norms. Politically, it has the legitimacy required to express the will of the social body and to exercise the violence of which it deprives the other subjects of law. It is often recognizable by its power: its use of public force, its budgetary power, its jurisdictional power. These three powers, declining or being challenged by private, international and more satisfying mechanisms, some predicted the disappearance of the State, to deplore it or to dance on its corpse.

With such a background, in current theories of Regulation, primarily constructed by economic thought and at first sight one might say that the State is above all the enemy. And this for two main reasons. The first is theoretical and of a negative nature. The advocates of the theory of regulation deny the State the political qualities set out above. The State would not be a "person" but rather a group of individuals, civil servants, elected officials and other concrete human beings, expressing nothing but their particular interests, coming into conflict with other interests, and using their powers to serve the former rather than the latter as everyone else. The Regulation theory, adjoining the theory of the agency, is then aimed at controlling public agents and elected representatives in whom there is no reason to trust a priori.

The second reason is practical and positive. The State would not be a "person" but an organization. Here we find the same perspective as for the concept of enterprise, which classical lawyers conceive as a person or a group of people, while economists who conceive of the world through the market represent it as an organization. The state as an organization should be "efficient" or even "optimal". It is then the pragmatic function of the Regulation Law. When it is governed by traditional law, entangled by that it would be an almost religious illusions of the general interest, or even the social contract, it is suboptimal. The Regulation purpose is about making it more effective.

To this end, as an organization, the State is divided into independent regulatory agencies or independent administrative authorities that manage the subjects as close as possible, which is fortunate in reducing the asymmetry of information and in reviving trust in a direct link. The unitary, distant and arrogant State is abandoned for a flexible and pragmatic conception of a strategic state (without capital ...) that would finally have understood that it is an organization like any other ...

Competition law adopts this conception of the State, which it posed from the beginning that it was an economic operator like any other. This is how this conception which would be  more "neutral" of the world is often presented.

Successive crises, whether sanitary or financial, have produced a pendulum effect.

Now, the notions of general interest or common goods are credited of an autonomous value, and the necessity of surpassing immediate interests and of finding persons to bear superior interests or to take charge of the interests of others, even a non-immediate one, emerged.

Thus, the State or the public authority, reappears in the globalization. The Compliance Law or the Corporal Social Responsibility of the crucial companies are converging towards a consideration of the State, which can not be reduced to a pure and simple organization receptacle of externalities.

 

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

Impartiality is the quality, maybe the virtue, that is demanded of the judge, not only the one who is called like that but also the one who has the function to judge the others (maybe without this name).

It can not be defined as the absolute positive aptitude, namely the total absence of prejudice, the heroic aptitude for a person to totally ignore his or her personal opinions and personal history. This heroic virtue is nonsense because not only is it inaccurate, impossible but it is also not desirable because a person is not a machine. It must not be so because good justice is human justice. In this respect, impartiality refers to a philosophical conception of what is justice and what is Regulation, not machines, but systems that must keep the human person in their center (Sunstein).

Thus Impartiality is articulated with the subjective nature of the assessment not only inevitable but also desirable that the judge makes of situations. Because Law is reasonable, Impartiality is defined only negatively: the absence of bias.

Impartiality is defined first and foremost as a subjective and individual quality, namely, the prohibition on the person who makes a decision affecting the situation of others (as is the case of a judge) to a a personal interest in this situation. The constitutional prohibition of being "judge and party" is thus the expression of the principle of impartiality. This definition is in line with the otherwise general requirement of no conflict of interests.

Impartiality is defined secondly as an objective and individual quality, namely the prohibition for a person who has already known of the case to know again (because he or she has already had an opinion about it, this having constituted an objective pre-judgment).

Impartiality is defined thirdly as an objective and structural quality, which obliges the organ which takes judgments to "give to see" a structure that makes it fit for this impartiality, objective impartiality that third parties can see and which generates confidence in its ability to judge without bias. This theory of English origin has been taken up by European law in the interpretation given to the European Convention on Human Rights. The expression "apparent impartiality" has sometimes given rise to misunderstandings. Indeed, far from being less demanding (in that it is "only" to be satisfied with an appearance of impartiality and not of a true impartiality), it is rather a matter of demanding more, not only of a true impartiality, but also of an impartiality which can be seen by all. This leads in particular to the obligation of transparency, to which the institutions, notably the State, were not necessarily bound by the law.

For a long time the Regulator, in that it took the form of an Administrative Authority, was not considered a jurisdiction, it was long considered that it was not directly subject to this requirement. It is clear from the case law that the national courts now consider that the regulatory authorities are courts "in the European sense", which implies a fundamental procedural guarantee for the operators concerned

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Consulter la lettre.

Sur l'affaire Sirven.

Sur la présentation de l'ouvrage, compilant les différentes correspondances adressées par Voltaire et son Avis au public sur les parricides.

J’ai dévoré, mon cher ami, le nouveau mémoire de M. de Beaumont sur l’innocence des Calas ; je l’ai admiré, j’ai répandu des larmes, mais il ne m’a rien appris ; il y a longtemps que j’étais convaincu ; et j’avais eu le bonheur de fournir les premières preuves.

Vous voulez savoir comment cette réclamation de toute l’Europe contre le meurtre juridique du malheureux Calas, roué à Toulouse, a pu venir d’un petit coin de terre ignoré, entre les Alpes et le Mont-Jura, à cent lieues du théâtre où se passa cette scène épouvantable.

Rien ne fera peut-être mieux voir la chaîne insensible qui lie tous les évènements de ce malheureux monde.

Sur la fin de mars 1762, un voyageur qui avait passé par le Languedoc, et qui vint dans ma retraite à deux lieues de Genève, m’apprit le supplice de Calas, et m’assura qu’il était innocent. Je lui répondis que son crime n’était pas vraisemblable, mais qu’il était moins vraisemblable encore que des juges eussent, sans aucun intérêt, fait périr un innocent par le supplice de la roue.

J’appris le lendemain qu’un des enfants de ce malheureux père s’était réfugié en Suisse, assez près de ma chaumière. Sa fuite me fit présumer que la famille était coupable. Cependant je fis réflexion que le père avait été condamné au supplice comme ayant seul assassiné son fils pour la religion, et que ce père était mort âgé de soixante-neuf ans. Je ne me souviens pas d’avoir jamais lu qu’aucun vieillard eût été possédé d’un si horrible fanatisme. J’avais toujours remarqué que cette rage n’attaquait d’ordinaire que la jeunesse, dont l’imagination ardente, tumultueuse, et faible s’enflamme par la superstition. Les fanatiques des Cévennes étaient des fous de vingt à trente ans, stylés à prophétiser dès l’enfance. Presque tous les convulsionnaires que j’avais vu à Paris en très grand nombre étaient de petites filles et de jeunes garçons. Les vieillards chez les moines sont moins emportés, et moins susceptibles des fureurs du zèle, que ceux qui sortent du noviciat. Les fameux assassins, armés par le fanatisme, ont tous été de jeunes gens, de même que tous ceux qui ont prétendu être possédés ; jamais on n’a vu exorciser un vieillard. Cette idée me fit douter d’un crime qui d’ailleurs n’est guère dans la nature. J’en ignorais les circonstances.

Je fis venir le jeune Calas chez moi. Je m’attendais à voir un énergumène tel que son pays en a produit quelquefois. Je vis un enfant simple, ingénu, de la physionomie la plus douce et la plus intéressante, et qui, en me parlant, faisait des efforts inutiles pour retenir ses larmes. Il me dit qu’il était à Nîmes en apprentissage chez un fabricant, lorsque la voix publique lui avait appris qu’on allait condamner dans Toulouse toute sa famille au supplice, que presque tout le Languedoc la croyait coupable, et que, pour se dérober à des opprobres si affreux, il était venu se cacher en Suisse.

Je lui demandai si son père et sa mère étaient d’un caractère violent : il me dit qu’ils n’avaient jamais battu un seul de leurs enfants, et qu’il n’y avait point de parents plus indulgents et plus tendres.

