Updated: Dec. 3, 2020 (Initial publication: July 15, 2020)

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Rights, primary and natural Compliance Tools

by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

ComplianceTech®. Pour lire ce document de travail en français, cliquer sur le drapeau français

Full Reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Rights, primary and natural Compliance Tools, Working Paper, July  2020.

This Working paper is the basis for an article to be published in the collective book  Compliance Tools .

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There was a time when Regulatory techniques  were above all only calculations of the best tarifications, taken up by monopolistic companies, while Compliance techniques were only obedience to all rules governing us. All this could therefore only be business of abacus and badine, used by engineers and consisted only of mechanical reflexes of "conformity" to all kinds of rules with the corset ensuring that everyone is bent in front of them!footnote-1946. In the perspective of a Regulation and Compliance thus conceived, that is to say effective, it would not be necessary to insert prerogatives for people, since these could only be sources of inefficiency, of cost. and protest, where the order would come from figures set in advance and controlled processes.

Systems have since evolved to integrate these prerogatives of each person: rights. Is this evolution really acquired? Maybe more effectively in Regulation Law than in its extension which is Compliance Law. This may be surprising since Compliance Law, in that it extends Regulatory Law in enterprises should, on the contrary, promote rights by meeting the enterprise, which is a group of people ....!footnote-1986 . But the modern reluctance to define the enterprise (and the company) as a group of people and the preference given to a definition of the company (and the enterprise) as an "asset", a "good" of which investors would be the owners, maybe explains the sidelining of rights not only in Regulatory Law but also in Compliance Law even though it is being deployed in the space of the enterprise!footnote-1987.

In addition, if Regulation has long been the subject of a branch of Law in which rights have full place, the presentation of Compliance as "conformity", that is to say the proven assurance of obedience to all the applicable rules, leaves no space for the prerogatives of people, which appear rather as resistance to the obedience that would be expected of them. There again, the expectation of what would be a good ratio of conformity between behaviors and prescriptions would be obtained by a "design", data processing being the new form of calculation, improved by precision tools where the being human is not required!footnote-1989. His fallibility and the little confidence which one can place in him leads even to exclude the people and to conceive Compliance system between machines, not only to alert of the failures, but also to manufacture the "regulations" and to connect those. here, in a "regulatory fabric" without a jump stitch, entirely enveloping human beings!footnote-1990.

It would therefore be with regret, and probably because some constitutional jurisdictions still attach some value to fundamental rights that the systems of "conformity" of behavior to the rules make some room for the prerogatives of people, their more essential rights. It is sometimes said that this is part of the cost. It would therefore be as by "forcing" that rights would exist in Compliance systems, a kind of price that the effectiveness of Compliance must pay as a tribute to the Rule of Law principle!footnote-1991.

If in a poor definition Compliance is conceived in this only "conformity", leading to a landscape in which the behaviors of the people adjust to the rules governing the situations, Compliance being only the most "effective way" to ensure the application of the rules, in a mechanical perspective of Law, then it would effectively be necessary to reduce the prerogatives of people to a minimal part, because any "additional cost" is intended to disappear, even if it is produced here by constitutional requirements. In the looming battle between the effectiveness of the application of rules and the concern for the legal prerogatives of people who should above all obey and not claim their rights, especially their right not to obey , or their right to keep secret in Compliance techniques which is based on the centralization of information, the effectiveness of efficiency could only, by the very power of this tautology, prevail!footnote-1988... 

The defeat would not be total, however, collaboration would still be possible and active between people availing themselves of their rights and Compliance Law. Indeed, in many respects, if rights have been recognized in Compliance systems, it is not only because Compliance Law, like any branch of Law, can only be deployed with respect for fundamental rights. kept by fundamental legal texts, but also because of the effectiveness of rights as " Compliance Tools".

Indeed, because they constitute a very effective "tool" to ensure the entire functioning of a system whose goals are so difficult to achieve, because every effort must be made to achieve these goals, the public authorities not only rely on the power of crucial operators, but also distribute prerogatives to people who, thus encouraged, activate the Compliance system and participate in the achievement of the "monumental goals". Rights can prove to be the most effective tools to effectively achieve the goals set, to such an extent that they can be considered as "primary tools"  (I).

