Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary
The distinction between "Public Law" and "Private Law" is important. In the systems of Continental Law, or still called under Roman-Germanic Law, or even called Civil Law systems, it is even around it that legal systems are built: it can be a basic distinction, a summa divisio, as it it in the Civil Law systems. In the so-called Common Law or Anglo-American systems, the distinction is less fundamental, but it remains, justifying in particular that the rules and disputes concerning the administration call for special rules and are apprehended by special tribunals.
In principle, this distinction is based on the nature of the persons whose legal situation is examined. Under"Public Law" a legal situation involving a person who is itself a public-law entity: the State, a local authority, a public undertaking, etc. That is why, for example, the contract which may be concluded will be of public law, and the judge who may be seized of it will be an administrative court. If the situation does not involve a person governed by public law, then it will be governed by "Private Law". There are a thousand exceptions, but this is the starting and basic and fondamental principle.
Two essential remarks, bearing a system of values, explaining that the systems of Civil Law and Common Law are in fact confronting each other.
The two bodies of rules and institutions are not of equal strength because one of the categories is "closed", corresponding to one criterion (the "public person"), while the other is open: Public Law is a closed category; on the contrary, Private law becomes "active" as soon as there is no public person (a "private person" who or which must define himself or itself as a "non-public person").
One can consider this articulation between Public Law and Private Law in two ways, radically opposed. It may express a mark of inferiority in disfavour of private law: we are all "ordinary" persons in "ordinary" situations with "ordinary" activities (this will be the French conception ....). On the contrary, Public Law is the mark of the State, of Public Order, of Sovereignty, of public power, of the general will, in the interstices of which individuals slip in to act and satisfy their small particular interests
On the contrary, Private Law can be considered as the expression of the "common law": people are free and do what they want, through ownership and contract. As an exception and because they have elected people to do so, the rulers (whom they control), by exception, enact norms that constrain them. But this is an exception, since repression - public law and criminal law, which has the same status in this respect - is only a tribute to the freedom of persons, since this freedom remains wholly in the form of the private enterprise on the market.
It is then measured that the articulation between Public and Private Law profoundly reflects a philosophy and a political position. If it is considered that Regulation is the underlying order by which the Sovereign allows the deployment of his subjects who also benefit from a long-term policy constructed by the autonomous and measured political will, then Public Law in Is the master, the Regulation Law expressing a renewed search for efficiency, this but only this. If we believe that Regulation is whereby economic rationality manages to protect persons and companies from risks and to compensate for market failures, a market whose liberal principle remains the ideal, then Private Law is the core, whith contract and private property as basis tools.
France and the Latin countries adhere rather to this metaphysics of values which entrusts to the Public Authorities and the State the legitimacy and the power to express the general interest by Public Law, Regulators and Constitutional Courts, expressing it on a technical form renewed by the Regulatory tools: incitations, soft law, etc. The legal systems whose history draws on British history put more trust in the person of the entrepreneur and conceive of Regulation Law as an efficient outsourcing of functions to administrations that are efficient, informed and impartial.
Certainly, in the technical daily of the Law of Regulation and following the different sectors, Public and Private Law mix up: public companies take the form of publicly traded companies under private law or private companies will be entrusted with missions of public service, instituting them as second-level regulators as are the infrastructure network operators.
But the fundamental conception of systems (rooted in the history of the people) and practice marry. In the silence of regulations (and the more they are gossiping and the more the judge must interpret them, which amounts to a "silence"), what sense to give to the system?
To take only a few questions, frequent in practice:
The absence of a firm and shared definition of what is the Law of Regulation does not facilitate practice. Hesitations in translations from one language to another increase confusion.
For the time being, there is a tendency to refer to Public Law in the sectors where whe take precedence over public operators' monopolies, such as telecommunications, energy, railways, air and postal services, and to refer to Private Law in the sectors which have long been the subject of competition between operators, namely banking, finance and insurance.
It should be recognized that the criterion of distinction has little economic rationale. The notion of risk would be a clearer and more manageable criterion. But it would then lead to a greater challenge to the distinction between Public and Private Law. Because the Law of Regulation, impregnated with Economy and Economic Analysis of Law, has sometimes little basis of legal tradition, it put in question of this summa divisio. If this were to be the case, it would be the totality of the legal systems which would be upset, especially in its judicial organization, since the judicial civil and commercial system is so distinctly distinguished (that of "ordinary" persons, that of "common law ) and the administrative judge (the "natural judge" of the State). It is then realized that the Law of Regulation challenges the whole Law, especially in the Latin countries and the Civil Law systems.
Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary
The notion of "Common Goods" refers to a political conception insofar as it concerns objectively commercial goods such as cultural goods or medical services, but which the community is going to demand that everyone should have access to it even though the individual does not have the ability to pay the exact price. It is then the taxpayer - present or future - or the social partners who bear the cost, or even some companies, through the corporal social social responsibility mechanism.
This protection of Common Goods can be done by the State in the name of the interest of the social group for which it is responsible and whose it expresses the will, particularly through the notion of the general interest. In this now restricted framework which is the State, this reference runs counter to the principle of competition. This is particularly clear in Europe, which is based on a Union built on an autonomous and integrated legal order in the Member States in which competition continues to have a principled value and benefits from the hierarchy of norms. The evolution of European Law has balanced the principle of competition with other principles, such as the management of systemic risks, for example health, financial or environmental risks and the creation of the banking union shows that the principle of competition is no longer an apex in the European system.
But it still remains to an economic and financial conception of Europe, definition that the definition of the Regulatory Law when it is restricted to the management of the market failures feeds. It is conceivable that Europe will one day evolve towards a more humanistic conception of Regulatory Law, the same one that the European States practice and defend, notably through the notion of public service. Indeed and traditionally, public services give people access to common goods, such as education, health or culture.
Paradoxically, even though Law is not set up on a global scale, it is at this level that the legal notion of "common goods" has developed.
When one refers to goods that are called "global goods", one then seeks goods that are common to humanity, such as oceans or civilizations. It is at once the heart of Nature and the heart of Human Being, which plunges into the past and the future. Paradoxically, the concept of "global goods" is still more political in substance, but because of a lack of global political governance, effective protection is difficult, as their political consecration can only be effective nationally or simply declaratory internationally. That is why this balance is at present only at national level, which refers to the difficulty of regulating globalization.
Thus, the "common goods" legally exist more under their black face: the "global evils" or "global ills" or "global failures", against which a "Global Law" actually takes place. The notion of "global evils" constitutes a sort of mirror of Common Goods. It is then observed that countries that develop legal discourse to regulate global evils and global goods thus deploy global unilateral national Law. This is the case in the United States, notably in financial regulatory Law or more broadly through the new Compliance Law, which is being born. Companies have a role to play, particularly through Codes of Conduct and Corporate Social Responsibility.
Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary
The goal for which a mechanism, a solution an institution or a rule is adopted, instituted or elaborated, is in principle external to them. Knowledge of this goal is a tool to better understand them and is only that.
On the contrary, in Regulation Law, the goal is the heart itself. By definition, Regulation Law is a set of instruments that articulate to take their meaning in relation to a goal. Moreover, these instruments are legitimate to represent a constraint only because they realize a goal which is itself legitimate. The interpretation of Regulation Law is based on the aims pursued: the reasoning is teleological.
This teleological nature explains that efficiency is no longer merely a concern - as for ordinary legal mechanisms, but rather a principle of Regulation Law. It explains the welcome, especially through the European Union Law of the theory of the useful effect. This link between rules, which are only means, and aims, refers to the principle of proportionality, which requires that constraints and exceptions be applied only when they are necessary, proportionality being the form off the classic principle of necessity.
Because the aim is the center, it must be expressed by the author of the Regulation standards, and this is all the more so if they are of a political nature, being not limited to mitigating technical failures of markets. This goal can be varied: the management of systemic risks, but also the consideration of the fundamental rights of people, the preservation of the environment, public health, civilization, education, etc. The silence of the legislature, which limits itself to the making of rules whereas these are merely instruments, without explicating the goal whereas the latter is a political decision, is a fault in the legislative art.
Moreover, in order that the person who applies the Regulation norm, in particular the Regulator and the Judge, has no excessive margin for interpretation and does not substitute for political power, the author of the Regulation norm needs to aim specifically for one goal : in this way, the one who applies the norm will be constrained. Or, if the author targets several purposes, then he must articulate them in relation to each other, by hierarchizing them for example. If he fails to do so, the institution which applies the regulatory standards will itself have to choose the purpose and exercise a power which he does not possess.
This express designation of purpose has been made for the European Banking Union, this Regulation and Supervision construction, whose primary aim is to prevent systemic risks and resolve crises. Similarly, the purpose of the Regulation of essentiel infrastructures is to provide third parties access to the network. Similarly, in the case of a transitional regulation introduced following liberalization, the aim is to establish competition, the principle of which has been declared by the liberalization law. When this is not clearly stated, there is a lapse in the legislative art.
Thesaurus : Doctrine
Thesaurus : Doctrine
Référence complète Fox, E., The new world order, in Mélanges Joël Monéger, Liber Amicorum en l'honneur du Professeur Joël Monéger, LexisNexis, 2017, 818 p.
Thesaurus : Doctrine
Référence complète : Lagarde, Ch., A regulatory Approch to FinTech, mai 2018.
Thesaurus : Doctrine
Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary
Paradoxically, the notion of conflict of interest seems to be at the center of Economic Law only recently in Economic Law, in both Corporate and Public Law. This is due to the philosophy which animates these two branches of Law, very different for each, and which has changed in each.
In fact, and in the first place in Public Law, in the Continental legal systems and especially in French legal tradition, on the side of the State, the one who serves it, by a sort of natural effect,, makes the general interest incarnated by the State pass before its personal interest. There is an opposition of interests, namely the personal interest of this public official who would like to work less and earn more, and the common interest of the population, who would like to pay less taxes and for example benefit trains that always arrive on time and the general interest which would be for example the construction of a European rail network.
But this conflict would be resolved "naturally" because the public official, having "a sense of the general interest" and being animated by the "sense of public service", sacrifices himself to serve the general interes. He stays late at his office and gets the trains on time. This theory of public service was the inheritance of royalty, a system in which the King is at the service of the People, like the aristocracy is in the "service of the King." There could therefore be no conflict of interest, neither in the administration nor in the public enterprises, nor to observe, manage or dissolve. The question does not arise ...
Let us now take the side of the companies, seen by the Company Law. In the classical conception of corporate governance, corporate officers are necessarily shareholders of the company and the profits are mandatorily distributed among all partners: the partnership agreement is a "contract of common interest". Thus, the corporate officer works in the knowledge that the fruits of his efforts will come back to him through the profits he will receive as a partner. Whatever its egoism - and even the agent must be, this mechanism produces the satisfaction of all the other partners who mechanically will also receive the profits. Selfishness is indeed the motor of the system, as in the classical theory of Market and Competition. Thus, in the corporate mechanism, there is never a conflict of interest since the corporate officer is obligatorily associated: he will always work in the interest of the partners since in this he works for himself. As Company Law posits that the loss of the company will also be incurred and suffered by all partners, he will also avoid this prospect. Again, there is no need for any control. The question of a conflict of interest between the mandatary and those who conferred this function does not structurally arise...
These two representations both proved inaccurate. They were based on quite different philosophies - the public official being supposed to have exceeded his own interest, the corporate officer being supposed to serve the common interest or the social interest by concern for his own interest - but this was by a unique reasoning that these two representations were defeated.
Let us take the first on Public Law: the "sense of the State" is not so common in the administration and the public enterprises, that the people who work there sacrifice themselves for the social group. They are human beings like the others. Researchers in economics and finance, through this elementary reflection of suspicion, have shattered these political and legal representations. In particular, it has been observed that the institutional lifestyle of public enterprises, very close to the government and their leaders, is often not very justified, whereas it is paid by the taxpayer, that is, by the social group which they claimed to serve. Europe, by affirming in the Treaty of Rome the principle of "neutrality of the capital of enterprises", that is to say, indifference to the fact that the enterprise has as its shareholder a private person or a public person, validated this absence of exceeding of his particular interest by the servant of the State, become simple economic agent. This made it possible to reach the conclusion made for Company Law.
Disillusionment was of the same magnitude. It has been observed that the corporate officer, ordinary human being, is not devoted to the company and does not have the only benefit of the profits he will later receive as a partner. He sometimes gets very little, so he can receive very many advantages (financial, pecuniary or in kind, direct or indirect). The other shareholders see their profits decrease accordingly. They are thus in a conflict of interest. Moreover, the corporate officer was elected by the shareholders' meeting, that is to say, in practice, the majority shareholder or the "controlling" shareholder (controlling shareholder) and not by all. He may not even be associated (but a "senior officer").
The very fact that the situation is no longer qualified by lawyers, through the qualifications of classical Company Law, still borrowing from the Civil Contract Law, the qualifications coming more from financial theories, borrowing from the theory of the agency, adically changed the perspective. The assumptions have been reversed: by the same "nature effect", the conflict of interest has been disclosed as structurally existing between the manager and the minority shareholder. Since the minority shareholder does not have the de facto power to dismiss the corporate officer since he does not have the majority of the voting rights, the question does not even arise whether the manager has or has not a corporate status: the minority shareholder has only the power to sell his securities, if the management of the manager is unfavorable (right of exit) or the power to say, protest and make known. This presupposes that he is informed, which will put at the center of a new Company Law information, even transparency.
