Updated: Jan. 14, 2021 (Initial publication: Dec. 14, 2020)
🎤 The Economic Attractiveness of Impartiality ("L'attractivité économique de l'impartialité"), in ""Economic Attractiveness, Judge Office and Impartiality. Thinking the judge Office" ("L'attractivité économique, l'office du juge et l'impartialité. Penser l'office du juge")
► Full Reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., The Economic Attractiveness of Impartiality ("L'attractivité économique de l'impartialité"), in ""Economic Attractiveness, Judge Office and Impartiality. Thinking the judge Office" ("L'attractivité économique, l'office du juge et l'impartialité. Penser l'office du juge"),
🎥 watch the conference (in French with English subtitles)
📝 read the colloquium program ( in French)
This Working Paper is significantly different from the conference because it was conceived befor the colloquia cycle beginning. In addition, since this manifestation was a Round Table, the conference has taken more into account previous conferences and what said the other two speakers.
📊 see the slides, basis of the conference (in French)
The slides could not be shown during the conference. Orally, it was appropriate to more develop the introductory remarks for emphasizing the human and unique dimension of the Judge Office, expected in economic matters. As a result, the second part of the conference was not given orally, so slides therefore remain the only media available.
► Summary of the conference : To fit into the ambition of this general colloquia cycle, which is to "Think the Judge Office" and in this round table which apprehends the imperative of economic attractiveness of this office, firstly emerges the seemingly contradictory relationship between this imperative and the distance that the judge must maintain. Thus it is often asserted that the judge should be internalized at this point in the "places", - an economic concept of great scope (to which the first part of the introduction is devoted, defining the "place" at the same time as a closed and porous space and as a "systemic litigant" -, that he/she should ipso facto lose his/her distance, that is to say his/her impartiality. As places are in competition, even if weighing on one hand the effectiveness of the place, and on the other hand the impartiality of a judge who is external to this place - Judge referring to the Law , Impartiality would necessarily emerge weakened. It would then be necessary on a case-by-case basis to get the judge to give the desired concessions...
The conference aim is to take the opposite position and to state that the Place - in particular because they must be strongly distinguished from the Markets, of which they were the ancestors - require a Judge, who is at the same time "singular", that is to say with a personality, a face, opinions, and in distance so that his/her imagination does not surprise Place. Indeed, these require a human Justice, and a not mechanical one and singular judges, of whom the juge des référés or the arbitrator are the epigone, meets this need. But for reducing their "margins of discretion", how Economy qualifies the Impartiality of a person who can never be neutral, the singular Judge's Office must be inserted into mechanisms reducing these margins. In this way, the Place may reach a Judge who is always more impartial, and in doing so the Place becomes always more attractive.
To achieve this in practice, the place expresses two legitimate expectations, as a "systemic litigant", whose satisfaction increases and the singular Judge's Impartiality and increases the Attractiveness of the Place as a space. This clearly shows that the Place's Attractiveness and the Judge's Impartiality, because judges are inserted into procedures, into institutions and into a "jurisdictional family", are not only not contradictory, but are on the contrary convergent, one fueling the other.
Concretely, and judicial practice shows it, it is necessary to consolidate the particular Judge's Impartiality by inserting him/her into collective processes. As it is necessary to promote a radiance of Impartiality by strengthening the "jurisdictional family".
To consolidate the singular Judge's Impartiality by inserting him/her into collective processes, it is necessary to admit without hesitation the subjectivity of the judge, to seek it even. The reduction of the margins of discretion, definition of impartiality, being obtained by the inclusion of the judge in a procedure of which he /her alone is the master but in which he/her is not alone. This has the technical consequence that he/her is himself/herself in an adversarial debate, not only during the proceedings, but also before (in the media), inside the judgment (and the decision of the Criminal Chamber of 25 November 2020 is a model of that) and after the judgment. By that, the Judge shows that by his/her office he/she is in the future, as climate justice will show. In addition, to limit his/her margins of discretion, the singular judge must fit into a rational principle of coherence, vertical and horizontal. Vertical coherence, because he/she integrates what it is said and the technique of the "determining opinion" is to be encouraged, the singular judge having to avoid it only if he/she has "strong reasons" to do it. This is to follow this general rule Comply or Explain (which is the very opposite of blind obedience). Horizontal coherence, because the singular judge either sticks to what he/she said, estoppel also being a rule of logic. But above all, the institution must extract as much as possible from " institutional doctrines", by all means, of which the annual reports are an example.
To consolidate the singular Judge's Impartiality by strengthening the notion and reality of the "Jurisdictional Family", it is necessary to have of it a broader conception, which could lead to "guidelines" common to various jurisdictions, and a stronger one, by integrating those surrounding the judge to lead to judgment. In this, the procedure before the Court of Justice of the European Union, working on a common file, is a model. If this community were even stronger, the Judge Office would be even more useful than it is already in the digital space.
Thus, Judges who are always human, always diverse, always singular, who listen, consider and adjust to the situation, who within a Jurisdictional Family fit into an Institutional Doctrine which transcends and supports them but which they transform if there is a strong reason to do so, a reason always expressed said: this is the embodied Impartiality that makes an economic and financial Place attractive.
Jan. 17, 2020
This Working Paper written in English is the basis for an article published in French in the French journal Dalloz Avocat , in March 2020.
Summary of the working Paper.
If we perceive Compliance Law as an aggression of the private company and a binding set of mechanisms that have no meaning and added value for it, then the attorney has a utility: defending the business. It can do so not only during the sanctions phase, but also to prevent it.
But this function is not central.
