Food for thoughts

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Salah, M., La mondialisation vue de l'Islam, in Archives de Philosophie du Droit, La mondialisation entre illusion et utopie, tome 47, Dalloz, 2003, 27-54.

 

La mondialisation apparaît comme une occidentalisation des cultures et du droit. L'Islam qui prend forme juridique devrait se l'approprier sans se dénaturer. La réussite d'un tel processus difficile dépendra de la qualité de la régulation qui sera mise en place.

 

Lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage dans lequel l'article a été publié.

Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent via le drive lire l'article dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation".

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Lafontaine, C., Le corps-marché. La marchandisation de la vie humaine à l'ère de la bioéconomie, Le seuil, 2014.
 

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

The distinction between "Public Law" and "Private Law" is important. In the systems of Continental Law, or still called under Roman-Germanic Law, or even called Civil Law systems, it is even around it that legal systems are built: it can be a basic distinction, a summa divisio, as it it in the Civil Law systems. In the so-called Common Law or Anglo-American systems, the distinction is less fundamental, but it remains, justifying in particular that the rules and disputes concerning the administration call for special rules and are apprehended by special tribunals.

In principle, this distinction is based on the nature of the persons whose legal situation is examined. Under"Public Law" a legal situation involving a person who is itself a public-law entity: the State, a local authority, a public undertaking, etc. That is why, for example, the contract which may be concluded will be of public law, and the judge who may be seized of it will be an administrative court. If the situation does not involve a person governed by public law, then it will be governed by "Private Law". There are a thousand exceptions, but this is the starting and basic and fondamental principle.

Two essential remarks, bearing a system of values, explaining that the systems of Civil Law and Common Law are in fact confronting each other.

The two bodies of rules and institutions are not of equal strength because one of the categories is "closed", corresponding to one criterion (the "public person"), while the other is open: Public Law is a closed category; on the contrary, Private law becomes "active" as soon as there is no public person (a "private person" who or which must define himself or itself as a "non-public person").

One can consider this articulation between Public Law and Private Law in two ways, radically opposed. It may express a mark of inferiority in disfavour of private law: we are all "ordinary" persons in "ordinary" situations with "ordinary" activities (this will be the French conception ....). On the contrary, Public Law is the mark of the State, of Public Order, of Sovereignty, of public power, of the general will, in the interstices of which individuals slip in to act and satisfy their small particular interests

On the contrary, Private Law can be considered as the expression of the "common law": people are free and do what they want, through ownership and contract. As an exception and because they have elected people to do so, the rulers (whom they control), by exception, enact norms that constrain them. But this is an exception, since repression - public law and criminal law, which has the same status in this respect - is only a tribute to the freedom of persons, since this freedom remains wholly in the form of the private enterprise on the market.

It is then measured that the articulation between Public and Private Law profoundly reflects a philosophy and a political position. If it is considered that Regulation is the underlying order by which the Sovereign allows the deployment of his subjects who also benefit from a long-term policy constructed by the autonomous and measured political will, then Public Law in Is the master, the Regulation Law expressing a renewed search for efficiency, this but only this. If we believe that Regulation is whereby economic rationality manages to protect persons and companies from risks and to compensate for market failures, a market whose liberal principle remains the ideal, then Private Law is the core, whith contract and private property as basis tools.

France and the Latin countries adhere rather to this metaphysics of values which entrusts to the Public Authorities and the State the legitimacy and the power to express the general interest by Public Law, Regulators and Constitutional Courts, expressing it on a technical form renewed by the Regulatory tools: incitations, soft law, etc. The legal systems whose history draws on British history put more trust in the person of the entrepreneur and conceive of Regulation Law as an efficient outsourcing of functions to administrations that are efficient, informed and impartial.

Certainly, in the technical daily of the Law of Regulation and following the different sectors, Public and Private Law mix up:  public companies take the form of publicly traded companies under private law or private companies will be entrusted with missions of public service, instituting them as second-level regulators as are the infrastructure network operators.

But the fundamental conception of systems (rooted in the history of the people) and practice marry. In the silence of regulations (and the more they are gossiping and the more the judge must interpret them, which amounts to a "silence"), what sense to give to the system?

To take only a few questions, frequent in practice:

  •      What judge to seize? The administrative judge or the civil judge? What is the "natural judge" of the Regulatory Law?
  •      What standard to apply? The contractual will? The implicit will of the legislator? What is the "natural author" of the Law of Regulation?
  •      Does the silence of the text prohibit action for operators or on the contrary does silence mean their freedom to act?

The absence of a firm and shared definition of what is the Law of Regulation does not facilitate practice. Hesitations in translations from one language to another increase confusion.

For the time being, there is a tendency to refer to Public Law in the sectors where whe take precedence over public operators' monopolies, such as telecommunications, energy, railways, air and postal services, and to refer to Private Law in the sectors which have long been the subject of competition between operators, namely banking, finance and insurance.

