Food for thoughts

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

The notion of "Common Goods" refers to a political conception insofar as it concerns objectively commercial goods such as cultural goods or medical services, but which the community is going to demand that everyone should have access to it even though the individual does not have the ability to pay the exact price. It is then the taxpayer - present or future - or the social partners who bear the cost, or even some companies, through the corporal social social responsibility mechanism.

This protection of Common Goods can be done by the State in the name of the interest of the social group for which it is responsible and whose it expresses the will, particularly through the notion of the general interest. In this now restricted framework which is the State, this reference runs counter to the principle of competition. This is particularly clear in Europe, which is based on a Union built on an autonomous and integrated legal order in the Member States in which competition continues to have a principled value and benefits from the hierarchy of norms. The evolution of European Law has balanced the principle of competition with other principles, such as the management of systemic risks, for example health, financial or environmental risks and the creation of the banking union shows that the principle of competition is no longer an apex in the European system.

But it still remains to an economic and financial conception of Europe, definition that the definition of the Regulatory Law  when it is restricted to the management of the market failures feeds. It is conceivable that Europe will one day evolve towards a more humanistic conception of Regulatory  Law, the same one that the European States practice and defend, notably through the notion of public service. Indeed and traditionally, public services give people access to common goods, such as education, health or culture.

Paradoxically, even though Law is not set up on a global scale, it is at this level that the legal notion of "common goods" has developed.

When one refers to goods that are called "global goods", one then seeks goods that are common to humanity, such as oceans or civilizations. It is at once the heart of Nature and the heart of Human Being, which plunges into the past and the future. Paradoxically, the concept of "global goods" is still more political in substance, but because of a lack of global political governance, effective protection is difficult, as their political consecration can only be effective nationally or simply declaratory internationally. That is why this balance is at present only at national level, which refers to the difficulty of regulating globalization.

Thus, the "common goods" legally exist more under their black face: the "global evils" or "global ills" or "global failures", against which a "Global Law" actually takes place. The notion of "global evils" constitutes a sort of mirror of Common Goods. It is then observed that countries that develop legal discourse to regulate global evils and global goods thus deploy global unilateral national Law. This is the case in the United States, notably in financial regulatory Law or more broadly through the new Compliance Law, which is being born. Companies have a role to play, particularly through Codes of Conduct and Corporate Social Responsibility.

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Salah, M., La mondialisation vue de l'Islam, in Archives de Philosophie du Droit, La mondialisation entre illusion et utopie, tome 47, Dalloz, 2003, 27-54.

 

La mondialisation apparaît comme une occidentalisation des cultures et du droit. L'Islam qui prend forme juridique devrait se l'approprier sans se dénaturer. La réussite d'un tel processus difficile dépendra de la qualité de la régulation qui sera mise en place.

 

Lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage dans lequel l'article a été publié.

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Full reference : Teubner, G., L'auto-constitutionnalisation des entreprises transnationales ? Sur les rapports entres les codes de conduite "privés" et "publics" des entreprises, in Supiot, A. (dir.), L'entreprise dans un monde sans frontières. Perspectives économiques et juridiques, coll. "Les sens du droit", Dalloz, 2015, p.71-83.

 

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Thesaurus : Doctrine

 Full Reference: Deffains, B., L’enjeu économique de compétitivité internationale de la compliance (The economic challenge of international competitiveness of Compliance"), in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), Les buts monumentaux de la Compliance, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, to be published.

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► Article English Summary  (done by the Author, translated by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance) :  "Compliance", which can be define as obedience to the regulations is a stake for the company in that it can choose as a strategy to do it or not to do it, according to what costs it and brings it such a choice. This same choice of understanding is offered to the author of the norm, the Legislator or the Judge, even the entire legal system making regulation more or less expensive, and compliance with it for businesses. So when the French law known as “Vigilance law” was adopted in 2017, the French Parliament was criticized for dealing a blow to the “international competitiveness” of French companies. ”Today, it is on its model that the  European Directive is conceived. The extraterritoriality attached to Compliance Law, often presented as an economic aggression, is nevertheless a consubstantial effect, with its desire to claim to protect beyond borders. , coming us back to a classic question in Economics: what is the price of virtue?

To fuel a debate that began a few centuries ago, it is on the side of the issues that the analysis must be made economically. Indeed, Compliance Law is not only located in Ex Ante, to prevent, detect, remedy, reorganize the future, but also claims to face more "monumental" difficulties than traditional branches of Law. And it is concretely by examining the new instruments that Compliance Law has put in place and offered or imposed on companies that the question of international competitiveness must be examined. The mechanisms of information, secrecy, accountability or responsibility, which have a great effect on the international competitiveness of companies and systems, have changed and their measure has not yet been taken.

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📝 read the présentation générale du livre, 📕Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, in which this article is published.

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Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Lafontaine, C., Le corps-marché. La marchandisation de la vie humaine à l'ère de la bioéconomie, Le seuil, 2014.
 

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence générale, Cohendet, M.-A. et Fleury, M., Droit constitutionnel et droit international de l'environnement, Revue française de droit constitutionnel , PUF, » 2020/2, n°122, p.271-297. 

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Résumé de l'article : 

Thesaurus : Doctrine

 Full Reference: Deffains, B., The economic challenge of international competitiveness of Compliance, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, series "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, to be published.

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► Article Summary: "Compliance", which can be define as obedience to the regulations is a stake for the company in that it can choose as a strategy to do it or not to do it, according to what costs it and brings it such a choice. This same choice of understanding is offered to the author of the norm, the Legislator or the Judge, even the entire legal system making regulation more or less expensive, and compliance with it for businesses. So when the French law known as “Vigilance law” was adopted in 2017, the French Parliament was criticized for dealing a blow to the “international competitiveness” of French companies. ”Today, it is on its model that the  European Directive is conceived. The extraterritoriality attached to Compliance Law, often presented as an economic aggression, is nevertheless a consubstantial effect, with its desire to claim to protect beyond borders. , coming us back to a classic question in Economics: what is the price of virtue?