Thus, this conflict of interests finds a solution in the actual transfer of securities, beyond the legal principle of negotiability. For this reason, if the company is listed, the conflict of interest is translated dialectically into a relationship between the corporate officer and the financial market which, by its liquidity, allows the agent to be sanctioned, and also provides information, Financial market and the minority shareholder becoming identical. The manager could certainly have a "sense of social interest", a sort of equivalent of the state's sense for a civil servant, if he had an ethics, which would feed a self-regulation. Few people believe in the reality of this hypothesis. By pragmatism, it is more readily accepted that the manager will prefer his interest to that of the minority shareholder. Indeed, he can serve his personal interest rather than the interest for which a power has been given to him through the informational rent he has, and the asymmetry of information he enjoys. All the regulation will intervene to reduce this asymmetry of information and to equip the minority shareholder thanks to the regulator who defends the interests of the market against the corporate officers, if necessary through the criminal law. But the belief in managerial volunteerism has recently taken on a new dimension with corporate social responsability, the social responsibility of the company where managers express their concern for others.
The identification of conflicts of interests, their prevention and their management are transforming Financial Regulatory Law and then the Common Law of Regulation, because today it is no longer believed a priori that people exceed their personal interest to serve the interest of others. It is perhaps to regain trust and even sympathy that companies have invested in social responsibility. The latter is elaborated by rules which are at first very flexible but which can also express a concern for the general interest. In this, it can meet Compliance Law and express on behalf of the companies a concern for the general interest, if the companies provide proof of this concern.
To take an example of a conflict of interest that resulted in substantial legal changes, the potentially dangerous situation of credit rating agencies has been pointed out when they are both paid by banks, advising them and designing products, While being the source of the ratings, the main indices from which the investments are made. Banks being the first financial intermediaries, these conflicts of interest are therefore systematically dangerous. That is why in Europe ESMA exercises control over these rating agencies.
The identification of conflicts of interest, which most often involves changing the way we look at a situation - which seemed normal until the point of view changes - the moral and legal perspective being different, Trust one has in this person or another one modifying this look, is today what moves the most in Regulation Law.
This is true of Public and Corporate Law, which are extended by the Regulation Law, here itself transformed by Compliance Law, notably by the launchers of alerts. But this is also true that all political institutions and elected officials.
For a rule emerges: the more central the notion of conflict of interest becomes, the more it must be realized that Trust is no longer given a priori, either to a person, to a function, to a mechanism, to a system. Trust is no longer given only a posteriori in procedures that burden the action, where one must give to see continuously that one has deserved this trust.
Thesaurus : Doctrine
Référence complète : Manacorda, Stefano, La dynamique des programmes de conformité des entreprises : déclin ou transfiguration du droit pénal des affaires ?, in Supiot, Alain (dir.), L'entreprise dans un monde sans frontières. Perspectives économiques et juridiques, coll. "Les sens du droit", Dalloz, 2015, 320 p.
Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent via le Drive lire l'article dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation".
Thesaurus : Doctrine
Full reference : Teubner, G., L'auto-constitutionnalisation des entreprises transnationales ? Sur les rapports entres les codes de conduite "privés" et "publics" des entreprises, in Supiot, A. (dir.), L'entreprise dans un monde sans frontières. Perspectives économiques et juridiques, coll. "Les sens du droit", Dalloz, 2015, p.71-83.
Sciences Po students can read this article via the Drive in the folder MAFR - Régulation
Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary
The liberal professions such as lawyers, doctors or accountants are organized into professional bodies and consider that they can not be reduced to mere companies operating in markets because the service they offer includes a human and moral dimension, translated by ethics, under the supervision of their internal professional organization, particularly through ex ante their power to adopt their own standards of behavior, and in ex post, the disciplinary power of their professional order.
Competition law refutes this organization from the Old Regime and simply considers the "markets of legal or medical services, firms having to compete with each other and not having to organize the sector, by or fixing Numerus clausus, etc.
In the perspective of regulation, the liberal professions are, on the contrary, the ones most pertinento organize self-regulation in a globalized economy from the moment they give rise to a credible surveillance system and thus deserve the confidence of customers and public regulators.
Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary
Legally, the State is a public law subject defined by territory, people and institutions. It acts in the international space and emits norms. Politically, it has the legitimacy required to express the will of the social body and to exercise the violence of which it deprives the other subjects of law. It is often recognizable by its power: its use of public force, its budgetary power, its jurisdictional power. These three powers, declining or being challenged by private, international and more satisfying mechanisms, some predicted the disappearance of the State, to deplore it or to dance on its corpse.
With such a background, in current theories of Regulation, primarily constructed by economic thought and at first sight one might say that the State is above all the enemy. And this for two main reasons. The first is theoretical and of a negative nature. The advocates of the theory of regulation deny the State the political qualities set out above. The State would not be a "person" but rather a group of individuals, civil servants, elected officials and other concrete human beings, expressing nothing but their particular interests, coming into conflict with other interests, and using their powers to serve the former rather than the latter as everyone else. The Regulation theory, adjoining the theory of the agency, is then aimed at controlling public agents and elected representatives in whom there is no reason to trust a priori.
The second reason is practical and positive. The State would not be a "person" but an organization. Here we find the same perspective as for the concept of enterprise, which classical lawyers conceive as a person or a group of people, while economists who conceive of the world through the market represent it as an organization. The state as an organization should be "efficient" or even "optimal". It is then the pragmatic function of the Regulation Law. When it is governed by traditional law, entangled by that it would be an almost religious illusions of the general interest, or even the social contract, it is suboptimal. The Regulation purpose is about making it more effective.
To this end, as an organization, the State is divided into independent regulatory agencies or independent administrative authorities that manage the subjects as close as possible, which is fortunate in reducing the asymmetry of information and in reviving trust in a direct link. The unitary, distant and arrogant State is abandoned for a flexible and pragmatic conception of a strategic state (without capital ...) that would finally have understood that it is an organization like any other ...
Competition law adopts this conception of the State, which it posed from the beginning that it was an economic operator like any other. This is how this conception which would be more "neutral" of the world is often presented.
Successive crises, whether sanitary or financial, have produced a pendulum effect.
Now, the notions of general interest or common goods are credited of an autonomous value, and the necessity of surpassing immediate interests and of finding persons to bear superior interests or to take charge of the interests of others, even a non-immediate one, emerged.
Thus, the State or the public authority, reappears in the globalization. The Compliance Law or the Corporal Social Responsibility of the crucial companies are converging towards a consideration of the State, which can not be reduced to a pure and simple organization receptacle of externalities.
