The goal for which a mechanism, a solution an institution or a rule is adopted, instituted or elaborated, is in principle external to them. Knowledge of this goal is a tool to better understand them and is only that.

On the contrary, in Regulation Law, the goal is the heart itself. By definition, Regulation Law is a set of instruments that articulate to take their meaning in relation to a goal. Moreover, these instruments are legitimate to represent a constraint only because they realize a goal which is itself legitimate. The interpretation of Regulation Law is based on the aims pursued: the reasoning is teleological.

This teleological nature explains that efficiency is no longer merely a concern - as for ordinary legal mechanisms, but rather a principle of Regulation Law. It explains the welcome, especially through the European Union Law of the theory of the useful effect. This link between rules, which are only means, and aims, refers to the principle of proportionality, which requires that constraints and exceptions be applied only when they are necessary, proportionality being the form off the classic principle of necessity.

Because the aim is the center, it must be expressed by the author of the Regulation standards, and this is all the more so if they are of a political nature, being not limited to mitigating technical failures of markets. This goal can be varied: the management of systemic risks, but also the consideration of the fundamental rights of people, the preservation of the environment, public health, civilization, education, etc. The silence of the legislature, which limits itself to the making of rules whereas these are merely instruments, without explicating the goal whereas the latter is a political decision, is a fault in the legislative art.

Moreover, in order that the person who applies the Regulation norm, in particular the Regulator and the Judge, has no excessive margin for interpretation and does not substitute for political power, the author of the Regulation norm needs to aim specifically for one goal : in this way, the one who applies the norm will be constrained. Or, if the author targets several purposes, then he must articulate them in relation to each other, by hierarchizing them for example. If he fails to do so, the institution which applies the regulatory standards will itself have to choose the purpose and exercise a power which he does not possess.

This express designation of purpose has been made for the European Banking Union,  this Regulation and Supervision construction, whose primary aim is to prevent systemic risks and resolve crises. Similarly, the purpose of the Regulation of essentiel infrastructures is to provide third parties access to the network. Similarly, in the case of a transitional regulation introduced following liberalization, the aim is to establish competition, the principle of which has been declared by the liberalization law. When this is not clearly stated, there is a lapse in the legislative art.

Legally, the State is a public law subject defined by territory, people and institutions. It acts in the international space and emits norms. Politically, it has the legitimacy required to express the will of the social body and to exercise the violence of which it deprives the other subjects of law. It is often recognizable by its power: its use of public force, its budgetary power, its jurisdictional power. These three powers, declining or being challenged by private, international and more satisfying mechanisms, some predicted the disappearance of the State, to deplore it or to dance on its corpse.

With such a background, in current theories of Regulation, primarily constructed by economic thought and at first sight one might say that the State is above all the enemy. And this for two main reasons. The first is theoretical and of a negative nature. The advocates of the theory of regulation deny the State the political qualities set out above. The State would not be a "person" but rather a group of individuals, civil servants, elected officials and other concrete human beings, expressing nothing but their particular interests, coming into conflict with other interests, and using their powers to serve the former rather than the latter as everyone else. The Regulation theory, adjoining the theory of the agency, is then aimed at controlling public agents and elected representatives in whom there is no reason to trust a priori.

The second reason is practical and positive. The State would not be a "person" but an organization. Here we find the same perspective as for the concept of enterprise, which classical lawyers conceive as a person or a group of people, while economists who conceive of the world through the market represent it as an organization. The state as an organization should be "efficient" or even "optimal". It is then the pragmatic function of the Regulation Law. When it is governed by traditional law, entangled by that it would be an almost religious illusions of the general interest, or even the social contract, it is suboptimal. The Regulation purpose is about making it more effective.

To this end, as an organization, the State is divided into independent regulatory agencies or independent administrative authorities that manage the subjects as close as possible, which is fortunate in reducing the asymmetry of information and in reviving trust in a direct link. The unitary, distant and arrogant State is abandoned for a flexible and pragmatic conception of a strategic state (without capital ...) that would finally have understood that it is an organization like any other ...

Competition law adopts this conception of the State, which it posed from the beginning that it was an economic operator like any other. This is how this conception which would be  more "neutral" of the world is often presented.

Successive crises, whether sanitary or financial, have produced a pendulum effect.

Now, the notions of general interest or common goods are credited of an autonomous value, and the necessity of surpassing immediate interests and of finding persons to bear superior interests or to take charge of the interests of others, even a non-immediate one, emerged.

Thus, the State or the public authority, reappears in the globalization. The Compliance Law or the Corporal Social Responsibility of the crucial companies are converging towards a consideration of the State, which can not be reduced to a pure and simple organization receptacle of externalities.

► Référence complète : M. Caffin-Moi, "L’imprégnation des branches du droit par les mécanismes de compliance : le contrat", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), Compliance et contrat, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", à paraître

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📕lire une présentation de l'ouvrage, Compliance et contrat, dans lequel cet article est publié

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► Résumé de l'article (fair par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC) : L'auteure commence par montrer que les contrats sont de plus en plus présents dans le Droit de la Compliance, celui-ci n'étant plus ce qui est seulement exprimé par des lois d'ordre public, tandis que le contrat ne porterait que les intérêts privés de deux parties particulières. Elle expose comment concrètement aujourd'hui, et chaque jour davantage, les contrats sont utilisés comme un instrument de diffusion de la Compliance, la Vigilance étant exemplaire de cela, les textes incitant les entreprises à le faire, la CS3D mettant "le contrat à l'honneur" par la mise en place de "cascades contractuelles", le contrat agissant à la fois en surface et en profondeur.

Mais il ne faut pas que le contrat soit un moyen de restreindre la responsabilité, et l'on trouve des points de "friction" entre Contrat et Compliance.

Tout d'abord, parce que les réglementations, voire la jurisprudence, obligent les entreprises à contracter, par exemple avec des fournisseurs de rang 2, ce qui est une atteinte à la liberté de ne pas contracter.

En outre, les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance institutionnalisent une relation contractuelle qui peut être déséquilibrée, voire engendrer une concurrence déloyale si une entreprise s'y plie et l'autre pas, la Compliance conférant de plus des prérogatives exorbitantes à l'entreprise.

Pour ne pas provoquer trop de conflits, et l'auteure souligne que le premier est certainement celui sur la compétence juridictionnelle entre le tribunal de commerce et le Tribunal judiciaire de Paris, il faut impérativement un dialogue des juges.

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The Independent Administrative Authority (IAA) is the legal form that the legislator has most often chosen to build regulatory authorities. The IAA is only its legal form, but French law has attached great importance to it, following the often formalistic tradition of public law. They are thus independent administrative authorities, especially in the legal systems of continental law like France, Germany or Italy.

The essential element is in the last adjective: the "independent" character of the organism. This means that this organ, which is only administrative so has a vocation to be placed in the executive hierarchy, does not obey the Government. In this, regulators have often been presented as free electrons, which posed the problem of their legitimacy, since they could no longer draw upstream in the legitimacy of the Government. This independence also poses the difficulty of their responsibility, the responsibility of the State for their actions, and the accountability of their use of their powers. Moreover, the independence of regulators is sometimes questioned if it is the government that retains the power to appoint the leaders of the regulatory authority. Finally, the budgetary autonomy of the regulator is crucial to ensure its independence, although the authorities having the privilege of benefiting from a budget - which is not included in the LOLF - are very few in number. They are no longer referred to as "independent administrative authorities" but as "Independent Public Authorities", the legislator making a distinction between the two (French Law of 20 January 2017).