To fuel a debate that began a few centuries ago, it is on the side of the issues that the analysis must be made economically. Indeed, Compliance Law is not only located in Ex Ante, to prevent, detect, remedy, reorganize the future, but also claims to face more "monumental" difficulties than traditional branches of Law. And it is concretely by examining the new instruments that Compliance Law has put in place and offered or imposed on companies that the question of international competitiveness must be examined. The mechanisms of information, secrecy, accountability or responsibility, which have a great effect on the international competitiveness of companies and systems, have changed and their measure has not yet been taken.

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📘  lire la présentation générale du livre, Compliance Monumental Goals, dans  lequel cet article est publié

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Complete reference : Archives de Philosophie du Droit (APD), Le droit international, tome 32, ed. Sirey, 1987, 442 p. 

 

Read the table of contents.

Read the summaries of the articles in English

 

See the presentation of other volumes of Archives de Philosophie du Droit.

Thesaurus : Doctrine

 Full Reference: Pottier, S.,  For European compliance, a vector of economic and political affirmation,  in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.),Compliance Monumental Goals, series "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, to be published.

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► Article Summary (donne by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance):  Today's monumental goals, particularly environmental and climatic ones, are of a financial magnitude that we had not imagined but the essential stake is rather in the way of using these funds, that is to determine the rules which, to be effective and fair, should be global. The challenge is therefore to design these rules and organize the necessary alliance between States and companies.

It is no longer disputed today that the concern for these monumental goals and the concern for profitability of investments go hand in hand, the most conservative financiers admitting, moreover, that concern for others and for the future must be taken into account, the ESG rating and the "green bonds" expressing it.

Companies are increasingly made more responsible, in particular by the reputational pressure exerted by the request made to actively participate in the achievement of these goals, this insertion in the very heart of the management of the company showing the link between compliance and the trust of which companies need, CSR also being based on this relationship, the whole placing the company upstream, to prevent criticism, even if they are unjustified. All governance is therefore impacted by compliance requirements, in particular transparency.

Despite the global nature of the topic and the techniques, Europe has a great specificity, where its sovereignty is at stake and which Europe must defend and develop, as a tool for risk management and the development of its industry. Less mechanical than the tick the box, Europe makes the spirit of Compliance prevail, where the competitiveness of companies is deployed in a link with States to achieve substantial goals. For this, it is imperative to strengthen the European conception of compliance standards and to use the model. The European model of compliance arouses a lot of interest. The duty of vigilance is a very good example. It is of primary interest to explain it, develop it and promote it beyond Europe.

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📝 see the general presentation of the book 📘Compliance Monumental Goals in which this article is published

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Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Lagarde, Ch., A regulatory Approch to FinTech, mai 2018. 

 

Lire l'article

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Manacorda, Stefano, La dynamique des programmes de conformité des entreprises : déclin ou transfiguration du droit pénal des affaires ?, in Supiot, Alain (dir.), L'entreprise dans un monde sans frontières. Perspectives économiques et juridiques, coll. "Les sens du droit", Dalloz, 2015, 320 p.

 

Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent via le Drive lire l'article dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation".

 

 

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

Paradoxically, the notion of conflict of interest seems to be at the center of Economic Law only recently in Economic Law, in both Corporate and Public Law. This is due to the philosophy which animates these two branches of Law, very different for each, and which has changed in each.

In fact, and in the first place in Public Law, in the Continental legal systems and especially in French legal tradition, on the side of the State, the one who serves it, by a sort of natural effect,, makes the general interest incarnated by the State pass before its personal interest. There is an opposition of interests, namely the personal interest of this public official who would like to work less and earn more, and the common interest of the population, who would like to pay less taxes and for example benefit trains that always arrive on time and the general interest which would be for example the construction of a European rail network.

But this conflict would be resolved "naturally" because the public official, having "a sense of the general interest" and being animated by the "sense of public service", sacrifices himself to serve the general interes. He stays late at his office and gets the trains on time. This theory of public service was the inheritance of royalty, a system in which the King is at the service of the People, like the aristocracy is in the "service of the King." There could therefore be no conflict of interest, neither in the administration nor in the public enterprises, nor to observe, manage or dissolve. The question does not arise ...

Let us now take the side of the companies, seen by the Company Law. In the classical conception of corporate governance, corporate officers are necessarily shareholders of the company and the profits are mandatorily distributed among all partners: the partnership agreement is a "contract of common interest". Thus, the corporate officer works in the knowledge that the fruits of his efforts will come back to him through the profits he will receive as a partner. Whatever its egoism - and even the agent must be, this mechanism produces the satisfaction of all the other partners who mechanically will also receive the profits. Selfishness is indeed the motor of the system, as in the classical theory of Market and Competition. Thus, in the corporate mechanism, there is never a conflict of interest since the corporate officer is obligatorily associated: he will always work in the interest of the partners since in this he works for himself. As Company Law posits that the loss of the company will also be incurred and suffered by all partners, he will also avoid this prospect. Again, there is no need for any control. The question of a conflict of interest between the mandatary and those who conferred this function does not structurally arise...

These two representations both proved inaccurate. They were based on quite different philosophies - the public official being supposed to have exceeded his own interest, the corporate officer being supposed to serve the common interest or the social interest by concern for his own interest - but this was by  a unique reasoning that these two representations were defeated.

Let us take the first on Public Law: the "sense of the State" is not so common in the administration and the public enterprises, that the people who work there sacrifice themselves for the social group. They are human beings like the others. Researchers in economics and finance, through this elementary reflection of suspicion, have shattered these political and legal representations. In particular, it has been observed that the institutional lifestyle of public enterprises, very close to the government and their leaders, is often not very justified, whereas it is paid by the taxpayer, that is, by the social group which they claimed to serve. Europe, by affirming in the Treaty of Rome the principle of "neutrality of the capital of enterprises", that is to say, indifference to the fact that the enterprise has as its shareholder a private person or a public person, validated this absence of exceeding of his particular interest by the servant of the State, become simple economic agent. This made it possible to reach the conclusion made for Company Law.

