Thesaurus : Doctrine
Référence complète : Salah, M., La mondialisation vue de l'Islam, in Archives de Philosophie du Droit, La mondialisation entre illusion et utopie, tome 47, Dalloz, 2003, 27-54.
La mondialisation apparaît comme une occidentalisation des cultures et du droit. L'Islam qui prend forme juridique devrait se l'approprier sans se dénaturer. La réussite d'un tel processus difficile dépendra de la qualité de la régulation qui sera mise en place.
Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent via le drive lire l'article dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation".
Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary
The distinction between "Public Law" and "Private Law" is important. In the systems of Continental Law, or still called under Roman-Germanic Law, or even called Civil Law systems, it is even around it that legal systems are built: it can be a basic distinction, a summa divisio, as it it in the Civil Law systems. In the so-called Common Law or Anglo-American systems, the distinction is less fundamental, but it remains, justifying in particular that the rules and disputes concerning the administration call for special rules and are apprehended by special tribunals.
In principle, this distinction is based on the nature of the persons whose legal situation is examined. Under"Public Law" a legal situation involving a person who is itself a public-law entity: the State, a local authority, a public undertaking, etc. That is why, for example, the contract which may be concluded will be of public law, and the judge who may be seized of it will be an administrative court. If the situation does not involve a person governed by public law, then it will be governed by "Private Law". There are a thousand exceptions, but this is the starting and basic and fondamental principle.
Two essential remarks, bearing a system of values, explaining that the systems of Civil Law and Common Law are in fact confronting each other.
The two bodies of rules and institutions are not of equal strength because one of the categories is "closed", corresponding to one criterion (the "public person"), while the other is open: Public Law is a closed category; on the contrary, Private law becomes "active" as soon as there is no public person (a "private person" who or which must define himself or itself as a "non-public person").
One can consider this articulation between Public Law and Private Law in two ways, radically opposed. It may express a mark of inferiority in disfavour of private law: we are all "ordinary" persons in "ordinary" situations with "ordinary" activities (this will be the French conception ....). On the contrary, Public Law is the mark of the State, of Public Order, of Sovereignty, of public power, of the general will, in the interstices of which individuals slip in to act and satisfy their small particular interests
On the contrary, Private Law can be considered as the expression of the "common law": people are free and do what they want, through ownership and contract. As an exception and because they have elected people to do so, the rulers (whom they control), by exception, enact norms that constrain them. But this is an exception, since repression - public law and criminal law, which has the same status in this respect - is only a tribute to the freedom of persons, since this freedom remains wholly in the form of the private enterprise on the market.
It is then measured that the articulation between Public and Private Law profoundly reflects a philosophy and a political position. If it is considered that Regulation is the underlying order by which the Sovereign allows the deployment of his subjects who also benefit from a long-term policy constructed by the autonomous and measured political will, then Public Law in Is the master, the Regulation Law expressing a renewed search for efficiency, this but only this. If we believe that Regulation is whereby economic rationality manages to protect persons and companies from risks and to compensate for market failures, a market whose liberal principle remains the ideal, then Private Law is the core, whith contract and private property as basis tools.
France and the Latin countries adhere rather to this metaphysics of values which entrusts to the Public Authorities and the State the legitimacy and the power to express the general interest by Public Law, Regulators and Constitutional Courts, expressing it on a technical form renewed by the Regulatory tools: incitations, soft law, etc. The legal systems whose history draws on British history put more trust in the person of the entrepreneur and conceive of Regulation Law as an efficient outsourcing of functions to administrations that are efficient, informed and impartial.
Certainly, in the technical daily of the Law of Regulation and following the different sectors, Public and Private Law mix up: public companies take the form of publicly traded companies under private law or private companies will be entrusted with missions of public service, instituting them as second-level regulators as are the infrastructure network operators.
But the fundamental conception of systems (rooted in the history of the people) and practice marry. In the silence of regulations (and the more they are gossiping and the more the judge must interpret them, which amounts to a "silence"), what sense to give to the system?
To take only a few questions, frequent in practice:
The absence of a firm and shared definition of what is the Law of Regulation does not facilitate practice. Hesitations in translations from one language to another increase confusion.
For the time being, there is a tendency to refer to Public Law in the sectors where whe take precedence over public operators' monopolies, such as telecommunications, energy, railways, air and postal services, and to refer to Private Law in the sectors which have long been the subject of competition between operators, namely banking, finance and insurance.
It should be recognized that the criterion of distinction has little economic rationale. The notion of risk would be a clearer and more manageable criterion. But it would then lead to a greater challenge to the distinction between Public and Private Law. Because the Law of Regulation, impregnated with Economy and Economic Analysis of Law, has sometimes little basis of legal tradition, it put in question of this summa divisio. If this were to be the case, it would be the totality of the legal systems which would be upset, especially in its judicial organization, since the judicial civil and commercial system is so distinctly distinguished (that of "ordinary" persons, that of "common law ) and the administrative judge (the "natural judge" of the State). It is then realized that the Law of Regulation challenges the whole Law, especially in the Latin countries and the Civil Law systems.