It should be recognized that the criterion of distinction has little economic rationale. The notion of risk would be a clearer and more manageable criterion. But it would then lead to a greater challenge to the distinction between Public and Private Law. Because the Law of Regulation, impregnated with Economy and Economic Analysis of Law, has sometimes little basis of legal tradition, it put in question of this summa divisio. If this were to be the case, it would be the totality of the legal systems which would be upset, especially in its judicial organization, since the judicial civil and commercial system is so distinctly distinguished (that of "ordinary" persons, that of "common law ) and the administrative judge (the "natural judge" of the State). It is then realized that the Law of Regulation challenges the whole Law, especially in the Latin countries and the Civil Law systems.

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète Fox, E., The new world order, in Mélanges Joël Monéger, Liber Amicorum en l'honneur du Professeur Joël Monéger, LexisNexis, 2017, 818 p.  

 

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Complete reference : Archives de Philosophie du Droit (APD), Le droit international, tome 32, ed. Sirey, 1987, 442 p. 

 

Read the table of contents.

Read the summaries of the articles in English

 

See the presentation of other volumes of Archives de Philosophie du Droit.

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

The goal for which a mechanism, a solution an institution or a rule is adopted, instituted or elaborated, is in principle external to them. Knowledge of this goal is a tool to better understand them and is only that.

On the contrary, in Regulation Law, the goal is the heart itself. By definition, Regulation Law is a set of instruments that articulate to take their meaning in relation to a goal. Moreover, these instruments are legitimate to represent a constraint only because they realize a goal which is itself legitimate. The interpretation of Regulation Law is based on the aims pursued: the reasoning is teleological.

This teleological nature explains that efficiency is no longer merely a concern - as for ordinary legal mechanisms, but rather a principle of Regulation Law. It explains the welcome, especially through the European Union Law of the theory of the useful effect. This link between rules, which are only means, and aims, refers to the principle of proportionality, which requires that constraints and exceptions be applied only when they are necessary, proportionality being the form off the classic principle of necessity.

Because the aim is the center, it must be expressed by the author of the Regulation standards, and this is all the more so if they are of a political nature, being not limited to mitigating technical failures of markets. This goal can be varied: the management of systemic risks, but also the consideration of the fundamental rights of people, the preservation of the environment, public health, civilization, education, etc. The silence of the legislature, which limits itself to the making of rules whereas these are merely instruments, without explicating the goal whereas the latter is a political decision, is a fault in the legislative art.

Moreover, in order that the person who applies the Regulation norm, in particular the Regulator and the Judge, has no excessive margin for interpretation and does not substitute for political power, the author of the Regulation norm needs to aim specifically for one goal : in this way, the one who applies the norm will be constrained. Or, if the author targets several purposes, then he must articulate them in relation to each other, by hierarchizing them for example. If he fails to do so, the institution which applies the regulatory standards will itself have to choose the purpose and exercise a power which he does not possess.

This express designation of purpose has been made for the European Banking Union,  this Regulation and Supervision construction, whose primary aim is to prevent systemic risks and resolve crises. Similarly, the purpose of the Regulation of essentiel infrastructures is to provide third parties access to the network. Similarly, in the case of a transitional regulation introduced following liberalization, the aim is to establish competition, the principle of which has been declared by the liberalization law. When this is not clearly stated, there is a lapse in the legislative art.

 

 

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

Legally, the State is a public law subject defined by territory, people and institutions. It acts in the international space and emits norms. Politically, it has the legitimacy required to express the will of the social body and to exercise the violence of which it deprives the other subjects of law. It is often recognizable by its power: its use of public force, its budgetary power, its jurisdictional power. These three powers, declining or being challenged by private, international and more satisfying mechanisms, some predicted the disappearance of the State, to deplore it or to dance on its corpse.

With such a background, in current theories of Regulation, primarily constructed by economic thought and at first sight one might say that the State is above all the enemy. And this for two main reasons. The first is theoretical and of a negative nature. The advocates of the theory of regulation deny the State the political qualities set out above. The State would not be a "person" but rather a group of individuals, civil servants, elected officials and other concrete human beings, expressing nothing but their particular interests, coming into conflict with other interests, and using their powers to serve the former rather than the latter as everyone else. The Regulation theory, adjoining the theory of the agency, is then aimed at controlling public agents and elected representatives in whom there is no reason to trust a priori.

The second reason is practical and positive. The State would not be a "person" but an organization. Here we find the same perspective as for the concept of enterprise, which classical lawyers conceive as a person or a group of people, while economists who conceive of the world through the market represent it as an organization. The state as an organization should be "efficient" or even "optimal". It is then the pragmatic function of the Regulation Law. When it is governed by traditional law, entangled by that it would be an almost religious illusions of the general interest, or even the social contract, it is suboptimal. The Regulation purpose is about making it more effective.

To this end, as an organization, the State is divided into independent regulatory agencies or independent administrative authorities that manage the subjects as close as possible, which is fortunate in reducing the asymmetry of information and in reviving trust in a direct link. The unitary, distant and arrogant State is abandoned for a flexible and pragmatic conception of a strategic state (without capital ...) that would finally have understood that it is an organization like any other ...