But it is necessary to be more ambitious, even to reverse the perspective. Indeed because all the Monumental Goals by which Compliance Law is defined can be reduced to the protection of people, that is to say to the effectiveness of their prerogatives, by a mirror effect between rights. given by Law to persons and the rights which constitute the very purpose of all Compliance Law, in particular the protection of all human beings, even if they are in a situation of great weakness, rights become a "natural tool" of Compliance Law (II).

Rights are the Compliance Law future. 

1

Contre cela, la critique radicale, savante et fondée d'Alain Supiot, dans l'ensemble de son oeuvre et plus particulièrement dans La gouvernance par les nombres, 2015. 

2

Sur la définition de l'entreprise comme un groupe de personnes qui se réunissent pour entreprise, v. le travail de référence d'Alain Supiot, par exemple son article d'introduction "L'entreprise...", dans l'ouvrage qu'il a dirigé L'entreprise dans la mondialisation ...., 2015 ...

3

Si l'entreprise pouvait renaître comme idée de cristallisation d'une idée commune entre des personnes, naturellement titulaires de droits subjectifs, exerçant ensemble leur liberté d'entreprendre pour réaliser un projet commun, ce qui correspond à la définition classique du contrat d'entreprise donnée à l'article 1832 du Code civil, cela renforcerait considérablement la présence des droits subjectifs dans le Droit de la Compliance et conforterait la nature humaniste de celui-ci.

En outre, dans une telle définition la loi de la majorité, qui n'est qu'une loi de fonctionnement d'une catégorie de sociétés que sont les sociétés de capitaux, deviendrait moins puissante, au profit des "droits propres" de tout associé (au-delà du cercle des sociétés de personnes), sans qu'il soit besoin d'aller chercher au-delà du cercle des associés ou titulaires de titres émis par la société ou l'entreprise (dit shareholders) et d'aller donner le "droit à la parole" à des personnes qui, parce qu'elles sont "concernées" (les "parties prenantes", les skateholders) ont désormais de plus en plus le "droit à la parole". 

4

La Compliance by Design reflète ces tensions. Elles sont particulièrement bien décrites par Cécile Granier. V. ....

5

Contre cette conception de la légalité, qui prévoit tout et à laquelle il faudrait prouver par avance et que l'on se "conforme" entièrement, ce qui est contraire aux principes mêmes du libéralisme dont le principe est la liberté d'agir et non pas l'obéissance, Carbonnier affirme que les règles sont faites ne pas s'appliquer et qu'elles ne sont que le "mince vernis" des choses, qu'il convenait de se méfier de la "passion du Droit". V. not. son dernier ouvrage Droit et passion du droit sous la Vième République, 1995. Carbonnier est considéré comme le plus grand juriste français du XXième siècle. Il rédigea les lois qui réformèrent en profondeur le Code civil et publia des ouvrages sur "l'art législatif". 

6

Au contraire, l'Etat de Droit n'est pas un coût extérieur au système de Compliance efficace, que celui-ci doit internaliser. Il est le fondement même du Droit de la Compliance. Voir dans ce sens la démonstration faite par le président de la Cour de Justice de l'Union européenne, Koen Laearnt, ..., in Pour une Europe de la Compliance, 2019. 

7

Sur la démonstration comme quoi la Constitution, en ce qu'elle contient de l'incalculable, est broyée dans cette façon de faire, v. Alain Supiot, Intervention 2019

 

I. RIGHTS, THE MOST EFFECTIVE TOOLS FOR EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE

Legal prerogatives held by all subjects of law!footnote-1992, rights are today resolutely welcome in regulated economic systems, not because these systems would have been captured by particular interests, according to the general criticism formulated by the French author Carbonnier!footnote-1993 regretting the society ceasing to be governed by the Law common to all and equal for all, which has become "pulverized" in a multitude of rights translating the inequality of power which is deployed in the relations between people!footnote-1947, but because they make the regulatory system work better.

Indeed, the multiplication of rights is not a sign of a weakening of the State and its public authorities, it is the new form that the power and sovereignty that the latter takes, distributing these particular powers that are the rights to subjects of Law so that they contribute to the effective implementation of the Regulatory systems (A). This is even clearer in Compliance Law which invented new rights, including the so famous "right to be forgotten" (B).

