Food for thoughts

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

The distinction between "Public Law" and "Private Law" is important. In the systems of Continental Law, or still called under Roman-Germanic Law, or even called Civil Law systems, it is even around it that legal systems are built: it can be a basic distinction, a summa divisio, as it it in the Civil Law systems. In the so-called Common Law or Anglo-American systems, the distinction is less fundamental, but it remains, justifying in particular that the rules and disputes concerning the administration call for special rules and are apprehended by special tribunals.

In principle, this distinction is based on the nature of the persons whose legal situation is examined. Under"Public Law" a legal situation involving a person who is itself a public-law entity: the State, a local authority, a public undertaking, etc. That is why, for example, the contract which may be concluded will be of public law, and the judge who may be seized of it will be an administrative court. If the situation does not involve a person governed by public law, then it will be governed by "Private Law". There are a thousand exceptions, but this is the starting and basic and fondamental principle.

Two essential remarks, bearing a system of values, explaining that the systems of Civil Law and Common Law are in fact confronting each other.

The two bodies of rules and institutions are not of equal strength because one of the categories is "closed", corresponding to one criterion (the "public person"), while the other is open: Public Law is a closed category; on the contrary, Private law becomes "active" as soon as there is no public person (a "private person" who or which must define himself or itself as a "non-public person").

One can consider this articulation between Public Law and Private Law in two ways, radically opposed. It may express a mark of inferiority in disfavour of private law: we are all "ordinary" persons in "ordinary" situations with "ordinary" activities (this will be the French conception ....). On the contrary, Public Law is the mark of the State, of Public Order, of Sovereignty, of public power, of the general will, in the interstices of which individuals slip in to act and satisfy their small particular interests

On the contrary, Private Law can be considered as the expression of the "common law": people are free and do what they want, through ownership and contract. As an exception and because they have elected people to do so, the rulers (whom they control), by exception, enact norms that constrain them. But this is an exception, since repression - public law and criminal law, which has the same status in this respect - is only a tribute to the freedom of persons, since this freedom remains wholly in the form of the private enterprise on the market.

It is then measured that the articulation between Public and Private Law profoundly reflects a philosophy and a political position. If it is considered that Regulation is the underlying order by which the Sovereign allows the deployment of his subjects who also benefit from a long-term policy constructed by the autonomous and measured political will, then Public Law in Is the master, the Regulation Law expressing a renewed search for efficiency, this but only this. If we believe that Regulation is whereby economic rationality manages to protect persons and companies from risks and to compensate for market failures, a market whose liberal principle remains the ideal, then Private Law is the core, whith contract and private property as basis tools.

France and the Latin countries adhere rather to this metaphysics of values which entrusts to the Public Authorities and the State the legitimacy and the power to express the general interest by Public Law, Regulators and Constitutional Courts, expressing it on a technical form renewed by the Regulatory tools: incitations, soft law, etc. The legal systems whose history draws on British history put more trust in the person of the entrepreneur and conceive of Regulation Law as an efficient outsourcing of functions to administrations that are efficient, informed and impartial.

Certainly, in the technical daily of the Law of Regulation and following the different sectors, Public and Private Law mix up:  public companies take the form of publicly traded companies under private law or private companies will be entrusted with missions of public service, instituting them as second-level regulators as are the infrastructure network operators.

But the fundamental conception of systems (rooted in the history of the people) and practice marry. In the silence of regulations (and the more they are gossiping and the more the judge must interpret them, which amounts to a "silence"), what sense to give to the system?

To take only a few questions, frequent in practice:

  •      What judge to seize? The administrative judge or the civil judge? What is the "natural judge" of the Regulatory Law?
  •      What standard to apply? The contractual will? The implicit will of the legislator? What is the "natural author" of the Law of Regulation?
  •      Does the silence of the text prohibit action for operators or on the contrary does silence mean their freedom to act?

The absence of a firm and shared definition of what is the Law of Regulation does not facilitate practice. Hesitations in translations from one language to another increase confusion.

For the time being, there is a tendency to refer to Public Law in the sectors where whe take precedence over public operators' monopolies, such as telecommunications, energy, railways, air and postal services, and to refer to Private Law in the sectors which have long been the subject of competition between operators, namely banking, finance and insurance.

It should be recognized that the criterion of distinction has little economic rationale. The notion of risk would be a clearer and more manageable criterion. But it would then lead to a greater challenge to the distinction between Public and Private Law. Because the Law of Regulation, impregnated with Economy and Economic Analysis of Law, has sometimes little basis of legal tradition, it put in question of this summa divisio. If this were to be the case, it would be the totality of the legal systems which would be upset, especially in its judicial organization, since the judicial civil and commercial system is so distinctly distinguished (that of "ordinary" persons, that of "common law ) and the administrative judge (the "natural judge" of the State). It is then realized that the Law of Regulation challenges the whole Law, especially in the Latin countries and the Civil Law systems.

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Marcou, G., L'ordre public économique aujourd'hui. Un essai de redéfinition, in, Revet, TH. et Vidal, L. Annales de la régulation, IRJS, 2009, p.79 et s.

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence : Beauvais, P., Méthode transactionnelle et justice pénale, in  Gaudemet, A. (dir.), La compliance : un nouveau monde? Aspects d'une mutation du droit, coll. "Colloques", éd. Panthéon-Assas, Panthéon-Assas, 2016, pp. 79-90.

Voir la présentation générale de  l'ouvrage dans lequel l'article a été publié.

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Salah, M., La mondialisation vue de l'Islam, in Archives de Philosophie du Droit, La mondialisation entre illusion et utopie, tome 47, Dalloz, 2003, 27-54.

 

La mondialisation apparaît comme une occidentalisation des cultures et du droit. L'Islam qui prend forme juridique devrait se l'approprier sans se dénaturer. La réussite d'un tel processus difficile dépendra de la qualité de la régulation qui sera mise en place.

 

Lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage dans lequel l'article a été publié.

Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent via le drive lire l'article dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation".

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Complete reference : Archives de Philosophie du Droit (APD), Le sujet de droit, tome 34, ed. Sirey, 1989, 430 p. 