It becomes so if we understand Compliance Law as a body of substantial rules, pursuing a "monumental goal": the protection of the person, goal injected by political bodies and taken up by the operator. From this, the company must convince everyone to take it back, inside the company and outside. In a general and contradictory debate, the attorney carries this conviction, because he and she is always convincing those who at the end judge (market, public opinion, etc.) that is their raison d'être.
(In this short document, the pop-ups refer to the different works that develop each of the points)
Feb. 14, 2019
Référence complète : Supiot, A., Kafka, un artiste de la Loi, in dossier Kafka, Le nouveau magazine littéraire, n°14, février 2019, pp.92-95.
May 22, 2018
Thesaurus : Doctrine
Référence complète : Schiller, S., La compliance extra-financière les risques de contradictions de domaines d'application, in Borga, N., Marin, J.-Cl. et Roda, J.-Cl. (dir.), Compliance : l'entreprise, le régulateur et le juge, Série Régulations & Compliance, Dalloz, 2018, pp. 55-66.
Consulter les autres titres de la Série dans laquelle est publié l'ouvrage.
Feb. 22, 2017
Thesaurus : Doctrine
Dec. 1, 2014
Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.A., Généralités sur le principe du contradictoire. Étude de droit processuel, coll. "Anthologie du Droit", LGDJ - Lextenso éditions, 2014, 221 p.
Republished from Généralités sur le principe du contradictoire », Étude de droit processuel, Th. paris II, 1988.
This book is the publication of a thèse d'Etat (French official thesis) written under the direction of Jean Foyer and defended in the Panthéon-Assas University (Paris II) face to a jury made up among others of François Terré, René Chapus, Gérard Cornu, Geneviève Viney.
The main idea is to defend that the principle of contradictory is a simple and fundamental principle, without which there is no Law. It is the reason why it is obvious to study it as in civil procedure as in criminal, administrative or arbitrary procedures, to take back a "Procedural Law" perspective conceived by Motulsky. Indeed, without a judge listening without having already decided the facts and Law versions that presents the one whose the situation will be affected by the decision that the judge will make, there is no rule of Law.
The main beneficiary of the principle of contradictory, it is not really the person and it is in this that the contradictory is detached from the rights of the defense, it is the judge. Indeed, emphasizing contradictory versions of Law and facts which collide in front of him or her, the judge perceives more exactly and more fairly the world and the use of Law that he or she should favor. Thus, Law is better used. In this, we can consider that the principle of contradictory is consubstantial to Law.
Updated: July 31, 2013 (Initial publication: Oct. 17, 2011)
Teachings : Les Grandes Questions du Droit, semestre d'automne 2011
Oct. 29, 2012
Référence complète : FRISON-ROCHE, Marie-Anne, Experts et procédure : l'amicus curiae, Revue de droit d'Assas, octobre 2012, p.91-94.
Lire le résumé de la contribution ci-dessous.
Aug. 4, 2004
Le principe du contradictoire et les droits de la défense devant l’Organe de Règlement des Différents de l’Organisation Mondiale du Commerce in "Le principe du contradictoire devant les juridictions internationales"
Référence complète : FRISON-ROCHE, Marie-Anne, Le principe du contradictoire et les droits de la défense devant l’Organe de Règlement des Différents de l’Organisation Mondiale du Commerce in Le principe du contradictoire devant les juridictions internationales, collection « Contentieux international », Pedone, 2004, pp.125-148.
Oct. 1, 2001
Référence complète : FRISON-ROCHE, Marie-Anne, L’erreur du juge, RTD civ., 2001, pp.819-832.
Le principe demeure que le juge ne commet pas d'erreur.
La puissance normative du dispositif des jugements couvre les motifs de celui-ci. Ainsi, le jugement qui arrête le droit de critique, est recouvert par le pouvoir normatif du droit d'une force de "vérité légale" qui bloque son contraire qu'est la vérité scientifique. Les exceptions ne font que confirmer la règle. En effet, l'erreur de plume est rectifiée mais elle n'est précisément pas une erreur de jugement. En outre, le recours en révision n''est ouvert qu'en cas de découverte d'un fait nouveau, c'est-à-dire lorsque le juge n'a donc pas commis d'erreur en ce qu'il n'est pas à l'origine de la représentation inexacte des faits.
Mais le procès ne peut se défaire de son rapport à la vérité et l'institution de son lien à la vertu de justice. C'est pourquoi, l'erreur judiciaire est de plus en plus mal supportée. Il faudrait ouvrir davantage le recours en révision, notamment l'admettre en cas d'erreur manifeste.
Lire le résumé de l'article ci-dessouss.
May 10, 1995
Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., La procédure de l’expertise, in Mazeaud, D. et Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.) L’expertise, coll. "Thèmes et Commentaires", Dalloz, 1995, p.87 s.
Lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage dans lequel l'article a été publié.
L'article a été repris in Experts, n°24, septembre 1994, p.8
Sept. 17, 1793
Thesaurus : 02. Lois
La "Loi de prairial", dite encore "Loi des suspects", plus exactement le décret du 17 septembre 1793 "relatif aux gens suspects" pris par la Convention Nationale est de sinistre mémoire.
En effet par ce texte, principalement conçu par Robespierre, organise une façon de mener les procès, sans aucune présomption d'innocence ni aucune place pour les droits de la défense.
Beaucoup de personnes furent menées à la mort par le jeu de la Loi des suspects.
A contrario, on mesure que l'Etat de droit est avant tout construit sur les principes de procédure.
On ne peut qu'être frappé entre l'analogie entre la Loi des suspects et les conseils procéduraux donnés par Staline, ordonnant pareillement d'écarter et la présomption d'innocence et tout respect du contradictoire ou des droits de la défense.