 

A. THE MULTIPLICATION OF INDIVIDUAL PREROGATIVES IN ECONOMIC SYSTEMS REGULATED BY THE LAW OF REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE

There was a time when the power of the State was sufficient to regulate, through regulations, the regulated sectors, to such an extent that one confused "regulations" and "Regulatory Law", while the rights remained in what was the black box for both markets and regulated sectors: enterprises (1). Rights were all the more absent as "effective tools" as Competition Law prohibiting the State from fully using the "most absolute" of rights that is the property right footnote-1997 to prosecute the general interest through public enterprises!footnote-1994, while case law admitted to others the use of the procedural right of action against the State, obliged it to be accountable for the decisions taken by Regulators who have nevertheless become independent from it!footnote-1995. Let us recognize that there is reason, for the legislative and executive powers, to doubt the benefit brought by rights in the systems of public regulation ... This changed when the Regulation Law has been affected by the procedural Law (2).

 

1. The unilateral power of the State, sufficient to govern economic areas

The arrival of rights in Regulatory Law took place with noise, annoyance and great difficulty. This can only be understood by looking back, in what was the construction of Regulation Law, in which Compliance Law is anchored!footnote-1944.

Previously the Regulation of the economy by the State, rather a matter of Public Law, made little room for rights which were understood as the particular prerogatives that ordinary people hold to express and defend their interests. In general, Economic Law leaves relatively little room for the prerogatives of the people at the very heart of the functioning of the system, considering in particular that the proper functioning of free Competition is an objective principle of Public Order!footnote-2001, which has neither for source nor for consequence a "right to competition"!footnote-1945.

Including at the constitutional level, the system of Competition is thus built on a space, in which people move thanks to a principle of Freedom, Freedom of which they are entitled and which is expressed in particular in Contractual Freedom, the autonomy of their will being sufficient within the limits of the particular laws. Thus the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union is generally presented as what concretizes and strengthens the three Freedoms of movement (of people, capital and goods) and not what protects rights!footnote-1998 . In a more general way for the functioning of a liberal economy, the only rights required relate to the goods, the "property right " being besides in the British and American spirit intimate of the freedom of enterprise, which supposes, for the benefit of independent legal persons, a mastery of "things" that have become "goods" by their legal availability, availability and mastery being sufficient to classically define the economic system of property.

The admission of rights seemed even less useful or even relevant in Regulatory Law, in which property and contract are not primary instruments, since Regulatory Law was rather defined as the way for State to insert its concern for the general interest and the long term beyond the individual interests that people transform into these particular prerogatives that are their subjective rights and that they exercise among themselves (personal subjective rights) or over things (real subjective rights) but which it is assumed that they do not express more than their interest. This is how economists identify purely and simply a "right" (in particular the property right) and the control exercised over a situation in an own interest.

Consequently, the Economic Law ruling the spaces, whether spaces of competitive markets or spaces of regulated markets, rather falls under the power of the States (the "public power" to manage the "public service"), which by, their sanctioning power, readjust these spaces in Ex Post if there is a anticompetitive behavior (Competition Law) or which, by their regulatory normative power, organize them in Ex Ante (Regulation Law). Under these conditions, the rights can without damage be absent from Regulatory Law of  which constructs the sectors and maintains them in balance. For example Energy Regulatory Law, which fixes the prices or organizes the auctions, or  Financial Regulatory Law, which ensures the correct information and represses market abuse. These are always objective principles, implemented by regulations and sanctioned by public authorities. Even when, in a definition where Regulatory mechanisms are only an accessory to Competition!footnote-1999, Regulation Law is only defined as the means by which a competitive market is established, Regulation being only what accompanies liberalization, rights are not required no more since Competition Law does not do much more room to rights.

Indeed, the property right being itself reduced to the power to dispose of goods, associated with contractual freedom, this mastery is put at the service of the circulation of goods. Even more, while the State enterprise - by the control given by the holding of a share of the capital - could have enabled the State to regulate a sector via a "crucial operator", Competition Authorities, by neutralizing the specificity of the 'State-shareholder!footnote-2000  enjoin State to behave like an ordinary investor, prohibit it from using the political power of property rights with political power, through the power to vote in the companies and to have seats in the boards. 