 

Read the table of contents.

Read the summaries of the articles in English

 

See the presentation of other volumes of Archives de Philosophie du Droit.

Teachings : Grandes Questions du Droit, Semestre d'Automne 2014

A l'occasion de l'enseignement de "Grandes Questions du Droit, aussi lors du "galop d'essai" ou lors de l'examen final, il ne sera pas demandé d'exercices très spécifiques, comme les "commentaires d'arrêt", tels qu'on peut les demander aux étudiants dans les Facultés de droit. Mais le premier sujet proposé sera toujours une dissertation juridique, notamment parce que la dissertation est un genre d'exercice dont la méthode est déjà acquise dans d'autres disciplines, méthode qui garde sa pertinence à propos de la matière juridique. Une dissertation juridique présente pourtant certaines spécificités Le présent document a pour objet de donner quelques indications. Elles ne valent pas règles d'or, mais un étudiant qui les suit ne peut se le voir reprocher.

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

First of all, the Regulation and Compliance Law is difficult to understand in others languages than English, through translation, for example in French.  This corpus of rules and institutions suffers from ambiguity and confusion because of its vocabulary of Anglophone origin, in which words or expressions that are similar or identical have not the same meaning in English and, for example, in French..

To every lord all honor, this is the case for the term "Regulation".

In English, "regulation" refers to the phenomenon which the French language expresses by the term "Régulation". But it can also aim at the complete fitting of what will hold a sector reaching a market failure and in which regulation is only one tool among others. The expression "regulatory system" will be used with precision, but also the term "Regulation", the use of the capital letter indicating the difference between the simple administrative power to take texts ("regulation") and the entire system which supports the sector ("Regulation"). It is inevitable that in a quick reading, or even by the play of digital, which overwrites the capital letters, and the automatic translations, this distinction of formulation, which stands for a lower / upper case, disappears. And confusion arises.


The consequences are considerable. It is notably because of this homonymy, that frequently in the French language one puts at the same level the Droit de la Régulation ("regulatory law, Regulation") and the réglementation (regulation). It will be based on such an association, of a tautological nature, to assert that "by nature" the Regulatory Law  is "public law", since the author of the reglementation (regulation) is a person of public law, in particular the State or Independent administrative authorities such as Regulators. There remains the current and difficult justification for the considerable presence of contracts, arbitrators, etc. Except to criticize the very idea of Regulatory Law, because it would be the sign of a sort of victory of the private interests, since conceived by instruments of private law.

Thus two major disadvantages appear. First of all, it maintains in the Law of Regulation the summa divisio of Public and Private Law, which is no longer able to account for the evolution of Law in this field and leads observers, notably economists or international Institutions, to assert that the Common Law system would be more adapted today to the world economy notably because if it does indeed place administrative law, constitutional law, etc., it does not conceive them through the distinction Law Public / private law, as the Continental system of Civil Law continues to do.

Secondly, no doubt because this new Law draws on economic and financial theories that are mainly built in the United Kingdom and the United States, the habit is taken to no longer translate. In other languages, for example, texts written in French are phrases such as "le Régulateur doit être  accountable".

It is inaccurate that the idea of ​​accountability is reducible to the idea of ​​"responsibility". The authors do not translate it, they do not recopy and insert it in texts written in French.

One passes from the "translation-treason" to the absence of translation, that is to say to the domination of the system of thought whose word is native, here the U.K. and the U.S.A.

One of the current major issues of this phenomenon is in the very term of "Compliance". The French term "conformité" does not translate it. To respect what compliance is, it is appropriate for the moment to recopy the word itself, so as not to denature the concept by a translation. The challenge is to find a francophone word that expresses this new idea, particularly with regard to legal systems that are not common law, so that their general framework remains.

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Complete reference : Archives de Philosophie du Droit (APD), Droit et esthétique, tome 40, ed. Sirey, 1996, 533 p. 

 

Read the forth of cover.

Read the table of contents.

Read the sumaries of the articles in English

 

See the presentation of other volumes of Archives de Philosophie du Droit.

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Complete reference : Archives de Philosophie du Droit (APD), Le droit international, tome 32, ed. Sirey, 1987, 442 p. 

 

Read the table of contents.

Read the summaries of the articles in English

 

See the presentation of other volumes of Archives de Philosophie du Droit.

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

Paradoxically, the notion of conflict of interest seems to be at the center of Economic Law only recently in Economic Law, in both Corporate and Public Law. This is due to the philosophy which animates these two branches of Law, very different for each, and which has changed in each.

In fact, and in the first place in Public Law, in the Continental legal systems and especially in French legal tradition, on the side of the State, the one who serves it, by a sort of natural effect,, makes the general interest incarnated by the State pass before its personal interest. There is an opposition of interests, namely the personal interest of this public official who would like to work less and earn more, and the common interest of the population, who would like to pay less taxes and for example benefit trains that always arrive on time and the general interest which would be for example the construction of a European rail network.

But this conflict would be resolved "naturally" because the public official, having "a sense of the general interest" and being animated by the "sense of public service", sacrifices himself to serve the general interes. He stays late at his office and gets the trains on time. This theory of public service was the inheritance of royalty, a system in which the King is at the service of the People, like the aristocracy is in the "service of the King." There could therefore be no conflict of interest, neither in the administration nor in the public enterprises, nor to observe, manage or dissolve. The question does not arise ...

Let us now take the side of the companies, seen by the Company Law. In the classical conception of corporate governance, corporate officers are necessarily shareholders of the company and the profits are mandatorily distributed among all partners: the partnership agreement is a "contract of common interest". Thus, the corporate officer works in the knowledge that the fruits of his efforts will come back to him through the profits he will receive as a partner. Whatever its egoism - and even the agent must be, this mechanism produces the satisfaction of all the other partners who mechanically will also receive the profits. Selfishness is indeed the motor of the system, as in the classical theory of Market and Competition. Thus, in the corporate mechanism, there is never a conflict of interest since the corporate officer is obligatorily associated: he will always work in the interest of the partners since in this he works for himself. As Company Law posits that the loss of the company will also be incurred and suffered by all partners, he will also avoid this prospect. Again, there is no need for any control. The question of a conflict of interest between the mandatary and those who conferred this function does not structurally arise...