The second point concerns the second adjective: that it is an "administrative" body. This corresponds to the traditional idea that regulation is the mechanism by which the State intervenes in the economy, in the image of a kind of deconcentration of ministries, in the Scandinavian model of the agency. If we allow ourselves to be enclosed in this vocabulary, we conclude that this administrative body makes an administrative decision which is the subject of an appeal before a judge. Thus, in the first place, this would be a first instance appeal and not a judgment since the administrative authority is not a court. Secondly, the natural judge of the appeal should be the administrative judge since it is an administrative decision issued by an administrative authority. But in France the Ordinance of 1 December 1986 sur la concurrence et la libéralisation des prix (on competition and price liberalization), because it intended precisely to break the idea of ​​an administered economy in order to impose price freedom on the idea of ​​economic liberalism, required that attacks against the decisions of economic regulators taking the form of IAA are brought before the Court of Appeal of Paris, judicial jurisdiction. Some great authors were even able to conclude that the Paris Court of Appeal had become an administrative court. But today the procedural system has become extremely complex, because according to the IAA and according to the different kinds of decisions adopted, they are subject to an appeal either to the Court of Appeal of Paris or to the Conseil d'État (Council of State) . If one observes the successive laws that modify the system, one finds that after this great position of principle of 1986, the administrative judge gradually takes again its place in the system, in particular in the financial regulation. Is it logical to conclude that we are returning to a spirit of regulation defined as an administrative police and an economy administered by the State?

Finally, the third term is the name itself: "authority". It means in the first place an entity whose power holds before in its "authority". But it marks that it is not a jurisdiction, that it takes unilateral decisions. It was without counting the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the judicial judge! Indeed, Article 6§1 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that everyone has the right to an impartial tribunal in civil and criminal matters. The notion of "criminal matter" does not coincide with the formal traditional concept of criminal law but refers to the broad and concrete factual concept of repression. Thus, by a reasoning which goes backwards, an organization, whatever the qualification that a State has formally conferred on it, which has an activity of repression, acts "in criminal matters". From this alone, in the European sense, it is a "tribunal". This automatically triggers a series of fundamental procedural guarantees for the benefit of the person who is likely to be the subject of a decision on his part. In France, a series of jurisprudence, both of the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation), the Conseil d'État (Council of State) or the Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) has confirmed this juridictionnalization of the AAI.

Paradoxically, the notion of conflict of interest seems to be at the center of Economic Law only recently in Economic Law, in both Corporate and Public Law. This is due to the philosophy which animates these two branches of Law, very different for each, and which has changed in each.

In fact, and in the first place in Public Law, in the Continental legal systems and especially in French legal tradition, on the side of the State, the one who serves it, by a sort of natural effect,, makes the general interest incarnated by the State pass before its personal interest. There is an opposition of interests, namely the personal interest of this public official who would like to work less and earn more, and the common interest of the population, who would like to pay less taxes and for example benefit trains that always arrive on time and the general interest which would be for example the construction of a European rail network.

But this conflict would be resolved "naturally" because the public official, having "a sense of the general interest" and being animated by the "sense of public service", sacrifices himself to serve the general interes. He stays late at his office and gets the trains on time. This theory of public service was the inheritance of royalty, a system in which the King is at the service of the People, like the aristocracy is in the "service of the King." There could therefore be no conflict of interest, neither in the administration nor in the public enterprises, nor to observe, manage or dissolve. The question does not arise ...

Let us now take the side of the companies, seen by the Company Law. In the classical conception of corporate governance, corporate officers are necessarily shareholders of the company and the profits are mandatorily distributed among all partners: the partnership agreement is a "contract of common interest". Thus, the corporate officer works in the knowledge that the fruits of his efforts will come back to him through the profits he will receive as a partner. Whatever its egoism - and even the agent must be, this mechanism produces the satisfaction of all the other partners who mechanically will also receive the profits. Selfishness is indeed the motor of the system, as in the classical theory of Market and Competition. Thus, in the corporate mechanism, there is never a conflict of interest since the corporate officer is obligatorily associated: he will always work in the interest of the partners since in this he works for himself. As Company Law posits that the loss of the company will also be incurred and suffered by all partners, he will also avoid this prospect. Again, there is no need for any control. The question of a conflict of interest between the mandatary and those who conferred this function does not structurally arise...

These two representations both proved inaccurate. They were based on quite different philosophies - the public official being supposed to have exceeded his own interest, the corporate officer being supposed to serve the common interest or the social interest by concern for his own interest - but this was by  a unique reasoning that these two representations were defeated.

Let us take the first on Public Law: the "sense of the State" is not so common in the administration and the public enterprises, that the people who work there sacrifice themselves for the social group. They are human beings like the others. Researchers in economics and finance, through this elementary reflection of suspicion, have shattered these political and legal representations. In particular, it has been observed that the institutional lifestyle of public enterprises, very close to the government and their leaders, is often not very justified, whereas it is paid by the taxpayer, that is, by the social group which they claimed to serve. Europe, by affirming in the Treaty of Rome the principle of "neutrality of the capital of enterprises", that is to say, indifference to the fact that the enterprise has as its shareholder a private person or a public person, validated this absence of exceeding of his particular interest by the servant of the State, become simple economic agent. This made it possible to reach the conclusion made for Company Law.

Disillusionment was of the same magnitude. It has been observed that the corporate officer, ordinary human being, is not devoted to the company and does not have the only benefit of the profits he will later receive as a partner. He sometimes gets very little, so he can receive very many advantages (financial, pecuniary or in kind, direct or indirect). The other shareholders see their profits decrease accordingly. They are thus in a conflict of interest. Moreover, the corporate officer was elected by the shareholders' meeting, that is to say, in practice, the majority shareholder or the "controlling" shareholder (controlling shareholder) and not by all. He may not even be associated (but a "senior officer").

The very fact that the situation is no longer qualified by lawyers, through the qualifications of classical Company Law, still borrowing from the Civil Contract Law, the qualifications coming more from financial theories, borrowing from the theory of the agency, adically changed the perspective. The assumptions have been reversed: by the same "nature effect", the conflict of interest has been disclosed as structurally existing between the manager and the minority shareholder. Since the minority shareholder does not have the de facto power to dismiss the corporate officer since he does not have the majority of the voting rights, the question does not even arise whether the manager has or has not a corporate status: the minority shareholder has only the power to sell his securities, if the management of the manager is unfavorable (right of exit) or the power to say, protest and make known. This presupposes that he is informed, which will put at the center of a new Company Law information, even transparency.

Thus, this conflict of interests finds a solution in the actual transfer of securities, beyond the legal principle of negotiability. For this reason, if the company is listed, the conflict of interest is translated dialectically into a relationship between the corporate officer and the financial market which, by its liquidity, allows the agent to be sanctioned, and also provides information, Financial market and the minority shareholder becoming identical. The manager could certainly have a "sense of social interest", a sort of equivalent of the state's sense for a civil servant, if he had an ethics, which would feed a self-regulation. Few people believe in the reality of this hypothesis. By pragmatism, it is more readily accepted that the manager will prefer his interest to that of the minority shareholder. Indeed, he can serve his personal interest rather than the interest for which a power has been given to him through the informational rent he has, and the asymmetry of information he enjoys. All the regulation will intervene to reduce this asymmetry of information and to equip the minority shareholder thanks to the regulator who defends the interests of the market against the corporate officers, if necessary through the criminal law. But the belief in managerial volunteerism has recently taken on a new dimension with corporate social responsability, the social responsibility of the company where managers express their concern for others.

The identification of conflicts of interests, their prevention and their management are transforming Financial Regulatory Law and then the Common Law of Regulation, because today it is no longer believed a priori that people exceed their personal interest to serve the interest of others. It is perhaps to regain trust and even sympathy that companies have invested in social responsibility. The latter is elaborated by rules which are at first very flexible but which can also express a concern for the general interest. In this, it can meet Compliance Law and express on behalf of the companies a concern for the general interest, if the companies provide proof of this concern.

To take an example of a conflict of interest that resulted in substantial legal changes, the potentially dangerous situation of credit rating agencies has been pointed out when they are both paid by banks, advising them and designing products, While being the source of the ratings, the main indices from which the investments are made. Banks being the first financial intermediaries, these conflicts of interest are therefore systematically dangerous. That is why in Europe ESMA exercises control over these rating agencies.