Thesaurus : Doctrine
Référence complète : Salah, M., La mondialisation vue de l'Islam, in Archives de Philosophie du Droit, La mondialisation entre illusion et utopie, tome 47, Dalloz, 2003, 27-54.
La mondialisation apparaît comme une occidentalisation des cultures et du droit. L'Islam qui prend forme juridique devrait se l'approprier sans se dénaturer. La réussite d'un tel processus difficile dépendra de la qualité de la régulation qui sera mise en place.
Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent via le drive lire l'article dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation".
June 24, 2020
Thesaurus : Soft Law
Full reference: Faure-Muntian, Valeria and Fasquelle, Daniel, Information Report of the Commission des Affaires économiques (committee on economic affairs) on digital platforms, Assemblée National (National Assembly), June 2020, 104p.
June 18, 2020
This working document, "The Dreamed Compliance Law", is the basis for an article, written in French, "Compliance", inserted in the collective work to be published under the direction of Jean-Baptiste Racine, Le Droit économique du XXIème siècle, in the Serie Droit & Economie, LGDJ-Lextenso, 2020.
No one can know what the Law of the 21st century will be. Pretending to know it is just not to realize its ignorance. Why then writing about it, since the future is always surprising?
One can only write about the unknown part of the Law of tomorrow. If the future is then modeled on what was written, so much the better for the prophet, a tribute that can, for example, be paid to Pierre Godé
Lévi-Strauss argued that teaching is defined as dreaming out loud. Teaching and describing the Law of a century that we will never know gives even more freedom to dream about it. This freedom increases when the object is a branch of Law in the process of being born, state of the stammering "Compliance Law" of which some still maintain, as it was made for Regulation Law, that there is not existing. The hand can then, as it pleases, trace its beautiful or hideous features: what face will Compliance Law have, as soon as we assume that it will exist?
It may as well be a nightmare (I) as a happy dream (II).
It is up to us to choose in which category this branch of Law will flourish. Because what we can be sure of is this fulfillment. It is certainly already taking sides to presuppose the very existence of Compliance Law. Not only to consider it possibility with hostility because to be an enemy of something or someone is already to recognize their existence. Before that, two objections radically block the very existence of Compliance Law and their shadow remains in the future of it
Firstly, it is said that Compliance does not come under Law, but for example only ethics since it would consist in keeping well in companies which care about the interest of others or the planet, for example by spontaneous care of the environment; Compliance being a crystallization of social responsibility, the one for which we have our conscience, we express our "raison d'être" and we are not accountable
Second, there would be many Compliance mechanisms but insufficient to constitute a branch of Law. Indeed we would find Compliance in Company Law, Labor Law, Financial Law, Banking Law, Criminal Law, Administrative Law, European Law, International Law, etc.
These classic branches, which have been formed for so long, depending on the point of view adopted, would gain in modernity or be threatened with decay by this kind of extension which will be Compliance. There would thus be as many "little legal sectoral rules" as there are branches of law. These new internal developments would be like a new bud, on which care should be taken - if the tree regains its strength - or a weed to be eradicated - if the French garden loses its perspective.
Thus the matter being scattered as many as specialist lawyers, often criminalists or specialists in banking and Financial Law, then tomorrow all specialists in all branches of Law, this could constitute the most radical obstacle to Compliance Law. Indeed, we would come back to confuse Compliance and the "modernization" of Law itself as a whole, since it would only be a question of perfecting each of the classic branches of the legal system.
If we keep in this half-sleep that is any projection in the future the hope of a branch of the constituted Law, we must discard these two perspectives of annihilation, in the total absence of Law as in recovery by all Law. To dismiss the sorrowful spirits who see no future in Compliance and keep only its enemies in the space of this article, let us assume that Compliance Law will exist in the 21st century. In what form and by what means, in the palm of which institutions, in the shadow of which legal system? Since it is a question of projecting ourselves onto the black screen of our nights of dreamy lawyers, let us take the current state only as a trailer. Like the one developed by the genius who by the contempt not only brought down into the flames of hell the cinema which has become a consumer industry with which producers force-feed us but offered us the vision of its future. What is what we see today the trailer? We let our imagination run wild since the trailer films are autonomous works compared to the film which follows them.
We have no idea what will happen and what we are watching from the brief and violent current images of Compliance Law, the cinema of which rather makes a hero of the whistleblower
Everything will depend on the concept that we will retain of Compliance Law. Because the script is not written, because Compliance Law is a Law with a political dimension, that it is defined by the ambitions that we can claim to have by setting monumental goals that we are going to achieve, a claim that will make it one major branch of the Law of tomorrow, or we can abandon any claim, lower our heads and arms, and reject any claim. It is then that the power of Compliance Law, which will be no less great, will turn against us, human beings, as in a nightmare.
Mélanges Pierre Godé, off-trade book, 2019.
Godé, P., Le Droit de l'avenir (Un Droit en devenir), 1999.
It is in particular the idea of the movement of analysis of Law & Literature which poses that by telling the past in one way or another, by thus inventing it, Law, and in particular the Judge, invents the future and being written, creates it. On this movement which was powerful in the United States, v. Cabrillac, R. et Frison-Roche, M.-A., Droit et Littérature, à paraître.
See infra I. Compliance Law as nightmarish octopus.
On the fact that "social responsibility" makes it possible not to be legally responsible, cf. Supiot, A., Du nouveau au self-service normatif: la responsabilité sociale des entreprises, 2004; this is not the subject of this article and this question will not be developed here.
See, for instance, ..., Replace Regulation by norm by Regulation by Data, 2020.
See, for instance, Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance Law (monography), 2016 ; Compliance Law, 2020.
On what the cinema does with the whistleblower, with the availability of trailers and extracts from the films, see Frison-Roche, M.-A., introduction of the article The impossible unicity of the legal category of whistleblowers, 2019.
Frison-Roche, M.-A., ... (retrouver sur LinkedIn).
June 18, 2020
Organization of scientific events
Comme les précédents cycles consacrés au thème général de la Compliance et visant à construire un "Droit de la Compliance", ayant vocation comme eux à être publiés dans la série Régulation & Compliance, coéditée entre le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et les Éditions Dalloz, ce cycle continue d'approfondir un aspect particulier de cette branche du Droit en train d'être inventée, s'étant appliqué avant même d'avoir été conçu.
L'année universitaire 2020/2021 donne lieu à deux cycles complets et distincts de colloques, l'un approfondissant un concept-clé du Droit de la Compliance, à savoir les "buts monumentaux", tandis que l'autre silonne un phénomène aux multiples racines et conséquences : "La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance.