Disillusionment was of the same magnitude. It has been observed that the corporate officer, ordinary human being, is not devoted to the company and does not have the only benefit of the profits he will later receive as a partner. He sometimes gets very little, so he can receive very many advantages (financial, pecuniary or in kind, direct or indirect). The other shareholders see their profits decrease accordingly. They are thus in a conflict of interest. Moreover, the corporate officer was elected by the shareholders' meeting, that is to say, in practice, the majority shareholder or the "controlling" shareholder (controlling shareholder) and not by all. He may not even be associated (but a "senior officer").

The very fact that the situation is no longer qualified by lawyers, through the qualifications of classical Company Law, still borrowing from the Civil Contract Law, the qualifications coming more from financial theories, borrowing from the theory of the agency, adically changed the perspective. The assumptions have been reversed: by the same "nature effect", the conflict of interest has been disclosed as structurally existing between the manager and the minority shareholder. Since the minority shareholder does not have the de facto power to dismiss the corporate officer since he does not have the majority of the voting rights, the question does not even arise whether the manager has or has not a corporate status: the minority shareholder has only the power to sell his securities, if the management of the manager is unfavorable (right of exit) or the power to say, protest and make known. This presupposes that he is informed, which will put at the center of a new Company Law information, even transparency.

Thus, this conflict of interests finds a solution in the actual transfer of securities, beyond the legal principle of negotiability. For this reason, if the company is listed, the conflict of interest is translated dialectically into a relationship between the corporate officer and the financial market which, by its liquidity, allows the agent to be sanctioned, and also provides information, Financial market and the minority shareholder becoming identical. The manager could certainly have a "sense of social interest", a sort of equivalent of the state's sense for a civil servant, if he had an ethics, which would feed a self-regulation. Few people believe in the reality of this hypothesis. By pragmatism, it is more readily accepted that the manager will prefer his interest to that of the minority shareholder. Indeed, he can serve his personal interest rather than the interest for which a power has been given to him through the informational rent he has, and the asymmetry of information he enjoys. All the regulation will intervene to reduce this asymmetry of information and to equip the minority shareholder thanks to the regulator who defends the interests of the market against the corporate officers, if necessary through the criminal law. But the belief in managerial volunteerism has recently taken on a new dimension with corporate social responsability, the social responsibility of the company where managers express their concern for others.

The identification of conflicts of interests, their prevention and their management are transforming Financial Regulatory Law and then the Common Law of Regulation, because today it is no longer believed a priori that people exceed their personal interest to serve the interest of others. It is perhaps to regain trust and even sympathy that companies have invested in social responsibility. The latter is elaborated by rules which are at first very flexible but which can also express a concern for the general interest. In this, it can meet Compliance Law and express on behalf of the companies a concern for the general interest, if the companies provide proof of this concern.

To take an example of a conflict of interest that resulted in substantial legal changes, the potentially dangerous situation of credit rating agencies has been pointed out when they are both paid by banks, advising them and designing products, While being the source of the ratings, the main indices from which the investments are made. Banks being the first financial intermediaries, these conflicts of interest are therefore systematically dangerous. That is why in Europe ESMA exercises control over these rating agencies.

The identification of conflicts of interest, which most often involves changing the way we look at a situation - which seemed normal until the point of view changes - the moral and legal perspective being different, Trust one has in this person or another one modifying this look, is today what moves the most in Regulation Law.
This is true of Public and Corporate Law, which are extended by the Regulation Law, here itself transformed by Compliance Law, notably by the launchers of alerts. But this is also true that all political institutions and elected officials.

For a rule emerges: the more central the notion of conflict of interest becomes, the more it must be realized that Trust is no longer given a priori, either to a person, to a function, to a mechanism, to a system. Trust is no longer given only a posteriori in procedures that burden the action, where one must give to see continuously that one has deserved this trust.

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

The goal for which a mechanism, a solution an institution or a rule is adopted, instituted or elaborated, is in principle external to them. Knowledge of this goal is a tool to better understand them and is only that.

On the contrary, in Regulation Law, the goal is the heart itself. By definition, Regulation Law is a set of instruments that articulate to take their meaning in relation to a goal. Moreover, these instruments are legitimate to represent a constraint only because they realize a goal which is itself legitimate. The interpretation of Regulation Law is based on the aims pursued: the reasoning is teleological.

This teleological nature explains that efficiency is no longer merely a concern - as for ordinary legal mechanisms, but rather a principle of Regulation Law. It explains the welcome, especially through the European Union Law of the theory of the useful effect. This link between rules, which are only means, and aims, refers to the principle of proportionality, which requires that constraints and exceptions be applied only when they are necessary, proportionality being the form off the classic principle of necessity.

Because the aim is the center, it must be expressed by the author of the Regulation standards, and this is all the more so if they are of a political nature, being not limited to mitigating technical failures of markets. This goal can be varied: the management of systemic risks, but also the consideration of the fundamental rights of people, the preservation of the environment, public health, civilization, education, etc. The silence of the legislature, which limits itself to the making of rules whereas these are merely instruments, without explicating the goal whereas the latter is a political decision, is a fault in the legislative art.

Moreover, in order that the person who applies the Regulation norm, in particular the Regulator and the Judge, has no excessive margin for interpretation and does not substitute for political power, the author of the Regulation norm needs to aim specifically for one goal : in this way, the one who applies the norm will be constrained. Or, if the author targets several purposes, then he must articulate them in relation to each other, by hierarchizing them for example. If he fails to do so, the institution which applies the regulatory standards will itself have to choose the purpose and exercise a power which he does not possess.