The identification of conflicts of interest, which most often involves changing the way we look at a situation - which seemed normal until the point of view changes - the moral and legal perspective being different, Trust one has in this person or another one modifying this look, is today what moves the most in Regulation Law.
This is true of Public and Corporate Law, which are extended by the Regulation Law, here itself transformed by Compliance Law, notably by the launchers of alerts. But this is also true that all political institutions and elected officials.

For a rule emerges: the more central the notion of conflict of interest becomes, the more it must be realized that Trust is no longer given a priori, either to a person, to a function, to a mechanism, to a system. Trust is no longer given only a posteriori in procedures that burden the action, where one must give to see continuously that one has deserved this trust.

The State's traditional view is that it serves the general interest through its public services, either directly (by its administrations, or even by public enterprises), or by delegation (eg through the concession mechanism). Public service is generally defined in a functional way, ie through public service missions that the organization must perform, such as providing public transport or caring for the population whatever (Eg in France by the public firm the SNCF). The liberalization of those public sectors, the primary reference to the market as a means of achieving the general interest, the primary reference to competition and the play of the European Law has destroyed this intimacy between public service, general interest, public enterprise and State.

Today, in a dialectical game, the Regulation keeps this concern for public service missions in balance with the competition, in a competitive context and under the control of a Regulator. The system is more complex and challenging because it creates new difficulties, such as information asymmetry or less easy integration of long-term planning, but it is better suited to an open and globalized economy.

► Référence complète : A.-M. Ilcheva, "Condamnation de Shell aux Pays-Bas : la responsabilité climatique des entreprises pétrolières se dessine", D. 2021, pp. 1968-1970

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► Résumé de l'article : Après une brève description de l'affaire en cause au principal, l'auteure explicite dans un premier les fondements du jugement dit "Shell". Elle explique que l'action engagée était fondée sur le droit de la responsabilité civile délictuelle néerlandais, plus précisément le "duty of care" de l'article 6:162 du code civil néerlandais, lequel amène le juge, afin d'établir le fait générateur, à apprécier le comportement de l'entreprise défenderesse au regard du standard de comportement de la personne prudente et raisonnable. Sont également mobilisés par le juge des travaux scientifiques (rapport du GIEC), des normes de droit international (CEDH) et des normes de droit souple (Principes directeurs de l'ONU), afin de caractériser tant le fait générateur que le dommage (notamment futur). Dans un second temps, l'auteure envisage la portée de ce jugement, frappé d'appel au moment de la rédaction de son article. Elle souligne que le juge s'est appuyé sur la notion d'entreprise, permettant ainsi de contourner l'obstacle traditionnel lié à la personnalité morale, et qu'il a retenu ici une responsabilité préventive, tournée vers le futur. Elle termine en mettant en avant les conditions nécessaires pour que ce jugement soit effectif et constate que l'effort demandé à l'entreprise est plus important que celui préconisé par les rapports d'experts.

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🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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The notion of "Common Goods" refers to a political conception insofar as it concerns objectively commercial goods such as cultural goods or medical services, but which the community is going to demand that everyone should have access to it even though the individual does not have the ability to pay the exact price. It is then the taxpayer - present or future - or the social partners who bear the cost, or even some companies, through the corporal social social responsibility mechanism.

This protection of Common Goods can be done by the State in the name of the interest of the social group for which it is responsible and whose it expresses the will, particularly through the notion of the general interest. In this now restricted framework which is the State, this reference runs counter to the principle of competition. This is particularly clear in Europe, which is based on a Union built on an autonomous and integrated legal order in the Member States in which competition continues to have a principled value and benefits from the hierarchy of norms. The evolution of European Law has balanced the principle of competition with other principles, such as the management of systemic risks, for example health, financial or environmental risks and the creation of the banking union shows that the principle of competition is no longer an apex in the European system.

But it still remains to an economic and financial conception of Europe, definition that the definition of the Regulatory Law  when it is restricted to the management of the market failures feeds. It is conceivable that Europe will one day evolve towards a more humanistic conception of Regulatory  Law, the same one that the European States practice and defend, notably through the notion of public service. Indeed and traditionally, public services give people access to common goods, such as education, health or culture.

Paradoxically, even though Law is not set up on a global scale, it is at this level that the legal notion of "common goods" has developed.

When one refers to goods that are called "global goods", one then seeks goods that are common to humanity, such as oceans or civilizations. It is at once the heart of Nature and the heart of Human Being, which plunges into the past and the future. Paradoxically, the concept of "global goods" is still more political in substance, but because of a lack of global political governance, effective protection is difficult, as their political consecration can only be effective nationally or simply declaratory internationally. That is why this balance is at present only at national level, which refers to the difficulty of regulating globalization.

Thus, the "common goods" legally exist more under their black face: the "global evils" or "global ills" or "global failures", against which a "Global Law" actually takes place. The notion of "global evils" constitutes a sort of mirror of Common Goods. It is then observed that countries that develop legal discourse to regulate global evils and global goods thus deploy global unilateral national Law. This is the case in the United States, notably in financial regulatory Law or more broadly through the new Compliance Law, which is being born. Companies have a role to play, particularly through Codes of Conduct and Corporate Social Responsibility.

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'Obligation de Compliance, coll."Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, to be published.

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📘 At the same time, a book in English, Compliance Obligation, is published in the collection copublished by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Éditions Bruylant.

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🧮the book follows the cycle of colloquia 2023 organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its Universities partners.

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📚this volume is one of a series of books devoted to Compliance in this collection.

► read the presentations of the other books:

• further books:

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Le système probatoire de la Compliance, 2025

• previous books:

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche & M. Boissavy (eds.), 📕Compliance et droits de la défense. Enquête interne - CJIP - CRPC, 2023

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕La juridictionnalisation de Compliance, 2023

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, 2022

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Les outils de la Compliance, 2021

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Pour une Europe de la Compliance, 2019

🕴️N. Borga, 🕴️J.-Cl. Marin and 🕴️J.-Ch. Roda (eds.), 📕Compliance : l'Entreprise, le Régulateur et le Juge, 2018

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Régulation, Supervision, Compliance, 2017

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Internet, espace d'interrégulation, 2016

📚see the global presentation of all the books of the collection.

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► General presentation of this book: Compliance Compliance is sometimes presented as something that cannot be avoided, which is tantamount to seeing it as the legal obligation par excellence, Criminal Law being its most appropriate mode of expression. It is sometimes presented as something that the company does out of ethical concern, self-regulation which is the opposite of legal obligation. For the moment, therefore, there is no single vision of the Compliance Obligation. This is all the less the case because of the multitude of texts, themselves constantly evolving and changing, which inject such a wide range of compliance obligations that we give up trying to establish any unity, thinking that, on a case-by-case basis, we will define a regime and a legal constraint of greater or lesser strength, aimed at one subject or debtor or another, for the benefit of one or other.

This lack of unity, due to the absence of a definition of the Compliance Obligation, makes the application of the texts difficult to foresee and therefore makes the Judge fearful, even though he/she is going to take on more and more importance.

This book asks the practical questions: What is Compliance obliging? Who is obliged to comply? and How far are we obliged to comply? and provides answers, Compliance practices, constraints and innovations will be better mastered and anticipated by all those they affect: companies, stakeholders, technicians, lawyers, consultants, institutions and courts.

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🏗️general construction of this Book: The book opens with a double Introduction.  The first, which is freely accessible, consists of a summary of the book, while the second, which is substantial, deals with the unified conception that we can, and indeed should, have, of the "Compliance Obligation", without losing the concrete and active character that characterises this branch of law.

The first Part of the book aims to define the Compliance Obligation. To this end, Chapter I deals with the Nature of this obligation. Chapter II deals with the Spaces of the Compliance Obligation.

The Part II aims to articulate the Compliance Obligation with other branches of Law. 

The Part III of the book looks at the way in which the possibility of obliging and the means of obliging are provided.  To this end, Chapter I deals with the Convergence of the Sources of the Compliance Obligation. Chapter II considers International Arbitration as a reinforcement of the Compliance Obligation. To this end, Chapter I deals with the Convergence of the Sources of the Compliance Obligation. Chapter II considers International Arbitration as a reinforcement of the Compliance Obligation. 