J’avoue qu’il ne m’en fallut pas davantage pour présumer fortement l’innocence de la famille. Je pris de nouvelles informations de deux négociants de Genève, d’une probité reconnue, qui avaient logé à Toulouse chez Calas. Ils me confirmèrent dans mon opinion. Loin de croire la famille Calas fanatique et parricide, je crus voir que c’étaient des fanatiques qui l’avaient accusée et perdue. Je savais depuis longtemps de quoi l’esprit de parti et la calomnie sont capables.

Mais quel fut mon étonnement lorsque, ayant écrit en Languedoc sur cette étrange aventure, catholiques et protestants me répondirent qu’il ne fallait pas douter du crime des Calas ! Je ne me rebutai point. Je pris la liberté d’écrire à ceux mêmes qui avaient gouverné la province, à des commandants de provinces voisines, à des ministres d’État ; tous me conseillèrent unanimement de ne me point mêler d’une si mauvaise affaire ; tout le monde me condamna, et je persistai : voici le parti que je pris.

La veuve de Calas, à qui, pour comble de malheur et d’outrage, on avait enlevé ses filles, était retirée dans une solitude où elle se nourrissait de ses larmes, et où elle attendait la mort. Je ne m’informai point si elle était attachée ou non à la religion protestante, mais seulement si elle croyait un Dieu rémunérateur de la vertu et vengeur des crimes. Je lui fis demander si elle signerait au nom de ce Dieu que son mari était mort innocent ; elle n’hésita pas. Je n’hésitai pas non plus. Je priai M. Mariette de prendre au conseil du roi sa défense. Il fallait tirer madame Calas de sa retraite, et lui faire entreprendre le voyage de Paris.

On vit alors que s’il y a de grands crimes sur la terre, il y a autant de vertus ; et que si la superstition produit d’horribles malheurs, la philosophie les répare.

Une dame dont la générosité égale la haute naissance, qui était alors à Genève pour faire inoculer ses filles, fut la première qui secourut cette famille infortunée. Des Français retirés en ce pays la secondèrent ; des Anglais qui voyageaient se signalèrent ; et, comme dit M. de Beaumont, il y eut un combat de générosité entre ces deux nations, à qui secourrait le mieux la vertu si cruellement opprimée.

Le reste, qui le sait mieux que vous ? Qui a servi l’innocence avec un zèle plus constant et plus intrépide ? Combien n’avez-vous pas encouragé la voix des orateurs, qui a été entendue de toute la France et de l’Europe attentive ? Nous avons vu renouveler les temps où Cicéron justifiait, devant une assemblée de législateurs, Amerinus accusé de parricide. Quelques personnes, qu’on appelle dévotes, se sont élevées contre les Calas ; mais, pour la première fois depuis l’établissement du fanatisme, la voix des sages les a fait taire.

La raison remporte donc de grandes victoires parmi nous ! Mais croiriez-vous, mon cher ami que la famille des Calas, si bien secourue, si bien vengée, n’était pas la seule alors que la religion accusât d’un parricide, n’était pas la seule immolée aux fureurs du préjugé ? Il y en a une plus malheureuse encore, parce qu’éprouvant les mêmes horreurs, elle n’a pas eu les mêmes consolations ; elle n’a point trouvé des Mariette, des Beaumont, et des Loiseau.

Il semble qu’il y ait dans le Languedoc une furie infernale amenée autrefois par les inquisiteurs à la suite de Simon de Montfort, et que depuis ce temps elle secoue quelquefois son flambeau.

Un feudiste de Castres, nommé Sirven, avait trois filles. Comme la religion de cette famille est la prétendue réformée, on enlève, entre les bras de sa femme, la plus jeune de leurs filles. On la met dans un couvent, on la fouette pour lui mieux apprendre son catéchisme ; elle devient folle, elle va se jeter dans un puits, à une lieue de la maison de son père. Aussitôt les zélés ne doutent pas que le père, la mère et les sœurs n’aient noyé cette enfant. Il passait pour constant, chez les catholiques de la province, qu’un des points capitaux de la religion protestante est que les pères et mères sont tenus de pendre, d’égorger ou de noyer tous leurs enfants qu’ils soupçonneront avoir quelque penchant pour la religion romaine. C’était précisément le temps où les Calas étaient aux fers, et où l’on dressait leur échafaud.

L’aventure de la fille noyée parvient incontinent à Toulouse. Voilà un nouvel exemple, s’écrie-t-on, d’un père et d’une mère parricides. La fureur publique s’en augmente ; on roue Calas, et on décrète Sirven, sa femme et ses filles. Sirven épouvanté n’a que le temps de fuir avec toute sa famille malade. Ils marchent à pied, dénués de tout secours, à travers des montagnes escarpées, alors couvertes de neige. Une de ses filles accouche parmi les glaçons ; et, mourante, elle emporte son enfant mourant dans ses bras : ils prennent enfin leur chemin vers la Suisse.

Le même hasard qui m’amena les enfants de Calas veut encore que les Sirven s’adressent à moi. Figurez-vous, mon ami, quatre moutons que des bouchers accusent d’avoir mangé un agneau ; voilà ce que je vis. Il m’est impossible de vous peindre tant d’innocence et tant de malheurs. Que devais-je faire, et qu’eussiez-vous fait à ma place ? Faut-il s’en tenir à gémir sur la nature humaine ? Je prends la liberté d’écrire à monsieur le premier président de Languedoc, homme vertueux et sage ; mais il n’était point à Toulouse. Je fais présenter par un de vos amis un placet à monsieur le vice-chancelier. Pendant ce temps-là, on exécute vers Castres, en effigie, le père, la mère, les deux filles ; leur bien est confisqué, dévasté, il n’en reste plus rien.

Voilà toute une famille honnête, innocente, vertueuse, livrée à l’opprobre et à la mendicité chez les étrangers : ils trouvent de la pitié, sans doute ; mais qu’il est dur d’être jusqu’au tombeau un objet de pitié ! On me répond enfin qu’on pourra leur obtenir des lettres de grâce. Je crus d’abord que c’était de leurs juges qu’on me parlait, et que ces lettres étaient pour eux. Vous croyez bien que la famille aimerait mieux mendier son pain de porte en porte, et expirer de misère, que de demander une grâce qui supposerait un crime trop horrible pour être graciable ; mais aussi comment obtenir justice ? Comment s’aller remettre en prison dans sa patrie où la moitié du peuple dit encore que le meurtre de Calas était juste ? Ira-t-on une seconde fois demander une évocation au conseil ? Tentera-t-on d’émouvoir la pitié publique, que l’infortune des Calas a peut-être épuisée, et qui se lassera d’avoir des accusations de parricide à réfuter, des condamnés à réhabiliter, et à des juges à confondre ?

Ces deux évènements tragiques, arrivés coup sur coup, ne sont-ils pas, mon ami, des preuves de cette fatalité inévitable à laquelle notre misérable espèce est soumise ? Vérité terrible, tant enseignée dans Homère et dans Sophocle ; mais vérité utile, puisqu’elle nous apprend à nous résigner et à savoir souffrir.

Vous dirai-je que, tandis que le désastre étonnant des Calas et des Sirven affligeait ma sensibilité, un homme, dont vous devinerez l’état à ses discours, me reprocha l’intérêt que je prenais à deux familles qui m’étaient étrangères ? De quoi vous mêlez-vous ? me dit-il ; laissez les morts ensevelir leurs morts. Je lui répondis : J’ai trouvé dans mes déserts l’Israélite baigné dans son sang, souffrez que je répande un peu d’huile et de vin sur ses blessures : vous êtes lévite, laissez-moi être Samaritain.

Il est vrai que pour prix de mes peines on m’a bien traité en Samaritain ; on a fait un libelle diffamatoire sous le nom d’Instruction pastorale et de Mandement ; mais il faut l’oublier, c’est un jésuite qui l’a composé. Le malheureux ne savait pas alors que je donnais un asile à un jésuite. Pouvais-je mieux prouver que nous devons regarder nos ennemis comme nos frères.