Competition law adopts this conception of the State, which it posed from the beginning that it was an economic operator like any other. This is how this conception which would be  more "neutral" of the world is often presented.

Successive crises, whether sanitary or financial, have produced a pendulum effect.

Now, the notions of general interest or common goods are credited of an autonomous value, and the necessity of surpassing immediate interests and of finding persons to bear superior interests or to take charge of the interests of others, even a non-immediate one, emerged.

Thus, the State or the public authority, reappears in the globalization. The Compliance Law or the Corporal Social Responsibility of the crucial companies are converging towards a consideration of the State, which can not be reduced to a pure and simple organization receptacle of externalities.

 

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Full reference : Teubner, G., L'auto-constitutionnalisation des entreprises transnationales ? Sur les rapports entres les codes de conduite "privés" et "publics" des entreprises, in Supiot, A. (dir.), L'entreprise dans un monde sans frontières. Perspectives économiques et juridiques, coll. "Les sens du droit", Dalloz, 2015, p.71-83.

 

Sciences Po students can read this article via the Drive in the folder MAFR - Régulation

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Lagarde, Ch., A regulatory Approch to FinTech, mai 2018. 

 

Lire l'article

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

The liberal professions such as lawyers, doctors or accountants are organized into professional bodies and consider that they can not be reduced to mere companies operating in markets because the service they offer includes a human and moral dimension, translated by ethics, under the supervision of their internal professional organization, particularly through ex ante their power to adopt their own standards of behavior, and in ex post, the disciplinary power of their professional order.

Competition law refutes this organization from the Old Regime and simply considers the "markets of legal or medical services, firms having to compete with each other and not having to organize the sector, by  or fixing Numerus clausus, etc.

In the perspective of regulation, the liberal professions are, on the contrary, the ones most pertinento organize self-regulation in a globalized economy from the moment they give rise to a credible surveillance system and thus deserve the confidence of customers and public regulators.

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

The notion of "Common Goods" refers to a political conception insofar as it concerns objectively commercial goods such as cultural goods or medical services, but which the community is going to demand that everyone should have access to it even though the individual does not have the ability to pay the exact price. It is then the taxpayer - present or future - or the social partners who bear the cost, or even some companies, through the corporal social social responsibility mechanism.

This protection of Common Goods can be done by the State in the name of the interest of the social group for which it is responsible and whose it expresses the will, particularly through the notion of the general interest. In this now restricted framework which is the State, this reference runs counter to the principle of competition. This is particularly clear in Europe, which is based on a Union built on an autonomous and integrated legal order in the Member States in which competition continues to have a principled value and benefits from the hierarchy of norms. The evolution of European Law has balanced the principle of competition with other principles, such as the management of systemic risks, for example health, financial or environmental risks and the creation of the banking union shows that the principle of competition is no longer an apex in the European system.

But it still remains to an economic and financial conception of Europe, definition that the definition of the Regulatory Law  when it is restricted to the management of the market failures feeds. It is conceivable that Europe will one day evolve towards a more humanistic conception of Regulatory  Law, the same one that the European States practice and defend, notably through the notion of public service. Indeed and traditionally, public services give people access to common goods, such as education, health or culture.

Paradoxically, even though Law is not set up on a global scale, it is at this level that the legal notion of "common goods" has developed.

When one refers to goods that are called "global goods", one then seeks goods that are common to humanity, such as oceans or civilizations. It is at once the heart of Nature and the heart of Human Being, which plunges into the past and the future. Paradoxically, the concept of "global goods" is still more political in substance, but because of a lack of global political governance, effective protection is difficult, as their political consecration can only be effective nationally or simply declaratory internationally. That is why this balance is at present only at national level, which refers to the difficulty of regulating globalization.

Thus, the "common goods" legally exist more under their black face: the "global evils" or "global ills" or "global failures", against which a "Global Law" actually takes place. The notion of "global evils" constitutes a sort of mirror of Common Goods. It is then observed that countries that develop legal discourse to regulate global evils and global goods thus deploy global unilateral national Law. This is the case in the United States, notably in financial regulatory Law or more broadly through the new Compliance Law, which is being born. Companies have a role to play, particularly through Codes of Conduct and Corporate Social Responsibility.

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Manacorda, Stefano, La dynamique des programmes de conformité des entreprises : déclin ou transfiguration du droit pénal des affaires ?, in Supiot, Alain (dir.), L'entreprise dans un monde sans frontières. Perspectives économiques et juridiques, coll. "Les sens du droit", Dalloz, 2015, 320 p.

 

Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent via le Drive lire l'article dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation".

 

 

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

Paradoxically, the notion of conflict of interest seems to be at the center of Economic Law only recently in Economic Law, in both Corporate and Public Law. This is due to the philosophy which animates these two branches of Law, very different for each, and which has changed in each.