La Juridictionnalisation de la Compliance est peut-être aussi ancienne que les mécanismes de Compliance eux-mêmes.
Ces diverses conférences auront lieu dans plusieurs lieux, selon la part prise par les très nombreuses structures universitaires qui cette année encore apportent leur concours au Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) pour la réalisation du cycle. Il en résultera deux ouvrages, l'un en langue française : La Juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, l'autre en langue anglaise : Juridictionnalization of Compliance.
Ce cycle de conférences La Juridictionnalisation de la Compliance débutera en octobre 2020 et se prolongera jusqu'en octobre 202.
June 17, 2020
Thesaurus : Soft Law
Full reference: White Paper on Leveling the Playing Field as Regards Foreign Subsidies adopted by European Commission on 17th of June 2020, 49p.
June 10, 2020
Thesaurus : Doctrine
Full reference: Fasterling, B., "Criminal Compliance - Les risques d'un droit pénal du risque", Revue internationale de droit économique, 2016/2 (t.XXX), p. 217-237
April 24, 2020
Its subject is the confrontation between the current health crisis situation and the Compliance Law.
Summary. After defining Compliance Law, distinguishing the procedural and poor definition and the substantial and rich definition, the starting point is to admit the aporia: the type of health crisis caused by Covid-19 will be renewed and it is imperative to prevent it, even to manage it, then to organize the crisis exit. Public Authorities are legitimate to do so, but because this type of crisis being global and the State being consubstantially linked to borders, States are hardly powerful. Their traditional International Law shows their limits in this current crisis and one cannot hope that this configulration will improve radically.
In contrast, some companies and markets, notably the financial markets, are global. But the markets are not legitimate to carry out such missions and counting on the generosity of certain large companies is far too fragile in front of the "monumental goal" that is the prevention of the next health crisis, crisis which must never happen.
How to get out of this aporia?
By Compliance Law, basis of, in a literal and strong sense, the "Law of the Future".
We need to be inspired by the Banking and Financial Compliance Law. Designed in the United States after the 1929 crisis to tend towards the "monumental goal" of the absence of a new devastating crisis in the country and the world, this set of new legal mechanisms gave duty and power of supervision, regulation and compliance to market authorities and central bankers. These are independent of governments but in constant contact with them. Today, they claim to have as first priority the fight against climate change. Now and for the future, they must also be given the responsibility and the powers to prevent a global health disaster, similar to a global ecological disaster, similar to a global financial disaster. This does not require a modification of the texts because their mandate consists in fighting instability. Stability must become a primary legal principle, of which the fight against monetary instability was only a first example. By the new use that central banks must make of it by preventing and managing health crises, Compliance Law will ensure that the future will be not catastrophic.
March 22, 2020
This working paper is the basis for an article in the French Law Journal Le Clunet.
When we compare the terms "Compliance" and "Extraterritoriality", it is often with dissatisfaction, even anger and indignation. On the momentum, after having expressed a principle of disapproval of such a merger, attention is focused on how we can fight against it, to break the link between Compliance and Extraterritoriality. But do we have to go so fast? Is this negative initial assessment correct?
Indeed, thus gone, it is frequently explained that the binding mechanisms of Compliance are suffered, that they come from abroad!footnote-1750, that they apply with efficiency but in an illegitimate way, without agreement of the one who must submit to it, whose resistance is therefore certainly ineffective but nevertheless justified. In the same spirit, when we start to shell the cases, like so many scars, sort of rosary, even crown of thorns, BNPP case!footnote-1718, Astom case!footnote-1717, etc., the wounds not yet closed turn into reproaches made against the rules, public authorities, even reproaches made against named people.
We are leaving this kind of complaint against X, which targets what would be this appalling "Compliance", this Law which would be both hostile and mechanical which would not have been able to stay within the limits of borders, Compliance being thus placed in contrast to sovereignty and protection, which presuppose staying within its limits!footnote-1716 and being able to protect companies from abroad. More concretely, this presentation targets more directly the United States, which uses "the legal weapon", slipped under what is then designated as "the artifice of the Law" with extraterritorial scope. But this effect would in reality be the very object of the whole: their hegemonic will to better organize at least a global racket, notably through the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and at best a world government through notably the embargoes.Those who believed otherwise would be naive or foolish. This silences the opponents because who likes this costume? So the world would be put in a ruled cut; what the mafia could not have done, Compliance Law would have obtained, offering the whole world to the United States thanks to the extraterritoriality of its national Law.
Compliance Law would thus become the very negation of Law, since it has the effect, even the purpose (barely concealed by strategic, powerful and shameless States), of counting borders for nothing, whereas Public International Law, in that it is built between the sovereign subjects of law that are the States presupposes the primary respect for borders to better exceed them while Private International Law takes the same postulate to better welcome foreign Law in situations presenting a foreign element!footnote-1726. Jurists believed in the force of Law; by Compliance, we would return to the sad reality that only the powerful, here the United States, dominate and - ironically - it is under the pretext of Law that they do it. It would be necessary to be well duped, or accomplice, to see there still legal where there is only the balance of powers. When one is more intelligent or skilful than that, one understands that the "small" can only be "subject" to the Compliance Law, one would have to be powerful to be the normative source and its enforcement agent. It is then towards this mis-named Department of Justice (DoJ) that the fearful, hateful and resigned glances turn.
If you see it that way, what should you do then? The answer is obvious: react!
It is necessary to save the sovereignty, France, companies, the Law itself. If that is how the question is posed, how can we disagree? It is therefore necessary to destroy the Compliance Law and the extra-territoriality of American Law which had found this "Trojan horse", an expression so frequently used. This is the basis for the administrative reports available, for example the Berger-Lellouche!footnote-1719 parliamentary reports and the Gauvainfootnote-1720 report. Both of them broadly develop the two preceding claims, namely that the extra-priority of compliance mechanisms is illegitimate and harmful, since it is a mechanism invented by the Americans and harming the Europeans, or even invented by the Americans to harm Europeans, the description being made in much more violent terms than those used here. The description seems acquired, the reflections therefore relate to the remedies. The reaction is most often to "block" the Compliance Law in its extraterritorial effect.