Thesaurus : Doctrine
Thesaurus : Doctrine
Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary
The goal for which a mechanism, a solution an institution or a rule is adopted, instituted or elaborated, is in principle external to them. Knowledge of this goal is a tool to better understand them and is only that.
On the contrary, in Regulation Law, the goal is the heart itself. By definition, Regulation Law is a set of instruments that articulate to take their meaning in relation to a goal. Moreover, these instruments are legitimate to represent a constraint only because they realize a goal which is itself legitimate. The interpretation of Regulation Law is based on the aims pursued: the reasoning is teleological.
This teleological nature explains that efficiency is no longer merely a concern - as for ordinary legal mechanisms, but rather a principle of Regulation Law. It explains the welcome, especially through the European Union Law of the theory of the useful effect. This link between rules, which are only means, and aims, refers to the principle of proportionality, which requires that constraints and exceptions be applied only when they are necessary, proportionality being the form off the classic principle of necessity.
Because the aim is the center, it must be expressed by the author of the Regulation standards, and this is all the more so if they are of a political nature, being not limited to mitigating technical failures of markets. This goal can be varied: the management of systemic risks, but also the consideration of the fundamental rights of people, the preservation of the environment, public health, civilization, education, etc. The silence of the legislature, which limits itself to the making of rules whereas these are merely instruments, without explicating the goal whereas the latter is a political decision, is a fault in the legislative art.
Moreover, in order that the person who applies the Regulation norm, in particular the Regulator and the Judge, has no excessive margin for interpretation and does not substitute for political power, the author of the Regulation norm needs to aim specifically for one goal : in this way, the one who applies the norm will be constrained. Or, if the author targets several purposes, then he must articulate them in relation to each other, by hierarchizing them for example. If he fails to do so, the institution which applies the regulatory standards will itself have to choose the purpose and exercise a power which he does not possess.
This express designation of purpose has been made for the European Banking Union, this Regulation and Supervision construction, whose primary aim is to prevent systemic risks and resolve crises. Similarly, the purpose of the Regulation of essentiel infrastructures is to provide third parties access to the network. Similarly, in the case of a transitional regulation introduced following liberalization, the aim is to establish competition, the principle of which has been declared by the liberalization law. When this is not clearly stated, there is a lapse in the legislative art.
Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary
The liberal professions such as lawyers, doctors or accountants are organized into professional bodies and consider that they can not be reduced to mere companies operating in markets because the service they offer includes a human and moral dimension, translated by ethics, under the supervision of their internal professional organization, particularly through ex ante their power to adopt their own standards of behavior, and in ex post, the disciplinary power of their professional order.
Competition law refutes this organization from the Old Regime and simply considers the "markets of legal or medical services, firms having to compete with each other and not having to organize the sector, by or fixing Numerus clausus, etc.
In the perspective of regulation, the liberal professions are, on the contrary, the ones most pertinento organize self-regulation in a globalized economy from the moment they give rise to a credible surveillance system and thus deserve the confidence of customers and public regulators.
Thesaurus : Doctrine
Référence complète Fox, E., The new world order, in Mélanges Joël Monéger, Liber Amicorum en l'honneur du Professeur Joël Monéger, LexisNexis, 2017, 818 p.
Thesaurus : Doctrine
Full reference : Teubner, G., L'auto-constitutionnalisation des entreprises transnationales ? Sur les rapports entres les codes de conduite "privés" et "publics" des entreprises, in Supiot, A. (dir.), L'entreprise dans un monde sans frontières. Perspectives économiques et juridiques, coll. "Les sens du droit", Dalloz, 2015, p.71-83.
Sciences Po students can read this article via the Drive in the folder MAFR - Régulation
Thesaurus : Doctrine
Référence complète : Lagarde, Ch., A regulatory Approch to FinTech, mai 2018.
Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary
Legally, the State is a public law subject defined by territory, people and institutions. It acts in the international space and emits norms. Politically, it has the legitimacy required to express the will of the social body and to exercise the violence of which it deprives the other subjects of law. It is often recognizable by its power: its use of public force, its budgetary power, its jurisdictional power. These three powers, declining or being challenged by private, international and more satisfying mechanisms, some predicted the disappearance of the State, to deplore it or to dance on its corpse.
With such a background, in current theories of Regulation, primarily constructed by economic thought and at first sight one might say that the State is above all the enemy. And this for two main reasons. The first is theoretical and of a negative nature. The advocates of the theory of regulation deny the State the political qualities set out above. The State would not be a "person" but rather a group of individuals, civil servants, elected officials and other concrete human beings, expressing nothing but their particular interests, coming into conflict with other interests, and using their powers to serve the former rather than the latter as everyone else. The Regulation theory, adjoining the theory of the agency, is then aimed at controlling public agents and elected representatives in whom there is no reason to trust a priori.