Vos passions sont l’amour de la vérité, l’humanité, la haine de la calomnie. La conformité de nos caractères a produit notre amitié. J’ai passé ma vie à chercher, à publier cette vérité que j’aime. Quel autre des historiens modernes a défendu la mémoire d’un grand prince contre les impostures atroces de je ne sais quel écrivain qu’on peut appeler le calomniateur des rois, des ministres, et des grands capitaines, et qui cependant aujourd’hui ne peut trouver un lecteur ?

Je n’ai donc fait, dans les horribles désastres des Calas et des Sirven, que ce que font tous les hommes ; j’ai suivi mon penchant. Celui d’un philosophe n’est pas de plaindre les malheureux, c’est de les servir.

Je sais avec quelle fureur le fanatisme s’élève contre la philosophie. Elle a deux filles qu’il voudrait faire périr comme Calas, ce sont la Vérité et la Tolérance ; tandis que la philosophie ne veut que désarmer les enfants du fanatisme, le Mensonge et la Persécution.

Des gens qui ne raisonnent pas ont voulu décréditer ceux qui raisonnent : ils ont confondu le philosophe avec le sophiste ; ils se sont bien trompés. Le vrai philosophe peut quelquefois s’irriter contre la calomnie, qui le poursuit lui-même ; il peut couvrir d’un éternel mépris le vil mercenaire qui outrage deux fois par mois la raison, le bon goût, et la vertu : il peut même livrer, en passant, au ridicule ceux qui insultent à la littérature dans le sanctuaire où ils auraient dû l’honorer : mais il ne connaît ni les cabales, ni les sourdes pratiques, ni la vengeance. Il sait, comme le sage de Montbar, comme celui de Vore rendre la terre plus fertile, et ses habitants plus heureux. Le vrai philosophe défriche les champs incultes, augmente le nombre des charrues, et par conséquent des habitants ; occupe le pauvre et l’enrichit ; encourage les mariages, établit l’orphelin ; ne murmure point contre des impôts nécessaires, et met le cultivateur en état de les payer avec allégresse. Il n’attend rien des hommes, et il leur fait tout le bien dont il est capable. Il a l’hypocrite en horreur, mais il plaint le superstitieux ; enfin il sait être ami.

Je m’aperçois que je fais votre portrait, et qu’il n’y manquerait rien si vous étiez assez heureux pour habiter la campagne.

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

The distinction between "Public Law" and "Private Law" is important. In the systems of Continental Law, or still called under Roman-Germanic Law, or even called Civil Law systems, it is even around it that legal systems are built: it can be a basic distinction, a summa divisio, as it it in the Civil Law systems. In the so-called Common Law or Anglo-American systems, the distinction is less fundamental, but it remains, justifying in particular that the rules and disputes concerning the administration call for special rules and are apprehended by special tribunals.

In principle, this distinction is based on the nature of the persons whose legal situation is examined. Under"Public Law" a legal situation involving a person who is itself a public-law entity: the State, a local authority, a public undertaking, etc. That is why, for example, the contract which may be concluded will be of public law, and the judge who may be seized of it will be an administrative court. If the situation does not involve a person governed by public law, then it will be governed by "Private Law". There are a thousand exceptions, but this is the starting and basic and fondamental principle.

Two essential remarks, bearing a system of values, explaining that the systems of Civil Law and Common Law are in fact confronting each other.

The two bodies of rules and institutions are not of equal strength because one of the categories is "closed", corresponding to one criterion (the "public person"), while the other is open: Public Law is a closed category; on the contrary, Private law becomes "active" as soon as there is no public person (a "private person" who or which must define himself or itself as a "non-public person").

One can consider this articulation between Public Law and Private Law in two ways, radically opposed. It may express a mark of inferiority in disfavour of private law: we are all "ordinary" persons in "ordinary" situations with "ordinary" activities (this will be the French conception ....). On the contrary, Public Law is the mark of the State, of Public Order, of Sovereignty, of public power, of the general will, in the interstices of which individuals slip in to act and satisfy their small particular interests

On the contrary, Private Law can be considered as the expression of the "common law": people are free and do what they want, through ownership and contract. As an exception and because they have elected people to do so, the rulers (whom they control), by exception, enact norms that constrain them. But this is an exception, since repression - public law and criminal law, which has the same status in this respect - is only a tribute to the freedom of persons, since this freedom remains wholly in the form of the private enterprise on the market.

It is then measured that the articulation between Public and Private Law profoundly reflects a philosophy and a political position. If it is considered that Regulation is the underlying order by which the Sovereign allows the deployment of his subjects who also benefit from a long-term policy constructed by the autonomous and measured political will, then Public Law in Is the master, the Regulation Law expressing a renewed search for efficiency, this but only this. If we believe that Regulation is whereby economic rationality manages to protect persons and companies from risks and to compensate for market failures, a market whose liberal principle remains the ideal, then Private Law is the core, whith contract and private property as basis tools.

France and the Latin countries adhere rather to this metaphysics of values which entrusts to the Public Authorities and the State the legitimacy and the power to express the general interest by Public Law, Regulators and Constitutional Courts, expressing it on a technical form renewed by the Regulatory tools: incitations, soft law, etc. The legal systems whose history draws on British history put more trust in the person of the entrepreneur and conceive of Regulation Law as an efficient outsourcing of functions to administrations that are efficient, informed and impartial.

Certainly, in the technical daily of the Law of Regulation and following the different sectors, Public and Private Law mix up:  public companies take the form of publicly traded companies under private law or private companies will be entrusted with missions of public service, instituting them as second-level regulators as are the infrastructure network operators.

But the fundamental conception of systems (rooted in the history of the people) and practice marry. In the silence of regulations (and the more they are gossiping and the more the judge must interpret them, which amounts to a "silence"), what sense to give to the system?

To take only a few questions, frequent in practice:

  •      What judge to seize? The administrative judge or the civil judge? What is the "natural judge" of the Regulatory Law?
  •      What standard to apply? The contractual will? The implicit will of the legislator? What is the "natural author" of the Law of Regulation?
  •      Does the silence of the text prohibit action for operators or on the contrary does silence mean their freedom to act?

The absence of a firm and shared definition of what is the Law of Regulation does not facilitate practice. Hesitations in translations from one language to another increase confusion.

For the time being, there is a tendency to refer to Public Law in the sectors where whe take precedence over public operators' monopolies, such as telecommunications, energy, railways, air and postal services, and to refer to Private Law in the sectors which have long been the subject of competition between operators, namely banking, finance and insurance.

It should be recognized that the criterion of distinction has little economic rationale. The notion of risk would be a clearer and more manageable criterion. But it would then lead to a greater challenge to the distinction between Public and Private Law. Because the Law of Regulation, impregnated with Economy and Economic Analysis of Law, has sometimes little basis of legal tradition, it put in question of this summa divisio. If this were to be the case, it would be the totality of the legal systems which would be upset, especially in its judicial organization, since the judicial civil and commercial system is so distinctly distinguished (that of "ordinary" persons, that of "common law ) and the administrative judge (the "natural judge" of the State). It is then realized that the Law of Regulation challenges the whole Law, especially in the Latin countries and the Civil Law systems.

Thesaurus : Films

Voir l'extrait du film dans lequel l'avocat plaide l'innocence de sa cliente.

Henri-Georges Cluzot est un cinéaste qui utilise ici Brigitte Bardot, au sommet de sa célébrité, à contre-emploi.

April 22, 2022

Editorial responsibilities : Direction of the serie Regulation & Compliance, JoRC and Bruylant

► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, series "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2022, to be published.

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📅  This book is based on the 2021 colloquia organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its Universities partners.

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► Read the presentation of the other books of this Collection:

📘  Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), Compliance Monumental Goals2022 ;

📘  Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), Compliance Tools, 2020.