But without discussing the effectiveness of the remedies proposed downstream, it is necessary to return to this description so widely shared made upstream. Because many elements on the contrary lead to affirm that ComplianceLaw first of all and by nature can only be extraterritorial and that it must be. Whether or not the State in which it was created has malicious intentions. The description which is made to us most often describes particular cases from which we draw generalities, but we cannot reduce Compliance Law to the already cooled cases, as BNPP case, or to the always hot case of the American embargo on Iran. Furthermore, one cannot take the issue of embargoes and draw conclusions, legitimate for it, but which would apply to the whole of Compliance Law. The fact that theCompliance Law is a branch of Law at the stage still of emergence can lead to this confusion which consists in taking the part for the whole, but it is very regrettable because what is justified for the embargoes does not is in no way relevant for all Compliance Law, of which precisely the Law of embargoes is only a small part, even an abusive use. This overlapping is not often perceived, because the definition of Compliance Law and its criterion are not clearly enough defined, namely the existence of a "monumental goal"!footnote-1725, which does not exist in an embargo decided unilaterally by an order decreed by the President of the United States, but which exists in all other cases and fully justifies extraterritoriality, extraterritoriality which is even consubstantial with Compliance Law (I).
Once we have distinguished the embargoes, as an atypical, sometimes even illegitimate part, of Compliance Law, we should continue this work of distinction by emphasizing that the United States has certainly invented Compliance Law!footnote-1721 but only developed a mechanical concept for the prevention and management of systemic risks. Europe has taken up this systemic conception of the protection of systems, for example financial or banking, but superimposed another conception, drawing on its deep humanist tradition!footnote-1722, whose protection of personal data is only an example and whose monumental goal is the protection of the human being. This primary concern then justifies the European use of Compliance mechanisms to interfere with global objects regardless of their location, especially the environment, and to block the entry onto the ground of objects that enter, which is contrary to Competition Law but builds a legitimate barrier under this Compliance Law, in the indifference of an extraterritorial origin (II).
Indeed, this branch of the new Law which is Compliance Law is not reducible to Competition Law!footnote-1723, any more than it is not reducible to a method. It is a substantial, extraterritorial Law because the "monumental goals" which give it substantial unity are extraterritorial. This can directly contribute to the future of a Europe which on the one hand will be able to pursue, in an extraterritorial manner, monumental humanist goals, in the field of the environment or the protection of personal information or access to the Law (in particular by the technique of compliance programs) and which, on the other hand, by the techniques of traceability of products!footnote-1724, will have the means not to bring in products manufactured in an indecent manner, except in countries which do not grant value than in Competition Law to enter the WTO.
Read the developments below.
Dec. 11, 2019
This working document serves as the basis for the conference given in the symposium made under the direction of Lucien Rapp, Les incitations, outils de la Compliance,
Référence : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance et Incitations : un couple à propulser, in Faculté de droit de l'Université Toulouse-Capitole, et Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRc),Les incitations, outils de la Compliance, 12 décembre 2019, Toulouse.
The so-called incentive theory targets mechanisms that do not directly use coercion but nevertheless obtain the desired behaviors for those who set up the devices. The working document procedure in three stages.
At first, the association seems natural between the incentive mechanisms and the "Compliance Law" defined in a dynamic way. Indeed if we define it as placing its legal normativity in the "monumental goals" that it pursues, such as the disappearance of corruption, the detection of money laundering so that the criminality which is under it disappears underlying, or as the effective protection of nature or the concrete concern of human beings, then what counts is not the means in themselves but to tend effectively towards these "monumental goals. For this, what was previously public policies led by the States, because they are definitely not in a position to do so, the burden is internalized in the companies which are able to strive towards these goals: the "crucial operators", because they have the surface, the technological, informational and financial means.
In this perspective, the internalization of the public will causing a split with the state form linked to a territory which deprives the Politics of its power of constraint, the incentive mechanisms appear as the most effective means to achieve these monumental goals. They appear both negatively and positively. Negatively in that they do not require in Ex Ante clearly identifiable and localized institutional sources and no more in Ex Post of power of sanction. Interest replaces obligation. Positively, the incentives are relayed through the operators' strategies, which was the so often criticized form of public action: the "plan". Duration is thus injected thanks to the Compliance mechanism, as we can see through its development in the interest of the environment ("Climate Plan"), or through the education mechanism, which is only conceived over time.
However, in a second step, the opposition seems radical between Compliance Law and Incentives. This stems from three convictions, as strong as they are probably inaccurate. In the first place the idea that in general there is a Law only if there is a mechanism of immediate constraint which is attached to the norm. A law currently in the course of adoption shows it with envi ... As soon as the incentive would not rest on the obligation, then it would be nothing ... In the second place, and as if that were a kind of consolation ..., Compliance either would not be Law either ... It is so often said that it is only a process, without meaning, procedures to follow without trying to understand, that algorithms integrate into endless and meaningless mechanics. While the incentives are addressed to the human mind, Compliance would be a process by which machines would connect to other machines ... Third, the alpha and omega of Digital Law would be in the Competition law, because it can do without States, subject them and apprehend what is a-sectoral, in particular finance and digital, because the world is now financialized and digitalized. The violence of Competition Law which goes back in Ex Ante thanks to "compliance sanctions" by applying in particular the essential facilities while continuing to deny the relevance of the duration and taking as concern "market power" is incompatible with a coupling with incentive mechanisms that are based on duration and power, converging towards goals determined by what the Competition Law aims to ignore: the project, that of the Politics and that of the company , who use their power deployed over time to make it happen.
It is therefore necessary, in a third step, to modify our conception of the Law, in particular thanks to the Law of Compliance, in that it is autonomous from the Law of Competition, so that the insertion of the incentive mechanisms allow organizations little known by it. ci to achieve monumental goals which it is imperative today to claim. For example the Climate. This is expressly stated by the European Commission. All the texts that are expressing it are based on this reformed couple: Compliance and Incentive. This couple supposes that we recognize as such the existence of companies as they carry a project, which is other than the creation of market wealth circulating on a market, which can be an industrial project specific to an area. both economic and political. The Regulation then detaches itself from the concept of sector and is transformed into supervision of the crucial companies in the correspondence between the project and the action, which returns to the concept of "plan". In this the banking supervision is only the advanced bastion of all the energy plans or more generally industrial and technological being able by incentive to be set up, this conception of the Compliance making it possible to build zones which are not reduced to the exchange instant merchant. The incentive corresponds to the fact that Compliance Law relies on the power of the company to achieve its own political goals, for example combating disinformation in the digital space or obtaining a healthy environment. This supposes that Compliance ceases to be conceived only as a mode of effectiveness of the rules, for example of Competition Law, to be recognized as a substantial branch of Law. A branch that expresses political goals. A branch that is anchored in crucial companies whose autonomy it recognizes in relation to the markets. This allows, in particular by the culprit with the incentive mechanisms leading to long-term collaborative operations supervised by public authorities, not to be governed by simple competition law, unfit to materialize projects.
See the intervention plan below.
Nov. 21, 2019
Référence complète : contribution à l'organisation et à la tenue de la conférence de présentation de l'Association Henri Capitant, Faculté de Droit d'Oslo, centre de droit privé, 21 novembre 2019.