The second reason is practical and positive. The State would not be a "person" but an organization. Here we find the same perspective as for the concept of enterprise, which classical lawyers conceive as a person or a group of people, while economists who conceive of the world through the market represent it as an organization. The state as an organization should be "efficient" or even "optimal". It is then the pragmatic function of the Regulation Law. When it is governed by traditional law, entangled by that it would be an almost religious illusions of the general interest, or even the social contract, it is suboptimal. The Regulation purpose is about making it more effective.
To this end, as an organization, the State is divided into independent regulatory agencies or independent administrative authorities that manage the subjects as close as possible, which is fortunate in reducing the asymmetry of information and in reviving trust in a direct link. The unitary, distant and arrogant State is abandoned for a flexible and pragmatic conception of a strategic state (without capital ...) that would finally have understood that it is an organization like any other ...
Competition law adopts this conception of the State, which it posed from the beginning that it was an economic operator like any other. This is how this conception which would be more "neutral" of the world is often presented.
Successive crises, whether sanitary or financial, have produced a pendulum effect.
Now, the notions of general interest or common goods are credited of an autonomous value, and the necessity of surpassing immediate interests and of finding persons to bear superior interests or to take charge of the interests of others, even a non-immediate one, emerged.
Thus, the State or the public authority, reappears in the globalization. The Compliance Law or the Corporal Social Responsibility of the crucial companies are converging towards a consideration of the State, which can not be reduced to a pure and simple organization receptacle of externalities.
Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary
The notion of "Common Goods" refers to a political conception insofar as it concerns objectively commercial goods such as cultural goods or medical services, but which the community is going to demand that everyone should have access to it even though the individual does not have the ability to pay the exact price. It is then the taxpayer - present or future - or the social partners who bear the cost, or even some companies, through the corporal social social responsibility mechanism.
This protection of Common Goods can be done by the State in the name of the interest of the social group for which it is responsible and whose it expresses the will, particularly through the notion of the general interest. In this now restricted framework which is the State, this reference runs counter to the principle of competition. This is particularly clear in Europe, which is based on a Union built on an autonomous and integrated legal order in the Member States in which competition continues to have a principled value and benefits from the hierarchy of norms. The evolution of European Law has balanced the principle of competition with other principles, such as the management of systemic risks, for example health, financial or environmental risks and the creation of the banking union shows that the principle of competition is no longer an apex in the European system.
But it still remains to an economic and financial conception of Europe, definition that the definition of the Regulatory Law when it is restricted to the management of the market failures feeds. It is conceivable that Europe will one day evolve towards a more humanistic conception of Regulatory Law, the same one that the European States practice and defend, notably through the notion of public service. Indeed and traditionally, public services give people access to common goods, such as education, health or culture.
Paradoxically, even though Law is not set up on a global scale, it is at this level that the legal notion of "common goods" has developed.
When one refers to goods that are called "global goods", one then seeks goods that are common to humanity, such as oceans or civilizations. It is at once the heart of Nature and the heart of Human Being, which plunges into the past and the future. Paradoxically, the concept of "global goods" is still more political in substance, but because of a lack of global political governance, effective protection is difficult, as their political consecration can only be effective nationally or simply declaratory internationally. That is why this balance is at present only at national level, which refers to the difficulty of regulating globalization.
Thus, the "common goods" legally exist more under their black face: the "global evils" or "global ills" or "global failures", against which a "Global Law" actually takes place. The notion of "global evils" constitutes a sort of mirror of Common Goods. It is then observed that countries that develop legal discourse to regulate global evils and global goods thus deploy global unilateral national Law. This is the case in the United States, notably in financial regulatory Law or more broadly through the new Compliance Law, which is being born. Companies have a role to play, particularly through Codes of Conduct and Corporate Social Responsibility.
Thesaurus : Doctrine
Référence complète : Manacorda, Stefano, La dynamique des programmes de conformité des entreprises : déclin ou transfiguration du droit pénal des affaires ?, in Supiot, Alain (dir.), L'entreprise dans un monde sans frontières. Perspectives économiques et juridiques, coll. "Les sens du droit", Dalloz, 2015, 320 p.
Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent via le Drive lire l'article dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation".
Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary
Paradoxically, the notion of conflict of interest seems to be at the center of Economic Law only recently in Economic Law, in both Corporate and Public Law. This is due to the philosophy which animates these two branches of Law, very different for each, and which has changed in each.