This express designation of purpose has been made for the European Banking Union,  this Regulation and Supervision construction, whose primary aim is to prevent systemic risks and resolve crises. Similarly, the purpose of the Regulation of essentiel infrastructures is to provide third parties access to the network. Similarly, in the case of a transitional regulation introduced following liberalization, the aim is to establish competition, the principle of which has been declared by the liberalization law. When this is not clearly stated, there is a lapse in the legislative art.

 

 

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète Fox, E., The new world order, in Mélanges Joël Monéger, Liber Amicorum en l'honneur du Professeur Joël Monéger, LexisNexis, 2017, 818 p.  

 

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

The distinction between "Public Law" and "Private Law" is important. In the systems of Continental Law, or still called under Roman-Germanic Law, or even called Civil Law systems, it is even around it that legal systems are built: it can be a basic distinction, a summa divisio, as it it in the Civil Law systems. In the so-called Common Law or Anglo-American systems, the distinction is less fundamental, but it remains, justifying in particular that the rules and disputes concerning the administration call for special rules and are apprehended by special tribunals.

In principle, this distinction is based on the nature of the persons whose legal situation is examined. Under"Public Law" a legal situation involving a person who is itself a public-law entity: the State, a local authority, a public undertaking, etc. That is why, for example, the contract which may be concluded will be of public law, and the judge who may be seized of it will be an administrative court. If the situation does not involve a person governed by public law, then it will be governed by "Private Law". There are a thousand exceptions, but this is the starting and basic and fondamental principle.

Two essential remarks, bearing a system of values, explaining that the systems of Civil Law and Common Law are in fact confronting each other.

The two bodies of rules and institutions are not of equal strength because one of the categories is "closed", corresponding to one criterion (the "public person"), while the other is open: Public Law is a closed category; on the contrary, Private law becomes "active" as soon as there is no public person (a "private person" who or which must define himself or itself as a "non-public person").

One can consider this articulation between Public Law and Private Law in two ways, radically opposed. It may express a mark of inferiority in disfavour of private law: we are all "ordinary" persons in "ordinary" situations with "ordinary" activities (this will be the French conception ....). On the contrary, Public Law is the mark of the State, of Public Order, of Sovereignty, of public power, of the general will, in the interstices of which individuals slip in to act and satisfy their small particular interests

On the contrary, Private Law can be considered as the expression of the "common law": people are free and do what they want, through ownership and contract. As an exception and because they have elected people to do so, the rulers (whom they control), by exception, enact norms that constrain them. But this is an exception, since repression - public law and criminal law, which has the same status in this respect - is only a tribute to the freedom of persons, since this freedom remains wholly in the form of the private enterprise on the market.

It is then measured that the articulation between Public and Private Law profoundly reflects a philosophy and a political position. If it is considered that Regulation is the underlying order by which the Sovereign allows the deployment of his subjects who also benefit from a long-term policy constructed by the autonomous and measured political will, then Public Law in Is the master, the Regulation Law expressing a renewed search for efficiency, this but only this. If we believe that Regulation is whereby economic rationality manages to protect persons and companies from risks and to compensate for market failures, a market whose liberal principle remains the ideal, then Private Law is the core, whith contract and private property as basis tools.

France and the Latin countries adhere rather to this metaphysics of values which entrusts to the Public Authorities and the State the legitimacy and the power to express the general interest by Public Law, Regulators and Constitutional Courts, expressing it on a technical form renewed by the Regulatory tools: incitations, soft law, etc. The legal systems whose history draws on British history put more trust in the person of the entrepreneur and conceive of Regulation Law as an efficient outsourcing of functions to administrations that are efficient, informed and impartial.

Certainly, in the technical daily of the Law of Regulation and following the different sectors, Public and Private Law mix up:  public companies take the form of publicly traded companies under private law or private companies will be entrusted with missions of public service, instituting them as second-level regulators as are the infrastructure network operators.

But the fundamental conception of systems (rooted in the history of the people) and practice marry. In the silence of regulations (and the more they are gossiping and the more the judge must interpret them, which amounts to a "silence"), what sense to give to the system?

To take only a few questions, frequent in practice:

  •      What judge to seize? The administrative judge or the civil judge? What is the "natural judge" of the Regulatory Law?
  •      What standard to apply? The contractual will? The implicit will of the legislator? What is the "natural author" of the Law of Regulation?
  •      Does the silence of the text prohibit action for operators or on the contrary does silence mean their freedom to act?

The absence of a firm and shared definition of what is the Law of Regulation does not facilitate practice. Hesitations in translations from one language to another increase confusion.

For the time being, there is a tendency to refer to Public Law in the sectors where whe take precedence over public operators' monopolies, such as telecommunications, energy, railways, air and postal services, and to refer to Private Law in the sectors which have long been the subject of competition between operators, namely banking, finance and insurance.

It should be recognized that the criterion of distinction has little economic rationale. The notion of risk would be a clearer and more manageable criterion. But it would then lead to a greater challenge to the distinction between Public and Private Law. Because the Law of Regulation, impregnated with Economy and Economic Analysis of Law, has sometimes little basis of legal tradition, it put in question of this summa divisio. If this were to be the case, it would be the totality of the legal systems which would be upset, especially in its judicial organization, since the judicial civil and commercial system is so distinctly distinguished (that of "ordinary" persons, that of "common law ) and the administrative judge (the "natural judge" of the State). It is then realized that the Law of Regulation challenges the whole Law, especially in the Latin countries and the Civil Law systems.

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

Legally, the State is a public law subject defined by territory, people and institutions. It acts in the international space and emits norms. Politically, it has the legitimacy required to express the will of the social body and to exercise the violence of which it deprives the other subjects of law. It is often recognizable by its power: its use of public force, its budgetary power, its jurisdictional power. These three powers, declining or being challenged by private, international and more satisfying mechanisms, some predicted the disappearance of the State, to deplore it or to dance on its corpse.