In fact, and in the first place in Public Law, in the Continental legal systems and especially in French legal tradition, on the side of the State, the one who serves it, by a sort of natural effect,, makes the general interest incarnated by the State pass before its personal interest. There is an opposition of interests, namely the personal interest of this public official who would like to work less and earn more, and the common interest of the population, who would like to pay less taxes and for example benefit trains that always arrive on time and the general interest which would be for example the construction of a European rail network.

But this conflict would be resolved "naturally" because the public official, having "a sense of the general interest" and being animated by the "sense of public service", sacrifices himself to serve the general interes. He stays late at his office and gets the trains on time. This theory of public service was the inheritance of royalty, a system in which the King is at the service of the People, like the aristocracy is in the "service of the King." There could therefore be no conflict of interest, neither in the administration nor in the public enterprises, nor to observe, manage or dissolve. The question does not arise ...

Let us now take the side of the companies, seen by the Company Law. In the classical conception of corporate governance, corporate officers are necessarily shareholders of the company and the profits are mandatorily distributed among all partners: the partnership agreement is a "contract of common interest". Thus, the corporate officer works in the knowledge that the fruits of his efforts will come back to him through the profits he will receive as a partner. Whatever its egoism - and even the agent must be, this mechanism produces the satisfaction of all the other partners who mechanically will also receive the profits. Selfishness is indeed the motor of the system, as in the classical theory of Market and Competition. Thus, in the corporate mechanism, there is never a conflict of interest since the corporate officer is obligatorily associated: he will always work in the interest of the partners since in this he works for himself. As Company Law posits that the loss of the company will also be incurred and suffered by all partners, he will also avoid this prospect. Again, there is no need for any control. The question of a conflict of interest between the mandatary and those who conferred this function does not structurally arise...

These two representations both proved inaccurate. They were based on quite different philosophies - the public official being supposed to have exceeded his own interest, the corporate officer being supposed to serve the common interest or the social interest by concern for his own interest - but this was by  a unique reasoning that these two representations were defeated.

Let us take the first on Public Law: the "sense of the State" is not so common in the administration and the public enterprises, that the people who work there sacrifice themselves for the social group. They are human beings like the others. Researchers in economics and finance, through this elementary reflection of suspicion, have shattered these political and legal representations. In particular, it has been observed that the institutional lifestyle of public enterprises, very close to the government and their leaders, is often not very justified, whereas it is paid by the taxpayer, that is, by the social group which they claimed to serve. Europe, by affirming in the Treaty of Rome the principle of "neutrality of the capital of enterprises", that is to say, indifference to the fact that the enterprise has as its shareholder a private person or a public person, validated this absence of exceeding of his particular interest by the servant of the State, become simple economic agent. This made it possible to reach the conclusion made for Company Law.

Disillusionment was of the same magnitude. It has been observed that the corporate officer, ordinary human being, is not devoted to the company and does not have the only benefit of the profits he will later receive as a partner. He sometimes gets very little, so he can receive very many advantages (financial, pecuniary or in kind, direct or indirect). The other shareholders see their profits decrease accordingly. They are thus in a conflict of interest. Moreover, the corporate officer was elected by the shareholders' meeting, that is to say, in practice, the majority shareholder or the "controlling" shareholder (controlling shareholder) and not by all. He may not even be associated (but a "senior officer").

The very fact that the situation is no longer qualified by lawyers, through the qualifications of classical Company Law, still borrowing from the Civil Contract Law, the qualifications coming more from financial theories, borrowing from the theory of the agency, adically changed the perspective. The assumptions have been reversed: by the same "nature effect", the conflict of interest has been disclosed as structurally existing between the manager and the minority shareholder. Since the minority shareholder does not have the de facto power to dismiss the corporate officer since he does not have the majority of the voting rights, the question does not even arise whether the manager has or has not a corporate status: the minority shareholder has only the power to sell his securities, if the management of the manager is unfavorable (right of exit) or the power to say, protest and make known. This presupposes that he is informed, which will put at the center of a new Company Law information, even transparency.

Thus, this conflict of interests finds a solution in the actual transfer of securities, beyond the legal principle of negotiability. For this reason, if the company is listed, the conflict of interest is translated dialectically into a relationship between the corporate officer and the financial market which, by its liquidity, allows the agent to be sanctioned, and also provides information, Financial market and the minority shareholder becoming identical. The manager could certainly have a "sense of social interest", a sort of equivalent of the state's sense for a civil servant, if he had an ethics, which would feed a self-regulation. Few people believe in the reality of this hypothesis. By pragmatism, it is more readily accepted that the manager will prefer his interest to that of the minority shareholder. Indeed, he can serve his personal interest rather than the interest for which a power has been given to him through the informational rent he has, and the asymmetry of information he enjoys. All the regulation will intervene to reduce this asymmetry of information and to equip the minority shareholder thanks to the regulator who defends the interests of the market against the corporate officers, if necessary through the criminal law. But the belief in managerial volunteerism has recently taken on a new dimension with corporate social responsability, the social responsibility of the company where managers express their concern for others.