In fact, and in the first place in Public Law, in the Continental legal systems and especially in French legal tradition, on the side of the State, the one who serves it, by a sort of natural effect,, makes the general interest incarnated by the State pass before its personal interest. There is an opposition of interests, namely the personal interest of this public official who would like to work less and earn more, and the common interest of the population, who would like to pay less taxes and for example benefit trains that always arrive on time and the general interest which would be for example the construction of a European rail network.
But this conflict would be resolved "naturally" because the public official, having "a sense of the general interest" and being animated by the "sense of public service", sacrifices himself to serve the general interes. He stays late at his office and gets the trains on time. This theory of public service was the inheritance of royalty, a system in which the King is at the service of the People, like the aristocracy is in the "service of the King." There could therefore be no conflict of interest, neither in the administration nor in the public enterprises, nor to observe, manage or dissolve. The question does not arise ...
Let us now take the side of the companies, seen by the Company Law. In the classical conception of corporate governance, corporate officers are necessarily shareholders of the company and the profits are mandatorily distributed among all partners: the partnership agreement is a "contract of common interest". Thus, the corporate officer works in the knowledge that the fruits of his efforts will come back to him through the profits he will receive as a partner. Whatever its egoism - and even the agent must be, this mechanism produces the satisfaction of all the other partners who mechanically will also receive the profits. Selfishness is indeed the motor of the system, as in the classical theory of Market and Competition. Thus, in the corporate mechanism, there is never a conflict of interest since the corporate officer is obligatorily associated: he will always work in the interest of the partners since in this he works for himself. As Company Law posits that the loss of the company will also be incurred and suffered by all partners, he will also avoid this prospect. Again, there is no need for any control. The question of a conflict of interest between the mandatary and those who conferred this function does not structurally arise...
These two representations both proved inaccurate. They were based on quite different philosophies - the public official being supposed to have exceeded his own interest, the corporate officer being supposed to serve the common interest or the social interest by concern for his own interest - but this was by a unique reasoning that these two representations were defeated.
Let us take the first on Public Law: the "sense of the State" is not so common in the administration and the public enterprises, that the people who work there sacrifice themselves for the social group. They are human beings like the others. Researchers in economics and finance, through this elementary reflection of suspicion, have shattered these political and legal representations. In particular, it has been observed that the institutional lifestyle of public enterprises, very close to the government and their leaders, is often not very justified, whereas it is paid by the taxpayer, that is, by the social group which they claimed to serve. Europe, by affirming in the Treaty of Rome the principle of "neutrality of the capital of enterprises", that is to say, indifference to the fact that the enterprise has as its shareholder a private person or a public person, validated this absence of exceeding of his particular interest by the servant of the State, become simple economic agent. This made it possible to reach the conclusion made for Company Law.
Disillusionment was of the same magnitude. It has been observed that the corporate officer, ordinary human being, is not devoted to the company and does not have the only benefit of the profits he will later receive as a partner. He sometimes gets very little, so he can receive very many advantages (financial, pecuniary or in kind, direct or indirect). The other shareholders see their profits decrease accordingly. They are thus in a conflict of interest. Moreover, the corporate officer was elected by the shareholders' meeting, that is to say, in practice, the majority shareholder or the "controlling" shareholder (controlling shareholder) and not by all. He may not even be associated (but a "senior officer").
The very fact that the situation is no longer qualified by lawyers, through the qualifications of classical Company Law, still borrowing from the Civil Contract Law, the qualifications coming more from financial theories, borrowing from the theory of the agency, adically changed the perspective. The assumptions have been reversed: by the same "nature effect", the conflict of interest has been disclosed as structurally existing between the manager and the minority shareholder. Since the minority shareholder does not have the de facto power to dismiss the corporate officer since he does not have the majority of the voting rights, the question does not even arise whether the manager has or has not a corporate status: the minority shareholder has only the power to sell his securities, if the management of the manager is unfavorable (right of exit) or the power to say, protest and make known. This presupposes that he is informed, which will put at the center of a new Company Law information, even transparency.
Thus, this conflict of interests finds a solution in the actual transfer of securities, beyond the legal principle of negotiability. For this reason, if the company is listed, the conflict of interest is translated dialectically into a relationship between the corporate officer and the financial market which, by its liquidity, allows the agent to be sanctioned, and also provides information, Financial market and the minority shareholder becoming identical. The manager could certainly have a "sense of social interest", a sort of equivalent of the state's sense for a civil servant, if he had an ethics, which would feed a self-regulation. Few people believe in the reality of this hypothesis. By pragmatism, it is more readily accepted that the manager will prefer his interest to that of the minority shareholder. Indeed, he can serve his personal interest rather than the interest for which a power has been given to him through the informational rent he has, and the asymmetry of information he enjoys. All the regulation will intervene to reduce this asymmetry of information and to equip the minority shareholder thanks to the regulator who defends the interests of the market against the corporate officers, if necessary through the criminal law. But the belief in managerial volunteerism has recently taken on a new dimension with corporate social responsability, the social responsibility of the company where managers express their concern for others.