The last Part of the book is devoted to Vigilance, the leading edge of the Compliance Obligation. Chapter I is devoted to a study of the various sectors, and analyses the Intensities of the Vigilance Obligation. Chapter II deals with the Variations in Tension generated by the Vigilance Obligation. Finally, Chapter III deals with the New Modalities of the Compliance Obligation, highlighted by the Vigilance Imperative.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

ANCRER LES OBLIGATIONS DE COMPLIANCE SI DIVERSES  

 DANS LEUR NATURE, LEURS REGIMES ET LEUR FORCE 

POUR DEGAGER  L'UNITE DE L'OBLIGATION DE COMPLIANCE

LA RENDANT COMPREHENSIBLE ET PRATIQUABLE 

(ANCHOR COMPLIANCE OBLIGATIONS, SO DIVERSE

 IN THEIR NATURE, THEIR REGIMES AND THEIR FORCE,

TO BRING OUT THE UNITY OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

MAKING IT COMPREHENSIBLE AND PRACTICABLE)

♦️ Obligation de Compliance : construire une structure de compliance produisant des effets crédibles au regard des Buts Monumentaux visés par le Législateur (Compliance Obligation: building a compliance structure that produces credible results with regard to the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator), by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

TITRE I.

CERNER L’OBLIGATION DE COMPLIANCE 

(IDENTIFYING THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION)

CHAPITRE I : LA NATURE DE L’OBLIGATION DE COMPLIANCE (THE NATURE OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION)

Section 1 ♦️ La volonté, le cœur et le calcul, les trois traits cernant l'Obligation de Compliance  (Will, Heart and Calculation, the three traits encercling the Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 2 ♦️ De la dette à l’obligation de compliance (From the Debt to the Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Bruno Deffains

Section 3 ♦️ Obligation de Compliance et droits humains (Compliance Obligation and Human Rights), by 🕴️Jean-Baptiste Racine

Section 4 ♦️ L'Obligation de Compliance et les mutations de la souveraineté et de la citoyenneté (Compliance Obligation and changes in Sovereignty and Citizenship), by 🕴️René Sève

Section 5 ♦️ La définition de l''obligation de compliance confrontée au droit de la cybersécurité (The definition of the Compliance Obligation in Cybersecurity Law) by🕴️Michel Séjean

CHAPITRE II : LES ESPACES DE L’OBLIGATION DE COMPLIANCE (SPACES OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION)

Section 1 ♦️ Entités industrielles et Obligation de compliance (Industrial entities and Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Etienne Maclouf

Section 2 ♦️ L'Obligation de Compliance dans les chaînes de valeur (The Compliance Obligation in Value Chains), by 🕴️Lucien Rapp

Section 3 ♦️ Compliance et conflits de lois. Le droit international de la vigilance-conformité à partir de quelques applications récentes sur le continent européen (Compliance and conflict of laws. International Law of Vigilance-Conformity, based on recent applications in Europe), by 🕴️Louis d'Avout 

TITRE II.

ARTICULER L’OBLIGATION DE COMPLIANCE AVEC DES BRANCHES DU DROIT

(ARTICULATING THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION WITH BRANCHES OF LAW)

Section 1 ♦️ Dimensions constitutionnelles de l'Obligation de Compliance (Constitutional dimensions of the Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Stéphane Mouton

Section 2 ♦️ Droit fiscal et obligation de compliance (Tax Law and Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Daniel Gutmann

Section 3 ♦️ Le droit processuel, prototype de l'Obligation de Compliance (General Procedural Law, prototype of the Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 4 ♦️ Le droit des sociétés et des marchés financiers face à l'Obligation de Compliance (Corporate and Financial Markets Law facing the Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Anne-Valérie Le Fur

Section 5 ♦️ Le rapport entre le Droit de la responsabilité civile et l'Obligation de Compliance (The link between Tort Law and Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Jean-Sébastien Borghetti

Section 6 ♦️ Dimensions environnementales et climatiques de l'Obligation de Compliance (Environmental and Climatic Dimensions of the Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Marta Torre-Schaub

Section 7 ♦️ Droit de la concurrence et Droit de la Compliance (Competition Law and Compliance Law), by 🕴️Jean-Christophe Roda

Section 8 ♦️ L'Obligation de Compliance en Droit global (The Compliance Obligation in Global Law), by 🕴️Benoît Frydman & 🕴️Alice Briegleb

Section 9 ♦️ Transformation des relations de travail et obligation de vigilance (Transformation of Labour Relations and Vigilance Obligation), by 🕴️Stéphane Vernac

Section 11 ♦️ Les juges du droit des entreprises en difficulté et les obligations de compliance (Judges of Insolvency Law and Compliance Obligations), by 🕴️Jean-Baptiste Barbièri

TITRE III.

COMPLIANCE : DONNER ET SE DONNER LES MOYENS D’OBLIGER

(COMPLIANCE : GIVE AND TAKE THE MEANS TO OBLIGE)

CHAPITRE I : LA CONVERGENCE DES SOURCES (CONVERGENCE OF SOURCES)

Section 1 ♦️ Obligation sur obligation vaut (Compliance Obligation on Obligation works), by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 2 ♦️ Les technologies disponibles, prescrites ou proscrites pour satisfaire Compliance et Vigilance (Technologies available, prescribed or prohibited to meet Compliance and Vigilance requirements), by 🕴️Emmanuel Netter

Section 3 ♦️ La cybersécurité et l’Obligation de Compliance (Cybersecurity and Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Michel Séjean🕴️

Section 4 ♦️ Contrainte légale et stratégie des entreprises en matière de Compliance (Legal Constraint and Company Strategies in Compliance matters), by 🕴️Jean-Philippe Denis & Nathalie Fabbe-Costes

Section 5 ♦️ La loi, source de l’Obligation de Compliance (The Law, source of the Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Jean-Baptiste Blanc

Section 6 ♦️ Opposition et convergence des systèmes juridiques américains et européens dans les règles et cultures de compliance (Opposition and Convergence of American and European Legal Systems in Compliance Rules and Cultures), by 🕴️Raphaël Gauvain & 🕴️Blanche Balian

Section 7 ♦️ Ce à quoi les engagements engagent qu'est un engagement (What a ), by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

CHAPITRE II : L’ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL EN RENFORT DE L’OBLIGATION DE COMPLIANCE (INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN SUPPORT OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION)

Section 1 ♦️ Comment l'arbitrage international peut être un renfort de l'Obligation de Compliance (How International Arbitration can reinforce the Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Laurent Aynès

Section 2 ♦️ La considération par l'Arbitrage de l'Obligation de Compliance pour une place d'arbitrage durable (Arbitration' consideration of Compliance Obligation for a Sustainable Arbitration Place),  by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche 

Section 3 ♦️ L’usage de l’arbitrage international pour renforcer l’obligation de Compliance : l’exemple du secteur de la construction (The use of International Arbitration to reinforce the Compliance Obligation: the example of the construction sector), by 🕴️Christophe Lapp

Section 4 ♦️ L’arbitre, juge, superviseur, accompagnateur  ? (The Arbitrator, Judge, Supervisor, Support) , by 🕴️Jean-Baptiste Racine

TITRE IV.