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► Book Summary: There have always been Judges and Lawyers in Compliance Law, in particular because this branch of Law is an extension of Regulatory Law in which they have a core place. This results from the fact that the decisions taken in respect of Compliance are contestable in Court, including Arbitration, those issued by the Company, such as those of States or Authorities, the Judge in turn becoming what Compliance Law is effective.

The novelty lies more in the phenomenon of "jurisdictionalization", that is to say that the trial model penetrates all Compliance Law, and not only the Ex Post part that it includes. Moreover, it seems that this jurisdictionalisation influences the non-legal dimension of Compliance. This movement has effects that must be measured and causes that must be understood. Advantages and disadvantages that must be balanced. If only to form an opinion vis-à-vis Companies that have become Prosecutors and Judges of themselves and others ...: encourage this "Jurisdictionalisation of Compliance", fight it, perhaps influence it? In any case, understand it!

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► Read the first presentations of some articles of the book :

📝 Augagneur, L.-M., Reputational Treatment by and on the platforms 

📝 Bavitot, A., Shaping the company through negotiated Criminal Justice Agreements

📝 Coulon, J.-M., How a company works to make Compliance Law a reality: the example of the construction sector

📝Frison-Roche, M.-A., The Judge-Judged ; articulating words and things in the face of the impossible conflict of interests

📝 Granier, C., The Jurisprudence of the Firms established as prosecutors and Judges of themselves by Compliance Law

📝Kessedjian, C.,  Arbitration serving the fight against Human Rights violations by Businesses 

📝 Kleiman, E., The goals of compliance confronted to arbitration and its actors

📝 Lapp, Ch., How a Company works to make Compliance Law a reality: the statues of processes

📝 Siproudhis, J.-B., The transfer of responsibility from the regulator and the judge to the company: demonstration by the whistleblowing mechanism

📝Toe, S., L’application judiciaire des normes de la compliance en remède aux insuffisances des procédures collectives 

March 26, 2022

Publications

 Full Reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A.,The Judge-Judged ; articulating words and things in the face of the impossible conflict of interest", in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.),  Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, série "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, to be published. 

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 Article Summary (made par the Author : Since the topic of this article is part of a chapter devoted to the Company established as Prosecutor and Judge of itself by Compliance Law, chapter aiming to use the relevant qualifications, it is appropriate therefore to worry about the adjustment of words and things, of the way in which the relationship between ones and the others evolve, and of the more particular question of knowing if this evolution is radical or not when one speaks of "judge ".

because "judging" is a word that the Law has disputed with other disciplines, but that it has appropriated not so much to confer more powers on those who act in its name, for example that who supervise and punish, but on the contrary to impose limits, since to the one who judges it has put the chains of the procedure under foot, thus making bearable for the other the exercise of such a power. This is why those who want the power to judge would often want to not have the title, because having de jure the title of judge is being subject to the correlated regime, it is to be submitted to procedural correctness.

It is therefore to better limit that the Law sees who judges, for obliging this so-powerful character to the procedure. But the Law also has the power to appoint a judge and to fix the contours of all the characters in the trial. He usually does it with clarity, distinguishing the ones of the others, not confusing them. This art of distinction has constitutional value. Thus, not only the one who judges must be named "judge" but the procedural apparatus which goes with this character and which constitutes a way of doing things and fundamental rights, are not "granted" by kindness or in a second step: it is a block. If you didn't want to have to endure procedural rights, you didn't have to want to be a judge. Admittedly, one could conclude that the procedure would therefore have become "substantial"; by this elevation, it is rather a fashion of saying that the procedure would no longer be a "servant": it is a kind of declaration of love for the procedure, as long as one affirms that at the acts of judging , or investigating, or prosecuting, are "naturally" attached the procedural rights for the one who is likely to be the object of these powers.

Compliance Law, in search of allies to achieve the Monumental Goals for the aims of which it was instituted, will require, or even demand, private companies to go and seek themselves, in particular through investigations. internal or active vigilance on others, for finding facts likely to be reproached to them. Compliance Law will also require that they prosecute those who have committed these acts. Compliance La will again demand that they sanction the acts that people have committed in their name.

This is clearly understood from the point of view of Ex Ante efficiency. The confusion of roles is often very efficient since it is synonymous with the accumulation of powers. For example, it is more efficient that the one who pursues is also the one who instructs and judges, since he knows the case so well... Besides, it is more efficient that he also elaborates the rules, so he knows better than anyone the "spirit" of the texts. This was often emphasized in Regulatory Law. When everything is Information and risk management, that would be necessary ... But all this is not obvious.

For two reasons, one external and the other internal.

Externally, the first reason is that it is not appropriate to "name" a judge who is not. This would be too easy, because it would then be enough to designate anyone, or even to do it oneself to appropriate the regime that goes with it, in particular for obtain a so-called legitimate power for obtaining that others obey even though they are not subordinate or from them they transmit information, even though they would be  competitors: it would then be necessary to remember that only the Law is able to appoint judge ; in this new Compliance era, companies would be judges, prosecutors, investigators!  Maybe, if the Law says it, but if it didn't, it would be necessary to come back to this tautology ... But are we in such a radicalism? Moreover, do judges have "the prerogative" of judgment and the Law has not admitted this power for companies to judge for a long time? As soon as the procedure is there in Ex Ante and the control of the judge in Ex Post?

The second reason, internal to the company, situation on which the article focuses, is that the company investigates itself, judges itself, sanctions itself. However, the legal person expressing its will only through its organs, we underline in practice the difficulties for the same human being to formulate grievances, as he/she is the agent of the legal person, adressed to the natural person that he/she himself/herself is. The two interests of the two are not the same, are often opposed; how the secrets of one can be kept with respect to the other, represented by the same individual? ... It is all the mystery, even the artifice of legal personality that appears and we understand better that Compliance Law no longer wants to use this strange classical notion. Because all the rules of procedure cannot mask that to prosecute oneself does not make more sense than to contract with oneself. This conflict of interest is impossible to resolve because naming the same individual X then naming him/her Y, by declaring open the dispute between them does not make sense.

This dualism, which is impossible to admit when it comes to playing these functions with regard to corporate officers, can come back to life by setting up third parties who will carry secrets and oppositions. For example by the designation of two separate lawyers for the human being agent and the human being representative of the legal person, each lawyer being able to have secrets for each other and to oppose each other. These spaces of reconstitution of the so "natural" oppositions in procedure between the one who judges and the one who is judged can also take the technological form of platforms: where there is no longer anyone, where the process has replaced the procedure, there is no longer any human judgment. We can thus see that the fear of conflicts of interest is so strong that we resign ourselves to saying that only the machine would be "impartial", a derisory conception of impartiality, against which it is advisable to fight.

This then leads to a final question: can the company claim to exercise the jurisdictional power to prosecute and judge and investigate without even claiming to be a prosecutor, an investigating judge, or a court? The company's advantage would be to be able to escape the legal regime that classical Law attaches to its words, mainly the rights of the defense and the rights of action for others, the principle of publicity of justice for everyone, which expresses the link between procedure and democracy . When Facebook said on June 12, 2021 "react" to the decision of May 5, 2021 adopted by what would only be an Oversight Board to decide "as a consequence" of a 2-year suspension of Donald Trump's account, the art of qualifications seem to be used in order to avoid any regime constraint.

But this art of euphemism is very old. Thus the States, when they wanted to increase repression, presented the transformation of the system as a softening of it through the "decriminalization" of Economic Law, transferred from the criminal courts to the independent administrative agencies. The efficiency was greatly increased, since the guarantees of the Criminal Procedure ceased to apply. But 20 years later, Words found their way back to Things: under Criminal Law, slept the "criminal matter", which requires the same "Impartiality". In 1996, a judge once affirmed it and everything was changed. Let us therefore wait for what the Courts will say, since they are the masters of qualifications, as Article 12 of the French Code of Civil Procedure says, as Motulsky wrote it in 1972. Law has time.