The identification of conflicts of interests, their prevention and their management are transforming Financial Regulatory Law and then the Common Law of Regulation, because today it is no longer believed a priori that people exceed their personal interest to serve the interest of others. It is perhaps to regain trust and even sympathy that companies have invested in social responsibility. The latter is elaborated by rules which are at first very flexible but which can also express a concern for the general interest. In this, it can meet Compliance Law and express on behalf of the companies a concern for the general interest, if the companies provide proof of this concern.
To take an example of a conflict of interest that resulted in substantial legal changes, the potentially dangerous situation of credit rating agencies has been pointed out when they are both paid by banks, advising them and designing products, While being the source of the ratings, the main indices from which the investments are made. Banks being the first financial intermediaries, these conflicts of interest are therefore systematically dangerous. That is why in Europe ESMA exercises control over these rating agencies.
The identification of conflicts of interest, which most often involves changing the way we look at a situation - which seemed normal until the point of view changes - the moral and legal perspective being different, Trust one has in this person or another one modifying this look, is today what moves the most in Regulation Law.
This is true of Public and Corporate Law, which are extended by the Regulation Law, here itself transformed by Compliance Law, notably by the launchers of alerts. But this is also true that all political institutions and elected officials.
For a rule emerges: the more central the notion of conflict of interest becomes, the more it must be realized that Trust is no longer given a priori, either to a person, to a function, to a mechanism, to a system. Trust is no longer given only a posteriori in procedures that burden the action, where one must give to see continuously that one has deserved this trust.
Nov. 1, 2021
This working paper served as a basis for an interview organized by Olivia Dufour in French in Actu-juridiques-Lextenso on 11st of January 2021.
March 31, 2021
Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance et arbitrage. Rapport de synthèse: un adossement (Compliance and Arbitration: a Backing. Conclusion), in Frison-Roche, M.-A. & Racine, J.-B., Compliance et Arbitrage (Compliance and Arbitration), Colloquium co-organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Centre de recherches sur la Justice et le Règlement des Conflits (CRJ) of Panthéon-Assas University (Paris II), with the support avec the International Court of Arbitration, Paris, 31st of March 2021
See Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's conclusion in video (in French, with English subtitles)
These notes of the conclusion have been written as the colloquium took place.
See the video of the entire colloquium (in French, with English subtitles)
This colloquium is part of the Cycle of colloquium 2021 organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its partners around the topic Compliance Juridictionnalization.
This manifestation is in French but the interventions will be the basis for a specific chapter of the English collective book directed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Compliance Juridictionnalization, co-published by the JoRC and Bruylant.
An equivalent book in French, La Juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, directed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, will be co-published by the JoRC and Dalloz.
Read the notes established for the conclusion below ⤵️
March 22, 2021
Compliance: at the moment
March 17, 2021
Full reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., The Potential of Compliance Law (Les potentialités du Droit de la Compliance), conference given to Muriel Fabre-Magnan's students, Paris I, 17th of March 2021.
This conference has been designed for Paris I's students following a Law cursus, specialized in Law of obligations and especially in Tort Law.
It therefore aims to show the technical content of Compliance Law and what it can become.
It has been followed by a debate with students.
Summary: Compliance Law is a branch of Law in the process of being born. We can be sure of its existence in the French positive Law, through the technical examination of laws called "Sapin 2" (2016) and "Vigilance" (2017). It appears at radically new. It is the reason why it is perceived as an attack, especially from United-States and we rather use legal knowledge to counter it. But if we study the historical reasons of its adoption in the United-States and the "monumental goals", whether they are negative (what should not appear in the future) or positive (what should appear in the future), we can measure that this Law, which is essentially Ex Ante could be the means through which scattered but legitimate public authorities and powerful but illegitimate big firms could ally. Therefore potentially Compliance Law could be the worst, simple tool of obedience (mechanical "conformité") or the best: what through which we could do something face to global problems, like global warming, or what we would accept to look in the face: the care for others.
March 2, 2021
Thesaurus : 08. Juridictions du fond
Full reference: Tribunal administratif de Paris (Paris administrative court), 4th section, 1st Chamber, Oxfam France, Notre Affaire à tous, Fondation pour la Nature et l’Homme et Greenpeace France, 3rd of February 2021, n°1904967, 1904968, 1904972, 1904976/4-1
Feb. 10, 2021
Teachings : Banking and Financial Regulatory Law - Semester 2021
Résumé de la leçon : Dans une conception classique et du Droit et du "libre marché", le principe est la liberté d'action de la personne. Même si l'exercice de cette liberté, voire d'un droit subjectif peut causer un dommage, par exemple un dommage concurrentiel, c'est en quelque sorte le prix légitime d'une société libre et concurrentielle. Ainsi dans une conception libérale, seul l'abus est sanctionné, c'est-à-dire l'exercice fautif que l'on fait de sa liberté ou de son droit, allant parfois jusqu'à l'exigence d'une faute qualifiée.