LA VIGILANCE, POINTE AVANCÉE DE L’OBLIGATION DE COMPLIANCE

(VIGILANCE, SPEARHEAD OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION)

Section 1 ♦️ La Vigilance, pointe avancée et part totale de l'Obligation de Compliance (....), by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

CHAPITRE I : LES INTENSITÉS DE L’OBLIGATION DE VIGILANCE, POINTE AVANCÉE DU SYSTÈME DE COMPLIANCE (INTENSITIES OF THE VIGILANCE OBLIGATION, SPEARHEAD OF THE COMPLIANCE SYSTEM)

Section 2 ♦️ L’intensité de l’Obligation de Vigilance selon les secteurs : le cas des opérateurs financiers (Intensity of the Vigilance Obligation by Sectors: the case of Financial Operators), by 🕴️Anne-Claire Rouaud

Section 3 ♦️ L’intensité de l’Obligation de Vigilance selon les secteurs : le cas des opérateurs bancaires et d’assurance (Intensity of the Vigilance Obligation by Sectors: the case of Banking and Insurance Operators), by 🕴️Mathieu Françon

Section 4 ♦️ L’intensité de l’obligation de vigilance selon les secteurs : le cas des opérateurs numériques (Intensity of the Vigilance Obligation by Sectors: the case of Digital Operators), by 🕴️Grégoire Loiseau

Section 5 ♦️ L’Obligation de vigilance des opérateurs énergétiques (The Vigilance obligation of Energy Operators), by 🕴️Marie Lamoureux

Section 2 ♦️ Transformation de la gouvernance et obligation de Vigilance (Transformation of Governance and Vigilance Obligation), by 🕴️Véronique Magniermag

CHAPITRE II : LES DISPUTES AUTOUR DE L'OBLIGATION DE VIGILANCE, POINTE AVANCÉE DU SYSTÈME DE COMPLIANCE, DANS SON RAPPORT AVEC LA RESPONSABILITÉ

Section 1 ♦️ Le rapport entre le droit de la responsabilité civile et l'obligation de compliance, by 🕴️Jean-Sébastien Borghetti

Section 2 ♦️ Repenser le concept de responsabilité civile à l’aune du devoir de vigilance, pointe avancée de la compliance (Rethinking the Concept of Civil Liability in the light of the Duty of Vigilance, Spearhead of Compliance), by 🕴️Mustapha Mekki

Section 3 ♦️ Tensions et contradictions entre les instruments relatifs à la vigilance raisonnable des entreprises, by 🕴️Laurence Dubin

Section 4 ♦️ Compliance, Vigilance et Responsabilité civile : mettre en ordre et raison garde (Compliance, Vigilance  and Civil Liability: put in order and keep the Reason), by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

CHAPITRE III : LES MODALITÉS NOUVELLES DE L'OBLIGATION DE COMPLIANCE, MISES EN LUMIÈRE PAR L'IMPÉRATIF DE VIGILANCE (NEW MODALITIES OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION, HIGHLIGHTED BY THE VIGILANCE IMPERATIVE)

Section 1 ♦️ Clauses et contrats, modalités de l’obligation de vigilance (Clauses and Contracts, terms and conditions of implementation of the Vigilance Obligation), by 🕴️Gilles J. Martin

Section 2 ♦️ La preuve de la bonne exécution de la Vigilance au regard du système probatoire de Compliance (Proof that Vigilance has been properly carried out with regard to the Compliance Evidence System), by 🕴️Jean-Christophe Roda

TITRE V.

LE JUGE ET L'OBLIGATION DE COMPLIANCE

(THE JUDGE AND THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION)

Section 1 Section 1 ♦️ Devoir de vigilance et litiges commerciaux : une compétence à partager ?, par 🕴️François Ancel

Section 2 ♦️ Les enjeux présents à venir de l’articulation des principes de procédure civile et commerciale avec la logique de compliance (Present and Future Challenges of Articulating Principles of Civil and Commercial Procedure with the Logic of Compliance), by 🕴️Thibault Goujon-Bethan

Section 3 ♦️ Le juge de l’amiable et la compliance (The amicable settlement judge and compliance), by 🕴️Malik Chapuis

Section 4 ♦️ Le Juge requis pour une Obligation de Compliance effective (The Judge required for an Effective Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

L’OBLIGATION DE COMPLIANCE : VISION D’ENSEMBLE

(COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION : OVERVIEW)

♦️ L'obligation de compliance, charge portée par les entreprises systémiques donnant vie au Droit de la Compliance. - lignes de force de l'ouvrage (The Compliance Obligation, a burden borne by Systemic Companies giving life to Compliance Law -  key points of the book (free access) by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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► Référence complète : M. Mekki, "Peut-on repenser la responsabilité à l’aune du devoir de Vigilance, pointe avancée de la Compliance ?", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2025, sous presse.

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📕lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, L'obligation de Compliance, dans lequel cet article est publié

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► Résumé de l'article (fait par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC) : L'auteur développe les tensions que l'Obligation de Vigilance engendre sur le concept même de responsabilité. Répertoriant toutes les manifestations, très diverses, de la Vigilance, selon les domaines, il observe que se forme une logique téléologique de prévention et de gestion des risques systémiques, ce qu'est la compliance, sans doute remède à un État impuissant, s'appuyant sur une grande pluralité des normes.

La question est de savoir si l'on peut passer de ces droits spéciaux mais d'un esprit commun à un droit commun transformé. Les premières décisions rendues à propos de la loi de 2017 répondent par la négative, mais la question est ouverte.

Il faut alors revenir sur le concept même de responsabilité, qui pourrait accueillir un mécanisme général de Vigilance. Ce concept est très flexible et présente l'adaptabilité requise pour accueillir la logique de compliance. En effet, la responsabilité, classiquement ex post peut passer ex ante, à travers la notion de dette, non plus juridique mais éthique, car les entreprises doivent être "dignes de confiance".

La responsabilité préventive vise alors à restaurer l'équilibre des systèmes dans la poursuite des Buts Monumentaux, pour l'efficacité et l'efficience des systèmes. La responsabilité se mixte de subjectivité et d'objectivité, le risque devenant central (par rapport à la faute), le litige dépassant l'intérêt des parties, la remédiation devenant le sujet central dans un procès en responsabilité à repenser : le dialogue doit y être au centre, entre les juridictions, entre les entreprises et les parties prenantes, dans un office du juge adapté.

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Compliance, Vigilance et Responsabilité civile : mettre en ordre et raison garder" (Compliance, Vigilance and Civil Liability: put in Order and keep the sense of Reason), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2025, forthcoming

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📝read the article (in French)

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🚧read the bilingual Working Paper on which this article is based, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks

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📕real the general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published

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► English summary of this article: The descriptions of the Liability incurred by large companies as a result of their compliance obligations are very diverse, even contradictory, going beyond the wishes that may be expressed as to what this liability should be. The first part of this study therefore sets out the various liabilities incurred by companies, which differ in the conditions under which they are implemented and in their scope, so as not to confuse them.

Indeed, as the various laws establish specific legal compliance obligations, they give rise to liabilities of varying conditions and scope, and it is not possible to avail of the regime of one in a situation that falls within the scope of another. It is therefore necessary to review the various bodies of compliance legislation, the GDPR, the ALM-FT regulations, the French so-called Sapin 2 law, the French so-called Vigilance law , the European IA Act , the European European DGA Act, etc., to recall the inflexion that each of these bodies of legislation has made to the liability rules applied to the companies subject to them. Nevertheless, the unicity of the Compliance Obligation, overcoming this necessary diversity of situations, regulations and liability regimes,  can provide grouping lines to indicate beyond this diversity the extent of the liability incurred by companies.

Once this classification has been made, the second part of the study develops the observation that none of this can create any principle of general liability on large companies in terms of compliance, and in particular not in terms of vigilance. It is not possible to deduce a general principle of specific obligations of liability or specific obligations to reparation, for example in the area of vigilance, as the texts creating specific vigilance obligation refer to the conditions of commun Tort Law (proof damage and causality), and International Public Law does not have the force to generate a general principle binding companies in this respect.

The third part stresses that it is nevertheless always possible to invoke Tort Law, and companies cannot claim to escape this. This may involve contractual liability, a situation  becoming increasingly frequent as companies contractualise their legal compliance obligations, reproducing them but also modifying them, and as Vigilance duty is an obligation that goes beyond the specific situations covered by the regulations. 

But it is essential, and this is the subject of the fourth part, not to make companies pure and simple guarantors of the state of the world, present and future. Indeed, if we were to transform sectoral compliances into illustrations of what would then be a new general principle, but one that applied only to them, they would consequently exercise the other side of this coin, namely power over others.