These two representations both proved inaccurate. They were based on quite different philosophies - the public official being supposed to have exceeded his own interest, the corporate officer being supposed to serve the common interest or the social interest by concern for his own interest - but this was by  a unique reasoning that these two representations were defeated.

Let us take the first on Public Law: the "sense of the State" is not so common in the administration and the public enterprises, that the people who work there sacrifice themselves for the social group. They are human beings like the others. Researchers in economics and finance, through this elementary reflection of suspicion, have shattered these political and legal representations. In particular, it has been observed that the institutional lifestyle of public enterprises, very close to the government and their leaders, is often not very justified, whereas it is paid by the taxpayer, that is, by the social group which they claimed to serve. Europe, by affirming in the Treaty of Rome the principle of "neutrality of the capital of enterprises", that is to say, indifference to the fact that the enterprise has as its shareholder a private person or a public person, validated this absence of exceeding of his particular interest by the servant of the State, become simple economic agent. This made it possible to reach the conclusion made for Company Law.

Disillusionment was of the same magnitude. It has been observed that the corporate officer, ordinary human being, is not devoted to the company and does not have the only benefit of the profits he will later receive as a partner. He sometimes gets very little, so he can receive very many advantages (financial, pecuniary or in kind, direct or indirect). The other shareholders see their profits decrease accordingly. They are thus in a conflict of interest. Moreover, the corporate officer was elected by the shareholders' meeting, that is to say, in practice, the majority shareholder or the "controlling" shareholder (controlling shareholder) and not by all. He may not even be associated (but a "senior officer").

The very fact that the situation is no longer qualified by lawyers, through the qualifications of classical Company Law, still borrowing from the Civil Contract Law, the qualifications coming more from financial theories, borrowing from the theory of the agency, adically changed the perspective. The assumptions have been reversed: by the same "nature effect", the conflict of interest has been disclosed as structurally existing between the manager and the minority shareholder. Since the minority shareholder does not have the de facto power to dismiss the corporate officer since he does not have the majority of the voting rights, the question does not even arise whether the manager has or has not a corporate status: the minority shareholder has only the power to sell his securities, if the management of the manager is unfavorable (right of exit) or the power to say, protest and make known. This presupposes that he is informed, which will put at the center of a new Company Law information, even transparency.

Thus, this conflict of interests finds a solution in the actual transfer of securities, beyond the legal principle of negotiability. For this reason, if the company is listed, the conflict of interest is translated dialectically into a relationship between the corporate officer and the financial market which, by its liquidity, allows the agent to be sanctioned, and also provides information, Financial market and the minority shareholder becoming identical. The manager could certainly have a "sense of social interest", a sort of equivalent of the state's sense for a civil servant, if he had an ethics, which would feed a self-regulation. Few people believe in the reality of this hypothesis. By pragmatism, it is more readily accepted that the manager will prefer his interest to that of the minority shareholder. Indeed, he can serve his personal interest rather than the interest for which a power has been given to him through the informational rent he has, and the asymmetry of information he enjoys. All the regulation will intervene to reduce this asymmetry of information and to equip the minority shareholder thanks to the regulator who defends the interests of the market against the corporate officers, if necessary through the criminal law. But the belief in managerial volunteerism has recently taken on a new dimension with corporate social responsability, the social responsibility of the company where managers express their concern for others.

The identification of conflicts of interests, their prevention and their management are transforming Financial Regulatory Law and then the Common Law of Regulation, because today it is no longer believed a priori that people exceed their personal interest to serve the interest of others. It is perhaps to regain trust and even sympathy that companies have invested in social responsibility. The latter is elaborated by rules which are at first very flexible but which can also express a concern for the general interest. In this, it can meet Compliance Law and express on behalf of the companies a concern for the general interest, if the companies provide proof of this concern.

To take an example of a conflict of interest that resulted in substantial legal changes, the potentially dangerous situation of credit rating agencies has been pointed out when they are both paid by banks, advising them and designing products, While being the source of the ratings, the main indices from which the investments are made. Banks being the first financial intermediaries, these conflicts of interest are therefore systematically dangerous. That is why in Europe ESMA exercises control over these rating agencies.

The identification of conflicts of interest, which most often involves changing the way we look at a situation - which seemed normal until the point of view changes - the moral and legal perspective being different, Trust one has in this person or another one modifying this look, is today what moves the most in Regulation Law.
This is true of Public and Corporate Law, which are extended by the Regulation Law, here itself transformed by Compliance Law, notably by the launchers of alerts. But this is also true that all political institutions and elected officials.

For a rule emerges: the more central the notion of conflict of interest becomes, the more it must be realized that Trust is no longer given a priori, either to a person, to a function, to a mechanism, to a system. Trust is no longer given only a posteriori in procedures that burden the action, where one must give to see continuously that one has deserved this trust.

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

The Independent Administrative Authority (IAA) is the legal form that the legislator has most often chosen to build regulatory authorities. The IAA is only its legal form, but French law has attached great importance to it, following the often formalistic tradition of public law. They are thus independent administrative authorities, especially in the legal systems of continental law like France, Germany or Italy.

The essential element is in the last adjective: the "independent" character of the organism. This means that this organ, which is only administrative so has a vocation to be placed in the executive hierarchy, does not obey the Government. In this, regulators have often been presented as free electrons, which posed the problem of their legitimacy, since they could no longer draw upstream in the legitimacy of the Government. This independence also poses the difficulty of their responsibility, the responsibility of the State for their actions, and the accountability of their use of their powers. Moreover, the independence of regulators is sometimes questioned if it is the government that retains the power to appoint the leaders of the regulatory authority. Finally, the budgetary autonomy of the regulator is crucial to ensure its independence, although the authorities having the privilege of benefiting from a budget - which is not included in the LOLF - are very few in number. They are no longer referred to as "independent administrative authorities" but as "Independent Public Authorities", the legislator making a distinction between the two (French Law of 20 January 2017).

