Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary
The notion of "Common Goods" refers to a political conception insofar as it concerns objectively commercial goods such as cultural goods or medical services, but which the community is going to demand that everyone should have access to it even though the individual does not have the ability to pay the exact price. It is then the taxpayer - present or future - or the social partners who bear the cost, or even some companies, through the corporal social social responsibility mechanism.
This protection of Common Goods can be done by the State in the name of the interest of the social group for which it is responsible and whose it expresses the will, particularly through the notion of the general interest. In this now restricted framework which is the State, this reference runs counter to the principle of competition. This is particularly clear in Europe, which is based on a Union built on an autonomous and integrated legal order in the Member States in which competition continues to have a principled value and benefits from the hierarchy of norms. The evolution of European Law has balanced the principle of competition with other principles, such as the management of systemic risks, for example health, financial or environmental risks and the creation of the banking union shows that the principle of competition is no longer an apex in the European system.
But it still remains to an economic and financial conception of Europe, definition that the definition of the Regulatory Law when it is restricted to the management of the market failures feeds. It is conceivable that Europe will one day evolve towards a more humanistic conception of Regulatory Law, the same one that the European States practice and defend, notably through the notion of public service. Indeed and traditionally, public services give people access to common goods, such as education, health or culture.
Paradoxically, even though Law is not set up on a global scale, it is at this level that the legal notion of "common goods" has developed.
When one refers to goods that are called "global goods", one then seeks goods that are common to humanity, such as oceans or civilizations. It is at once the heart of Nature and the heart of Human Being, which plunges into the past and the future. Paradoxically, the concept of "global goods" is still more political in substance, but because of a lack of global political governance, effective protection is difficult, as their political consecration can only be effective nationally or simply declaratory internationally. That is why this balance is at present only at national level, which refers to the difficulty of regulating globalization.
Thus, the "common goods" legally exist more under their black face: the "global evils" or "global ills" or "global failures", against which a "Global Law" actually takes place. The notion of "global evils" constitutes a sort of mirror of Common Goods. It is then observed that countries that develop legal discourse to regulate global evils and global goods thus deploy global unilateral national Law. This is the case in the United States, notably in financial regulatory Law or more broadly through the new Compliance Law, which is being born. Companies have a role to play, particularly through Codes of Conduct and Corporate Social Responsibility.
March 22, 2020
This working paper is the basis for an article in the French Law Journal Le Clunet.
When we compare the terms "Compliance" and "Extraterritoriality", it is often with dissatisfaction, even anger and indignation. On the momentum, after having expressed a principle of disapproval of such a merger, attention is focused on how we can fight against it, to break the link between Compliance and Extraterritoriality. But do we have to go so fast? Is this negative initial assessment correct?
Indeed, thus gone, it is frequently explained that the binding mechanisms of Compliance are suffered, that they come from abroad
We are leaving this kind of complaint against X, which targets what would be this appalling "Compliance", this Law which would be both hostile and mechanical which would not have been able to stay within the limits of borders, Compliance being thus placed in contrast to sovereignty and protection, which presuppose staying within its limits
Compliance Law would thus become the very negation of Law, since it has the effect, even the purpose (barely concealed by strategic, powerful and shameless States), of counting borders for nothing, whereas Public International Law, in that it is built between the sovereign subjects of law that are the States presupposes the primary respect for borders to better exceed them while Private International Law takes the same postulate to better welcome foreign Law in situations presenting a foreign element
If you see it that way, what should you do then? The answer is obvious: react!
It is necessary to save the sovereignty, France, companies, the Law itself. If that is how the question is posed, how can we disagree? It is therefore necessary to destroy the Compliance Law and the extra-territoriality of American Law which had found this "Trojan horse", an expression so frequently used. This is the basis for the administrative reports available, for example the Berger-Lellouche
But without discussing the effectiveness of the remedies proposed downstream, it is necessary to return to this description so widely shared made upstream. Because many elements on the contrary lead to affirm that ComplianceLaw first of all and by nature can only be extraterritorial and that it must be. Whether or not the State in which it was created has malicious intentions. The description which is made to us most often describes particular cases from which we draw generalities, but we cannot reduce Compliance Law to the already cooled cases, as BNPP case, or to the always hot case of the American embargo on Iran. Furthermore, one cannot take the issue of embargoes and draw conclusions, legitimate for it, but which would apply to the whole of Compliance Law. The fact that theCompliance Law is a branch of Law at the stage still of emergence can lead to this confusion which consists in taking the part for the whole, but it is very regrettable because what is justified for the embargoes does not is in no way relevant for all Compliance Law, of which precisely the Law of embargoes is only a small part, even an abusive use. This overlapping is not often perceived, because the definition of Compliance Law and its criterion are not clearly enough defined, namely the existence of a "monumental goal"
Once we have distinguished the embargoes, as an atypical, sometimes even illegitimate part, of Compliance Law, we should continue this work of distinction by emphasizing that the United States has certainly invented Compliance Law
Indeed, this branch of the new Law which is Compliance Law is not reducible to Competition Law
Read the developments below.