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► Référence complète : J.-D. Bretzner & A. Aynès, "Droit de la preuve. janvier 2024 - décembre 2025", D. 2025, panorama, pp. 602-612

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, hearing before the French working group on the modernisation of French Arbitration Law, about the issue Arbitrage et Droit de la Compliance : est-il besoin d'un texte ? ("Arbitration and Compliance Law: is a text required?"), Directorate of Civil Affairs' French Ministry of Justice, 13 February 2025.

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► Result of this presentation and the ensuing discussion, recorded in the working group's report published in March 2025 (published in French, translated her: "This report on the guiding principles would not be complete without mentioning the discussions in the working group on the introduction of a guiding principle requiring the arbitral tribunal to take into account "human, environmental and compliance issues, as well as respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of the parties".This proposal gave rise to particularly heated discussions. Some saw it as a scarecrow likely to make French Arbitration Law less attractive and to weaken Arbitration awards, opening up cases of recourse on the pretext of bad faith, even though these values would already be taken into account in the review of domestic or international public policy.  Others, on the other hand, felt that such a text would have the advantage of enshrining an Arbitration Law connected to values that are not exclusively economically oriented, pointing out, moreover, that such a principle would not be redundant with the control of public policy, which intervenes ex post, whereas this text imposes Ex Ante responsability, and that this principle would allow a noteworthy introduction of Compliance Law in rbitration.  They added that the promotion of such values could make it possible to demonstrate a commitment to virtuous arbitration practice. In the light of these differences, after much hesitation, the decision was made not to include it in the draft Code, considering that the final choice was more a question of political dimension that the working group felt it could not decide on its own. ". (p. 36).

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► English Summary of the presentation: My presentation deals with the relationship between Compliance Law and Arbitration, particularly International Arbitration. It is built around 12 successive points. The work I have carried out on these various points is associated with it. It precedes the answers I shall give to the questions put by the members of the working group and the ensuing discussion.

1. stagnation in the relationship between Arbitration and Compliance Law, due to continuing misunderstandings about Compliance

2. progress towards a better understanding of Compliance and the appropriateness of the arbitrator's role within Compliance Law

3. prospects for the growing relationship between Compliance Law and Arbitration, particularly with regard to the value chains built up by international companies

4. educational issues

5. time required to build a "culture of place" in this matter

6. "Doctrinal" difficulties

7. benefit from the production of a "doctrine of place" on this subject

8. going beyond the continental summa divisio of Public Law and Private Law

9. practical assimilation of Regulatory Contracts in sustainable sectors and chains

10. opening up the Arbitration World to this articulation with Compliance Law

11.  Can an official legal text contribute to this?

12.  example of the guiding principles of the French Code of Civil Procedure.

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► Référence complète : M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Le feu des contentieux de divorce et le froid que le juge doit souffler,", in  Association du Collège de Droit de l'Université Jean-Moulin Lyon 3, Rencontre et discussion autour du dernier roman de Eliette Abecassis : un divorce à la française. Manufacture des tabacs, 20 janvier 2025, 17h-19h, Lyon.

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🪑🪑🪑🪑participent également à cette conférence-débat :

🕴️Eliette Abécassis, Ecrivain

🕴️Vincent Egéa, professeur à l'Université Aix-Marseille 

🕴️Hervé de Gaudemar, professeur à l'Université Jean-Moulin Lyon 3

🕴️Jean-Christophe Roda, professeur à l'Université Jean-Moulin Lyon 3

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► Présentation de mon intervention dans cette conférence-débat  : Après avoir écouté la présentation par Vincent Egéa du livre d'Eliette Abécassis, Divorce à la française, publié par celle-ci chez Grasset, puis la description qu'Eliette Abécassis en a faite, dans son choix d'écrire sur cela, dans sa façon de l'écrire, la construction du roman, la distribution des paroles de chacun qui exprime son monde à lui, l'entrechoc de ces mondes et le juge devant lequel de plus en plus ces "vérités" sont racontés dans des rapports personnels et sociaux de plus en plus violents et liquéfiés, 

avant qu'un débat ne s'instaure avec l'auditoire d'étudiants très nombreux,

j'ai repris dans ce livre à la fois si beau et si instructif qu'il permet au lecteur d'accéder à la réalité du Droit et de ce contentieux particulier du divorce.

Notamment en ce qu'il est désormais courant, et pour chacun singulier puisque chacun a son histoire et la défend avec flamme et stratégie. Cet enflammement, que les conseils ou la famille peut modérer mais bien souvent attisent, n'est pas propre au Droit de la famille. Même en Droit économique et financier, on trouve cela. Mais c'est bien dans les conflits du divorce que la passion se déchaine, la passion de la vérité pouvant particulier à cet emballement.

L'office du juge est alors de "modérer" cela, s'appuyant sur la froideur du Droit, froideur qu'on lui reproche souvent mais qui est aussi sa distance, son impartialité et qu'il peut à travers notamment le juge apporter pour remettre à une température modérée les rapports parentaux, pour éviter que l'enfant ne s'enflamme à son tour. C'est bien ce que le Législateur lui demanda en 1975. D'ailleurs son auteur, Carbonnier, demandait par ailleurs au Législateur d'être autour comme "étranger" à son objet pour ne pas se laisser aller à la "passion", contre laquelle il mit en garde notamment le juge en 1995.

En lisant ce roman qui nous institue juge et nous amène à manier nous-même le principe du contradictoire au fur et à mesure que, tournant les pages, l'on écoute l'un et l'autre, l'on comprend à quel point la littérature est une voie royale pour accéder à la compréhension du Droit, en ce qu'il traduit l'état d'une société.

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📝Lire le compte-rendu de cette  conférence-débat

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► Référence complète : G. Cerqueira & A. Schreiber (dir.), La contractualisation du droit. Approches françaises et brésiliennes, Société de législation comparée (SLC), coll. "Colloques", vol. 61, 2024, 454 p.

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📗lire la 4ième de couverture

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📗lire la table des matières de l'ouvrage

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Résumé de l'ouvrage (fait par l'éditeur) : "L’ouvrage restitue les actes de deux colloques franco-brésiliens qui ont eu lieu en 2023, d’abord à Rio de Janeiro, puis à Paris, pour discuter du phénomène de la contractualisation du droit dans le cadre d’un partenariat inédit entre la Société de législation comparée et la Procurature générale de l’État de Rio de Janeiro.

Au programme, plusieurs approches et questionnements. L’approche privatiste s’intéresse à la contractualisation des piliers du droit civil : le contrat, la personne et la famille, les biens, auxquels s’ajoute le travail, dans la mesure où il exprime le rapport entre l’homme et l’économie de la cité. L’approche publiciste, quant à elle, examine l’emprise de la technique contractuelle sur des points névralgiques du Léviathan : le droit administratif, la gestion gouvernementale, le fisc, le contrôle des comptes publics et le droit répressif. L’approche procédurale, pour sa part, étudie l’incursion des conventions – lieux de concorde – dans le terrain du contentieux, y compris international. L’approche transversale, enfin, analyse la contractualisation du droit de l’environnement et, dans un domaine connexe, celle de la responsabilité sociale des entreprises. Au-delà des approches, plusieurs questionnements. Pour l’avocat, comment faire face à la contractualisation du droit ? Pour l’universitaire, comment comprendre le phénomène par nos a priori ? Pour le législateur, dans quelles conditions favoriser la contractualisation du droit ?

Dans une double perspective, française et brésilienne, cet ouvrage explore ainsi le chemin contractualiste emprunté par le droit dans sa dimension normative. En investissant les confins de la construction juridique par la technique contractuelle et son ressort volitif, l’ouvrage entend contribuer au débat sur le rôle croissant de la volonté dans la définition des fins et du contenu du droit.".