The second point concerns the second adjective: that it is an "administrative" body. This corresponds to the traditional idea that regulation is the mechanism by which the State intervenes in the economy, in the image of a kind of deconcentration of ministries, in the Scandinavian model of the agency. If we allow ourselves to be enclosed in this vocabulary, we conclude that this administrative body makes an administrative decision which is the subject of an appeal before a judge. Thus, in the first place, this would be a first instance appeal and not a judgment since the administrative authority is not a court. Secondly, the natural judge of the appeal should be the administrative judge since it is an administrative decision issued by an administrative authority. But in France the Ordinance of 1 December 1986 sur la concurrence et la libéralisation des prix (on competition and price liberalization), because it intended precisely to break the idea of ​​an administered economy in order to impose price freedom on the idea of ​​economic liberalism, required that attacks against the decisions of economic regulators taking the form of IAA are brought before the Court of Appeal of Paris, judicial jurisdiction. Some great authors were even able to conclude that the Paris Court of Appeal had become an administrative court. But today the procedural system has become extremely complex, because according to the IAA and according to the different kinds of decisions adopted, they are subject to an appeal either to the Court of Appeal of Paris or to the Conseil d'État (Council of State) . If one observes the successive laws that modify the system, one finds that after this great position of principle of 1986, the administrative judge gradually takes again its place in the system, in particular in the financial regulation. Is it logical to conclude that we are returning to a spirit of regulation defined as an administrative police and an economy administered by the State?

Finally, the third term is the name itself: "authority". It means in the first place an entity whose power holds before in its "authority". But it marks that it is not a jurisdiction, that it takes unilateral decisions. It was without counting the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the judicial judge! Indeed, Article 6§1 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that everyone has the right to an impartial tribunal in civil and criminal matters. The notion of "criminal matter" does not coincide with the formal traditional concept of criminal law but refers to the broad and concrete factual concept of repression. Thus, by a reasoning which goes backwards, an organization, whatever the qualification that a State has formally conferred on it, which has an activity of repression, acts "in criminal matters". From this alone, in the European sense, it is a "tribunal". This automatically triggers a series of fundamental procedural guarantees for the benefit of the person who is likely to be the subject of a decision on his part. In France, a series of jurisprudence, both of the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation), the Conseil d'État (Council of State) or the Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) has confirmed this juridictionnalization of the AAI.

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Archives de Philosophie du Droit (APD), Le droit et l'immatériel, tome 43, ed. Sirey, 1999, 521 p.

 

Lire la quatrième de couverture.

Lire la table des matières.

Lire les résumés des articles en langue anglais.

 

Lire la présentation de l'article de Hélène Ruiz Fabri, Immatériel, territorialité et État.

 

Voir la présentation d'autres tomes des Archives de Philosophie du Droit.

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Bossuet, sermon De l’éminente dignité des pauvres, 1659.

Édité par Alain Supiot, 64 p. , Éditions Mille et un nuits, 2015.

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

Legally, the State is a public law subject defined by territory, people and institutions. It acts in the international space and emits norms. Politically, it has the legitimacy required to express the will of the social body and to exercise the violence of which it deprives the other subjects of law. It is often recognizable by its power: its use of public force, its budgetary power, its jurisdictional power. These three powers, declining or being challenged by private, international and more satisfying mechanisms, some predicted the disappearance of the State, to deplore it or to dance on its corpse.

With such a background, in current theories of Regulation, primarily constructed by economic thought and at first sight one might say that the State is above all the enemy. And this for two main reasons. The first is theoretical and of a negative nature. The advocates of the theory of regulation deny the State the political qualities set out above. The State would not be a "person" but rather a group of individuals, civil servants, elected officials and other concrete human beings, expressing nothing but their particular interests, coming into conflict with other interests, and using their powers to serve the former rather than the latter as everyone else. The Regulation theory, adjoining the theory of the agency, is then aimed at controlling public agents and elected representatives in whom there is no reason to trust a priori.

The second reason is practical and positive. The State would not be a "person" but an organization. Here we find the same perspective as for the concept of enterprise, which classical lawyers conceive as a person or a group of people, while economists who conceive of the world through the market represent it as an organization. The state as an organization should be "efficient" or even "optimal". It is then the pragmatic function of the Regulation Law. When it is governed by traditional law, entangled by that it would be an almost religious illusions of the general interest, or even the social contract, it is suboptimal. The Regulation purpose is about making it more effective.

To this end, as an organization, the State is divided into independent regulatory agencies or independent administrative authorities that manage the subjects as close as possible, which is fortunate in reducing the asymmetry of information and in reviving trust in a direct link. The unitary, distant and arrogant State is abandoned for a flexible and pragmatic conception of a strategic state (without capital ...) that would finally have understood that it is an organization like any other ...

Competition law adopts this conception of the State, which it posed from the beginning that it was an economic operator like any other. This is how this conception which would be  more "neutral" of the world is often presented.

Successive crises, whether sanitary or financial, have produced a pendulum effect.

Now, the notions of general interest or common goods are credited of an autonomous value, and the necessity of surpassing immediate interests and of finding persons to bear superior interests or to take charge of the interests of others, even a non-immediate one, emerged.

Thus, the State or the public authority, reappears in the globalization. The Compliance Law or the Corporal Social Responsibility of the crucial companies are converging towards a consideration of the State, which can not be reduced to a pure and simple organization receptacle of externalities.

 

Oct. 6, 2021

Editorial responsibilities : Direction of the collection "Cours-Série Droit privé", Editions Dalloz (33)

► Référence générale : Gaudu, F., et Bergeron-Canut, F., Droit du travail, coll. "Cours Dalloz-Série Droit privé", 7ième éd., Dalloz, 2020, 620 p.

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► Présentation de l'ouvrage : Ce manuel à jour des derniers textes s'adresse à tous les étudiants en droit et à tous les praticiens qui actualisent leurs connaissances. 

Il développe dans une première partie les " relations individuelles de travail " ( formation du rapport contractuel, exécution et rupture du contrat de travail), pour consacrer sa seconde partie aux " relations collectives de travail ", ( conflits collectifs du travail, la représentation et la négociation collective et enfin la convention collective de travail).

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📝Consulter la table des matières.