Mais les secteurs bancaires et financiers ne sont pas gouvernés par le principe de libre concurrence. Ils sont gouvernés par le principe de régulation, le principe de concurrence n'y a qu'un rôle adjacent. Cela ne pourra qu'engendrer de graves difficultés lorsque le Droit de la concurrence et le Droit bancaire et financier font s'appliquer d'une façon cumulée ou confrontée sur une même situation.
Les marchés financiers sont construits sur le principe de régulation qui pose le principe de transparence et de partage d'une information exacte : c'est ainsi que l'intégrité des marchés financiers est assurée, l'Autorité des Marchés financiers en étant le gardien.
La prévention et la sanction des "abus" de marché est donc non pas une part résiduelle du Droit financier, mais un pilier de celui-ci, contrairement au Droit des marchés ordinaires concurrentiels, sur lesquels l'opacité et le non-partage des informations est la règle.
Cela explique l'état du droit des "abus de marché", dont l'effectivité de la prohibition est essentielle pour le bon fonctionnement ordinaire des marchés financiers. Leur prohibition nationale a été harmonisée par le Droit de l'Union européenne, à travers des textes dont les signes reprennent l'appellation anglaise : Market abuses (ainsi le nouveau Règlement communautaire sur les abus de marché est dit Règlement MAR (Market Abuses Regulation) et la directive qui l'accompagne MAD (Market Abuses Directive) .
Il sanctionne un certain nombre de comportements, qui portent atteinte à l'intégrité des marchés,
Mais il n'exprime plus des exceptions par rapport à un principe : des fautes par rapport à des libertés ou à des droits. Il exprime des moyens par rapport à des principes dont la sanction des abus ne constitue que la concrétisation de principes dont ils sont la continuité même : l'efficacité du marché, son intégrité, sa transparence, l'information de l'investisseur.
C'est pourquoi la sanction des abus de marché ne sont pas du tout un phénomène périphérique par rapport à la Régulation des marchés financiers et à l'activité et au fonctionnement des bancaires, comme l'est le Droit pénal : elle est au contraire à la fois ordinaire et centrale. Cette différence des deux ordres publics va se retrouver dans la question lancinante de la sanction pénale et de la sanction administrative des mêmes abus de marché (par exemple "manquement d'initié" et "délit d'initié", qui ont tendance à se cumuler dans des techniques de répression qui seront l'objet de la prochaine leçon.
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Utiliser les matériaux ci-dessous pour aller plus loin et pour préparer votre conférence de méthode:
Feb. 8, 2021
Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., L'invention de la vigilance : un terme nouveau pour une Responsabilité en Ex Ante, Document de travail, février 2021.
Ce document de travail sert de base à une conférence donnée à Oslo le 9 février 2021.
Résumé du document de travail :
Feb. 3, 2021
Teachings : Banking and Financial Regulatory Law - Semester 2021
Résumé de la leçon : L'Europe est avant tout et pour l'instant encore une construction juridique. Elle fut pendant longtemps avant tout la construction d'un marché, conçu politiquement comme un espace de libre circulation (des personnes, des marchandises, des capitaux). C'est pourquoi le Droit de la Concurrence est son ADN et demeure le coeur de la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice de l'Union européenne, qui tient désormais l'équilibre entre les diverses institutions, par exemple la Banque Centrale Européenne, dont les décisions peuvent être attaquées devant elle. Mais aujourd'hui le Droit de l'Union européenne se tourne vers d'autres buts que la "liberté", laquelle s'exprime dans l'immédiat, notamment la "stabilité", laquelle se développe dans le temps. C'est pourquoi la Banque y prend un si grande importance.
En outre, face aux "libertés" les "droits" montent en puissance : c'est par les institutions juridiques que l'Europe trouve de plus en plus son unité, l'Europe économique et financière (l'Union européenne) et l'Europe des droits humains (le Conseil de l'Europe au sein duquel s'est déployée la Cour européenne des droits de l'Homme) exprimant les mêmes principes. C'est bien à travers une décision prenant appui sur le Droit de la concurrence que la Commission européenne le 18 juillet 2018 a obligé Google à concrétiser le "droit d'accès" à des entreprises innovantes, apte à faire vivre l'écosystème numérique, tandis que le Régulateur financier doit respecter les "droits de la défense" des personnes qu'il sanctionne.