The identification of conflicts of interests, their prevention and their management are transforming Financial Regulatory Law and then the Common Law of Regulation, because today it is no longer believed a priori that people exceed their personal interest to serve the interest of others. It is perhaps to regain trust and even sympathy that companies have invested in social responsibility. The latter is elaborated by rules which are at first very flexible but which can also express a concern for the general interest. In this, it can meet Compliance Law and express on behalf of the companies a concern for the general interest, if the companies provide proof of this concern.

To take an example of a conflict of interest that resulted in substantial legal changes, the potentially dangerous situation of credit rating agencies has been pointed out when they are both paid by banks, advising them and designing products, While being the source of the ratings, the main indices from which the investments are made. Banks being the first financial intermediaries, these conflicts of interest are therefore systematically dangerous. That is why in Europe ESMA exercises control over these rating agencies.

The identification of conflicts of interest, which most often involves changing the way we look at a situation - which seemed normal until the point of view changes - the moral and legal perspective being different, Trust one has in this person or another one modifying this look, is today what moves the most in Regulation Law.
This is true of Public and Corporate Law, which are extended by the Regulation Law, here itself transformed by Compliance Law, notably by the launchers of alerts. But this is also true that all political institutions and elected officials.

For a rule emerges: the more central the notion of conflict of interest becomes, the more it must be realized that Trust is no longer given a priori, either to a person, to a function, to a mechanism, to a system. Trust is no longer given only a posteriori in procedures that burden the action, where one must give to see continuously that one has deserved this trust.

Oct. 22, 2021

Compliance: at the moment

Oct. 10, 2021

Compliance: at the moment

Oct. 10, 2021

Publications

► Full Reference complète: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Duty of Vigilance, Whistleblowing and International Competitiveness,  Working Paper, September  2021.

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🎤 this Working Paper is the basis for a conference  , in the colloquium Effectiveness  of Compliance and International Competitiveness , co-organised  by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Center for Law and Economics of the Panthéon-Assas University (Paris II),   November 4, 2021

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📝this Working Paper  is also the basis for an article. This article is to be published 

in its French version in the book  📕Les buts monumentaux de la Compliancein the series 📚 Régulations & Compliance

 in its English version in the book 📘Compliance Monumental Goals, in the series la collection 📚   Compliance & Regulation

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► Working Paper Summary: The "Compliance Tools" are very diverse. If it has been chosen to study more particularly among these the obligation of vigilance and the whistleblower, these rather than others and to study them together, it is because they present in the perspective of the specific topic chosen, namely "international competitiveness", and for companies, and for economic zones considered, and for legal system inseparable from them, a uniqueness: these are mechanisms which release Information. 

Sur ordre de la Loi, l'entreprise va non seulement cesser d'ignorer ce qu'elle recouvrait du mouchoir que Tartuffe le tendait ou qu'une conception du Droit des sociétés lui permettait légitimement d'ignorer. Il ne s'agit pas ici d'examiner si cette révolution que le Droit de la Compliance exprime dans le système juridique est d'une part légitime et d'autre part effective, mais d'essayer de mesurer ce qu'il en est au regard de la "Compétitivité internationale".

Le Droit de la Compliance sera donc ici examiné à travers ses instruments (et non par rapport à sa normativité, laquelle réside dans ses "Buts Monumentaux"). Or, ses instruments ont pour objet l'information et la mise à disposition de cette information, dans sa présentation, dans son intelligibilité et surtout dans les mains de ceux qui sont aptes à en faire "bon usage" pour que les Buts du Droit de la Compliance soient atteints.

Au regard de cette notion centrale qu'est l'information,la compétitivité internationale va être plus particulièrement concernée parce que le Droit de la Compliance va obliger l'entreprise à aller elle-même rechercher, puis exposer au regard de tous, notamment de ses concurrents, ses faiblesses, ses projets, ses alliances, ses failles. Cela ne pose pas de difficulté si ses compétiteurs sont eux-mêmes souvent à cette nouvelle loi, qui va bien au-delà de la transparence, laquelle est déjà un mécanisme nouveau car une entreprise n'est pas une organisation transparente et le Droit de la concurrence qui régit les entreprises ordinaires n'a jamais exigé cela, régit également les compétiteurs. Mais si ceux-ci ne sont pas soumis à cette loi si particulière qu'est le Droit de la Compliance, alors il y a distorsion de compétitivité du fait même du Droit. 

Certes, l'on peut dire que les marchés aiment la vertu, qu'ils lui accordent crédit car ils sont eux-mêmes basés sur l'idée de "promesse", laquelle repose ultimement sur un concept moral, mais cette mise à disposition d'informations multiples à autrui, lequel autrui demeure opaque est un problème majeur de compétitivité, que le concept de "loyauté des pratiques commerciale" ne prend que très partiellement en charte.