 

📝 dans la même collection, consulter la présentation de l'ouvrage Droit de la protection sociale. 

 

📚Consulter l'ensemble de la collection dans laquelle l'ouvrage a été publié.

Updated: Sept. 25, 2021 (Initial publication: March 25, 2021)

Publications

Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Instituer l'insécurité juridique comme principe, outil de prévention des crises systémiques catastrophiques totales, document de travail, mars et septembre 2021

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Ce document de travail fait suite à deux précédents documents de travail, réalisés pour le colloque qui s'est tenu à la Cour de cassation le 22 mars 2021.

Le premier avait été conçu et en partie réalisé  longtemps avant sa tenue pour traiter le sujet selon les canons habituels attendus ; 

Le second a été élaboré le veille de sa tenue sur 4 cas car la disparition de mes serveurs en raison d'un incendie, ayant également touché les copies de ceux-ci ne me permettait pas autre chose, les organisateurs m'ayant demandé de maintenir pourtant ma participation, ce dont je les remercie 📎!footnote-2299.

Le présent document de travail a été élaboré après la tenue du colloque afin que les organisateurs de ce colloque, au thème si aventureux, ne pensent pas qu'ils ne pouvaient pas compter sur moi.

Ce document de travail vise à dépasser ces avanies et à opérer la connexion du sujet pour lequel une contribution m'a été demandée (la crise économique) avec le sujet plus général qui me retient par ailleurs : la construction de la nouvelle branche qu'est le Droit de la Compliance, pourquoi le faire et comment le faire. 

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Introduction : Comme à tous, ce sujet de "L'insécurité juridique" me pose difficulté. Parce que,  n'étant pas grand personnage solitaire affrontant l'inconnu, comme tous les autres je voudrais plutôt la sécurité que l'insécurité, et tous les mots qui ne commencent pas par une négation : je voudrais le connu plutôt l'inconnu, je voudrais être comprise qu'incomprise, et ce n'est plus par confort que par urgence morale je voudrais vivre dans un monde juste plutôt que dans un monde injuste. C'est d'ailleurs pour cette dernière raison que je vais affronter l'aventure de l'Insécurité juridique comme principe premier, et non pas comme exception au principe de la Sécurité juridique 📎!footnote-2300

Cet ajout du "in" signale paradoxalement un retranchement : le "in" montre ce qui manque, comme le monde blessé qu'est le monde injuste. Me voilà invitée à traiter un sujet par avance abîmé,  car l'insécurité juridique c'est déjà comme une agression : un monde amputé de sa sécurité, comme c'est désagréable. 

C'est encore plus vrai pour "l'insécurité juridique". En effet, la notion fait face à la "sécurité juridique", cette sorte d'apport spécifique que le Droit offre au monde.   La "sécurité juridique" est aujourd'hui comme un Totem, qui serait indissociable du Tabou de l'Insécurité. Dans le monde juridique épuisé dans lequel nous ne serions plus aptes qu'à proposer quelques notions procédurales, surtout pas de notions substantielles car immédiatement taxées d'être trop politiques 📎!footnote-2277, la "sécurité juridique" qui n'est qu'une notion procédurale en ce qu'elle permet simplement que tout soit prévisible, que demain soit comme aujourd'hui, lequel est d'ailleurs comme était hier, est promue au rang normatif le plus haut. Les travaux abondent, les hymnes  d'approbation sont unanimes.  On ne demanderait plus que cela au système juridique, mais cela on l'exige : le droit serait une procédure qui garantirait la prévisibilité de la réglementation 📎!footnote-2276 et accroîtrait ainsi la solidité des projets  particuliers que nous avons, les uns et des autres et, grâce au pouvoir du Droit de rendre réel ce qu'il assure, nous savons que nos projets pourront tenir demain dans les mêmes termes choisis hier, puisque le Droit nous l'a promis. 

La sécurité juridique, parce que les systèmes juridiques n'auraient plus que cela à offrir, revendiquant par ailleurs leur neutralité et se rejoignant donc sur cette constance, cette cohérence, et cette confiance produites par cette sécurité, est notre nouveau doudou.

A cela, l'on apporte nuances dans les modalités, en soulignant que les circonstances changeantes de la vie exigent un peu de flexibilité, que le pragmatisme et des situations concrètes et particulières  qui sans cesse varient impliquent de prévoir  dès aujourd'hui que demain le contexte aura changé : il faut organiser de la prévisibilité dans le changement. De cela, le Droit souple s'en charge, les lignes directrices étant les nouvelles voies romaines qui nous montreront le chemin. Sécurité et flexibilité, dans un pragmatisme qui voit dans tout principe substantiel un signe de rigidité, voilà notre nouveau mantra. 

L'insécurité juridique est ainsi notre Tabou, dont les admissions justifiées seraient autant d'hommages rendus au Totem de la sécurité juridique, Totem et Tabou se renforçant toujours. Il y aurait donc imperfection du système juridique si l'on haussait l'insécurité au rang de véritable principe. C'est pourquoi lorsqu'on fait l'effort de parler d'insécurité juridique, on semble ne le faire que sur le mode de l'exception : l'insécurité juridique, cela serait ce qu'il est admissible de supporter comme exception légitime au principe de la sécurité juridique 📎!footnote-2275

L'on aura donc tendance à traiter de l'insécurité juridique comme une sorte de principe supportable lorsque quelque chose justifie qu'on porte atteinte au véritable principe premier qu'est la Sécurité juridique. C'est ailleurs ainsi le plus souvent qu'on l'aborde . Ce n'est donc pas le traiter comme un véritable principe, juste comme une exception supportable. 