Aujourd'hui à côté de l'Europe économique se développe en même temps par des textes une Europe bancaire et financière (on ne sait pas si par le Droit - par exemple le droit de la propriété intellectuelle - existera une Europe industrielle).La crise a fait naître l'Europe bancaire et financière. L'Union bancaire est issue de Règlements communautaires du 23 novembre 2010 établissant des sortes de "régulateurs européens" (ESMA, EBA, EIOPA) qui donnent une certaine unité aux marchés financiers qui demeurent nationaux, tandis que les entreprises de marché, entreprises privées en charge d'une mission de régulation, continuent leur déploiement selon des techniques de droit privé. L'Union bancaire est née d'une façon plus institutionnelle encore, par trois piliers qui assurent un continuum européen entre la prévention des crises, la résolution des crises et la garantie des dépôts. En cela, l'Europe bancaire est devenue fédérale.
Sur les marchés de capitaux, des instruments financiers et des titres, l'Union européenne a utilisé le pouvoir que lui confère depuis la jurisprudence Costa et grâce au processus Lamfallussy d'une sorte de "création continuée" pour injecter en permanence de nouvelles règles perfectionnant et unifiant les marchés nationaux. C'est désormais au niveau européen qu'est conçu la répression des abus de marché mais aussi l'information des investisseurs, comme le montre la réforme en cours dite "Prospectus 3". A l'initiative de la Commission Européenne, les textes sont produits en "paquet" car ils correspondent à des "plan d'action " . Cette façon de légiférer est désormais emprunté en droit français, par exemple par la loi dite PACTE du 29 avril 2019. Cette loi vise - en se contredisant parfois - à produire plus de concurrence, d'innovation, à attirer l'argent sur des marchés dont l'objectif est aussi la sécurité, notion d'égale importance que la liberté, jadis seul pilier du Droit économique. Conçue par les but, La loi est définitivement un "instrument", et un instrument parmi d'autres, la Cour de Justice tenant l'équilibre entre les buts, les instruments et les institutions.
La question du "régulateur" devient plus incertaine : la BCE est plus un "superviseur" qu'un "régulateur" ; le plan d'action pour une Europe des marchés de capitaux ne prévoit pas de régulateur, visant un capitalisme traditionnelle pour les petites entreprises (sorte de small businesses Act européen)
Utiliser les matériaux ci-dessous pour aller plus loin et préparer votre conférence de méthode.
Updated: Jan. 14, 2021 (Initial publication: Dec. 14, 2020)
The Economic Attractiveness of Impartiality ("L'attractivité économique de l'impartialité"), in ""Economic Attractiveness, Judge Office and Impartiality. Thinking the judge Office" ("L'attractivité économique, l'office du juge et l'impartialité. Penser l'office du juge")
Full Reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., The Economic Attractiveness of Impartiality ("L'attractivité économique de l'impartialité"), in ""Economic Attractiveness, Judge Office and Impartiality. Thinking the judge Office" ("L'attractivité économique, l'office du juge et l'impartialité. Penser l'office du juge"),
This conference was held in French.
Read the colloquium program ( in French)
See the conference (in French)
This Working Paper is significantly different from the conference because it was conceived befor the colloquia cycle beginning. In addition, since this manifestation was a Round Table, the conference has taken more into account previous conferences and what said the other two speakers.
See the slides basis of the conference (in French)
The slides could not be shown during the conference. Orally, it was appropriate to more develop the introductory remarks for emphasizing the human and unique dimension of the Judge Office, expected in economic matters. As a result, the second part of the conference was not given orally, so slides therefore remain the only media available.
Summary of the conference : To fit into the ambition of this general colloquia cycle, which is to "Think the Judge Office" and in this round table which apprehends the imperative of economic attractiveness of this office, firstly emerges the seemingly contradictory relationship between this imperative and the distance that the judge must maintain. Thus it is often asserted that the judge should be internalized at this point in the "places", - an economic concept of great scope (to which the first part of the introduction is devoted, defining the "place" at the same time as a closed and porous space and as a "systemic litigant" -, that he/she should ipso facto lose his/her distance, that is to say his/her impartiality. As places are in competition, even if weighing on one hand the effectiveness of the place, and on the other hand the impartiality of a judge who is external to this place - Judge referring to the Law , Impartiality would necessarily emerge weakened. It would then be necessary on a case-by-case basis to get the judge to give the desired concessions...
The conference aim is to take the opposite position and to state that the Place - in particular because they must be strongly distinguished from the Markets, of which they were the ancestors - require a Judge, who is at the same time "singular", that is to say with a personality, a face, opinions, and in distance so that his/her imagination does not surprise Place. Indeed, these require a human Justice, and a not mechanical one and singular judges, of whom the juge des référés or the arbitrator are the epigone, meets this need. But for reducing their "margins of discretion", how Economy qualifies the Impartiality of a person who can never be neutral, the singular Judge's Office must be inserted into mechanisms reducing these margins. In this way, the Place may reach a Judge who is always more impartial, and in doing so the Place becomes always more attractive.