With such a background, in current theories of Regulation, primarily constructed by economic thought and at first sight one might say that the State is above all the enemy. And this for two main reasons. The first is theoretical and of a negative nature. The advocates of the theory of regulation deny the State the political qualities set out above. The State would not be a "person" but rather a group of individuals, civil servants, elected officials and other concrete human beings, expressing nothing but their particular interests, coming into conflict with other interests, and using their powers to serve the former rather than the latter as everyone else. The Regulation theory, adjoining the theory of the agency, is then aimed at controlling public agents and elected representatives in whom there is no reason to trust a priori.

The second reason is practical and positive. The State would not be a "person" but an organization. Here we find the same perspective as for the concept of enterprise, which classical lawyers conceive as a person or a group of people, while economists who conceive of the world through the market represent it as an organization. The state as an organization should be "efficient" or even "optimal". It is then the pragmatic function of the Regulation Law. When it is governed by traditional law, entangled by that it would be an almost religious illusions of the general interest, or even the social contract, it is suboptimal. The Regulation purpose is about making it more effective.

To this end, as an organization, the State is divided into independent regulatory agencies or independent administrative authorities that manage the subjects as close as possible, which is fortunate in reducing the asymmetry of information and in reviving trust in a direct link. The unitary, distant and arrogant State is abandoned for a flexible and pragmatic conception of a strategic state (without capital ...) that would finally have understood that it is an organization like any other ...

Competition law adopts this conception of the State, which it posed from the beginning that it was an economic operator like any other. This is how this conception which would be  more "neutral" of the world is often presented.

Successive crises, whether sanitary or financial, have produced a pendulum effect.

Now, the notions of general interest or common goods are credited of an autonomous value, and the necessity of surpassing immediate interests and of finding persons to bear superior interests or to take charge of the interests of others, even a non-immediate one, emerged.

Thus, the State or the public authority, reappears in the globalization. The Compliance Law or the Corporal Social Responsibility of the crucial companies are converging towards a consideration of the State, which can not be reduced to a pure and simple organization receptacle of externalities.

 

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

The liberal professions such as lawyers, doctors or accountants are organized into professional bodies and consider that they can not be reduced to mere companies operating in markets because the service they offer includes a human and moral dimension, translated by ethics, under the supervision of their internal professional organization, particularly through ex ante their power to adopt their own standards of behavior, and in ex post, the disciplinary power of their professional order.

Competition law refutes this organization from the Old Regime and simply considers the "markets of legal or medical services, firms having to compete with each other and not having to organize the sector, by  or fixing Numerus clausus, etc.

In the perspective of regulation, the liberal professions are, on the contrary, the ones most pertinento organize self-regulation in a globalized economy from the moment they give rise to a credible surveillance system and thus deserve the confidence of customers and public regulators.

Feb. 9, 2022

Teachings : Banking and Financial Regulatory Law - Semester 2021

Résumé de la leçon : Dans une conception classique et du Droit et du "libre marché", le principe est la liberté d'action de la personne. Même si l'exercice de cette liberté, voire d'un droit subjectif peut causer un dommage, par exemple un dommage concurrentiel, c'est en quelque sorte le prix légitime d'une société libre et concurrentielle. Ainsi dans une conception  libérale, seul l'abus est sanctionné, c'est-à-dire l'exercice fautif que l'on fait de sa liberté ou de son droit, allant parfois jusqu'à l'exigence d'une faute qualifiée.

Mais les secteurs bancaires et financiers ne sont pas gouvernés par le principe de libre concurrence. Ils sont gouvernés par le principe de régulation, le principe de concurrence n'y a qu'un rôle adjacent. Cela ne pourra qu'engendrer de graves difficultés lorsque le Droit de la concurrence et le Droit bancaire et financier font s'appliquer d'une façon cumulée ou confrontée sur une même situation.

Les marchés financiers sont construits sur le principe de régulation qui pose le principe de transparence et de partage d'une information exacte : c'est ainsi que l'intégrité des marchés financiers est assurée, l'Autorité des Marchés financiers en étant le gardien.

La prévention et la sanction des "abus" de marché est donc non pas une part résiduelle du Droit financier, mais un pilier de celui-ci, contrairement au Droit des marchés ordinaires concurrentiels, sur lesquels l'opacité et le non-partage des informations est la règle. 

Cela explique l'état du droit des "abus de marché", dont l'effectivité de la prohibition est essentielle pour le bon fonctionnement ordinaire des marchés financiers. Leur prohibition nationale a été harmonisée par le Droit de l'Union européenne, à travers des textes dont les signes reprennent  l'appellation anglaise : Market abuses (ainsi le nouveau Règlement communautaire sur les abus de marché est dit Règlement MAR (Market Abuses Regulation) et la directive qui l'accompagne MAD (Market Abuses Directive) .

Il sanctionne un certain nombre de comportements, qui portent atteinte à l'intégrité des marchés, 

Mais il n'exprime plus des exceptions par rapport à un principe : des fautes par rapport à des libertés ou à des droits. Il exprime des moyens par rapport à des principes dont la sanction des abus ne constitue que la concrétisation de principes dont ils sont la continuité même : l'efficacité du marché, son intégrité, sa transparence, l'information de l'investisseur.

C'est pourquoi la sanction des abus de marché ne sont pas du tout un phénomène périphérique par rapport à la Régulation des marchés financiers et à l'activité et au fonctionnement des bancaires, comme l'est le Droit pénal : elle est au contraire à la fois ordinaire et centrale. Cette différence des deux ordres publics va se retrouver dans la question lancinante de la sanction pénale et de la sanction administrative des mêmes abus de marché (par exemple "manquement d'initié" et "délit d'initié", qui ont tendance à se cumuler dans des techniques de répression qui seront l'objet de la prochaine leçon. 