Ce par quoi l'on commence presque toujours, le Droit de la Compliance étant "étrange" notamment parce qu'il vient des Etats-Unis, v. Frison-Roche, M.-A., Le Droit de la Compliance, 2016.
V. par ex. Monéger, cas BNPP, ...., in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir)., ...
V. par ex. Bismuth, R. Pour une appréhension nuancée de l'extraterritorialité du droit américain - quelques réflexions autour des procédures et sanctions visant Alstom et BNP Paris, 2015.
Sur la définition de la souveraineté comme l'aptitude à comprendre ses limites et à demeurer dans ses limites, voire à les instituer soi-même, la souveraineté étant intime de l'idée d'Etat de Droit, v. Supiot, A., Mondialisation et Globalisation, ....
Pour le rappel de ces éléments de base et leur mise en perspective par rapport au Droit de la Compliance, v. Frison-Roche, M.-A. Le cas de l'Amazonie, ....
Rapport Berger-Lellouche, ....
Rapport Gauvain, ....
Critère dégagé en 2016 : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Le Droit de la Compliance.
Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance : hier, aujourd'hui, demain, 2017.
Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance Europe humaniste, 2019.
Frison-Roche, M.-A., Droit de la concurrence et Droit de la compliance, 2018
Sur les liens entre le Droit de la Compliance et la technologie de la blockchain, v. ....
June 28, 2019
It is often observed, even theorized, even advised and touted, that Compliance is a mechanism by which public authorities internalize political (eg environmental) concerns in big companies, which accept them, in Ex Ante, because they are rather in agreement with these "monumental goals" (eg saving the planet) and that this shared virtue is beneficial to their reputation. It is observed that this could be the most successful way in new configurations, such as digital.
But, and the Compliance Mechanism has often been brought closer to the contractual mechanism, this is only relevant if both parties are willing to do so. This is technically true, for example for the Deferred Prosecution, which requires explicit consent. This is true in a more general sense that the company wants to choose itself how to structure its organization to achieve the goals politically pursued by the State. Conversely, the compliance mechanisms work if the State is willing to admit the economic logic of the global private players and / or, if there are possible breaches, not to pursue its investigations and close the file it has opened, at a price more or less high.
But just say No.
As in contractual matters, the first freedom is negative and depends on the ability to say No.
The State can do it. But the company can do it too.
And Daimler just said No.
Publicly, including through an article in the Wall Street Journal of June 28, 2019.
The company sets out in a warning to the market that it is the object of a requirement on the part of the German Motor Authority (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt) of an allegation of fraud, by the installation of a software, aimed at misleading instruments for measuring emissions of greenhouse gases on cars using diesel.
It is therefore an environmental compliance mechanism that would have been intentionally countered.
On this allegation, the Regulator both warns the company of what it considers to be a fact, ie compliance fraud, and attaches it to an immediate measure, namely the removal of the circulation of 42,000 vehicles sold or proposed by Daimler with such a device.
And the firm answers : "No".
Which is probably only beginning, since a No ends the dialogue of Ex Ante to project in the Ex Post sanction procedures, calls 6 observations:
May 19, 2018
Il y a quelques jours, dans une réunion j'écoutais Alain Supiot.
Et cela m'a fait penser à un article sous presse que je viens de lire d'une ancienne élève à laquelle j'avais consacré des journées entières pour la guider dans son travail.
Puis ce matin, j'ai lu un extrait d'un livre de Bernard Maris.
Et cela m'a fait penser à des pages de Nietzsche.
Et je me suis dit : la question n'est-elle pas d'échapper non pas du tout à celle de la dette, qui est une question éthique et juridique fondamentale, une notion vaste et belle, mais à une sorte de piège, étroit et mortifère dans lequel il n'y aurait comme "place de référence" comme la place de "débiteur" ou bien la place de "créancier". A la fois en éthique, en économie et en droit.
Et si l'on a tant de mal à trouver notre place, n'est-ce pas parce qu'être "débiteur" peut renvoyer à deux positions qui n'ont rien à voir l'une avec l'autre ? L'une dans laquelle nous portons une dette qui suppose l'existence d'un créancier (ce qui suppose toujours une exécution à venir, une opposition, une violence), et l'autre dans laquelle nous portons une dette qui pourrait exister sans qu'existe un créancier ?
June 23, 1999
Thesaurus : Doctrine
Référence complète, Godé, P., Le droit de l'avenir (un droit en devenir), in Mélanges en hommage à François Terré, L'avenir du droit, Dalloz, Puf, Éditions du juris-classeur, 1999, p.61-78.
Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent lire cet article via le drive dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation"