Food for thoughts

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

The distinction between "Public Law" and "Private Law" is important. In the systems of Continental Law, or still called under Roman-Germanic Law, or even called Civil Law systems, it is even around it that legal systems are built: it can be a basic distinction, a summa divisio, as it it in the Civil Law systems. In the so-called Common Law or Anglo-American systems, the distinction is less fundamental, but it remains, justifying in particular that the rules and disputes concerning the administration call for special rules and are apprehended by special tribunals.

In principle, this distinction is based on the nature of the persons whose legal situation is examined. Under"Public Law" a legal situation involving a person who is itself a public-law entity: the State, a local authority, a public undertaking, etc. That is why, for example, the contract which may be concluded will be of public law, and the judge who may be seized of it will be an administrative court. If the situation does not involve a person governed by public law, then it will be governed by "Private Law". There are a thousand exceptions, but this is the starting and basic and fondamental principle.

Two essential remarks, bearing a system of values, explaining that the systems of Civil Law and Common Law are in fact confronting each other.

The two bodies of rules and institutions are not of equal strength because one of the categories is "closed", corresponding to one criterion (the "public person"), while the other is open: Public Law is a closed category; on the contrary, Private law becomes "active" as soon as there is no public person (a "private person" who or which must define himself or itself as a "non-public person").

One can consider this articulation between Public Law and Private Law in two ways, radically opposed. It may express a mark of inferiority in disfavour of private law: we are all "ordinary" persons in "ordinary" situations with "ordinary" activities (this will be the French conception ....). On the contrary, Public Law is the mark of the State, of Public Order, of Sovereignty, of public power, of the general will, in the interstices of which individuals slip in to act and satisfy their small particular interests

On the contrary, Private Law can be considered as the expression of the "common law": people are free and do what they want, through ownership and contract. As an exception and because they have elected people to do so, the rulers (whom they control), by exception, enact norms that constrain them. But this is an exception, since repression - public law and criminal law, which has the same status in this respect - is only a tribute to the freedom of persons, since this freedom remains wholly in the form of the private enterprise on the market.

It is then measured that the articulation between Public and Private Law profoundly reflects a philosophy and a political position. If it is considered that Regulation is the underlying order by which the Sovereign allows the deployment of his subjects who also benefit from a long-term policy constructed by the autonomous and measured political will, then Public Law in Is the master, the Regulation Law expressing a renewed search for efficiency, this but only this. If we believe that Regulation is whereby economic rationality manages to protect persons and companies from risks and to compensate for market failures, a market whose liberal principle remains the ideal, then Private Law is the core, whith contract and private property as basis tools.

France and the Latin countries adhere rather to this metaphysics of values which entrusts to the Public Authorities and the State the legitimacy and the power to express the general interest by Public Law, Regulators and Constitutional Courts, expressing it on a technical form renewed by the Regulatory tools: incitations, soft law, etc. The legal systems whose history draws on British history put more trust in the person of the entrepreneur and conceive of Regulation Law as an efficient outsourcing of functions to administrations that are efficient, informed and impartial.

Certainly, in the technical daily of the Law of Regulation and following the different sectors, Public and Private Law mix up:  public companies take the form of publicly traded companies under private law or private companies will be entrusted with missions of public service, instituting them as second-level regulators as are the infrastructure network operators.

But the fundamental conception of systems (rooted in the history of the people) and practice marry. In the silence of regulations (and the more they are gossiping and the more the judge must interpret them, which amounts to a "silence"), what sense to give to the system?

To take only a few questions, frequent in practice:

  •      What judge to seize? The administrative judge or the civil judge? What is the "natural judge" of the Regulatory Law?
  •      What standard to apply? The contractual will? The implicit will of the legislator? What is the "natural author" of the Law of Regulation?
  •      Does the silence of the text prohibit action for operators or on the contrary does silence mean their freedom to act?

The absence of a firm and shared definition of what is the Law of Regulation does not facilitate practice. Hesitations in translations from one language to another increase confusion.

For the time being, there is a tendency to refer to Public Law in the sectors where whe take precedence over public operators' monopolies, such as telecommunications, energy, railways, air and postal services, and to refer to Private Law in the sectors which have long been the subject of competition between operators, namely banking, finance and insurance.

It should be recognized that the criterion of distinction has little economic rationale. The notion of risk would be a clearer and more manageable criterion. But it would then lead to a greater challenge to the distinction between Public and Private Law. Because the Law of Regulation, impregnated with Economy and Economic Analysis of Law, has sometimes little basis of legal tradition, it put in question of this summa divisio. If this were to be the case, it would be the totality of the legal systems which would be upset, especially in its judicial organization, since the judicial civil and commercial system is so distinctly distinguished (that of "ordinary" persons, that of "common law ) and the administrative judge (the "natural judge" of the State). It is then realized that the Law of Regulation challenges the whole Law, especially in the Latin countries and the Civil Law systems.

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

Paradoxically, the notion of conflict of interest seems to be at the center of Economic Law only recently in Economic Law, in both Corporate and Public Law. This is due to the philosophy which animates these two branches of Law, very different for each, and which has changed in each.

In fact, and in the first place in Public Law, in the Continental legal systems and especially in French legal tradition, on the side of the State, the one who serves it, by a sort of natural effect,, makes the general interest incarnated by the State pass before its personal interest. There is an opposition of interests, namely the personal interest of this public official who would like to work less and earn more, and the common interest of the population, who would like to pay less taxes and for example benefit trains that always arrive on time and the general interest which would be for example the construction of a European rail network.

But this conflict would be resolved "naturally" because the public official, having "a sense of the general interest" and being animated by the "sense of public service", sacrifices himself to serve the general interes. He stays late at his office and gets the trains on time. This theory of public service was the inheritance of royalty, a system in which the King is at the service of the People, like the aristocracy is in the "service of the King." There could therefore be no conflict of interest, neither in the administration nor in the public enterprises, nor to observe, manage or dissolve. The question does not arise ...

Let us now take the side of the companies, seen by the Company Law. In the classical conception of corporate governance, corporate officers are necessarily shareholders of the company and the profits are mandatorily distributed among all partners: the partnership agreement is a "contract of common interest". Thus, the corporate officer works in the knowledge that the fruits of his efforts will come back to him through the profits he will receive as a partner. Whatever its egoism - and even the agent must be, this mechanism produces the satisfaction of all the other partners who mechanically will also receive the profits. Selfishness is indeed the motor of the system, as in the classical theory of Market and Competition. Thus, in the corporate mechanism, there is never a conflict of interest since the corporate officer is obligatorily associated: he will always work in the interest of the partners since in this he works for himself. As Company Law posits that the loss of the company will also be incurred and suffered by all partners, he will also avoid this prospect. Again, there is no need for any control. The question of a conflict of interest between the mandatary and those who conferred this function does not structurally arise...

These two representations both proved inaccurate. They were based on quite different philosophies - the public official being supposed to have exceeded his own interest, the corporate officer being supposed to serve the common interest or the social interest by concern for his own interest - but this was by  a unique reasoning that these two representations were defeated.

Let us take the first on Public Law: the "sense of the State" is not so common in the administration and the public enterprises, that the people who work there sacrifice themselves for the social group. They are human beings like the others. Researchers in economics and finance, through this elementary reflection of suspicion, have shattered these political and legal representations. In particular, it has been observed that the institutional lifestyle of public enterprises, very close to the government and their leaders, is often not very justified, whereas it is paid by the taxpayer, that is, by the social group which they claimed to serve. Europe, by affirming in the Treaty of Rome the principle of "neutrality of the capital of enterprises", that is to say, indifference to the fact that the enterprise has as its shareholder a private person or a public person, validated this absence of exceeding of his particular interest by the servant of the State, become simple economic agent. This made it possible to reach the conclusion made for Company Law.

Disillusionment was of the same magnitude. It has been observed that the corporate officer, ordinary human being, is not devoted to the company and does not have the only benefit of the profits he will later receive as a partner. He sometimes gets very little, so he can receive very many advantages (financial, pecuniary or in kind, direct or indirect). The other shareholders see their profits decrease accordingly. They are thus in a conflict of interest. Moreover, the corporate officer was elected by the shareholders' meeting, that is to say, in practice, the majority shareholder or the "controlling" shareholder (controlling shareholder) and not by all. He may not even be associated (but a "senior officer").

The very fact that the situation is no longer qualified by lawyers, through the qualifications of classical Company Law, still borrowing from the Civil Contract Law, the qualifications coming more from financial theories, borrowing from the theory of the agency, adically changed the perspective. The assumptions have been reversed: by the same "nature effect", the conflict of interest has been disclosed as structurally existing between the manager and the minority shareholder. Since the minority shareholder does not have the de facto power to dismiss the corporate officer since he does not have the majority of the voting rights, the question does not even arise whether the manager has or has not a corporate status: the minority shareholder has only the power to sell his securities, if the management of the manager is unfavorable (right of exit) or the power to say, protest and make known. This presupposes that he is informed, which will put at the center of a new Company Law information, even transparency.

Thus, this conflict of interests finds a solution in the actual transfer of securities, beyond the legal principle of negotiability. For this reason, if the company is listed, the conflict of interest is translated dialectically into a relationship between the corporate officer and the financial market which, by its liquidity, allows the agent to be sanctioned, and also provides information, Financial market and the minority shareholder becoming identical. The manager could certainly have a "sense of social interest", a sort of equivalent of the state's sense for a civil servant, if he had an ethics, which would feed a self-regulation. Few people believe in the reality of this hypothesis. By pragmatism, it is more readily accepted that the manager will prefer his interest to that of the minority shareholder. Indeed, he can serve his personal interest rather than the interest for which a power has been given to him through the informational rent he has, and the asymmetry of information he enjoys. All the regulation will intervene to reduce this asymmetry of information and to equip the minority shareholder thanks to the regulator who defends the interests of the market against the corporate officers, if necessary through the criminal law. But the belief in managerial volunteerism has recently taken on a new dimension with corporate social responsability, the social responsibility of the company where managers express their concern for others.

The identification of conflicts of interests, their prevention and their management are transforming Financial Regulatory Law and then the Common Law of Regulation, because today it is no longer believed a priori that people exceed their personal interest to serve the interest of others. It is perhaps to regain trust and even sympathy that companies have invested in social responsibility. The latter is elaborated by rules which are at first very flexible but which can also express a concern for the general interest. In this, it can meet Compliance Law and express on behalf of the companies a concern for the general interest, if the companies provide proof of this concern.

To take an example of a conflict of interest that resulted in substantial legal changes, the potentially dangerous situation of credit rating agencies has been pointed out when they are both paid by banks, advising them and designing products, While being the source of the ratings, the main indices from which the investments are made. Banks being the first financial intermediaries, these conflicts of interest are therefore systematically dangerous. That is why in Europe ESMA exercises control over these rating agencies.

The identification of conflicts of interest, which most often involves changing the way we look at a situation - which seemed normal until the point of view changes - the moral and legal perspective being different, Trust one has in this person or another one modifying this look, is today what moves the most in Regulation Law.
This is true of Public and Corporate Law, which are extended by the Regulation Law, here itself transformed by Compliance Law, notably by the launchers of alerts. But this is also true that all political institutions and elected officials.

For a rule emerges: the more central the notion of conflict of interest becomes, the more it must be realized that Trust is no longer given a priori, either to a person, to a function, to a mechanism, to a system. Trust is no longer given only a posteriori in procedures that burden the action, where one must give to see continuously that one has deserved this trust.

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Complete reference : Archives de Philosophie du Droit (APD), Le droit international, tome 32, ed. Sirey, 1987, 442 p. 

 

Read the table of contents.

Read the summaries of the articles in English

 

See the presentation of other volumes of Archives de Philosophie du Droit.

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

The liberal professions such as lawyers, doctors or accountants are organized into professional bodies and consider that they can not be reduced to mere companies operating in markets because the service they offer includes a human and moral dimension, translated by ethics, under the supervision of their internal professional organization, particularly through ex ante their power to adopt their own standards of behavior, and in ex post, the disciplinary power of their professional order.

Competition law refutes this organization from the Old Regime and simply considers the "markets of legal or medical services, firms having to compete with each other and not having to organize the sector, by  or fixing Numerus clausus, etc.

In the perspective of regulation, the liberal professions are, on the contrary, the ones most pertinento organize self-regulation in a globalized economy from the moment they give rise to a credible surveillance system and thus deserve the confidence of customers and public regulators.

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Lafontaine, C., Le corps-marché. La marchandisation de la vie humaine à l'ère de la bioéconomie, Le seuil, 2014.
 

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Manacorda, Stefano, La dynamique des programmes de conformité des entreprises : déclin ou transfiguration du droit pénal des affaires ?, in Supiot, Alain (dir.), L'entreprise dans un monde sans frontières. Perspectives économiques et juridiques, coll. "Les sens du droit", Dalloz, 2015, 320 p.

 

Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent via le Drive lire l'article dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation".

 

 

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

Legally, the State is a public law subject defined by territory, people and institutions. It acts in the international space and emits norms. Politically, it has the legitimacy required to express the will of the social body and to exercise the violence of which it deprives the other subjects of law. It is often recognizable by its power: its use of public force, its budgetary power, its jurisdictional power. These three powers, declining or being challenged by private, international and more satisfying mechanisms, some predicted the disappearance of the State, to deplore it or to dance on its corpse.

With such a background, in current theories of Regulation, primarily constructed by economic thought and at first sight one might say that the State is above all the enemy. And this for two main reasons. The first is theoretical and of a negative nature. The advocates of the theory of regulation deny the State the political qualities set out above. The State would not be a "person" but rather a group of individuals, civil servants, elected officials and other concrete human beings, expressing nothing but their particular interests, coming into conflict with other interests, and using their powers to serve the former rather than the latter as everyone else. The Regulation theory, adjoining the theory of the agency, is then aimed at controlling public agents and elected representatives in whom there is no reason to trust a priori.

The second reason is practical and positive. The State would not be a "person" but an organization. Here we find the same perspective as for the concept of enterprise, which classical lawyers conceive as a person or a group of people, while economists who conceive of the world through the market represent it as an organization. The state as an organization should be "efficient" or even "optimal". It is then the pragmatic function of the Regulation Law. When it is governed by traditional law, entangled by that it would be an almost religious illusions of the general interest, or even the social contract, it is suboptimal. The Regulation purpose is about making it more effective.

To this end, as an organization, the State is divided into independent regulatory agencies or independent administrative authorities that manage the subjects as close as possible, which is fortunate in reducing the asymmetry of information and in reviving trust in a direct link. The unitary, distant and arrogant State is abandoned for a flexible and pragmatic conception of a strategic state (without capital ...) that would finally have understood that it is an organization like any other ...

Competition law adopts this conception of the State, which it posed from the beginning that it was an economic operator like any other. This is how this conception which would be  more "neutral" of the world is often presented.

Successive crises, whether sanitary or financial, have produced a pendulum effect.

Now, the notions of general interest or common goods are credited of an autonomous value, and the necessity of surpassing immediate interests and of finding persons to bear superior interests or to take charge of the interests of others, even a non-immediate one, emerged.

Thus, the State or the public authority, reappears in the globalization. The Compliance Law or the Corporal Social Responsibility of the crucial companies are converging towards a consideration of the State, which can not be reduced to a pure and simple organization receptacle of externalities.

 

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Lagarde, Ch., A regulatory Approch to FinTech, mai 2018. 

 

Lire l'article

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Full reference : Teubner, G., L'auto-constitutionnalisation des entreprises transnationales ? Sur les rapports entres les codes de conduite "privés" et "publics" des entreprises, in Supiot, A. (dir.), L'entreprise dans un monde sans frontières. Perspectives économiques et juridiques, coll. "Les sens du droit", Dalloz, 2015, p.71-83.

 

Sciences Po students can read this article via the Drive in the folder MAFR - Régulation

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète Fox, E., The new world order, in Mélanges Joël Monéger, Liber Amicorum en l'honneur du Professeur Joël Monéger, LexisNexis, 2017, 818 p.  

 

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

The goal for which a mechanism, a solution an institution or a rule is adopted, instituted or elaborated, is in principle external to them. Knowledge of this goal is a tool to better understand them and is only that.

On the contrary, in Regulation Law, the goal is the heart itself. By definition, Regulation Law is a set of instruments that articulate to take their meaning in relation to a goal. Moreover, these instruments are legitimate to represent a constraint only because they realize a goal which is itself legitimate. The interpretation of Regulation Law is based on the aims pursued: the reasoning is teleological.

This teleological nature explains that efficiency is no longer merely a concern - as for ordinary legal mechanisms, but rather a principle of Regulation Law. It explains the welcome, especially through the European Union Law of the theory of the useful effect. This link between rules, which are only means, and aims, refers to the principle of proportionality, which requires that constraints and exceptions be applied only when they are necessary, proportionality being the form off the classic principle of necessity.

Because the aim is the center, it must be expressed by the author of the Regulation standards, and this is all the more so if they are of a political nature, being not limited to mitigating technical failures of markets. This goal can be varied: the management of systemic risks, but also the consideration of the fundamental rights of people, the preservation of the environment, public health, civilization, education, etc. The silence of the legislature, which limits itself to the making of rules whereas these are merely instruments, without explicating the goal whereas the latter is a political decision, is a fault in the legislative art.

Moreover, in order that the person who applies the Regulation norm, in particular the Regulator and the Judge, has no excessive margin for interpretation and does not substitute for political power, the author of the Regulation norm needs to aim specifically for one goal : in this way, the one who applies the norm will be constrained. Or, if the author targets several purposes, then he must articulate them in relation to each other, by hierarchizing them for example. If he fails to do so, the institution which applies the regulatory standards will itself have to choose the purpose and exercise a power which he does not possess.

This express designation of purpose has been made for the European Banking Union,  this Regulation and Supervision construction, whose primary aim is to prevent systemic risks and resolve crises. Similarly, the purpose of the Regulation of essentiel infrastructures is to provide third parties access to the network. Similarly, in the case of a transitional regulation introduced following liberalization, the aim is to establish competition, the principle of which has been declared by the liberalization law. When this is not clearly stated, there is a lapse in the legislative art.

 

 

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

The notion of "Common Goods" refers to a political conception insofar as it concerns objectively commercial goods such as cultural goods or medical services, but which the community is going to demand that everyone should have access to it even though the individual does not have the ability to pay the exact price. It is then the taxpayer - present or future - or the social partners who bear the cost, or even some companies, through the corporal social social responsibility mechanism.

This protection of Common Goods can be done by the State in the name of the interest of the social group for which it is responsible and whose it expresses the will, particularly through the notion of the general interest. In this now restricted framework which is the State, this reference runs counter to the principle of competition. This is particularly clear in Europe, which is based on a Union built on an autonomous and integrated legal order in the Member States in which competition continues to have a principled value and benefits from the hierarchy of norms. The evolution of European Law has balanced the principle of competition with other principles, such as the management of systemic risks, for example health, financial or environmental risks and the creation of the banking union shows that the principle of competition is no longer an apex in the European system.

But it still remains to an economic and financial conception of Europe, definition that the definition of the Regulatory Law  when it is restricted to the management of the market failures feeds. It is conceivable that Europe will one day evolve towards a more humanistic conception of Regulatory  Law, the same one that the European States practice and defend, notably through the notion of public service. Indeed and traditionally, public services give people access to common goods, such as education, health or culture.

Paradoxically, even though Law is not set up on a global scale, it is at this level that the legal notion of "common goods" has developed.

When one refers to goods that are called "global goods", one then seeks goods that are common to humanity, such as oceans or civilizations. It is at once the heart of Nature and the heart of Human Being, which plunges into the past and the future. Paradoxically, the concept of "global goods" is still more political in substance, but because of a lack of global political governance, effective protection is difficult, as their political consecration can only be effective nationally or simply declaratory internationally. That is why this balance is at present only at national level, which refers to the difficulty of regulating globalization.

Thus, the "common goods" legally exist more under their black face: the "global evils" or "global ills" or "global failures", against which a "Global Law" actually takes place. The notion of "global evils" constitutes a sort of mirror of Common Goods. It is then observed that countries that develop legal discourse to regulate global evils and global goods thus deploy global unilateral national Law. This is the case in the United States, notably in financial regulatory Law or more broadly through the new Compliance Law, which is being born. Companies have a role to play, particularly through Codes of Conduct and Corporate Social Responsibility.

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Salah, M., La mondialisation vue de l'Islam, in Archives de Philosophie du Droit, La mondialisation entre illusion et utopie, tome 47, Dalloz, 2003, 27-54.

 

La mondialisation apparaît comme une occidentalisation des cultures et du droit. L'Islam qui prend forme juridique devrait se l'approprier sans se dénaturer. La réussite d'un tel processus difficile dépendra de la qualité de la régulation qui sera mise en place.

 

Lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage dans lequel l'article a été publié.

Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent via le drive lire l'article dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation".

Dec. 2, 2020

Teachings : Generall Regulatory law

Au sens juridique, la responsabilité désigne le fait de "répondre", mais au sens commun la responsabilité désigne le fait d'avoir du pouvoir et de l'exercice dan les marges de donner la liberté d'action. Les deux sens doivent converger dans un système libéral.

Les systèmes soumis au Droit de la Régulation prévoient tout d'abord le principe de la responsabilité des régulateurs.  Alors même que certains soutiennent que l'indépendance de ceux-ci impliqueraient qu'on éloigne d'eux le mécanisme de la responsabilité, au contraire leur puissance de choix l'implique. L'État est juridiquement responsable pour eux, tandis que leur irresponsabilité politique comparée à l'ampleur de leurs pouvoirs a souvent était le ferment de leur contestation.

Par ailleurs, le mécanisme général de la responsabilité est utilisé, notamment parce que les mécanismes du Droit de la Régulation sont eux-mêmes défaillants. Cela peut tenir au fait qu'il y a des sortes de "trous noirs régulatoires", dont relève encore le numérique, soit parce que la globalisation rend inadéquates les régulations conçues par territoires. En effet, le mécanisme général de la responsabilité est apte à produire des effets structurels, du fait qu'il peut avoir des effets et donc un objet  disciplinaire, produisant des comportements, et ne plus avoir pour temps pertinent le passé mais plutôt l'avenir que le Droit de la responsabilité construit à construire, d'une façon politique. Le juge devient alors le régulateur de la mondialisation.

Mais cette violence de la responsabilité ainsi conçue ne doit pas s'appliquer à tous les opérateurs économiques. En effet, cette responsabilité "proactive" qui dépasse le mécanisme de l'Ex Post vers l'Ex Ante ne doit s'appliquer qu'aux opérateurs régulés, éventuellement aux "opérateurs cruciaux, pour qu'à travers leur personne, les buts de la régulation soient atteints (mécanisme de compliance). Les opérateurs ordinaires doivent demeurer dans un mécanisme Ex Post, la responsabilité ne devant pas engendrer des "devoirs généraux de prise en charge d'autrui", car l'entreprise ordinaire n'est pas de même nature que l'État.

 

D'une façon spécifique et au besoin :

 

D'une façon plus générale et au besoin :

 

Consulter ci-dessous la bibliographie spécifique à cette leçon portant sur la Responsabilité et la Régulation:

Updated: Nov. 26, 2020 (Initial publication: July 15, 2020)

Publications

Référence générale : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Les droits subjectifs, outils premiers et naturels du Droit de la Compliance, document de travail, juillet 2020.

Ce document de travail sert de base à un article à paraître dans l'ouvrage Les outils de la Compliance

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Il fut un temps où les techniques de Régulation n'étaient avant tout des calcul de la meilleure tarification, repris par des entreprises en monopole, tandis que les techniques de Compliance n'étaient qu'obéissance aux règles qui nous régissent. Tout cela pouvait donc n'être affaires de règles à calcul, maniées par des ingénieurs et de réflexes mécaniques de "conformité" à toutes sortes de règles!footnote-1946. Dans une telle perspective mécaniste, il ne serait pas requis d'insérer dans une Régulation et une Compliance bien conçue, c'est-à-dire efficace, des prérogatives pour les personnes, puisque ces prérogatives ne pourraient être que sources d'inefficacité, de coût et de contestation.

Les systèmes ont depuis évolué pour intégrer les droits subjectifs. Cette évolution est-elle vraiment acquise ? En effet, si cela fait désormais longtemps que la Régulation fait l'objet d'une branche du Droit dans laquelle les droits ont pleine place, la présentation de la Compliance comme la "conformité", c'est-à-dire l'assurance avérée de l'obéissance à toutes les règles applicables ne laisse pas d'espace aux prérogatives des personnes, qui apparaissent plutôt comme des résistances à l'obéissance qui est attendue d'elles. Là encore, l'assurance d'un bon rapport de conformité entre des comportements et des prescriptions s'obtient par un "design", l'informatique étant la nouvelle forme du calcul, s'obtient par des outils de précision où l'être humain n'est pas requis. Sa faillibilité de celui-ci et le peu de confiance que l'on peut lui faire conduit même à l'exclure. Cela serait donc à regret, et sans doute parce que quelques juridictions constitutionnelles y attachent encore quelque prix à des droits fondamentaux que les systèmes de conformité des comportements aux règles font quelques places aux prérogatives des personnes, à leurs droits subjectifs fondamentaux. Cela serait comme par un "forçage" que les droits subjectifs existeraient dans les systèmes de compliance, une sorte de prix que l'efficacité de la Compliance doit verser en tribut à l'Etat de Droit.