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📝 read the bilingual working paper, with technical developments, references and hypertext links , on which this article is based.

 

📝 read the general presentation ot the book Compliance Juridictionnalization in which this article is published.

 

March 24, 2022

Thesaurus : Doctrine

 Full Reference: Augagneur, L.-M., Le traitement réputationnel par et sur les plateformes, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, series "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, to be published. 

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 Article Summary (done by the author): The large platforms are in the position of arbiter of the reputation economy (referencing, notoriety) in which they themselves act. Although the stakes are usually low on a unit basis, the jurisdiction of reputation represents significant aggregate stakes. Platforms are thus led to detect and assess reputation manipulations (by users: SEO, fake reviews, fake followers; or by the platforms themselves as highlighted by the Google Shopping decision issued by the European Commission in 2017) that are implemented on a large scale with algorithmic tools.

The identification and treatment of manipulations is itself only possible by means of artificial intelligence tools. Google thus proceeds with an automated downgrading mechanism for sites that do not follow its guidelines, with the possibility of requesting a review through a very summary procedure entirely conducted by an algorithm. Tripadvisor, on the other hand, uses an algorithm to detect false reviews based on "fraud modeling to identify electronic patterns that cannot be detected by the human eye". It only conducts a human investigation in limited cases.

This jurisdictionality of reputation has little in common with that defined by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (legal origin, contradictory procedure, independence, application of the Rules of Law). It is characterized, on the one hand, by the absence of transparency of the rules and even of the existence of rules stated in predicative form and applied by deductive reasoning. It is replaced by an inductive probabilistic model by the identification of abnormal behaviors in relation to centroids. This approach of course raises the issue of statistical bias. More fundamentally, it reflects a transition from Rule of Law, not so much to "Code is Law" (Laurence Lessig), but to "Data is Law", that is, to a governance of numbers (rather than "by" numbers). It also comes back to a form of collective jurisdictionality, since the sanction comes from a computational apprehension of the phenomena of the multitude and not from an individual appreciation. Finally, it appears particularly consubstantial with compliance, since it is based on a teleological approach (the search for a finality rather than the application of principles).

On the other hand, this jurisdictionality is characterized by man-machine cooperation, whether in the decision-making process (which poses the problem of automaticity bias) or in the contradictory procedure (which poses, in particular, the problems of discussion with the machine and the explicability of the machine response).

Until now, the supervision of these processes has been based essentially on the mechanisms of transparency, a limited adversarial requirement and the accessibility of appeal channels. The French Law Loi pour une République Numérique ("Law  for a Digital Republic"), the European Legislation Platform-to-Business Regulation and the Omnibus Directive, have thus set requirements on the ranking criteria on platforms. The Omnibus Directive also requires that professionals guarantee that reviews come from consumers through reasonable and proportionate measures. As for the European Digital Services Act, it provides for transparency on content moderation rules, procedures and algorithms. But this transparency is often a sham. In the same way and for the moment the requirements of sufficient human intervention and adversarial processes appear very limited in the draft text.

The most efficient forms of this jurisdictionality ultimately emerge from the role played by third parties in a form of participatory dispute resolution. Thus, for example, FakeSpot detects false Tripadvisor reviews, Sistrix establishes a ranking index that helped establish the manipulation of Google's algorithm in the Google Shopping case by detecting artifacts based on algorithm changes. Moreover, the draft Digital Services Act envisages recognizing a specific status for trusted flaggers who identify illegal content on platforms.

This singular jurisdictional configuration (judge and party platform, massive situations, algorithmic systems for handling manipulations) thus leads us to reconsider the grammar of the jurisdictional process and its characteristics. If Law is a language (Alain Sériaux), it offers a new grammatical form that would be that of the middle way (mesotès) described by Benevéniste. Between the active and the passive way, there is a way in which the subject carries out an action in which he includes himself. Now, it is the very nature of this jurisdictionality of compliance to make laws by including oneself in them (nomos tithestai). In this respect, the irruption of artificial intelligence in this jurisdictional treatment undoubtedly bears witness to the renewal of the language of Law.

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📝 Consulter une présentation générale du volume dans lequel l'article est publié.

 

March 24, 2022

Publications

 Full Reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Le jugeant-jugé ; articuler les mots et les choses face à l'impossible conflit d'intérêts ("The Judge-Judged ; articulating words and things in the face of the impossible conflict of interest"), in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, to be published. 

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 Article Summary (made par the Author : Since the topic of this article is part of a chapter devoted to the Company established as Prosecutor and Judge of itself by Compliance Law, chapter aiming to use the relevant qualifications, it is appropriate therefore to worry about the adjustment of words and things, of the way in which the relationship between ones and the others evolve, and of the more particular question of knowing if this evolution is radical or not when one speaks of "judge ".

because "judging" is a word that the Law has disputed with other disciplines, but that it has appropriated not so much to confer more powers on those who act in its name, for example that who supervise and punish, but on the contrary to impose limits, since to the one who judges it has put the chains of the procedure under foot, thus making bearable for the other the exercise of such a power. This is why those who want the power to judge would often want to not have the title, because having de jure the title of judge is being subject to the correlated regime, it is to be submitted to procedural correctness.

It is therefore to better limit that the Law sees who judges, for obliging this so-powerful character to the procedure. But the Law also has the power to appoint a judge and to fix the contours of all the characters in the trial. He usually does it with clarity, distinguishing the ones of the others, not confusing them. This art of distinction has constitutional value. Thus, not only the one who judges must be named "judge" but the procedural apparatus which goes with this character and which constitutes a way of doing things and fundamental rights, are not "granted" by kindness or in a second step: it is a block. If you didn't want to have to endure procedural rights, you didn't have to want to be a judge. Admittedly, one could conclude that the procedure would therefore have become "substantial"; by this elevation, it is rather a fashion of saying that the procedure would no longer be a "servant": it is a kind of declaration of love for the procedure, as long as one affirms that at the acts of judging , or investigating, or prosecuting, are "naturally" attached the procedural rights for the one who is likely to be the object of these powers.

Compliance Law, in search of allies to achieve the Monumental Goals for the aims of which it was instituted, will require, or even demand, private companies to go and seek themselves, in particular through investigations. internal or active vigilance on others, for finding facts likely to be reproached to them. Compliance Law will also require that they prosecute those who have committed these acts. Compliance La will again demand that they sanction the acts that people have committed in their name.

This is clearly understood from the point of view of Ex Ante efficiency. The confusion of roles is often very efficient since it is synonymous with the accumulation of powers. For example, it is more efficient that the one who pursues is also the one who instructs and judges, since he knows the case so well... Besides, it is more efficient that he also elaborates the rules, so he knows better than anyone the "spirit" of the texts. This was often emphasized in Regulatory Law. When everything is Information and risk management, that would be necessary ... But all this is not obvious.

For two reasons, one external and the other internal.

Externally, the first reason is that it is not appropriate to "name" a judge who is not. This would be too easy, because it would then be enough to designate anyone, or even to do it oneself to appropriate the regime that goes with it, in particular for obtain a so-called legitimate power for obtaining that others obey even though they are not subordinate or from them they transmit information, even though they would be  competitors: it would then be necessary to remember that only the Law is able to appoint judge ; in this new Compliance era, companies would be judges, prosecutors, investigators!  Maybe, if the Law says it, but if it didn't, it would be necessary to come back to this tautology ... But are we in such a radicalism? Moreover, do judges have "the prerogative" of judgment and the Law has not admitted this power for companies to judge for a long time? As soon as the procedure is there in Ex Ante and the control of the judge in Ex Post?

The second reason, internal to the company, situation on which the article focuses, is that the company investigates itself, judges itself, sanctions itself. However, the legal person expressing its will only through its organs, we underline in practice the difficulties for the same human being to formulate grievances, as he/she is the agent of the legal person, adressed to the natural person that he/she himself/herself is. The two interests of the two are not the same, are often opposed; how the secrets of one can be kept with respect to the other, represented by the same individual? ... It is all the mystery, even the artifice of legal personality that appears and we understand better that Compliance Law no longer wants to use this strange classical notion. Because all the rules of procedure cannot mask that to prosecute oneself does not make more sense than to contract with oneself. This conflict of interest is impossible to resolve because naming the same individual X then naming him/her Y, by declaring open the dispute between them does not make sense.