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📝lire une présentation de l'article de Marie-Anne Frison-Roche : "Les conditions requises pour favoriser la "contractualisation" du droit"

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► Référence complète : M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Les conditions requises pour favoriser la "contractualisation" du droit", in G. Cerqueira & A. Schreiber (dir.), La contractualisation du droit. Approches françaises et brésiliennes, Société de législation comparée (SLC), coll. "Colloques", vol. 61, 2024, pp. 435-448

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📝lire l'article

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🚧lire le document de travail bilingue sur la base duquel cet article a été élaboré, doté de développements supplémentaires, de références techniques et de liens hypertextes

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► Résumé de l'article : 

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► Référence complète : L. d'Avout, "GPA : la première chambre civile couvre la fraude et institue le droit à l'enfant", JCP G, n° 48, 2 décembre 2024, act. 1410, pp. 1974-1978

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► Résumé de l'article (fait par l'auteur) : "La première chambre civile relance sa jurisprudence en matière de GPA. À travers deux arrêts récents (2 octobre et 14 novembre), elle remet en cause les principes essentiels du droit français de la filiation de la bioéthique, pourtant réaffirmés récemment avec force par le législateur".

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► Référence complète : M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Compliance et engagement : le juste milieu de l'arrêt rendu par la Cour d'appel de La Haye le 12 novembre 2024", in série de vidéos Surplomb, 28 novembre 2024

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🌐visionner sur LinkedIn cette vidéo de la série Surplomb

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🌐visionner sur LinkedIn cette vidéo de la série Surplomb, publiée dans la Newsletter Surplomb, par MAFR

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🎬visionner ci-dessous cette vidéo de la série Surplomb⤵️

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Surplomp, par mafr

la série de vidéos dédiée à la Régulation, la Compliance et la Vigilance

🌐suivre Marie-Anne Frison-Roche sur LinkedIn

🌐s'abonner à la Newsletter MAFR. Regulation, Compliance, Law

🌐s'abonner à la Newsletter Surplomb, par MAFR

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► Référence complète : M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Compliance, Climat, Dommage, Science et Vérité - Cour d'appel de La Haye, 12 novembre 2024", in série de vidéos Surplomb, 26 novembre 2024

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🌐visionner sur LinkedIn cette vidéo de la série Surplomb

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🌐visionner sur LinkedIn cette vidéo de la série Surplomb, publiée dans la Newsletter Surplomb, par MAFR

____

🎬visionner ci-dessous cette vidéo de la série Surplomb⤵️

____

Surplomp, par mafr

la série de vidéos dédiée à la Régulation, la Compliance et la Vigilance

🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn

🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law

🌐subscribe to the Newsletter Surplomb, par MAFR

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "GPA : "L’interdiction de la GPA posée par le Code civil n’existe plus" ("The French Civil Code ban on surrogacy no longer exists"), interview with Olivia Dufour, Actu-Juridique, 26 November 2024

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💬read the interview (in French)

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► Presentation of the interview by the journal: "Un simple arrêt de section rendu par la première civile de la Cour de cassation le 14 novembre 2024 peut-il donner plein effet à une "pure convention de GPA" ? Telle est la question que l’on peut se poser à la suite de cette décision. Éléments de réponse avec le professeur Marie-Anne Frison-Roche. ".

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🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📕GPA : dire Oui ou dire Non, 2018

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► Questions posées, réponses apportées : 

Actu-Juridique. Question : Un arrêt de section de la première chambre civile de la Cour de cassation rendu le 14 novembre dernier en matière de gestation pour autrui (GPA) a suscité l’émotion. Est-il exact de dire qu’en pratique, suite à cette décision, la prohibition en France de la GPA n’existe plus ?  

Marie-Anne Frison-Roche. Réponse. : 

A.J. Q. : Quels étaient les faits de l’espèce et en quoi diffèrent-ils des autres affaires ?

MaFR. R. : O

A.J. Q. : L’Europe avait-elle déjà pris position sur la GPA et si oui, par quels textes et dans quel sens ?

MaFR. R. : En Europe, c'est la jurisprudence de la CEDH qui en 2014 (arrêts Mennesson) est venu briser la jurisprudence française pour imposer que la filiation de l'enfant né d'une GPA réalisée à l'étranger dans un pays où la GPA est licite puisse être établie à l'égard du père dont les gamètes avaient été utilisées. Il ne restait plus alors qu'à procéder à l'adoption par le conjoint de celui-ci. La législation interne ne fût pas pour autant modifiée mais le fonctionnement de l'état-civil permet de rendre inefficace la prohibition. Mais c'était à la fois dire Non et Oui... L'enjeu fût donc de modifier les textes, soit pour exclure la GPA plus fortement, soit pour l'admettre plus ouvertement.

A.J. Q. : En quoi la technique juridique utilisée pour faire reconnaître cette GPA en France était-elle différente de ce que l’on connait usuellement ?

MaFR. R. : C

A.J. Q. : Quelle est la portée de cet arrêt ?

MaFR. R. : I

A.J. Q. : Qu’en est-il du rapport avec l’adoption ?

MaFR. R. : S

A.J. Q. : Le rapporteur n’a-t-il pas évoqué une possibilité de déguiser une adoption illicite à l’étranger sous une GPA ?

MaFR. R. : S

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► Référence complète : Gerechtshof Den Haag (Cour d'appel de La Haye), 12 novembre 2024, n° 200.302.332/01, Shell Plc c/ Milieudefensie et a.

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🏛️lire la décision

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🏛️lire la traduction de la décision (en anglais)

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🏛️consulter une présentation de la décision de première instance rendue dans cette affaire par la Cour de District de La Haye

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🎬Regarder la première vidéo de la série Surplomb réalisée à propos de cet arrêt et intitulée "Compliance, Climat, Dommage, Science et Vérité - Cour d'appel de La Haye, 12 novembre 2024"

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🎬Regarder la seconde vidéo de la série Surplomb réalisée à propos de cet arrêt et intitulée "Compliance et engagement : le juste milieu de l'arrêt rendu par la Cour d'appel de La Haye le 12 novembre 2024"

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► Référence complète : Civ. 1, 2 octobre 2024, n° 22-20.883 et 23-50.002

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🏛️lire l'arrêt rendu à la suite du pourvoi n° 22-20.883

🏛️lire l'arrêt rendu à la suite du pourvoi n° 23-50.002

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🏛️lire le communiqué de presse de la Cour de cassation accompagnant la publication de ces décisions

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📝Commentaires de ces décisions :

• JCP G, 14 octobre 2024, n° 41, actualité 1185, p. 1970 

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► Référence complète : E. Abécassis, Divorce à la française, Paris, Grasset, 288 p.

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📗lire la 4ième de couverture

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📝lire l'entretien d'Eliette Abécassis sur le rapport avec le droit, la justice, la famille, "Dalloz-Actu", 3 octobre 2024.

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► Présentation de l'ouvrage : "Le «  divorce à la française  » n’est pas un «  jardin à la française  »  : c’est une boucherie  !

Antoine et Margaux Maurepas se sont aimés et ont eu ensemble deux enfants. Lui est chirurgien, elle est romancière. Voilà qu’au moment de divorcer, ils se déchirent pour la garde de leurs enfants.
Le mari, la femme, le fils, la fille, la mère de l’un, la mère de l’autre, la deuxième épouse de l’un, le frère de l’autre, l’ami de l’un, l’amant de l’autre, l’éditeur de l’une, la comptable de l’autre  : plus les témoignages se succèdent auprès de la Juge aux Affaires familiales, plus la vérité se dérobe : Est-elle folle, est-il un pervers manipulateur et violent, qui est infidèle à qui, qui instrumentalise les enfants, qui complote avec sa mère, qui a le pouvoir symbolique et le pouvoir financier, entre l’écrivaine qui invente des fictions et le chirurgien qui opère ses patients  ? Qui est le bourreau, qui est la victime  ? Un tourbillon de témoignages, auditions, procès-verbaux, qui se contredisent sur les faits comme sur leur interprétation, et autant de versions à démêler, pour la Juge comme pour la lectrice et le lecteur, qui se trouvent exactement dans la même position d’inconfort qu’elle  : chacune et chacun est crédible quand on l’écoute ou le lit, et pourtant rien ne s’accorde dans ce puzzle d’une famille éclatée.