 

2. The de jure admission of classic rights, a consequence of the integration of Regulation and Compliance as elements of Rule of Law

The changes most often come from Procedure. No doubt because it is in this gentle way of doing!footnote-2002 that the deepest movements are made. This also shows that the opposition often highlighted between Civil Law and Common Law is not so relevant since the judge, third to the situation to be resolved, is in one and the other of the two systems at the center. of these and that it is always necessary to take this route that is Procedure to reach the master of systems that is the judge, master hidden in the first system (Civil Law), openly acting  in the second one (Common Law), but always master.  Anymay, in France, so often presented as a Civil Law system, the Conseil d'Etat (French Supreme Administrative Court) , an administrative jurisdiction, does not hide much to openly assert itself as being the "Regulator of regulators" in Regulatory Law!footnote-2003

When in France the Cour de cassation (French Supreme Judicial Court) by the Oury judgment of February 5, 1999 qualified the regulatory authorities as a "court", it injected into all the regulated sectors, in which the Regulator is itself the master, all procedural rights: first of all, the right to seize the regulatory authority, the right to debate and defend oneself, the right to benefit from its objective impartiality, the right to challenge its decision, including before a judicial court. This first revelation of the sort of naked King that is the distinction between Private Law and Public Law, fine clothes whose vision the Law of Compliance completes to dissolve for better restore the ambitions that the State can claim to express since it sets the goals and for companies to achieve them, put the procedural rights at the center of regulated systems.

More particularly, the procedural right to challenge in Ex Post what the State says in its task as an architect of the sectors leads to a corpus of case law on Regulatory Law and has produced, in all the regulated sectors, a "cognitive Ex Ante"footnote-1948 , a phenomenon of common construction of rules between public Authorities and privates enterprises, which is no longer contested, co-building even approved.

The phenomenon is increased in Compliance Law, the latter being an extension of Regulation Law. The procedural rights of the subjects of law that are the enterprises, very developed because of the part of the "repressive tools" in this branch of the Law!footnote-1949 accompany the "jurisdictionalization of Compliance"!footnote-1950, leading in particular to the enterprise to become a judge of itself!footnote-2004.  

These rights have therefore entered in a relatively violent way into the mechanisms of Regulation and Compliance, but are anchored in the simple principle according to which these mechanisms are built in the Rule of Law. As the Court of Justice of the European Union regularly reminds, all of these instruments being of a legal nature, and having to be articulated between them!!footnote-1951, they cannot be conceived without a common anchoring that to be the Rule of Law. Except to maintain that Regulation and Compliance would not belong to Law, and to read proposals in particular on the prowess expected from machines that are presented as "intelligent" leading to allegations in this sense (pure processes replacing Law), Regulation Law and Compliance Law are branches of Law, which have as common roots the Rule of Law.

Rule of Law has at its heart procedural rights. The courts have therefore made them appear in the positive Law of both branches, Public and Private Law, in a way acquired in Regulatory Law, in a new way for Compliance Law, a branch currently under development.  If we rule out reducing Regulation and Compliance to empty processes and tie them to the principle of Rule of Law, a principle which is common to Europe and the United States but which is not necessarily shared with all the other areas of the world which on the contrary appreciate the ex ante design of economic sectors and the proven obedience of all to the rules, then it is necessary to develop the procedural rights.

For that, it is necessary to develop and put at the center the jurisprudence of the constitutional courts, since these are above all guardians of the rights. It is just the beginning of this movement.

 

3. The emergence of rights renewed or specific to Compliance Law: from the "right of access" to the "right to be forgotten"

By another movement, Regulation Law then Compliance Law created in any case new rights, prerogatives offered by Law to people dealing with regulated situations.

For example the "right to electricity"!footnote-1952 which in the French law of February 10, 2000 was designed by the Legislator, giving everyone the prerogative to receive this essential good, not by the effect of a commitment of 'a contracting party, but by a definitively acquired prerogative. This thus produces for each a right to enter a contract, certain clauses of which are implied by this right of legal origin. Such insertion of a right as the source of the supplier's obligations considerably changes the legal regime !footnote-2005.