C'est pourquoi il convient d'examiner tout d'abord ce qu'il en est de la puissance économique et financière de l'information captée par l'entreprise sur elle-même que le Droit de la Compliance peut rendre disponible à tous, ce qui produit une asymétrie de puissance à laquelle le Droit de la Compliance ne semble pas avoir encore répondu (I). Mais le Droit de la Compliance oblige aussi les entreprises à rendre compte non seulement à ce qu'elles font mais encore à ce que font les autres pour elles. A travers l'obligation de vigilance, obligation objective et Ex Ante, à laquelle s'arrive le pouvoir du lanceur d'alerte, l'entreprise obtient un pouvoir d'information sur autrui qui pourrait bien résoudre ce qui est souvent présentée comme la dispute aporétique de l'extraterritorialité du Droit de la Compliance, rendant alors comptable les entreprises jusqu'ici protégées par leur système juridique "préservé" et atteint de ce fait par l'effectivité du Droit de la Compliance (II).  

 

Sept. 16, 2021

Thesaurus : Doctrine

 Full reference: Bismuth, R., Compliance et Souveraineté : Compliance and Sovereignty: ambiguous relationships,in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, series "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, to be published.

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► Article Summary (done by the author): :  At first glance, the notion of Sovereignty is difficult to combine with Compliance. Indeed, Sovereignty is part of Public International Law in a logic of essentially territorial distribution of competences, while Compliance has developed and disseminated in companies with tools and methods which largely ignore borders.

A closer look reveals more fundamentally three types of ambiguous interactions between the two. Compliance can first of all be understood as a tool allowing States, by relying on companies, to circumvent the obstacles and limits posed by a Sovereignty conceived in territorial terms and therefore to extend it. Such an approach can nevertheless lead to friction or even conflicts between Compliance and Sovereignty, the norms conveyed by the first not necessarily being in line with those imposed by the second.

This is particularly true when the Compliance "Monumental Goals" are not unilaterally defined or are not intended to be. Finally, by infusing companies with instruments and methods that are reminiscent of sovereign functions, compliance can also allow us to imagine an emerging movement tending to gradually establish Corporate Sovereignty beyond that of States.

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📘  read the general presentation of the book in which this article is published

Sept. 16, 2021

Thesaurus : Doctrine

 Full reference: Bismuth, R., Compliance et Souveraineté : relations ambigües ("Compliance and Sovereignty: ambiguous relationships"), in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Les buts monumentaux de la Compliance, series "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, to be published.

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► Article Summary (done by the author): :  At first glance, the notion of Sovereignty is difficult to combine with Compliance. Indeed, Sovereignty is part of Public International Law in a logic of essentially territorial distribution of competences, while Compliance has developed and disseminated in companies with tools and methods which largely ignore borders.

A closer look reveals more fundamentally three types of ambiguous interactions between the two. Compliance can first of all be understood as a tool allowing States, by relying on companies, to circumvent the obstacles and limits posed by a Sovereignty conceived in territorial terms and therefore to extend it. Such an approach can nevertheless lead to friction or even conflicts between Compliance and Sovereignty, the norms conveyed by the first not necessarily being in line with those imposed by the second.

This is particularly true when the Compliance "Monumental Goals" are not unilaterally defined or are not intended to be. Finally, by infusing companies with instruments and methods that are reminiscent of sovereign functions, compliance can also allow us to imagine an emerging movement tending to gradually establish Corporate Sovereignty beyond that of States.

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📝 Go to the general presentation of the book in which this article is published.

 

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Sept. 8, 2021

Editorial responsibilities : Direction of the collection "Cours-Série Droit privé", Editions Dalloz (33)

► Référence complète : André, Ch., Droit pénal spécial, Coll. "Cours Dalloz - Série Droit privé", Dalloz, 1ière éd., 2010, 6ième éd., 2021, 594 p.

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Présentation de l'ouvrage : La 6ième édition de ce Cours est à jour des réformes qui continuellement modifient les infractions pénales, notamment en matière économique et financière mais aussi sociales (par exemple les "gilets jaunes"), montrant avant tout la constante de la crise d'un droit pénal déliquescent et désormais éclaté en droits répressifs spéciaux. Aujourd'hui c'est non seulement un droit pénal spécial mais encore voire avant tout un droit pénal d'exceptions (ce qui pose problème au regard du droit pénal général, lequel est indissociable de la procédure pénal) qu'il faut apprendre, étudiants comme praticiens.

Ce Cours est construit en trois parties.

La première traite des infractions contre les personnes ; la deuxième des infractions contre les biens ; la troisième contres la Nation, l'État et la paix publique. 

Les éléments de procédure pénale, indissociables du droit pénal, sont expliqués à chaque infraction explicitée. 

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Lire la quatrième de couverture.

Lire la table des matières.

 

Voir l'ensemble des ouvrages de la même collection 📚 "Cours Dalloz -Série Droit privé"

et notamment

📕 Droit pénal général

📕 Procédure pénale

📕 Droit pénal des affaires

 

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Sept. 2, 2021

Interviews

► Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A.,La nouvelle loi de protection des données en Chine est un « anti-RGPD », entretien avec Olivia Dufour, Actu-Juridique, 2 septembre 2021. 