Si l'on admettait dans une définition pauvre que la Compliance ne soit que la "conformité", débouchant sur un paysage dans lequel les comportements des personnages s'ajustent aux règles gouvernant les situations, la Compliance n'étant que la façon la plus "efficace" d'assurer l'application des règles, dans une perspective mécanique du Droit, alors il faudrait réduire les prérogatives des personnes à une part congrue, une sorte de surcoût produit par les exigences constitutionnelles. Dans la bataille qui s'annonce entre l'efficacité d'application des règles et le souci des prérogatives juridiques des personnes qui devraient avant tout obéir et non pas revendiquer leurs droits, l'efficacité de l'efficacité ne pourrait que, par la puissance même de cette tautologie, l'emporter... La défaite ne serait pourtant pas totale, la collaboration est encore possible et active entre des personnes se prévalant de leurs droits subjectifs et le Droit de la Compliance. En effet, par de nombreux aspects, si les droits subjectifs ont été reconnus dans les systèmes de Compliance, c'est non seulement parce que le Droit de la Compliance, comme toute branche du Droit, ne peut se déployer que dans le respect des droits fondamentaux gardés par les textes juridiques fondamentaux, mais aussi en raison de l'efficacité des droits subjectifs comme "outils de de Compliance".

En effet, c'est parce qu'ils constituent un "outil" d'une grande efficacité pour assurer le fonctionnement entier d'un système dont les buts sont si difficiles à atteindre. Parce qu'il faut faire feu de tout bois pour concrétiser ces buts, les Autorités publiques non seulement s'appuient sur la puissance des opérateurs cruciaux, mais encore distribuent des prérogatives aux personnes qui, ainsi incitées, activent le système de Compliance et participent à la réalisation du "but monumental". Les droits subjectifs peuvent s'avérer les outils les plus efficaces pour atteindre effectivement les buts fixés, à tel point qu'on peut les considérer comme des "outils premiers" (I). Mais il convient d'avoir plus de prétention. En effet parce que tous les Buts Monumentaux par lesquels le Droit de la Compliance se définit peuvent se ramener à la protection des personnes, c'est-à-dire à l'effectivité de leurs prérogatives, par un effet de miroir entre les droits subjectifs donnés par le Droit aux personnes et les droits subjectifs qui constituent le but même de tout le Droit de la Compliance, notamment la protection de tous les êtres humains, même s'ils sont en situation de grande faiblesse, les droits subjectifs deviennent un "outil naturel" du Droit de la Compliance (II).

1

Contre cela, la critique radicale, savante et fondée d'Alain Supiot, dans l'ensemble de son oeuvre et plus particulièrement dans La gouvernance par les nombres, 2015. 

Nov. 23, 2020

Interviews

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Facebook: Quand le Droit de la Compliance démontre sa capacité à protéger les personnes (Facebook: When Compliance Law proves its ability to protect people), interview with Olivia Dufour, Actu-juridiques Lextenso, 23rd of November 2020

Read the interview (in French)

Read the news of the Newsletter MAFR - Law, Compliance, Regulation about this question

Nov. 18, 2020

Thesaurus : 05. CJCE - CJUE

Full reference: CJEU, 1st chamber, 18th of November 2020, decision C‑519/19, Ryanair DAC vs DelayFix

Read the decision

 

Summary of the decision

This decision of the CJEU of 18th of November 2020 is about the jurisdiction clause for any dispute in air transport contracts, here those of Ryanair. This decision is especially interesting about the question to know whether the professional assignee (collection company) of a debt whose holder was a consumer may or may not avail itself of the consumer protection provisions, canceling the scope of this type of clause. 

The Court takes back the criteria and the solution already used in 2019 about a credit contract: the protection applies by the criterion of the parties to the contract and not of the parties to the disputes. Such a clause is effective only if the integrality of the contract is transferred to the professional, and not only some of the stipulations.

This Regulatory decision, through "private enforcement", incentivizes consumers to transfer their compensation claim (around 250 euros) to collection companies which, in turn, discipline airlines to stay on schedule.

Nov. 18, 2020

Teachings : Generall Regulatory law

La géographie est un élément qui demeure d'une grande pertinence dans la mise en place et la mise en œuvre des différentes régulations, ne serait-ce que parce que l'Histoire ne se pense pas sans la géographie, et que l'État ne se pense pas ni sans l'Histoire ni sans la Géographie, puisque dans un rapport consubstantiel avec le territoire et donc la clôture. Le Droit International Public repose sur cela, pour que les Etats, sujets de Droit international agissent dans un second temps dans l'espace international et notamment s'engagent les uns par rapport aux autres (traités internationaux).

Pourtant, confronter la Régulation et la Géographie conduit dans un premier temps à une aporie. En effet, à première vue, la Régulation, parce qu'expression de l'État, ne pourrait être que légitime sur un territoire national et, si on le décline juridiquement, qu'inséré dans le système juridique français. Or, le système juridique français étant construit d'une façon très particulière, sur la summa divisio du Droit public et du Droit privé, cela conduit certains à croire que le Droit de la Régulation serait une sorte de sous-branche du Droit public, puis à concentrer à titre principal l'attention sur la question des Autorités administratives indépendantes (AAI), puisque cela est familier au Droit public, tandis que les économistes bâtissent les règles qui gouvernent à travers le monde la Régulation sur un modèle qui serait totalement uniforme quelque soit l'endroit où il s'applique. Ce décalage conduit à ce qui peut apparaître à certains comme une sorte d"invasion" des catégories anglo-saxonnes, ne serait-ce que par le vocabulaire utilisé, lequel transporte avec lui les concepts du droit anglo-américain et ses méthodes.  Il est vrai qu'en matière de régulation, les États-Unis, dont le droit a ses racines dans le droit britannique, a tendance (parce qu'ils en ont la puissance de faire) a appliquer leur droit d'une façon de fait extraterritoriale, par le vocabulaire et les concepts. On mesure ainsi que la puissance de droit dépend souvent de la puissance de fait. A cela, s'ajoute le relais de l'autorité, celle de la Cour suprême des États-Unis, par exemple, ou de la Cour de Justice de l'Union européenne. L'on finit par se dire que tout est, en matière de régulation, affaire de "coutume", c'est-à-dire de façon où les choses se font là où elles se font (conception allemande classique). 

Dans cette grande dispute des territoires, l'on ne peut échapper à ces sorties, non seulement en raison des jeux de pouvoirs, mais parce que la Régulation est un appareillage technique sorti des objets, lesquels ne tiennent pas dans les frontières, la frontière étant une notion juridique affaiblie par le Droit économique, voire ennemie de celle-ci. Le rapport entre la Régulation et la Géographie va dès lors changer selon les secteurs, ce rapport demeurant étroit si l'objet technique régulé est corporel et immobile, le rapport se brisant si l'objet est immatériel. Mais la financiarisation de l'économie remet en cause cette gradation puisqu'elle dématérialise la corporéité de l'économie.

Plus encore, la question est de savoir si la Régulation doit prendre acte ou doit contrer l'habileté des opérateurs qui peuvent se soustraire au territoire, par le seul fait de bouger ou, par exemple, en créant des personnes morales ou bien en n'en créant pas (par l'action économique extérieure via de simples succursales non responsables). Si l'on estime que la Régulation est une théorie libérale qui pallie les défaillances techniques de marché, le Droit laisse cette habileté se déployer, voire on l'encourage. Si le Droit de la Régulation défend d'autres objectifs, cette habileté sera contrée. Des cas illustrent ces habiletés qui se confrontent, celles des opérateurs, des politiques et des régulateurs : le cas Péchiney- Triangle ou le cas BNPP, par exemple. 

 

Se reporter au plan de la leçon 5

Consulter les slides de la leçon 5

 

Accéder au plan général du cours.

Consulter la bibliographie générale du cours

 

Consulter le Glossaire du Droit de la Régulation et de la Compliance

Consulter la Newsletter MAFR - Law, Compliance, Regulation

 

Consulter ci-dessous la bibliographie spécifique à la Géographie & la Régulation: 

Nov. 16, 2020

Thesaurus : Soft Law

Full reference: US Securities and Exchanges Commission, Whistleblower Program. 2020 Annual Report to Congress, 16th of November 2020

Read the report

 

Read, to go further on the question of whistleblowers:

 

Oct. 22, 2020

Interviews

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., "Health Data Hub est un coup de maître du Conseil d'Etat", interview realized by Olivia Dufour for Actu-juridiques, Lextenso, 22nd of October 2020

Read the news of 19th of October 2020 of the Newsletter MAFR - Law, Compliance, Regulation on which relies this interview: Conditions for the legality of a platform managed by an American company hosting European health data​: French Conseil d'Etat decision 

To go further, on the question of Compliance Law concerning Health Data Protection, read the news of 25th of August 2020: The always in expansion "Right to be Forgotten"​: a legitimate Oxymore in Compliance Law built on Information. Example of​ Cancer Survivors Protection 

Oct. 22, 2020

Thesaurus : Soft Law

Full reference: Coeurquetin, R., Comparaison mécanique des versions 2017 et 2020 des recommendations de l'Agence Française Anti-corruption sur la cartographie des risques de corruption, October 2020, 9 p. 

Read the mechanical comparison (in French)

To go further on the question of risk mapping, read Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's working papers: Drawing up Risk Maps a an Obligation and the Paradoxe of "Compliance Risks" and Anchor Points of the Risk Mapping in the Legal System

Oct. 19, 2020

Publications : Newsletter MAFR - Law, Compliance, Regulation

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Conditions for the legality of a platform managed by an American company hosting European health data​: French Conseil d'Etat decisionNewsletter MAFR - Law, Compliance, Regulation, 19th of October 2020

Read by freely subscribing the other news of the Newsletter MAFR - Law, Compliance, Regulation

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News Summary: In its ordinance of 13th of October 2020, Conseil national du logiciel libre (called Health Data Hub), the Conseil d'Etat (French Administrative Supreme Court) has determined the legal rules governing the possibility to give the management of sensitive data on a platform to a non-europeans firm, through the specific case of the decree and of the contract by which the management of the platform centralizing health data to fight against Covid-19 has been given to the Irish subsidiary of an American firm, Microsoft. 

The Conseil d'Etat used firstly CJEU case law, especially the decision of 16th of July 2020, called Schrems 2, in the light of which it was interpreted and French Law and the contract linking GIP and

The Conseil d'Etat concluded that it was not possible to transfer this data to United-Sates, that the contract could be only interpreted like this and that decree and contract's modifications secured this. But it observed that the risk of obtention by American public authorities was remaining. 

Because public order requires the maintenance of this platform and that it does not exist for the moment other technical solution, the Conseil d'Etat maintained the principle of its management by Microsoft, until a European operator is found. During this, the control by the CNIL (French Data Regulator), whose the observations has been taken into consideration, will be operated. 

We can retain three lessons from this great decision:

  • There is a perfect continuum between Ex Ante and Ex Post, because by a referred, the Conseil d'Etat succeed in obtaining an update of the decree, a modification of the contractual clauses by Microsoft and of the words of the Minister in order to, as soon as possible, the platform is managed by an European operator. Thus, because it is Compliance Law, the relevant time of the judge is the future. 
  • The Conseil d'Etat put the protection of people at the heart of its reasoning, what is compliant to the definition of Compliance Law. It succeeded to solve the dilemma: either protecting people thanks to the person to fight against the virus, or protecting people by preventing the centralization of data and their captation by American public authorities. Through a "political" decision, that is an action for the future, the Conseil found a provisional solution to protect people against the disease and against the dispossession of their data, requiring that an European solution is found. 
  • The Conseil d'Etat emphasized the Court of Justice of The European Union as the alpha and omega of Compliance Law. By interpreting the contract between a GIP (Public interest Group) and an Irish subsidy of an American group only with regards to the case law of the Court of Justice of European Union, the Conseil d'Etat shows that sovereign Europe of Data can be built. And that courts are at the heart of this. 

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Read the interview given on this Ordinance Health Data Hub

 

To go further about the question of Compliance Law concerning health data protection, read the news of 25th of August 2020: The always in expansion "Right to be Forgotten"​: a legitimate Oxymore in Compliance Law built on Information. Example of​ Cancer Survivors Protection 

 

Oct. 15, 2020

Thesaurus : Soft Law

Full reference: Serious Fraud Office, Operational Handbook about Deferred Prosecution Agreements, October 2020

Read the Operational Handbook

Oct. 14, 2020

Teachings : Compliance Law

Résumé de la leçon.

Le Droit de la Compliance semble être synonyme d"extraterritorialité, en ce qu'il se fit connaître d'une façon spectaculaire en 2014 par la décision américaine sanctionnant la banque française BNPP.  L'on a dès lors souvent assimilé "Compliance" et extraterritorialité du Droit américain, englobant les deux dans la même opprobre.Celle-ci est par exemple d'une grande violence dans le rapport dit "Gauvain" de 2019. Mais sauf à croire que le Droit n'est que l'instrument pur du Politique, en raison des "buts monumentaux" poursuivis par le Droit de la Compliance, celui-ci ne peut avoir en tant qu'instrument qu'une portée extraterritoriale, sauf à être utilisé par une Autorité locale pour ne servir qu'un but local. Dans cette hypothèse, précise et restreinte, l'extraterritorialité du Droit de la Compliance doit être combattue, ce qui est fait par la Cour de la Haye dans sa jurisprudence de 2018. Mais pour résoudre cette question particulière, l'on risque de détruire l'idée même de Droit de la Compliance, lequel suppose l'extraterritorialité. Et au moment même où le continent asiatique est en train d'utiliser le Droit de la Compliance dans une définition mécanique pour mieux s'isoler. 

Si l'on prend les autres sujets sur lesquels porte le Droit de la Compliance, lequel excède la question des embargos, l'on peut même soutenir qu'il a été fait pour ne pas être brider par les territoires, lesquels sont à la fois l'ancrage des Etats et leur intrinsèque faiblesse. L'internalisation dans les entreprises permet cela. Elle le permet tout d'abord par le mécanisme de "l'autorégulation". En effet, si l'on fait un lien, voire une identification entre la Compliance, l'éthique et l'autorégulation, alors la question des frontières ne se pose plus. Ainsi, l'entreprise s'auto-instituant non seulement comme un "néo-constituant" mais comme un ordre juridique complet, y compris dans le règlement des différents et dans les voies d'exécution (enforcement par le bannissement). La question de l'efficacité est donc réglée mais ouvre alors celle de la légitimité.  C'est pourquoi l'Europe a vocation à porter une conception extraterritoriale d'une définition pourtant européenne de ce qu'est le Droit de la Compliance. C'est ce à quoi les arrêts de la Cour de justice de l'Union européenne du 24 septembre 2019 viennent de mettre un coup d'arrêt. 

 

Se reporter à la Présentation générale du Cours de Droit de la Compliance.

 

Consulter le Dictionnaire bilingue du Droit de la Régulation et de la Compliance et la Newsletter MAFR - Law, Compliance, Regulation.

 

Consulter la Bibliographie générale du Cours de Droit de la Compliance

 

Consulter la bibliographie ci-dessous, spécifique à cette Leçon relative aux enjeux pratiques du Droit de la Compliance

Oct. 9, 2020

Thesaurus : Soft Law

Full reference: Financial Stability Board, The Use of Supervisory and Regulatory Technology by Authorities and Regulated Institutions. Market Developments and Stability Implications, Report of 9th of October 2020, 36 p. 

Read the report

Read the presentation of the report by the Financial Stability Board

To go further on the question of the use of new technologies in regulatory processes, read Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's working paper: Analysis of blockchains with regards with the uses they can fulfill and the functions that the ministerial officers must ensure