To achieve this in practice, the place expresses two legitimate expectations, as a "systemic litigant", whose satisfaction increases and the singular Judge's Impartiality and increases the Attractiveness of the Place as a space. This clearly shows that the Place's Attractiveness and the Judge's Impartiality, because judges are inserted into procedures, into institutions and into a "jurisdictional family", are not only not contradictory, but are on the contrary convergent, one fueling the other.
Concretely, and judicial practice shows it, it is necessary to consolidate the particular Judge's Impartiality by inserting him/her into collective processes. As it is necessary to promote a radiance of Impartiality by strengthening the "jurisdictional family".
To consolidate the singular Judge's Impartiality by inserting him/her into collective processes, it is necessary to admit without hesitation the subjectivity of the judge, to seek it even. The reduction of the margins of discretion, definition of impartiality, being obtained by the inclusion of the judge in a procedure of which he /her alone is the master but in which he/her is not alone. This has the technical consequence that he/her is himself/herself in an adversarial debate, not only during the proceedings, but also before (in the media), inside the judgment (and the decision of the Criminal Chamber of 25 November 2020 is a model of that) and after the judgment. By that, the Judge shows that by his/her office he/she is in the future, as climate justice will show. In addition, to limit his/her margins of discretion, the singular judge must fit into a rational principle of coherence, vertical and horizontal. Vertical coherence, because he/she integrates what it is said and the technique of the "determining opinion" is to be encouraged, the singular judge having to avoid it only if he/she has "strong reasons" to do it. This is to follow this general rule Comply or Explain (which is the very opposite of blind obedience). Horizontal coherence, because the singular judge either sticks to what he/she said, estoppel also being a rule of logic. But above all, the institution must extract as much as possible from " institutional doctrines", by all means, of which the annual reports are an example.
To consolidate the singular Judge's Impartiality by strengthening the notion and reality of the "Jurisdictional Family", it is necessary to have of it a broader conception, which could lead to "guidelines" common to various jurisdictions, and a stronger one, by integrating those surrounding the judge to lead to judgment. In this, the procedure before the Court of Justice of the European Union, working on a common file, is a model. If this community were even stronger, the Judge Office would be even more useful than it is already in the digital space.
Thus, Judges who are always human, always diverse, always singular, who listen, consider and adjust to the situation, who within a Jurisdictional Family fit into an Institutional Doctrine which transcends and supports them but which they transform if there is a strong reason to do so, a reason always expressed said: this is the embodied Impartiality that makes an economic and financial Place attractive.
Jan. 11, 2021
Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., "Let's Use the Power of GAFAMs in the Service of General Interest!" ("Utilisons la puissance des GAFAMs au service de l'intérêt général!"), interview done by Olivia Dufour, Actu-juridiques Lextenso, 11st of January 2021
Read the interview (in French)
Summary of the interview by Olivia Dufour:
Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Professor of Regulation and Compliance Law, reported to the government in 2019 about Internet governance. For this expert, giving a disciplinary power to GAFAMs is the only effective solution. And the suppression of Donald Trump's account is not likely to call this analysis into question.
The three questions (translated in English here by ourselves) asked by Olivia Dufour are:
To go further, especially about the logics that guide the Avia system, see:
Dec. 31, 2020
Thesaurus : Doctrine
Full reference: Zittrain, J. L., "Gaining Power, Losing Control", Clare Hall Tanner Lecture 2020, 2020
This intervention is divided in two parts:
Updated: Dec. 21, 2020 (Initial publication: Dec. 11, 2019)
This working document serves as the basis for two conference given in the symposium made under the direction of Lucien Rapp, Les incitations, outils de la Compliance ("Incitations: Compliance Tools").
Référence : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance et Incitations : un couple à propulser, in Faculté de droit de l'Université Toulouse-Capitole, et Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC),Les incitations, outils de la Compliance, 12 décembre 2019, Toulouse.
This Working Paper has been the basis for two conferences in the colloquium in Toulouse (France) under the scientific direction of Lucien Rapp, about Les incitations, outils de la Compliance ("Incitations, as Compliance Tools"), on December 12, 2019, the first one about The sanction as incitation and the second one about Incitations and Compliance Law (synthesis of this colloquium). sur le thème de la sanction comme incitation, la seconde en synthèse de ce colloque sur
Summary of this Working Paper: Compliance and Incentives appear at first glance to be totally opposite. Not only because sanctions are at the heart of Compliance and that sanction is associated with constraint while incentive is associated with non-constrained
To do this, the concept of “incentive Compliance” should be developed. This concept is not only appropriate, but it is necessary in a new conception of Sovereignty. For example for the digital Europe.
Read the developments below.
Voir cette question analysée d’une façon autonome, Frison-Roche, M.A., Résoudre la contradiction entre « sanction » et « incitation » sous le feu du Droit de la Compliance, 2020.