 

► Lire l'entretien complet. 

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Les 3 questions posées étaient :


❓ La Chine a adopté fin août une grande loi de protection des données personnelles. Celle-ci est présenté dans les médias comme un équivalent de notre RGPD. Est-ce le cas ?


La réponse est : non.

(lire la réponse développée dans l'entretien)

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❓ S'agit-il de simples effets indésirables ou bien du but poursuivi par le Législateur ?


La réponse est : Le but du Législateur n'est pas d'armer l'individu contre le pouvoir de l'Etat, c'est au contraire d'accroître le pouvoir de l'Etat, éventuellement contre lui.

(lire la réponse développée dans l'entretien)

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❓ Si la compliance peut servir les intérêts d'Etats non-démocratiques, c'est donc qu'elle est potentiellement dangereuse ?


La réponse est : elle n'est dangereuse que définie comme "méthode d'efficacité des règles ; il faut définir le Droit de la Compliance par son "but monumental" qui est la protection des personnes. La contradiction de la loi chinoise nouvelle apparaît alors.

(lire la réponse développée dans l'entretien)

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June 25, 2021

Compliance: at the moment

Under the scientific direction of Professor Emmanuelle Claudel, the French Association Droit et Commerce  devotes its annual conference to ➡️📅 "La concurrence dans tous ses états". In her introduction retracing the entire evolution of this Law, Emmanuelle Claudel underlined that competition Law takes a distance from its basic concepts, such as the notion of "market". The branch of Law is finding more and more points of contact with Regulatory and Compliance Law.

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In fact, in an economic and social system whose organization needs to be readjusted, the notion of “chain" must find its rightful place in conjunction with the notion of "market". For many objects, it is relevant to think not only in terms of "market" but in terms of chains. Indeed the "chain" gives consistency to the object itself. For example forests or food, as European Commission did (I).

But looking more concretely at the economic space, directly seeing people and things, such as agricultural products and what they are used for, that is to say to feed human beings, then this "Monumental Goal" must be entrusted to Crucial Entreprises the task of achieving it (II). Compliance Law can in the future caring of this, by setting new obligations, but also by loosening the so violent relationship, by its very indifference, between competition and food products.

 

I. NO LONGER THINK ONLY IN TERMS OF "MARKETS" BUT IN TERMS OF CHAIN: THE EXAMPLE FROM THE FARM TO THE FORK

We are starting to assert this for the forest but also for agriculture that the European Commission now connects with food. So food should not be seen simply as a succession of "markets". In fact, if we only conceive them in this way, the agricultural markets, which should benefit from the financing offered by financial markets, are sometimes grabbed by them, which can literally starve the world rather than helping to feed it.

Today, we agree to think about agriculture as a "chain" and, as the European Commission writes: From farm to fork. Indeed if agriculture is an important "sector" it is because it allows to feed the population. This basic fact has often been forgotten, in particular because competition Law, based on trade in products and not on the products themselves (of which it only measures the substituability, to identify the relevant markets) is not interested in what things are made for. We should not blame it, but in return, it cannot claim to dominate everything, since it is only pertinent for this small part of our life.

European Commission, which is emerging more and more from the neutral notion of the market to move towards the substantive notions of products and of what they are made for, of their results (happy or unhappy), is in the process of setting up an industrial policy and what could be a real agricultural policy, which is not made only of subsidies.

It consists in saying that it is necessary to design a chain which starts from the soil, its agricultural and livestock use to achieve what it is for: feeding the population.

It seems simple, but in a Law dominated by the sole Competition Law, which fought for example by the techniques of price support, it is a new way, because it is concrete, to conceive.

But how to do it ?

Because Economy does not necessarily have to be administered, Compliance Law can be of great help, especially through the wholesale markets.

 

II. INTERNALIZING THE MONUMENTAL GOALS OF AGRICULTURAL SECTORS IN THEIR CRUCIAL ENTERPRISES

Rather than administering the sectors, it is advisable to internalize in crucial companies the Monumental Goals which concern the future of the social group, for example feeding the population.

It is for this reason that we must conceive "wholesale markets", not only as does Competition Law, which qualifies them as markets between the producers and the resellers, but as companies which are, within vital chains, are in charge of supervising the link between upstream and downstream so that the goal is realized.

This is why these companies are directly concerned by Compliance Law, in its not mechanical definition of Compliance with the legal requirements applicable to them (which is our obligation to all) but in its definition which puts Compliance as something beyond Competition Law (➡️📝Frison-Roche, M.-A., Competition Law and Compliance Law, 2018)

Wholesale markets for food therefore have a decisive role to play, as demonstrated by the French Rungis market company which, during the time of the health crisis, helped to ensure the continuity of supply (see more generally Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Montpellier University, ➡️📅colloquium Public Norms and Compliance in times of crisis: monumental goals put to the test, contributions serving as a basis for a chapter in ➡️📘Compliance Monumental Goals, 2022).