This dualism, which is impossible to admit when it comes to playing these functions with regard to corporate officers, can come back to life by setting up third parties who will carry secrets and oppositions. For example by the designation of two separate lawyers for the human being agent and the human being representative of the legal person, each lawyer being able to have secrets for each other and to oppose each other. These spaces of reconstitution of the so "natural" oppositions in procedure between the one who judges and the one who is judged can also take the technological form of platforms: where there is no longer anyone, where the process has replaced the procedure, there is no longer any human judgment. We can thus see that the fear of conflicts of interest is so strong that we resign ourselves to saying that only the machine would be "impartial", a derisory conception of impartiality, against which it is advisable to fight.

This then leads to a final question: can the company claim to exercise the jurisdictional power to prosecute and judge and investigate without even claiming to be a prosecutor, an investigating judge, or a court? The company's advantage would be to be able to escape the legal regime that classical Law attaches to its words, mainly the rights of the defense and the rights of action for others, the principle of publicity of justice for everyone, which expresses the link between procedure and democracy . When Facebook said on June 12, 2021 "react" to the decision of May 5, 2021 adopted by what would only be an Oversight Board to decide "as a consequence" of a 2-year suspension of Donald Trump's account, the art of qualifications seem to be used in order to avoid any regime constraint.

But this art of euphemism is very old. Thus the States, when they wanted to increase repression, presented the transformation of the system as a softening of it through the "decriminalization" of Economic Law, transferred from the criminal courts to the independent administrative agencies. The efficiency was greatly increased, since the guarantees of the Criminal Procedure ceased to apply. But 20 years later, Words found their way back to Things: under Criminal Law, slept the "criminal matter", which requires the same "Impartiality". In 1996, a judge once affirmed it and everything was changed. Let us therefore wait for what the Courts will say, since they are the masters of qualifications, as Article 12 of the French Code of Civil Procedure says, as Motulsky wrote it in 1972. Law has time.

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📝 read the bilingual working paper, with technical developments, references and hypertext links , on which this article is based.

 

📝 read a general presentation ot the book Compliance Juridictionnalization in which this article is published.

 

Nov. 2, 2021

Thesaurus : Jurisprudence

Full reference: Cour d'appel de Paris, Pole 5 - chamber 7, 11th of February 2021, Veolia/Suez, n° 20/13807

Sept. 16, 2021

Conferences

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Rapport de synthèse (Conclusion) in André C., Frison-Roche, M.-A., Malaurie, M. and Petit, B., Les Buts monumentaux de la Compliance (Compliance Monumental Goals), Colloquium co-organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Laboratoire Dante of Paris-Saclay University,

📅  Septembre 16, 2021.

🧭 Maison du Barreau, 12 place Dauphine 75004 Paris

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📝 Read the program of this colloquium (in French) 

🎥 See Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's conclusion in video (in French)

📝 Read the bilingual working paper on which this conclusion is based 

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📅 This colloquium is part of the Cycle of colloquium 2021 organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its partners around Compliance Monumental Goals.  

📘 This manifestation is in French but the interventions will be part of an English collective book directed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Compliance Monumental Goals, co-edited by the JoRC and Bruylant.

📕 An equivalent book in French, Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, directed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, will be co-edited by the JoRC and Dalloz. 

June 24, 2021

Compliance: at the moment

► Compliance Law is above all a Time Management. This is why it is located in Ex Ante, before disasters happen, with the goal that they do not happen, to intervene at least on time to break the domino effect. This is why the achievement of Monumental Goals has been internalized in companies, this achievement being until now States’ affair. This does not mean that Ex Post is irrelevant. Especially because when the Ex Post entities are the most legitimate. It is the case of Judges. What has just happened to Rudy Giuliani illustrates this perfectly.

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On June 24, 2021, the Supreme Court of the State of New York published its decision concerning Rudy Giuliani (➡️⚖️Supreme Court of the State of New York Appellate Division, First Judicial Department, June 24, 2021, Giuliani)

Rudy Giuliani, who was federal prosecutor, then mayor of New York, then counsel to President Donald Trump, then lawyer was sentenced to the provisional suspension of his professional license in the State of New York (➡️📝New York Times, Court Suspends Giuliani's Law License, citing Trump Election lies, June 24, 2021).

The judgment evokes the insurrectionary events in the Capitol and relies on an ethics committee for the conduct that lawyers must have. First the convergence is remarkable in the motivation between the decisions made by Facebook with regard to Donald Trump, the professional structure to which Rudy Giuliani belongs and the decision of the state court (I).

The articulation is rather done in time (II). First of all, the company which intervenes as quickly as possible, because it is necessary to act (but for acting, it is also necessary to "judge", even if the entity is not a tribunal ...); then the profession (and here the person concerned belongs to a regulated profession but it is indeed in the name of "the general public interest" that the sanction will be pronounced), nothing that can escape the in fine validation or questioning of the Judge.

 

I. The articulation of the substantive principles implemented by the Company, the Jurisdiction and the Professional Regulator

In a Rule of Law, fundamental principles are the same for subjects of Law (companies being subjects of Law like others), intermediary bodies (like professional orders), jurisdictions and States.

In a Rule of Law, Truth is elementally kept by Law and Disinformation is sanctioned.

Thus, even if the power of Freedom of Speech in the United States has a constitutional power unlike any other, since "disinformation" is not sanctioned as such, the legal path of defamation action makes it possible to obtain protection against practices of massive disinformation.

Even if historians have worried about the paradoxical weakness of the United States because of its legal system (see 💻Snyder, T., The State of Our Democracy, 2021) Harvard Law professors have intervened to explain that no one could say everything, defamation action allowing a reaction.

This is the path that was used in January 2021 against Rudy Giuliani (➡️📝New York Times, Rudy Giuliani sued by Dominion Voting Systems over False Election Claims, May 4, 2021) for having unleashed a viral campaign of disinformation about what was presented as an incorrect result during the presidential election.

It is therefore "disinformation" which is sanctioned.

It was also prevented by systemic digital companies such as Google, Twitter, Facebook and Instagram, which disabled Donald Trump’s accounts, the other actor.

But besides, Rudy Giuliani is a lawyer.

As such, what he does engages the honor of his profession. It is therefore intended to be the subject of disciplinary procedures. 

This is why the jurisdiction of the State of New York took advice from an "ethics committee".

In particular with regard to the conclusions of the latter, the state jurisdiction declared that the false statements "tarnished the entire reputation of the legal profession". This justified his suspension in New York State. This suspension is temporary (disciplinary procedures will begin).

But on the other hand, the Court considers that the deontologically objectionable conduct "directly" increased the tensions which led to the violence of the events in the Capitol.

By taking such a justification, the Court operates the junction on the one hand with the other character that Rudy Giuliani advised, Donald Trump, but especially with the decision taken by the private companies, which suspended Donald Trump’s accounts.

Thus, in the name of the same principles, Public Order and respect for Truth, the Court by connecting, through its motivation, Companies - which had acted before - and Disciplinary Body which will intervene afterwards, has shown the coherence of the American legal system.

 

II. The articulation over time between crucial companies, jurisdictions and professions

The difficulty comes rather from the articulation in time.

Indeed, in this Donald Trump’s case who, in particular legally advised by Rudy Giuliani, affirmed that the elections had been stolen, which contributed to a start of insurgency and riots in Capitol, the question is the reaction time and the modality of reaction.

The first type of bodies which react were systemic digital companies: Google, Twitter, Facebook.

The modality was the deletion of Donald Trump's accounts, with the justification for inciting destabilization and civil war.

Controlling "hate speech", in Europe in name of Law, in the United States in name of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).