Par cette conférence de présentation et la discussion qui s'en est suivie avec les juristes réunis à l'initiative du professeur Mads Andenas, professeur de droit à la Faculté de Droit d'Oslo, les bases ont été posées de la constitution d'un Groupe norvégien de l'Association Henri Capitant.
Oct. 1, 2019
Teachings : Compliance Law
Résumé de la leçon.
Le Droit de la Compliance semble être synonyme d"extraterritorialité, en ce qu'il se fit connaître d'une façon spectaculaire en 2014 par la décision américaine sanctionnant la banque française BNPP. L'on a dès lors souvent assimilé "Compliance" et extraterritorialité du Droit américain, englobant les deux dans la même opprobre.Celle-ci est par exemple d'une grande violence dans le rapport dit "Gauvain" de 2019. Mais sauf à croire que le Droit n'est que l'instrument pur du Politique, en raison des "buts monumentaux" poursuivis par le Droit de la Compliance, celui-ci ne peut avoir en tant qu'instrument qu'une portée extraterritoriale, sauf à être utilisé par une Autorité locale pour ne servir qu'un but local. Dans cette hypothèse, précise et restreinte, l'extraterritorialité du Droit de la Compliance doit être combattue, ce qui est fait par la Cour de la Haye dans sa jurisprudence de 2018. Mais pour résoudre cette question particulière, l'on risque de détruire l'idée même de Droit de la Compliance, lequel suppose l'extraterritorialité. Et au moment même où le continent asiatique est en train d'utiliser le Droit de la Compliance dans une définition mécanique pour mieux s'isoler.
Si l'on prend les autres sujets sur lesquels porte le Droit de la Compliance, lequel excède la question des embargos, l'on peut même soutenir qu'il a été fait pour ne pas être brider par les territoires, lesquels sont à la fois l'ancrage des Etats et leur intrinsèque faiblesse. L'internalisation dans les entreprises permet cela. Elle le permet tout d'abord par le mécanisme de "l'autorégulation". En effet, si l'on fait un lien, voire une identification entre la Compliance, l'éthique et l'autorégulation, alors la question des frontières ne se pose plus. Ainsi, l'entreprise s'auto-instituant non seulement comme un "néo-constituant" mais comme un ordre juridique complet, y compris dans le règlement des différents et dans les voies d'exécution (enforcement par le bannissement). La question de l'efficacité est donc réglée mais ouvre alors celle de la légitimité. C'est pourquoi l'Europe a vocation à porter une conception extraterritoriale d'une définition pourtant européenne de ce qu'est le Droit de la Compliance. C'est ce à quoi les arrêts de la Cour de justice de l'Union européenne du 24 septembre 2019 viennent de mettre un coup d'arrêt.
Se reporter à la Présentation générale du Cours de Droit de la Compliance.
Consulter la bibliographie ci-dessous, spécifique à cette Leçon relative aux enjeux pratiques du Droit de la Compliance
Sept. 27, 2019
Thesaurus : Soft Law
Full reference: Information Note From the European Commission to the Permanent Representatives Committee About the Progress on Combatting Hate Speech Online Through the EU Code of Conduct, Council of the European Union, 27th of September 2019, 7p.
Updated: Sept. 24, 2019 (Initial publication: Aug. 31, 2019)
This working paper is the basis for an article to be published in French in Les Petites Affiches.
Summary : In August 2019, about the fire devastating the Amazon, the French Minister of Ecology says that this fact "is not just the business of a state" (n'est pas que l'affaire d'un Etat). This assertion denies the postulates of Public International Iaw (I). This supposes a new system, based on the idea that the power of the State on its territory is erased when the object that is there is no longer related to this "part" but to the All that is Universe (II). Let's accept the augur. First question: if it is not only the case of a State, whose business is it? (III). Second question: to anticipate the other cases that fall under this regime, what should be the criteria in the name of which the All will have to prevail over the part and who will then take care of the case of which the "local" State is divested? (IV). Because the perspective goes beyond the environment, beyond Brazil, beyond the States. It leads to Compliance Law animated by "monumental goals" that are the concern for the Universe and humans, in a humanist spirit. Let's go.
On August 27, 2019, on the French radio France Inter, Elisabeth Borne, French Minister of Ecology (Transition écologique) expresses it clearly: "Quand on est sur un enjeu tel que l'Amazonie, ça n'est pas que l'affaire d'un État", that can be translated : "When we are on a stake such as the Amazon, it is not only the business of one State ".
Starting from one case, "the Amazon", the Minister, thus taking up the position of the French President, associates a general consequence: "it is not only the affair of one State".
This is not a trivial sentence.
This affirmation denies, and why not, the entire system of Public International Law (I). By a new reasoning based on the idea that the All prevails, as by an effect of nature, on the Part (II).
Admitting this, it leads to opening two sets of questions. The first is related to the following main question: if it is not only the case of one State, of which is this the concern (III)? The second set of questions revolves around the questioning of the criteria on behalf of which other cases must be seized in the name of "All " and how to do it (IV).
A. The postulate of Public (and Private) International Law: parties (States) which, because of common interests, are in contact
The notion of State includes in its very definition the notion of territory (a territory, a population, institutions).
Thus the State governs through its institutions what is happening on its territory. For example, if there is a fire, or a risk of fire, the State makes arrangements through all legal, financial, technical and human instruments available to it. It is accountable for what it does through its political and legal responsibility.
When what is happening on its territory exceeds this one, in fact (epidemic, catastrophe with the consequences exceeding the borders, migrations, etc.) either according to its own opinion or according to that of the other States, the States, being sovereign subjects of Law in the international system, act together on a pre-built legal basis: bilateral or/and multilateral treaties
A particular technique has been developed for several millennia - but here again the seniority is not sufficient to keep the system: diplomacy, anchored in each state in a particular ministry: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which each national government has. If one State totally excludes one phenomenon in the territory of another, the progressive procedure of ceasing diplomatic ties begins.
This can result in wars.
In the "case of the Amazon" both the President of Brazil and the President of the United States stick to the classical construction of Law.
Indeed, the former asserted that the Amazon is in the territory of Brazil, thus falls under the jurisdiction of the power of the Brazilian State and the Brazilian Law, from which it follows that another State does not have to come to interfere. However, the French President takes the floor not as this forest extends also on a French territory but as it is the business of the World. On the contrary, the President of Brazil claims the closing effect, which excludes a third State from taking over directly something - even a difficulty - that takes place in the territory of another.
The President of the US federal State has said that these are joint decisions between the President of Brazil and other heads of State, sovereign subjects of Law, who must agree to organize a solution to solve a local problem . Because in the same way that States can declare war, they can help each other
The whole Public (and Private) International Law is therefore based on this assumption: "parts" of the world, on which sovereign parties (States) have taken contact, because circumstances make something that falls within one of them or several others.