Les enfants pourront-ils échapper au jugement de Salomon  ? La décision juste devant la loi sera-t-elle la bonne décision?
Ce sont certaines des interrogations qui traversent ces pages vertigineuses, où tous se reconnaîtront et essaieront de démêler le vrai du faux et de sauver ce qu’il reste à sauver.

Le procès impitoyable du couple, de la fiction et de la société. Un huis-clos étourdissant où Eliette Abécassis assoit plus que jamais son talent de romancière.".

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🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, participation to the round table "Le droit à l'enfant : réalité ou faux concept ?" ("The right to a child: reality or false concept?"), in Regards croisés sur les nouvelles filiations, Cour d'appel de Paris (Paris Court of Appeal), September 12, 2024

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🧮see the full programme of this event

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► Summary of the conference: 

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🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn

🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "GPA : "Il faut cesser de passer la femme par pertes et profits"" ("Surrogacy: "We have to stop writing off women""), interview with Olivia Dufour, Actu-Juridique, April 30, 2024

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💬read the interview (in French)

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► Presentation of the interview by the journal: "Le 23 avril 2024, les députés européens ont adopté une loi élargissant le champ d’application des mesures actuelles pour combattre et prévenir la traite des êtres humains et mieux soutenir ses victimes, par 563 voix pour, 7 contre et 17 abstentions. La maternité de substitution, ou GPA, entre désormais dans le champ de la traite des êtres humains. Mais depuis quelques jours, la polémique fait rage. Le nouveau texte réprime-t-il uniquement la GPA contrainte organisée par une association criminelle, ou toute forme de GPA ? Nous avons demandé au professeur Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, auteur d’un ouvrage intitulé « GPA : dire Oui ou dire Non » publié chez Dalloz en 2018, de nous éclairer sur les enjeux attachés à cette question et sur la position de l’Europe.".

(Free translation: "On April 23, 2024, Members of the European Parliament adopted a law extending the scope of existing measures to combat and prevent human trafficking and provide better support for its victims, by 563 votes to 7 with 17 abstentions. Surrogacy (gestation pour autrui - GPA in French), now falls within the scope of human trafficking. But in recent days, controversy has been raging. Does the new text punish only forced surrogate motherhood organised by a criminal association, or all forms of surrogacy? We asked Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, author of a book entitled "GPA: dire Oui ou dire Non" ("Surrogacy: say Yes or say No") published by Dalloz in 2018, to shed some light on the issues surrounding this question and on Europe's position".)

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🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📕GPA : dire Oui ou dire Non (Surrogacy: say Yes or say No), 2018

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► Questions asked, answers given:

Actu Juridique. Question : La GPA est une pratique ancienne même si elle est longtemps restée marginale, qu’est-ce qui a changé et nécessite aujourd’hui l’attention des pouvoirs publics et du législateur ?  

Surrogacy is a long-standing practice, even if it was marginal for a long time. What has changed that now requires the attention of public authorities and legislators?  

Marie-Anne Frison-Roche. Answer. : Two things have changed this practice. The first is the possibility of introducing a man's gametes and a woman's oocyte into a woman's body, thus reducing her to being a "carrier" and providing this service, which is very much in demand. The second is the transformation of the desire for a child, an eternal desire shared by many, into a "right to a child". This right to a child would need to be put into practice by any means, for the benefit of any holder who is unable or unwilling to suffer the inconvenience of pregnancy. This is how the practice developed. The legislator intervened, following case law, by declaring, as the Cour de cassation (French Court of cassation) had done, that this practice was contrary to the dignity of the human being, punishable under both the Code civil (French Civil Code) and the Code pénal (French Criminal Code).

A.J. Q. : Autrement dit, les innovations techniques couplées à l’émergence d’un sentiment de droit à l’enfant ont fait exploser la demande de maternité de substitution…

In other words, technical innovations coupled with the emergence of a sense of entitlement to a right to a child have led to an explosion in demand for surrogacy...

MaFR. A. : Yes, but this demand has to be matched by an offer. There are few fertile women prepared to bear children for others. The desire to have children is not matched by a desire to bear them for others without compensation. And the few women who are willing to do so are in countries far removed from the people who want them. The practice has only developed because of the very prosperous agencies on which everything depends. Without this intermediation, towards Ukraine for example, the practice could not have spread.

A.J. Q. : L’Europe avait-elle déjà pris position sur la GPA et si oui, par quels textes et dans quel sens ?

Has Europe already taken a position on surrogacy and, if so, in what texts and in what direction?

MaFR. A. : In Europe, it was the case law of the ECHR which in 2014 (Mennesson judgments) broke with French jurisprudence to impose that the filiation of a child born as a result of a surrogacy carried out abroad in a country where surrogacy is lawful can be established with regard to the father whose gametes had been used. All that remained was for the child to be adopted by the father's spouse. This did not change domestic legislation, but the way civil status works means that the prohibition can be rendered ineffective. But this meant saying Yes and No at the same time... The challenge was therefore to amend the texts, either to exclude surrogacy more strongly, or to admit it more openly.

A.J. Q. : Dans ce contexte, quelle nouveauté apporte le texte adopté par le Parlement européen le 23 avril dernier ?

Against this backdrop, what is new about the text adopted by the European Parliament on 23 April?

MaFR. A. : It depends on how you interpret it. When the text of the directive was being discussed, no one disputed that its adoption would result in the effective prohibition of surrogacy throughout the European Union and the strengthening of the basis of this prohibition in that surrogacy constitutes trafficking in human beings, the woman who carries the child and who legally remains the mother since she gives birth to the child, and that child. But once voted, the text gives rise to another interpretation, supported by some. It is argued that trafficking in human beings is not the "legal category" into which surrogacy falls, but the "condition" under which surrogacy is punishable; So, if surrogacy is practised without "trade" (trafficking is a trade), if there is no money involved, if there is only altruism and concern for the other person, then not only is surrogacy not punished, but what is more, this so-called "altruistic" surrogacy becomes legitimate by the very fact of this directive! The scope is therefore quite simply the opposite... This could give rise to litigation.

A.J. Q. : Dans l’ouvrage que vous avez consacré à la GPA en 2018 chez Lefebvre-Dalloz préfacé par Éliette Abécassis, vous montrez qu’on peut dire Oui ou Non à la GPA, mais qu’il faut répondre et surtout vous mettez en lumière les implications de ces choix. Pourquoi faut-il forcément répondre à cette question ?

In your book on GPA published by Lefebvre-Dalloz in 2018, with a preface by Éliette Abécassis, you show that we can say Yes or No to surrogacy, but that we must answer, and above all you highlight the implications of these choices. Why do we have to answer this question?

MaFR. A. : The question of whether or not to allow surrogacy must be answered (say Yes or say No), because it is a question of society. Not to answer it, to say neither yes nor no, to say yes and no at the same time, is not to choose the society in which we want to live.

A.J. Q. : Imaginons que l’on choisisse le Oui. Qu’implique-t-il sur les valeurs de la société et l’état du droit ?

What does this mean for the values of society and the Rule of Law?

MaFR. A. : If we accept that surrogacy is legal, then it is the will of the people involved that gives birth to the child. The agreement between the person or persons planning to have a child and the woman who agrees to carry the child, with the agent acting as intermediary. It is the society of the contract, because the State is nothing, it is only the scribe who copies the stipulations onto the civil status register. Parentage ceases to be the institution guarded by the State through which the individual is anchored in the social group. Parentage becomes a private matter. This contract-based society is in fact a market society. 

A.J. Q. : Et si l’on dit Non à la GPA, on le fait sur quel fondement et pourquoi ?

And if we say No to GPA, on what grounds and why?

MaFR. A. : If we maintain the prohibition of surrogacy and seek to make it effective, in particular by taking action against agencies, we are referring to a society where the State, through public order, watches over human beings and where the law controls power and protects women.

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