Therefore, the company is therefore instituted "Judge and prosecutor of itself" by Compliance Law, because it is in position to act at the right time, that is to say immediately (see ➡️📅 the colloquium, co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance and Lyon 3 University, The Firm instituted as Judge and Prosecutor of itselfCompliance Juridictionnalization, 2021).

It is remarkable that, despite all the criticisms that can legitimately be made of it (see eg Heymann, J., La nature juridique de la "Cour suprême" de Facebook" (The legal nature of the "so-called" Supreme Court of Facebook), in The Firm instituted as Judge and Prosecutor of itself, already quoted above.) this jurisdictionalization works, as soon as the procedural principles are respected (see ➡️📝Frison-Roche, M.-A., The judge-judged: articulating words and things in face of the impossible conflict of interests, in ➡️📕Compliance Juridictionnalization, 2022).

But in fine, the decision is always to come back to the Courts and systems depend above all on the probity of people, who are most firmly anchored in "professions".

What is remarkable in the present case is that we could "wait" for the time of justice, because the sanction of the adviser - and his neutralization by a ban to practice - is less urgent than the neutralization of Donald Trump on social networks. Their power as an "influencer” is not the same.

It is however remarkable that if the court took care to rely on the opinion of an "ethics committee", it did not wait for the disciplinary sanction itself.

This will come later.

Justice itself, above all sensitive to time, therefore pronounced in advance: a "provisional" suspension. In the same way that it has often been said that closing an account in the digital space was a capital punishment, one can consider that a professional suspension was, even in "temporary" form, a capital punishment for a professional.

We can see here that Professions, here the profession of attorney, are central to Compliance mechanisms. Indeed, the more States are weakened by their natural relationship with the “border”, the more the technical notion of “Profession”, which does not have this natural relationship, will have to be developed.

However, supervised by the Judge, a Profession has ethics at its heart. The same that the Judge, in anticipation, took as a basis to sanction for the future the adviser of a president immediately dismissed by the systemic company. 

So as long as crucial businesses, professional and jurisdictional structures adjust in substance, adjustment over time can work, by anticipation and feedback.

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June 23, 2021

Thesaurus : Doctrine

 Référence complète : Bruno, A., C.,  La façon dont les entreprises du secteur bancaire s'organisent et se comportent pour assumer leur rôle de "procureurs et juges d'elles-mêmes, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliancesérie "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, à paraître. 

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 Résumé de l'article (fait par l'auteur) : 

Tout d’abord il faut rappeler que la fonction compliance est née au sein de la finance, et qu’en se structurant, elle a évolué pour accompagner le passage du droit de la régulation au droit de la compliance. Par le biais de ces mutations, la compliance est passée d’une fonction contrôlante ex-post à une fonction contraignante ex-ante. La crise du LIBOR illustre imparfaitement la primauté de cette transition. L’évolution de ce rôle est illustrée par des exemples concrets.

Dans un premier temps, est étudiée la gestion du risque de réputation élément fondamental de l’entreprise procureur et juge d’elle-même. Le risque de réputation est un élément non négligeable pour un établissement financier, car celui-ci peut engendrer des conséquences négatives sur sa capitalisation, voire culminer en crise systémique. L’évitement de la crise financière de grande ampleur s’inscrit également dans les buts monumentaux de la compliance.

Afin d’éviter des scénarios complexes et inopportuns, le droit de la compliance intervient le plus en amont possible et identifie les sujets susceptibles d’impacter la réputation. La réglementation impose la mise en place de certains dispositifs ex ante. La loi Sapin 2 exige la mise en place d’outils qui concernent l’ensemble des entreprises (et non pas seulement les banques). En effet, au-delà du risque de réputation, il est essentiel de considérer le risque de corruption. La considération du risque de réputation peut justifier le refus d’exécuter certaines opérations. Dans cette optique la compliance doit évaluer les potentielles conséquences de l’entrée en relation avec un nouveau client en amont, pour parfois décliner la prestation de services. Ainsi la fonction compliance juge de façon unilatérale la relation en vue de gérer son risque de réputation.

En second lieu, le mécanisme de sanction interne institué par le droit de la compliance est également abordé, notamment les sanctions internes adoptées par la compliance dans un établissement financier.

La compliance peut agir en tant que procureur via des comités conduite mis en place au sein des métiers. En outre, la compliance peut déterminer et appliquer des sanctions à l’encontre des collaborateurs. De la sorte, on constate un double rôle de procureur et juge pour la fonction compliance dans le cadre d’un dispositif extraordinaire du droit commun.

Enfin, l’analyse traite du cas du jugeant-jugé : à la suite d’une décision de la banque, le régulateur peut prendre une position d’autant plus stricte en estimant que la banque applique mal ses lignes directrices. Ainsi, le droit de la compliance qui s’installe au sein de l’entreprise bancaire, se retrouve lui-même sous le jugement de son propre régulateur. L’entreprise se retrouve jugée et est amenée à être procureur et juge d’elle-même, de ses clients.

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📝 Consulter une présentation générale du volume dans lequel l'article est publié.

__________

 

 

June 23, 2021

Thesaurus : Doctrine

 Full Reference: Merabet, S., La vigilance, être juge et ne pas juger ("Vigilance, to be a judge and not to judging"), in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliancesérie "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, to be published. 

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 Article Summary (done by the Author) : Vigilance presents two diametrically opposed dangers. The company is caught in the crossfire. On the one hand, there is a risk that it exercises its role at a minimum, so that the obligations imposed on it are ineffective, thereby risking its own liability.   On the other hand, the danger is that the company oversteps its role and takes the place of the Judge. Does Vigilance always present the same dangers? Does it systematically involve the same role of the company? To be vigilant, is it to judge? The answer to these questions depends on the content of the obligations involved in Vigilance. However, these now seem very diverse.

How to distinguish between the various duties of Vigilance? A first approach could consist in considering a formal identification which leads to distinguish stricto sensu Vigilance, that which is envisaged by the French so-called "Sapin 2" law and identified as such, and the related obligations, such as for example the duty of moderation of companies on social networks, which without being baptized "duty of vigilance", nevertheless come close. The extension of Compliance obligations blurs the line between what exactly falls under Vigilance and what not. A more substantial approach should be taken to consider the degree of control exercised by the company. Understood in this way, it is possible to distinguish two categories: Negative Vigilance, which implies the identification of a risk, and Positive Vigilance, which even more supposes the neutralization of the risk. The first assumes a limited role for the company, while the second encourages it to act positively, even before an Authority has spoken. In this case, the role of the company is closer to that of the judge. That shows that all the obligations of vigilance cannot therefore be understood in a unitary manner.

As soon as the company is led - if not to take the place of the Judge - to act before the Judge even has the opportunity to pronounce himself/herself, then it seems legitimate to supervise the implementation of the company's duty of Vigilance, through a form of proceduralisation of Compliance. The company, as its employees or partners, would benefit from more Vigilance supervision. Insofar as all Vigilance obligations do not call the same role of the company, it is necessary to consider guiding principles of Vigilance, more or less intense depending on whether it is Negative or Positive Vigilance. 

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📝 go to the general presentation of the book in which this article is published.

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June 23, 2021

Thesaurus : Doctrine

 Full Reference: Bavitot, A., C., Le façonnage de l'entreprise par les accords de justice pénale négociée (("Shaping the company through negotiated Criminal Justice Agreements"), in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliancesérie "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, à paraître. 

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 Article Summary (done by the author): Negotiated justice is "the situation in which the criminal conflict is the object of a trade in the etymological sense of the term negotio, i.e. a debate between the parties to reach an agreement".

Thus, the French legislator has succumbed to globalized mimicry by creating the Convention judiciaire d'intérêt public (Public Interest Judicial Agreement), first in matters of probity and then in environmental matters. What is the nature of this deal of justice? Validated by a judge's order, it does not entail any declaration of guilt, has neither the nature nor the effects of a judgment of conviction and is not registered in the judicial record. Possible at the investigation stage as well as at the pre-trial stage, the Public Interest Judicial Agreement is original in that it makes it possible to avoid either the prosecutor's proceedings or the judge's wrath.