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Nov. 27, 2021

Conferences

► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Chair for "The temporal dimension: Imminence and Intertemporally", in Climate Change Cases before National and International Courts Cross-fertilization and Convergence", November 27, 2021, Paris. 

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read the program

 

Summary of the panel presentation: The specific topic of our panel is the “temporal dimension” of the judicial cases of Climate change.

We shall listen to two great experts on this topic, which is Time.

Listening the other previous speakers, I understand how this topic is important, because Climate Change requires an immediate action and it create a political issue, because everyone comes before courts.

A basis and fundamental problem, because the times are not adjusted. 

let's come back to basic notions, to have three times : “past, present, future”.

 

The issue of Climate Change is in the Future, the necessity of Action is in the Present and the basis temporal question is to know if Courts are the bodies adequate to responde ; maybe it is inevitable that Judge must be recreate their office because the time of the classical judicial office is the Past.

Immediately, this simple et huge problem appears : in a classical repartition, the judge is the legal character to intervenir for the Past, the present (maybe is for you and me), and the future is the time for the State, and more precisely for the Parliament.

But the climate change is a huge topic, not in the past, not in the present, but in the future.

Therefore a gap exists between the time of the topic and the time of the court before the case is explained for obtaining a solution : how to give a good answer ? Judge maybe must travel in time, from past to future …. Maybe, he must, but might he?

Classically, the judge can anticipate a very next future, but not the more distant and systemic future. Climate change belongs to the second one.

This is why the title of this panel is non only about the necessity to take in consideration the “imminence” but also the “intertemporally” : maybe court are the sole able to create this intertemporality between Past and Future, and by this way to obtain from States and companies to do something immediately !

 

By two legal ways. 

 

Courts can stay in Past, supervising States, if they dispose of effective legal decisions taken by States in the past about Climate Change (essentially Paris Agreement, for instance transposed in the French legal system by a formal law). This is why an efficient judicial solution would be the possibility for the courts to oblige State to implement their more or less committment they had taken in the past for the future (as the Conseil d’Etat did in the Commune de Grande-Synthe Cas Law).

Even for that, the courts must adopt a creative notion of what is a commitment from a State through a Law... ; as they must do about private companies comitment (in their codes of conduct or soft law of corporate social responsability). 

 

But what to do if States didn’t take such commitment ?

Some can allege Courts are not Parliaments and are not legitimate to rule for the future … It is a political issue, a very classical one but very accurate for Climate change (where States and companies are face to courts...) and maybe  And as our colleague said, judicial system is quite technically weak to concretize human rights.

 

Therefore, the second way, more innovative, est the new use of Tort Law : no more a liability Ex Post, but a responsibility Ex Ante. In every legal system, even in Civil Law systems, Tort Law is conceived by courts (for instance in French Law). 

If the new reasoning is conveived in Ex Ante, Tort Law must be a set of legal tools to reach the monumental tools to reach the "Monumental Goal" (being by nature future) which is the Climate Change stopping. 

In this teleological reasoning, the admissibility and the choice remedies, must be adapted to obtain what is central : the effectivity and the efficiencicy. 

In this sens, the judgement between two parties (which was an Ex Post act) may be conceived as an systemic efficient action (which was an Ex Ante act), because it must be. 

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Nov. 10, 2021

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Kemfouet, E.-D.,  Énergies renouvelables, transition énergétique et enjeux climatiques en droit africain, Revue Africaine de Droit de l’Environnement (African Journal of Environmental Law),n°6, nov. 2021.

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Lire le volume. 

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Émile-Derlin KEMFOUET

Nov. 4, 2021

Conferences

 

► Référence complète: Frison-Roche, M.A., Appréciation du lancement d'alerte et de l'obligation de vigilance au regard de la  compétitivité internationale (" ("Assessment of Whistleblowing and Vigilance Duty with regard to international competitiveness"),  in Benzoni, L., Deffains, B. et Frison-Roche, M.-A.(dir.) , Effectivité de la Compliance et Compétitivité internationale("Compliance Effectivity and International Competitiveness"), seminar co-organised by the  Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Centre de recherche sur l'Économie et le Droit (CRED)  of the Panthéon-Assas University, November 4, 2021. 

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This intervention is thematic ; it is articulated with those more general carried out in introduction by Bruno Deffains particularly focused on the necessarily global scope of Compliance and in conclusion by Laurent Benzoni on Compliance as a potential new pillar of industrial policy, the whole of the colloquium having been conceived by the three of us.

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📅 read the semirar program 

 

📅 this scientific event is part of the 2021 colloquia cycle, organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its Universities partners, on the general theme of Compliance Monumental Goals.

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🚧  read the bilingual Working Paper, basis of this conference

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see the slides used during the conference

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► Conference Summary: First of all and independently of the technical topic itself which, as the slides show, is focused on these two techniques based on Information which are the Whistleblowing and the Vigilance duty, it is essentiel to pose that the techniques themselves are conceived totally  differently depending on whether Compliance Law is conceived as a mechanical process and totally binding to fully comply with all applicable regulations and to demonstrate it in advance, under the threat of terrible fines, this definition being the both completely frightening and meaningless since what these applicable regulations contains is irrelevant, in which case the prospect of competitiveness boils down to notions of costs and also procedural considerations of foreseeability and legal certainty; or if Compliance Law is conceived as a new and substantial branch of Law Ex Ante developed to detect and prevent the systemic crises being before us, of which the climate crisis is unfortunately the epigone and which requires above all Action, an action of such magnitude which requires the alliance of all forces, that of States, companies, courts and people, in a renewal of concepts, particularly legal ones, and in the indifference of territories, which puts Compliance immediately at its right level: the world, because the scientifically emerging crisis is global, the so-called "extraterritoriality" theme now being misnamed. From this new general conception, the Vigilance obligation, about which so much was said when it was imposed in France in 2017, is the advanced point, soon taken up in Europe and whose scope must be naturally global, because that Compliance Law is consubstantially global.