Voilà pourquoi l'on m'a demandé d'examiner si l'insécurité juridique était supportable, admissible, lorsqu'il y a crise économique. Sans doute parce que lorsqu'il y a crise économique, alors tant pis les principes doivent un peu baisser pavillon et l'on fait avec les moyens du bord en admettant des exceptions, bien qu'avec beaucoup de réticences et de regrets 📎!footnote-2304... Puisque c'est l'hypothèse évoquée, je la suivrai volontiers, et dans un premier temps resterai dans cet enclos-là, mais c'est aller dans l'idée que l'insécurité juridique ne pourrait être qu'une exception faite au principe de la sécurité juridique parce qu'il faut que tout ne change pas vraiment : la crise ne rebat les cartes qu'un temps, le temps de la crise, mais lorsque la crise est passée l'on en revient au normal et à ce qui est bien, à savoir le "vrai principe", celui de la constance et de l'inchangé. Car il n'est supportable de "bafouer" la sécurité juridique qu'un temps 📎!footnote-2303. L'insécurité juridique serait donc ce qui intervient lorsqu'une crise économique s'ouvre afin d'aider à l'efficacité de sa gestion et pour sortir de cette crise. Cela et pas davantage (I).

L'insécurité juridique n'aurait donc qu'un temps, parce que par nature la crise elle-même n'a qu'un temps. La fin de la crise, la fin des problèmes et d'une situation anormale feraient disparaître le principe d'insécurité juridique, lequel serait donc un principe pathologique. 

Mais ce n'est pas parce que cette description semble partagée par beaucoup que ses prémisses soient exacts. En effet, la "crise" est-elle si exceptionnelle que ce qui justifie que l'insécurité juridique, qui permet d'aider à sa résolution, le soit aussi ? Si l'on constate plutôt que la crise est non seulement notre "ordinaire", et qu'en plus notre "ordinaire catastrophique" est "prévisible", voire virtuellement déjà là, et qu'en plus dans le futur, ce qui risque d'arriver est une crise catastrophique totale qui pourrait bien être définitive dans ses effets (ce qui enlève à la crise sa nature temporaire et le retour au "vrai principe" également), alors le principe exceptionnel, cantonné dans la crise, doit sortir de l'hypothèse de celle-ci pour venir  pleinement dans le Droit présent afin d'empêcher que se réalise cet ordinaire catastrophique. 

 Oui, regardons vers le futur : ne sont-ce pas de monumentales crises qui sont devant nous ? Et l'enjeu n'est-il pas d'adopter des principes premiers pour qu'elles n'adviennent pas ? S'il en est ainsi, alors l'absence de changement, la constance et le prévisible, c'est-à-dire le principe même de la Sécurité juridique, si choyé, n'est-ce pas ce qui fait obstacle à la prévention de l'advenance des crises économiques qui nous menacent ? Certes c'est sans doute une crise sanitaire et une crise écologique et climatique qui nous sont devant nous, mais de la même façon la crise économique de 2020 n'est elle-même qu'un accessoire de la crise sanitaire mondiale, prémisses de ce qui pourrait arriver.

Si nous sommes dans cette situation mondiale alors, ce n'est pas une conception procédurale des principes qu'il faut retenir, mais une conception politique. De la même façon, dans cette perspective ce n'est pas en terme d'exception, de "principe exceptionnel" mais bien en terme de principe premier qu'il faut penser l'Insécurité juridique, c'est-à-dire en terme d'éveil et d'aventure, car demain pourrait n'être pas du tout comme aujourd'hui. Seul le principe inverse de l' "Insécurité juridique" pourrait alors exprimer la volonté d'y répondre (II). 

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Lire ci-dessous les développements du document de travail

1

L'incendie d'OVH peut simplement être pris comme un exemple de crise. V. infra 

2

Ce qui occupe la seconde partie de la présente étude. 

3

Ainsi le Droit de la Compliance a longtemps été présenté comme une simple procédure d'effectivité des règles, ce qui rassure, plutôt que ce qui est sa définition substantielle, à savoir des "Buts Monumentaux", notamment sociaux et climatiques, qui lui donne toute son ampleur et révèle sa nature profondément politique. V. Frison-Roche, M.-A. ✏️Notes pour une synthèse opérée sur le vif des travaux du colloque : "Les Buts Monumentaux du Droit de la Compliance : radioscopie d'une notion" la notion de Buts Monumentaux du Droit de la Compliance, 2021 ; et voir plus généralement Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir), 📕 ​Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, 2022. 

4

Contre cela, Frison-Roche, M.-A., Non, je n'aime pas la réglementation, septembre 2021.

5

Il en est de même du principe de proportionnalité. Mais là aussi il serait adéquat de penser les choses différemment. Voir une démonstration dans ce sens, Frison-Roche, M.-A., Définition de la proportionnalité et Définition du Droit de la Compliance, 2021. 

6

Pour une description du choc que la loi déclarant "l'Etat d'urgence sanitaire" fit sur la doctrine juridique, Gelbrat, A. et , Etat d'urgence sanitaire : la doctrine dans tous ses états, 2020.  

7

Ce sont souvent dans ces termes que la doctrine s'exprime. Par exemple 📝Kamgaing, P.-C., Crise sanitaire et procédures judiciaires : étude de droit processuel, 2020, évoquant le fait que le droit processuel est "bafoué". 

Sept. 15, 2021

Publications

► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.A., Le Droit de la concurrence : des choix politiques pour son état futur - rapport de synthèse - ( ("Competition Law: political choices for its future state - Conclusion") , in Claudel, E. (ed.), Le Droit de la concurrence dans tous ses états ("Competition in all its states"), special issue, Gaz. Pal. , 15 Sept. 2021.

This publication is in French, but the Working Paper which is the basis of this article is bilingual. 

____

 

📅 this article follows the colloquium of the French Association Droit & Commerce in Deauville (France), the 25th  et 26th June 2021.

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✏️ It is based on  the bilingual Working Paper built on the notes taken during the colloquium for establishing the conclusion which has been provided.

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Article English Summary: All of these contributions on the issue of the "Competition in all its states" highlighted the choices available for what could be this branch of Law tomorrow: choice of a political nature between various possible definitions of Competition Law.  In method, the main thing is that this definition be clear. For this, this definition must be based on a principle and that the goal pursued by competition law is simple, so that in a second step, competition law can be easily articulated on the one hand with other branches of law. (by the care of the judge, in particular), on the other hand with "policies", such as "competition policy", then other policies (by the care of political authorities, especially European). In essence, two conceptions of principle are opposed: either Competition Law will want to appropriate the goals of other branches, such as those of Regulatory and Compliance Law, or Competition Law will have the modesty to remain anchored in its definition as Market Law. This is the crossroads where we are.