A detailed study of the agreements signed shows that in order to negotiate in the best possible way, the company can and must shape itself. The company will shape the facts of its agreement, shape its charge and, finally, shape its sentence. The article offers a concrete analysis of these three dimensions of corporate shaping to better approach understanding the legal nature of negotiated criminal justice agreements.

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📝 Consulter une présentation générale du volume dans lequel l'article est publié.

________

June 23, 2021

Thesaurus : Doctrine

 Full Reference: Heymann, J., La nature juridique de la "Cour suprême de Facebook", in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliancesérie "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, to be published. 

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 The summary below describes an article following the colloquium L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance , co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Faculté de Droit Lyon 3. This manifestation was designed under the scientific direction of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Christophe Roda and took place in Lyon on June 23, 2021.

In the book, the article will be published in Title I, devoted to: The Entreprise instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law.

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 Article Summary (done by the author) : Taking place in the general theme aiming at making “words and things coincide”, the article offers some thoughts on the “conditions of the discourse” – in the sense in which Foucault understood it in his Archéologie des sciences humaines – relating to the phenomenon of “jurisdictionalization” of Compliance.

            The thoughts are more specifically focusing on the nature of the so-called “Supreme Court” that Facebook instituted to hear appeals of decisions relating to content on the digital social networks that are Facebook and Instagram. Is this really a “Supreme Court”, designed in order to “judge” the Facebook Group?

            A careful examination of the Oversight Board – i.e. the so-called “Supreme Court” created by Facebook – reveals that the latter, in addition to its advisory mission (which consists of issuing policy advisory opinions on Facebook’s content policies), exercises some form of adjudicative function. This is essentially conceived in terms of compliance assessment, of the content published on the social networks Facebook or Instagram with the standards issued by these corporations on the one hand, of content enforcement decisions taken by Facebook with the Law on the other hand. The legal framework of reference is yet rather vague, although its substantial content seems to be per se evolutive, based on the geographical realm where the case to be reviewed is located. An adjudicative function can therefore be characterized, even if the Oversight Board can only claim for a limited one.

            The author can ultimately identify the Oversight Board as a preventive dispute settlement body, in the sense that it seems to aim at avoiding any referral to state courts and ruling before any court’s judgement can be delivered. Some questions are thus to be raised, relating with both legitimacy and authority of such a Board. But whatever the answers will be, the fact remains that the creation of the Oversight Board by a private law company already reveals all the liveliness of contemporary legal pluralism.

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📝 Consulter une présentation générale du volume dans lequel l'article est publié.

 

 

 

June 23, 2021

Editorial responsibilities : Direction of the "Regulations & Compliance" series, JoRC & Dalloz

Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2022, to be published.

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📘 In parallel, the English version of this book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, is published in the series co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant. 

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📅  This book comes after a  cycle of colloquia organisez in 2021 by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its Universities Partners.

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This volume is the continuation of the books dedicated to Compliance in this collection.

► Read the presentations of the other books on Compliance in this collection:

📕 Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Les buts monumentaux de la Compliance, 2022

📕 Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance2020

📕 Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Pour une Europe de la Compliance2019

📕Borga, N., Marin, J.Cl. Roda, J.-Ch. (ed.), Compliance : Entreprise, Régulateur, Juge, 2018

📕 Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Régulation, Supervision, Compliance2017

📕Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Internet, espace d'interrégulation, 2016

 

📕 Read the presentations of the other titles of the collection.

 

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►  General presentation of the book : There have always been Judges and Lawyers in Compliance Law, in particular because this branch of Law is an extension of Regulatory Law in which they have a core place. This results from the fact that the decisions taken in respect of Compliance are contestable in Court, including Arbitration, those issued by the Company, such as those of States or Authorities, the Judge in turn becoming what Compliance Law is effective.

The novelty lies more in the phenomenon of "jurisdictionalization", that is to say that the trial model penetrates all Compliance Law, and not only the Ex Post part that it includes. Moreover, it seems that this jurisdictionalization influences the non-legal dimension of Compliance. This movement has effects that must be measured and causes that must be understood. Advantages and disadvantages that must be balanced. If only to form an opinion vis-à-vis Companies that have become Prosecutors and Judges of themselves and others ...: encourage this "Juridictionalization of Compliance", fight it, perhaps influence it? In any case, understand it!

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► Lire l'avant-propos résumant l'ensemble des contributions de l'ouvrage

 

► Read the first presentations of some articles of the book :

📝Augagneur, L.-M., Le traitement réputationnel par et sur les plateformes

📝Bruno, A.,  La façon dont les entreprises du secteur bancaire s'organisent et se comportent pour assumer leur rôle de "procureurs et juges d'elles-mêmes

📝Coulon, J.-M., La façon dont une entreprise fonctionne pour concrétiser le Droit de la Compliance : l'exemple du secteur de la construction

📝 Frison-Roche, M.-A., Le jugeant- jugé ; articuler les mots et les choses face à l'impossible conflit d'intérêts 

📝 Granier, C., La jurisprudence des entreprises instituées juges et procureurs d'elles-mêmes par le Droit de la Compliance

📝 ​Heymann, J., La nature juridique de la "Cour suprême" de Facebook

📝Kessedjian, C.,  L'arbitrage au service de la lutte contre la violation des droits humain par les entreprises 

📝Kleiman, E., Les objectifs de la compliance confrontés aux acteurs de l’arbitrage

📝Lapp, Ch.,  La façon dont l'entreprise fonctionne pour concrétiser le Droit de la Compliance : Les statuts du process

📝Merabet, S., Etre juge et ne pas juger

📝Racine, J.-B., Compliance et Arbitrage : Introduction générale

📝 Siproudhis, J.-B., Le transfert de responsabilité du régulateur et du juge vers l’entreprise : la démonstration par le système d’alerte

📝Toe, S., L’application judiciaire des normes de la compliance en remède aux insuffisances des procédures collectives 

 

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June 23, 2021

Thesaurus : Doctrine

 Référence complète : Granier, C., L.-M.,  La jurisprudence des entreprises instituées juges et procureurs d'elles-mêmes par le Droit de la Compliance ("The Jurisprudence of the Firms established as prosecutors and Judges of themselves by Compliance Law"), in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliancesérie "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, à paraître. 

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 Résumé de l'article (done by the author) :Because Compliance shakes up established frameworks, Compliance forces to look at certain concepts in a new light, which until then seemed to be well tamed. This is particularly the case with the notion of "Jurisprudence". Recent developments in Compliance indeed raise questions about the possible existence of "jurisprudence" (case law) that would be produced by companies during the implementation of compliance procedures.

At first glance, the concept of "business jurisprudence" may appear unnatural because case law is traditionally understood as the fruit of the office of the Judge and, more particularly, of the State Judge. However, the observation that the company can position itself as a Judge with regard to itself and others in the context of the implementation of Compliance legitimately raises the question of the possibility for the latter. to produce case law. The example of Facebook's supervisory board and the first decisions rendered by this body increases the legitimacy of this crucial question.

Thinking about the concept of "Jurisprudence of companies" implies to compare the process of emergence of the case law standard emanating from the Judge with the process of emergence of a "Jurisprudence" that would be produced by companies during their "jurisdictional functions". On the material level, an analogy between State case law and company case law seems conceivable. It then remains to overcome an obstacle of an organic nature: can an institution other than the judge be understood as producing case law?

In view of contemporary developments in Law and the practical interest that exists in designing business case law, it seems appropriate to adopt a broader view of case law, which is detached from the traditional organic criterion. It therefore seems that it is possible but above all that it is necessary to think about the concept of "business case law" in order to highlight a new facet of the normative power of companies in the context of compliance, in particular with a view to its supervision.

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📝 Consulter une présentation générale du volume dans lequel l'article est publié.