Taking up more technically the legal techniques of Compliance and confronting them with the Competitiveness of firms, it is necessary that these Compliance Tools do not harm this Competitiveness because Compliance Law , supporting immense ambitions, can only function through an alliance between political  wills (with great pretensions, i.e. save the planet) and the entities which are able to concretize them (the crucial economic operators): the Compliance tools designed by legal systems must preserve the companies which put them in place and never favor their competitors.

On the basis of this principle, it is possible to assess these two legal techniques,  namely the whistleblowing and the Vigilance duty,  which both capture Information, which, as such, gives them a uniqueness and places them in the global Competition for Information.

Taking the whistleblowing first, it appears that its first beneficiary is the company itself since it discovers a weakness and can therefore remedy it. This is why, beyond the principle of protection of the whistleblower by the access of somebody to the legal statute conceived in France by the law known as "Sapin 2", it is criticized that all the incentives are not used for that the holder of such information transmits it to the manager and that the same law continues to require the absence of financial counterpart, the "heroic figure of the whistleblower and the refusal of his remuneration depriving the company of a means information and improvement. The American solution is better and tt is regrettable that the law transposing the European Directive maintains this ineffective conception. But French legislation has on the contrary developed the right incentive as to the person whom the information must be transmitted to is the manager, then externally if the latter does nothing. The solution is better that the American solution because the incentive is thus made to push the internal manager to act and put an remedy to the internal dysfunction, which increases the competitiveness of the company.

Even more, even if it seems counter-intuitive, the French Vigilance Duty greatly increases the competitiveness of the companies which are subject to it. Indeed, the 2017 Law by obliging them to prevent and fight against  human rights and environment violations has tacitly given them all the necessary powers to do so, in particular the power to capture Information on third-party companies, including ( and even above all) those which are not subject to transparency obligations. In this, companies, insofar as they are personally responsible, hold a supervisory power over others, a power which allows Compliance Law to globalize and which, in the process, increases their own power. This is why the obligation of vigilance is in many respects a boon for the companies which are subject to it. The resumption of the mechanism by the next European Directive, itself indifferent to the territory, will only strengthen this global power on other firms, even foreign ones.

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► This  conférence et le document de travail servent de base à un article dans un ouvrage :

📝This conference and the Working Paper constitute the basis for an article: 

📕  in its French version in the book  Les buts monumentaux de la Compliancein the Series 📚   Régulations & Compliance

 📘  in its English version in the book Compliance Monumental Goalsin the Series 📚   Compliance & Regulation

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Oct. 22, 2021

Compliance: at the moment

Oct. 10, 2021

Publications

► Full Reference complète: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Duty of Vigilance, Whistleblowing and International Competitiveness,  Working Paper, September  2021.

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🎤 this Working Paper is the basis for a conference  , in the colloquium Effectiveness  of Compliance and International Competitiveness , co-organised  by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Center for Law and Economics of the Panthéon-Assas University (Paris II),   November 4, 2021

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📝this Working Paper  is also the basis for an article. This article is to be published 

in its French version in the book  📕Les buts monumentaux de la Compliancein the series 📚 Régulations & Compliance

 in its English version in the book 📘Compliance Monumental Goals, in the series la collection 📚   Compliance & Regulation

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► Working Paper Summary: The "Compliance Tools" are very diverse. If it has been chosen to study more particularly among these the obligation of vigilance and the whistleblower, these rather than others and to study them together, it is because they present in the perspective of the specific topic chosen, namely "international competitiveness", and for companies, and for economic zones considered, and for legal system inseparable from them, a uniqueness: these are mechanisms which release Information. 

Sur ordre de la Loi, l'entreprise va non seulement cesser d'ignorer ce qu'elle recouvrait du mouchoir que Tartuffe le tendait ou qu'une conception du Droit des sociétés lui permettait légitimement d'ignorer. Il ne s'agit pas ici d'examiner si cette révolution que le Droit de la Compliance exprime dans le système juridique est d'une part légitime et d'autre part effective, mais d'essayer de mesurer ce qu'il en est au regard de la "Compétitivité internationale".

Le Droit de la Compliance sera donc ici examiné à travers ses instruments (et non par rapport à sa normativité, laquelle réside dans ses "Buts Monumentaux"). Or, ses instruments ont pour objet l'information et la mise à disposition de cette information, dans sa présentation, dans son intelligibilité et surtout dans les mains de ceux qui sont aptes à en faire "bon usage" pour que les Buts du Droit de la Compliance soient atteints.

Au regard de cette notion centrale qu'est l'information,la compétitivité internationale va être plus particulièrement concernée parce que le Droit de la Compliance va obliger l'entreprise à aller elle-même rechercher, puis exposer au regard de tous, notamment de ses concurrents, ses faiblesses, ses projets, ses alliances, ses failles. Cela ne pose pas de difficulté si ses compétiteurs sont eux-mêmes souvent à cette nouvelle loi, qui va bien au-delà de la transparence, laquelle est déjà un mécanisme nouveau car une entreprise n'est pas une organisation transparente et le Droit de la concurrence qui régit les entreprises ordinaires n'a jamais exigé cela, régit également les compétiteurs. Mais si ceux-ci ne sont pas soumis à cette loi si particulière qu'est le Droit de la Compliance, alors il y a distorsion de compétitivité du fait même du Droit. 

Certes, l'on peut dire que les marchés aiment la vertu, qu'ils lui accordent crédit car ils sont eux-mêmes basés sur l'idée de "promesse", laquelle repose ultimement sur un concept moral, mais cette mise à disposition d'informations multiples à autrui, lequel autrui demeure opaque est un problème majeur de compétitivité, que le concept de "loyauté des pratiques commerciale" ne prend que très partiellement en charte.