The internalization of these Goals in Companies resolves the aporia with which States are confronted in their intimacy with the notion of borders.

Indeed, il is useful to adopt a definition of "wholesale markets" no longer through the definition of the "market" but through the definition of "the crucial enterprise", which is itself "regulated" (Frison- Roche, M.-A., ➡️📝The Crucial Companies and their Regulation, 2014).

"Wholesale markets" are businesses where retailers go to get their supplies every day, remembering what the market place was like, remembering the time when the market is the place where human beings met, where the exchanges were not between capital and commodities but between people (Supiot, A., ➡️📕Mondialisation ou Globalisation, 2019).

These companies are grouped together in a global association: the World Union of Wholesale Markets. For wholesale companies, it is a question of coming together to ensure that the chains operate from soil maintenance to the mouths of human beings.

Because it is so difficult to find a World Regulator which is at the same time legitimate and effective in agricultural matters.

It is possible that a public regulator is more legitimate but it is for the moment impossible to establish worldwide (see generally ➡️📕Collart-Dutilleul, Fr. and Le Dolley, E., ed., Droit, économie et marchés de matières premières agricoles, 2013).

Therefore, an alliance between the political authorities, which care about public health and crucial companies, of which these "wholesale markets" are an example, by "Compliance Obligations" thus understood, is a concrete prospect.

This then results in an obligation and a power of Vigilance and coordination, which can already be found in banking (a sector where Compliance Law is more mature than elsewhere) which must develop, rather than being the object of the segmentation that, by nature, traditional Competition Law generates, market by market, market against market.

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June 23, 2021

Conferences

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., The judge-judged: Articulate words and things face to the difficult conflicts of interest, in L'entreprise instituée Procureur et Juge d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance, colloquium co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lyon 3 Law School, 23rd of June 2021.

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This conference was in French ; the Working Paper on which this conference was based is in French and in English: The judge-judged: Articulate words and things face to the stressful conflicts of interest 

📅  June 23, 2021, 9h30 - 18h30 

🧭 Lyon,  Lyon 3 Law School, "Salle de la Rotonde" and online

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📊 Read the slides on which this conference is based (in French)

🎥 See the video of this conference. 

 

📝 Read the general program of this colloquium (in French)

📝 Read the working paper on which this conference is based  (in English)

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📅 This colloquium is part of the cycle of colloquia in 2021 organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its partners about Compliance Juridictionnalization

📕 📘 The conference is the first basis for the writing of an article, forthcoming in a book whose the French version is La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC and Dalloz, and whose the English version Compliance Juridictionnalisation, is co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant. 

📚   The book in French will be published in the collection "Régulation & Compliance " while the book in English will be published in the same collection "Compliance & Regulation". 

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🔻 Summary of the conference: read below.

June 15, 2021

Thesaurus : 05. CJCE - CJUE

Full reference: CJEU, Grand chamber, Judgment Facebook Ireland e.a. v. Gegevensbeschermingsautoriteit, C-645-19, June 15, 2021

Read the judgment

Read the abstract of the judgment done by the Court

Read the press release

 

 

April 21, 2021

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Full reference : Racine, J.-B., La prégnance géographique dans le choix et l'usage des outils de la compliance, in M.-A. (dir.), Les outils  de la Compliance, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance and Dalloz, 2021, p. 157-164

Consult an overview of the volume in which the article was published.

 

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Summary of the article (by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche)

The author correlates Compliance Law and "Global Law" and underlines the balance of power that the former expresses, in particular on the part of the United States and even if it therefore "tends to become universal" , the particularities remain, if only in the implementation.

Focusing more particularly on "Compliance Tools", a comparison is made between several contributions of the volume, to establish that, in a definitive and desirable way, the Compliance mechanisms include both a global dimension and a local dimension .

 

Consult the summaries of the other articles composing the book.

 

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March 31, 2021

Conferences

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance et arbitrage. Rapport de synthèse: un adossement (Compliance and Arbitration: a Backing. Conclusion), in Frison-Roche, M.-A. & Racine, J.-B., Compliance et Arbitrage (Compliance and Arbitration), Colloquium co-organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Centre de recherches sur la Justice et le Règlement des Conflits (CRJ) of Panthéon-Assas University (Paris II), with the support avec the International Court of Arbitration, Paris, 31st of March 2021

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Read the program of this colloquium 

See Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's conclusion in video (in French, with English subtitles)

These notes of the conclusion have been written as the colloquium took place. 

See the video of the entire colloquium (in French, with English subtitles)

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This colloquium is part of the Cycle of colloquium 2021 organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its partners around the topic Compliance Juridictionnalization.  

This manifestation is in French but the interventions will be the basis for a specific chapter of the English collective book directed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Compliance Juridictionnalization, co-published by the JoRC and Bruylant.

An equivalent book in French, La Juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, directed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, will be co-published by the JoRC and Dalloz. 

 

Read the notes established for the conclusion below ⤵️