 

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July 23, 2021

Publications

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Programme de mise en conformité (Compliance), Dictionnaire de droit de la concurrence, Concurrences, Art. N° 12345, 2021

Read the definition (in French)

June 23, 2021

Editorial responsibilities : Direction of the collection "Cours-Série Droit privé", Editions Dalloz (33)

►  Référence complète : MARAIS, Astrid, Droit des personnes, Coll. "Cours Dalloz-Série Droit privé", Dalloz, 4ième éd. 2021, 250 p.

📝 Lire la 4ième de couverture.

Depuis la première édition de son ouvrage, la professeure Astrid Marais débute la présentation de celui-ci  ainsi : "Tout est chose ou personne".

À partir de ce principe essentiel, le manuel décrit comment le droit détermine les deux catégories de personnes : les personnes physiques et les personnes morales, comme il les individualise et comment il les protège. Le souci des personnes physiques est d'autant plus grand aujourd'hui que le droit prend en considération le corps des êtres humains.

C'est notamment pourquoi l'ouvrage expose le "Droit des personnes" à travers les diverses branches du Droit, désormais toutes concernées par celles-ci.

 

📚  Consulter l'ensemble de la collection dans laquelle l'ouvrage a été publié.

 

March 18, 2021

Editorial responsibilities : Direction of the collection "Cours-Série Droit privé", Editions Dalloz (33)

Référence complète : Cabrillac, R., Introduction générale au droit, 1ière éd. 1995 - 14ième éd., 2021, Coll. "Cours Dalloz-Série Droit privé", Dalloz, 296 p.

 

Le droit est réputé complexe, voire rébarbatif. Pour dépasser cette impression, qui ne correspond pas à sa nature, cet ouvrage, résolument pédagogique, s’adressent aux étudiants qui prennent contact pour la première fois avec la matière.

Il décrit tout d’abord les fondements du droit, ses origines et ses classifications puis il expose les sources du droit, les preuves et le procès.

Il est complété par des tests de connaissances.

Feb. 2, 2021

Thesaurus : 05. CJCE - CJUE

Full reference: CJEU, 2nd of February 2021, DB v. Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (Consob), case C‑481/19

Read the decision

Read the opinion of advocate general

 

Summary of the decision by CJEU: 

"Natural persons who are subject to an administrative investigation for insider dealing have the right to remain silent when their answers might establish their liability for an offence that is punishable by administrative sanctions of a criminal nature, or their criminal liability". 

 

To go further, read:

Dec. 9, 2020

Teachings : Generall Regulatory law

Au sens juridique, la responsabilité désigne le fait de "répondre", mais au sens commun la responsabilité désigne le fait d'avoir du pouvoir et de l'exercer dans les marges que donne la liberté d'action. Les deux sens doivent converger dans un système libéral.

Puisqu'il a été montré que les Régulateurs sont les maîtres des secteurs, ils seraient donc logiques qu'ils sont responsables. Mais, c'est encore un point commun qu'ils ont avec les juges, parce qu'ils sont consubstantiellement indépendants, ils ne peuvent pas voir leur responsabilité engagées. Cependant le droit positif a posé le principe de la Responsabilité de l'Etat du fait de leur Autorités de Régulation, tandis que leur irresponsabilité politique comparée à l'ampleur de leurs pouvoirs a souvent était le ferment de leur contestation.

Par ailleurs, le mécanisme général de la responsabilité est utilisé, notamment parce que les mécanismes du Droit de la Régulation sont eux-mêmes défaillants. En effet, comme l'a montré Alain Supiot, l'on peut "prendre la responsabilité au sérieux" et, si l'on applique cette perspective plus particulièrement à l'espace numérique, cela permettra de pallier les défaillances de la Régulation publique elle-même. En effet, il existe des sortes de  "trous noirs régulatoires", dont relève encore notamment le numérique.

Mais cette violence de la responsabilité ainsi conçue ne doit pas s'appliquer à tous les opérateurs économiques. En effet, cette responsabilité "proactive" qui dépasse le mécanisme de l'Ex Post vers l'Ex Ante ne doit s'appliquer qu'aux opérateurs régulés, éventuellement aux "opérateurs cruciaux, pour qu'à travers leur personne, les buts de la régulation soient atteints (mécanisme de compliance). Les opérateurs ordinaires doivent demeurer dans un mécanisme Ex Post, la responsabilité ne devant pas engendrer des "devoirs généraux de prise en charge d'autrui", car l'entreprise ordinaire n'est pas de même nature que l'État.

 

D'une façon spécifique et au besoin :

 

D'une façon plus générale et au besoin :

 

Consulter ci-dessous la bibliographie spécifique à cette leçon portant sur la Responsabilité et la Régulation:

Updated: Dec. 3, 2020 (Initial publication: July 15, 2020)

Publications

Full Reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Rights, primary and natural Compliance Tools, Working Paper, July  2020.

This Working paper is the basis for an article published in the collective book  Compliance Tools .

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There was a time when Regulatory techniques  were above all only calculations of the best tarifications, taken up by monopolistic companies, while Compliance techniques were only obedience to all rules governing us. All this could therefore only be business of abacus and badine, used by engineers and consisted only of mechanical reflexes of "conformity" to all kinds of rules with the corset ensuring that everyone is bent in front of them!footnote-1946. In the perspective of a Regulation and Compliance thus conceived, that is to say effective, it would not be necessary to insert prerogatives for people, since these could only be sources of inefficiency, of cost. and protest, where the order would come from figures set in advance and controlled processes.

Systems have since evolved to integrate these prerogatives of each person: rights. Is this evolution really acquired? Maybe more effectively in Regulation Law than in its extension which is Compliance Law. This may be surprising since Compliance Law, in that it extends Regulatory Law in enterprises should, on the contrary, promote rights by meeting the enterprise, which is a group of people ....!footnote-1986 . But the modern reluctance to define the enterprise (and the company) as a group of people and the preference given to a definition of the company (and the enterprise) as an "asset", a "good" of which investors would be the owners, maybe explains the sidelining of rights not only in Regulatory Law but also in Compliance Law even though it is being deployed in the space of the enterprise!footnote-1987.

In addition, if Regulation has long been the subject of a branch of Law in which rights have full place, the presentation of Compliance as "conformity", that is to say the proven assurance of obedience to all the applicable rules, leaves no space for the prerogatives of people, which appear rather as resistance to the obedience that would be expected of them. There again, the expectation of what would be a good ratio of conformity between behaviors and prescriptions would be obtained by a "design", data processing being the new form of calculation, improved by precision tools where the being human is not required!footnote-1989. His fallibility and the little confidence which one can place in him leads even to exclude the people and to conceive Compliance system between machines, not only to alert of the failures, but also to manufacture the "regulations" and to connect those. here, in a "regulatory fabric" without a jump stitch, entirely enveloping human beings!footnote-1990.

It would therefore be with regret, and probably because some constitutional jurisdictions still attach some value to fundamental rights that the systems of "conformity" of behavior to the rules make some room for the prerogatives of people, their more essential rights. It is sometimes said that this is part of the cost. It would therefore be as by "forcing" that rights would exist in Compliance systems, a kind of price that the effectiveness of Compliance must pay as a tribute to the Rule of Law principle!footnote-1991.

If in a poor definition Compliance is conceived in this only "conformity", leading to a landscape in which the behaviors of the people adjust to the rules governing the situations, Compliance being only the most "effective way" to ensure the application of the rules, in a mechanical perspective of Law, then it would effectively be necessary to reduce the prerogatives of people to a minimal part, because any "additional cost" is intended to disappear, even if it is produced here by constitutional requirements. In the looming battle between the effectiveness of the application of rules and the concern for the legal prerogatives of people who should above all obey and not claim their rights, especially their right not to obey , or their right to keep secret in Compliance techniques which is based on the centralization of information, the effectiveness of efficiency could only, by the very power of this tautology, prevail!footnote-1988... 

The defeat would not be total, however, collaboration would still be possible and active between people availing themselves of their rights and Compliance Law. Indeed, in many respects, if rights have been recognized in Compliance systems, it is not only because Compliance Law, like any branch of Law, can only be deployed with respect for fundamental rights. kept by fundamental legal texts, but also because of the effectiveness of rights as " Compliance Tools".

Indeed, because they constitute a very effective "tool" to ensure the entire functioning of a system whose goals are so difficult to achieve, because every effort must be made to achieve these goals, the public authorities not only rely on the power of crucial operators, but also distribute prerogatives to people who, thus encouraged, activate the Compliance system and participate in the achievement of the "monumental goals". Rights can prove to be the most effective tools to effectively achieve the goals set, to such an extent that they can be considered as "primary tools"  (I).

But it is necessary to be more ambitious, even to reverse the perspective. Indeed because all the Monumental Goals by which Compliance Law is defined can be reduced to the protection of people, that is to say to the effectiveness of their prerogatives, by a mirror effect between rights. given by Law to persons and the rights which constitute the very purpose of all Compliance Law, in particular the protection of all human beings, even if they are in a situation of great weakness, rights become a "natural tool" of Compliance Law (II).

Rights are the Compliance Law future. 

1

Contre cela, la critique radicale, savante et fondée d'Alain Supiot, dans l'ensemble de son oeuvre et plus particulièrement dans La gouvernance par les nombres, 2015. 

2

Sur la définition de l'entreprise comme un groupe de personnes qui se réunissent pour entreprise, v. le travail de référence d'Alain Supiot, par exemple son article d'introduction "L'entreprise...", dans l'ouvrage qu'il a dirigé L'entreprise dans la mondialisation ...., 2015 ...

3

Si l'entreprise pouvait renaître comme idée de cristallisation d'une idée commune entre des personnes, naturellement titulaires de droits subjectifs, exerçant ensemble leur liberté d'entreprendre pour réaliser un projet commun, ce qui correspond à la définition classique du contrat d'entreprise donnée à l'article 1832 du Code civil, cela renforcerait considérablement la présence des droits subjectifs dans le Droit de la Compliance et conforterait la nature humaniste de celui-ci.

En outre, dans une telle définition la loi de la majorité, qui n'est qu'une loi de fonctionnement d'une catégorie de sociétés que sont les sociétés de capitaux, deviendrait moins puissante, au profit des "droits propres" de tout associé (au-delà du cercle des sociétés de personnes), sans qu'il soit besoin d'aller chercher au-delà du cercle des associés ou titulaires de titres émis par la société ou l'entreprise (dit shareholders) et d'aller donner le "droit à la parole" à des personnes qui, parce qu'elles sont "concernées" (les "parties prenantes", les skateholders) ont désormais de plus en plus le "droit à la parole". 

4

La Compliance by Design reflète ces tensions. Elles sont particulièrement bien décrites par Cécile Granier. V. ....

5

Contre cette conception de la légalité, qui prévoit tout et à laquelle il faudrait prouver par avance et que l'on se "conforme" entièrement, ce qui est contraire aux principes mêmes du libéralisme dont le principe est la liberté d'agir et non pas l'obéissance, Carbonnier affirme que les règles sont faites ne pas s'appliquer et qu'elles ne sont que le "mince vernis" des choses, qu'il convenait de se méfier de la "passion du Droit". V. not. son dernier ouvrage Droit et passion du droit sous la Vième République, 1995. Carbonnier est considéré comme le plus grand juriste français du XXième siècle. Il rédigea les lois qui réformèrent en profondeur le Code civil et publia des ouvrages sur "l'art législatif". 

6

Au contraire, l'Etat de Droit n'est pas un coût extérieur au système de Compliance efficace, que celui-ci doit internaliser. Il est le fondement même du Droit de la Compliance. Voir dans ce sens la démonstration faite par le président de la Cour de Justice de l'Union européenne, Koen Laearnt, ..., in Pour une Europe de la Compliance, 2019. 

7

Sur la démonstration comme quoi la Constitution, en ce qu'elle contient de l'incalculable, est broyée dans cette façon de faire, v. Alain Supiot, Intervention 2019