C'est pourquoi il convient d'examiner tout d'abord ce qu'il en est de la puissance économique et financière de l'information captée par l'entreprise sur elle-même que le Droit de la Compliance peut rendre disponible à tous, ce qui produit une asymétrie de puissance à laquelle le Droit de la Compliance ne semble pas avoir encore répondu (I). Mais le Droit de la Compliance oblige aussi les entreprises à rendre compte non seulement à ce qu'elles font mais encore à ce que font les autres pour elles. A travers l'obligation de vigilance, obligation objective et Ex Ante, à laquelle s'arrive le pouvoir du lanceur d'alerte, l'entreprise obtient un pouvoir d'information sur autrui qui pourrait bien résoudre ce qui est souvent présentée comme la dispute aporétique de l'extraterritorialité du Droit de la Compliance, rendant alors comptable les entreprises jusqu'ici protégées par leur système juridique "préservé" et atteint de ce fait par l'effectivité du Droit de la Compliance (II).  

 

Oct. 10, 2021

Publications

► Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A.Vers un principe de proximité systémique active pour que le Droit de la Compliance concrétise sa vocation mondiale,  document de travail, octobre 2021.

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🎤 ce document de travail sert de base à la conclusion faite avec Laurent Benzoni du  colloque Effectivité de la Compliance et Compétitivité internationale, coorganisé par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et le Centre de recherche en Droit et en Économie de l'Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris II),  se tenant le 4 novembre  2021, Salle des Conseils, Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris II). 

Il est corrélé à un premier document de travail sur l'appréciation du lancement d'alerte et de l'obligation de vigilance au regard de la compétitivité internationale, lui-aussi base d'une intervention dans le même colloque. 

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📝Ce document de travail constitue aussi la base d'un article publié

📕dans sa version française dans l'ouvrage Les buts monumentaux de la Compliancedans la collection 📚   Régulations & Compliance

 📘dans sa version anglaise dans l'ouvrage Compliance Monumental Goalsdans  la collection 📚   Compliance & Regulation

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► Résumé du document de travail : Bien plus que la lutte contre la corruption et le FCPA, l 'obligation de vigilance est la pointe avancée de ce que doit être le Droit de la Compliance en ce qu'elle contraint l'entreprise à extraire d des entités qui sont pourtant sous un autre ciel juridique que celui dont relève l'entreprise ainsi obligée.  

C'est d'une façon plus générale qu'il faut affirmer la consubstantielle indifférence au territoire du Droit de la Compliance. Mais l'indifférence n'est qu'un principe négatif. Il faut également développer un principe positif. Ce principe positif doit être formulé comme le Principe de Proximité. Le Droit de la Compliance doit déployer ses effets dans l'indifférence du territoire dès l'instance que l'objet lui est proche ("proximité"), la dimension systémique d'un objet ou d'un risque ouvrant à ce moment-là un devoir d'action porté par le Droit de la Compliance.  

C'est déjà le cas pour l'obligation de vigilance, puisqu'elle implique de par la Loi pour l'entreprise assujettie toute la puissance nécessaire afin de remplir l'obligation imposée 📎!footnote-2329, permet à cette entreprise d'obtenir des informations, voire d'imposer à son tour au nom de sa propre responsabilité personnelles des obligations de compliance à des partenaires économiques qui sont pourtant sujets de droit de systèmes juridiques qui ne prévoient pas de tels contraintes.

Cela conduit à une perspective nouvelle, qui met en corrélation des principes pour l'instant en linéament dans l'obligation de vigilance au regard de la définition générale du Droit de la Compliance, qui doit pleinement affirmer sa nature mondiale. En effet, l'obligation de vigilance est la pointe avancée d'un Droit de la Compliance indifférent au territoire, d'un Droit agissant urbi et orbi 📎!footnote-2332, devant permettre l'action là où cela se passe, soit parce qu'y développe un phénomène à impact systémique : l'atteinte à l'environnement est déjà prévu par l'obligation de vigilance, il convient de l'étendre au Climat, et au risque systémique sanitaire. 

Pour l'instant se déroule encore une sorte de guerre de tranchée, cristallisée par le terme d'extraterritorialité, qui n'est adéquat que pour un objet national auquel l'on veut donner un effet lointain, comme un projectile que l'on lance avec une grande force, concrètement les déclaration d'embargos pour lesquels la force de la Compliance est illégitimement réquisitionnée.

Mais ici, comme le montre ces premiers textes visant les droits humains et l'environnement, c'est la notion même de distance qu'il convient de récuser en prenant le principe inverse : le Principe de proximité, en redéfinissant la notion de "Proximité" sous un angle systémique.  

Si l'on pense la proximité non pas d'une façon territoriale, le territoire ayant une dimension politique forte mais pas une dimension systémique, mais que l'on pense la proximité systémique d'une façon concrète à travers les effets directe d'un objet dont la situation impacte immédiatement la notre (comme dans l'espace climatique, ou dans l'espace numérique), alors la notion de territoire n'est plus première. 

Si l'idée d'humanisme devait enfin avoir quelque réalité, de la même façon qu'une entreprise "donneuse d'ordre" a un devoir de Compliance à l'égard de qui travaille pour elle, cela rejoint là encore la définition du Droit de la Compliance comme protecteur des êtres humains 📎!footnote-2330 qui sont proches parce qu'internalisés dans l'objet que nous consommons. C'est bien cette technique juridique là qui permet la transmission du droit d'action en responsabilité contractuelle avec la chose vendue. 

Dès lors, un Principe de Proximité active justifie l'action des entreprises pour intervenir, de la même façon que les Autorités publiques sont alors légitimes à les superviser dans l'indifférence du rattachement juridique formel, ce que l'on voit déjà dans l'espace numérique et dans la vigilance environnementale et humaniste.

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Oct. 10, 2021

Compliance: at the moment