This is precisely what is called into question. The notion of the "right of interference", whose evocation we hardly hear any more, had already done so. But on another basis.
B. The "right of interference": idea that somebody can directly interfere with what happens in a country , an idea that does not question the postulate of the International Maw, an idea that rests on something else: a " right for the other "
The "right of interference" is the idea that in certain territories, things happen that are inadmissible.
In memory of the jus cogens, a kind of "Natural Law" of Public International Law, Another, that could be another state, can come to meddle with what is happening in a territory that is closed, without declaring war. to the state that keeps its borders.
It is the need of others, for example those who die in mass on this territory, or the nature that is devastated in the indifference of the State on whose soil the disaster is happening, which founds this "right" of another state to come and take charge.
The foundation of this "right" is therefore a "duty".
C. The new idea: a territory is only part of the Globe, whose fate is everyone's concern
The idea is new because it is not based on altruism. And no more about self-interest. Yet, de facto and de jure , the Amazon is not on the sole territory of Brazil.
France is particularly well placed to say something about it since part of the Amazon is on French territory.
Thus the inaction of the main concerned Brazil directly affects the interest of France, a "forest" being a block that can not be divided. If we were in Property Law, we would say that we are in indivision with Brazil and that in this respect, with the other States on whose territories this forest extends, a solution must be found.
Because of the indivisibility of this particular object which is this particular fores
But this is not the argument put forward by France, particularly by the President of the Republic.
It is said that the whole world is concerned about the fate of the Amazon. It could be said that, in this respect, when what could be described as a "global forest" is well treated, its management does indeed fall within the power of Brazil, Brazilian companies and the Brazilian State, but when it is abused to the point of seeing its future compromised, when fires may make it disappear, then this forest appears not to be localized in Brazil but being located in the World, of which Brazil is only a part
This reasoning, which then gives voice to everyone, for in the world every state is included in it, is a new reasoning.
The economic-political theory of the "commons" does not account for it because it is not a very legal theory
II. THE NEW REASONING THAT COVERS THE CLASSIC REASONING OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
The new reasoning adopted by the Minister consists in saying that the Amazon does not concern only Brazil. This forest should therefore be directly related to the World (A). This is a welcome change in the system but based on a paradox (B).
A. When the Amazon is in danger of death, then it should no longer be attached to this part of the World that is Brazil, but directly to the World
This forest is presented as the "lung" of the planet, it is the "future" of humanity. In this, it can concern only one State, not even the one on whose territory this "Humanity good" is located
As such, without the need to declare war to Brazil, another State may speak, for example the French State through the one that represents it in the international order, that is to say its President, to say what to do, since according to him the President of Brazil does not say or do what it is absolutely necessary to do for the whole planet and for the future of Humanity.
This induces a complete renewal of international institutions.
Indeed a direct attachment to the World and no longer to Brazil gives the forest object a special status because of a goal that exceeds Brazil: save the Amazon would impose because it would save the world. Therefore, it can no longer be the subject of Brazil, which would be like "dispossessed" by a goal that is imposed on it: to save the Amazon rainforest, even though it is mainly on its territory, while other States become legitimate to dispose of this object, even if the forest would not be in part in their territory, even if they would not be affected in their own interests.
This contradicts all Public International Law
Such an upheaval justifies that such an affirmation is accepted with difficulty. One understands better than first consequence, which is not so innocuous, one of the first rules of diplomacy which is the politeness, between the heads of state, with regard to the spouses of these , have be broken
B. A welcome but paradoxical change in the system
Why not change the system?
This is difficult to admit, not only because it is brutal, but because it is paradoxical.
The paradox is the following. It is recognized that the theme of the disappearance of borders by "globalization"
The paradox is therefore, on the one hand, the rejection of the allegation of a de facto disappearance of borders by an economic interdependence, technology having denied "globalization" as a fact
This paradox leads to two questions.
The first question is: if "it's not juste one State affair", who's concerned?
The second question is: after the "case of the Amazon", what are the other cases? And how are we going to provide solutions, if we no longer have the solutions of Public International Law, that is to say, the agreement of the country whose territory is concerned and which we do not want not go to war?
If we have clear ideas on the answers to be given to these two sets of questions, then because indeed when the future of all is in progress it can not be the affair of a single State, it is necessary to question Public International Law. But do we have clear ideas on these two questions? And what are the possibilities for possible solutions?
See the text following below.
See for a general view (in French), Dupuy, P.M., & Kerbrat, Y., Les grands textes du Droit International Public, 10ième éd., coll. "Grands Arrêts", Dalloz, 2018. This book begins with a chronological index of the founding texts. This includes the 1962 United Nations Resolution on "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources".
S. for ex. UN General Assemblythe resolution 43/131 of December 8,1988, Humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations ; see also the resolution 45/100 of December 14, 1990, and the resolution 46/182 , 1992, Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations.
D'une façon générale, v. Bettati, M., L'ONU et l'action humanitaire, Politiques étrangères, 1993, 58-3, pp.641-658. L'article décrit tout l'évolution vers un "ordre public humanitaire", puis vers un "order public de l'humanité". Cela rejoint l'idée développée plus tard dans le présent article de "bien d'Humanité", non plus à travers des instiutions publiques mais à travers des entreprises qui sont seules en position d'en obtenir le respect à traver le Droit de la Compliance (v. infra IV).
On the question of the particularism of this case and the possibility or not to extend the reasoning to other cases, see IV.
This is exactly the reasoning of the European Union Law, when it intervenes even in a case which concerns "only" the French territory, because the Court of Justice of the European Union affirmed that France constitutes a "part" of the territory of the Union. Thus the All has competence for the Part, even if another part of the All (another member of the European Union) is not concerned.
Here the reasoning goes further, since a part could intervene on another part, insofar as they belong to the same All (the World, present and future).
S, for ex., and for takin only this example, Tirole, J., Economics for the Common Good, 2017.
On this notion of "Humanity goods", to which this particular case of the Amazon corresponds, s Frison-Roche, M.-A., Les biens d'humanité, débouché entre la querelle entre mondialisation et propriété intellectuelle (The Humanity goods, opened between the quarrel between globalization and intellectual property,) 2004.
S. Explanation of the postulates of Public International Law in the I.
Private International Law was built in the Middle Ages on the idea of a state being kind enough to apply foreign law to it as the person greets the foreign host in an affable manner.
Ruiz-Fabri, H., Immatériel, territorialité et État, 1999
Debray, R., Éloge des frontières, 2012.
S. for example in this sense, O'Sullivan, M., The Levelling. What's next after Globalization ?, 2019.