First of all, the right holder can rely on it even though he/she is not in a position to take advantage of his/she sole contractual freedom to enter into a contractual relationship, then to request the execution of the commitments of his/her contractor even if he/she does not honor his/her own, while the contractual relationship is by nature commutative: concretely and for example entering into an electricity supply contract and not being cut off even if he/she does not pay the bills.

What is offered in the electrical field, because there is set by Law a "right to electricity" which structures the sector, could be transposed for any essential good? A priori no, because the "right of access" only exists concerning monopoly essential infrastructures for the benefit of third parties and there is no such right of access to every essential goods, the decision to organize access to public goods, such as knowledge through access to education for all, referring to public policies and not to rights!footnote-2006.  

The question of the existence of a right of access which would be equivalent to a right to a free supply nevertheless arises in these terms, and with acuity, in the Regulatory perspective of digital space, since it is indeed in the name of the user's right of access of the Internet that might be established the obligation to open networks and content to everyone, possibly without financial compensation, thus giving a particular meaning to the principle of Neutrality. Indeed in an extreme conception, if the principle of Neutrality went beyond the objective principle of an "open Internet", guaranteed by the texts!footnote-2007, but referred to a substantial right that any Internet user would have to access at any time at the same speed, the whole system is changed. Indeed, the contracts which are concluded between the access providers and the Net surfers cannot stipulate different prices according to the quality of this access since this right of access thus enriched by the Law would be already fully acquired, a contractual stipulation does not can come nor reduce it  nor to enrich it.

For the moment, in particular because in a liberal system it is the parties who by the power of contract give rise to rights and obligations and not the Law, the Law being certainly the third party necessary for the bilateral relationship but not the one which alone holds the pen, rights on the one hand remain few in the regulated systems and on the other hand retain the mark of their origin. Indeed, this unilateralism traditionally characterizing Regulatory Law continues!footnote-1953,  since the contract will only be the legal implementation of this right conferred by Law on all. This therefore results in supply obligations linked to the persistent notion of Public Service.

Even more and more generally, the "right of access", which is an essential right in regulatory systems, is itself of legal origin, because it is the "right of access to essential infrastructures", the center of all the Regulation of the so-called" network sectors", the natural monopoly of infrastructures being thus admitted and supervised by the public Regulatory Authoity. This explains why both the realization of the "right of access" takes the form of an "access contract" and that its dispute is nevertheless attributed to the knowledge of the administrative Regulatory Authority.

This explains why in these so-called "network sectors", in particular Energy and Telecommunications, the Regulatory Authority is endowed with the power to settle disputes to find concrete solutions by implementation of access contracts!footnote-2008, because access is a central mechanism of Regulation of the sector. This mix justifye  in the French juridictionnal organization that the control of this Regulation work carried out by these administrative authorities nevertheless falls within the knowledge of the Paris Court of Appeal, a judicial jurisdiction.

This jurisdictional organization, which seems incomprehensible, almost a "faulty"!footnote-2009, to such an extent that some ask that, in a kind of welcome back to what would more coherent, this type of litigation be known by the only administrative courts, shows on the contrary that Regulation Law gives way to the dynamism of the actors, through their rights, private actors who want to enter the networks, for example.

Concerning Compliance Law, because it extends Regulation in the enterprises themselves, the "access rights" are taking more and more autonomy. In the coming years, for example, the "right of access" to decision-making functions in companies, for categories of people who do not statistically have access to them, will be stronger. In such a case, public policies of incentive or constraint through quotas would give way to rights, protected by courts.

Moreover, Compliance Law has almost made its appearance through rights!

Indeed, it is by the judgment of June 13, 2014, Google Spain, that the Court of Justice of the European Union!footnote-1954 established Compliance Law by forcing a crucial digital operator to technically destroy the access to Information. In the same way that Regulation Law had built by Law the right of access, Compliance Law has built by Case Law the right to non-access. This right called since "the right to be forgotten" is an extraordinary right since it allows a person to disappear in this digital world where henceforth everything is preserved eternally.

The digitization of the world has not only put it "into numbers"!footnote-2030, but has also disembodied it, as effectively as Finance and Competition had done by reducing things to their only cost and price, and has done what did not had never been done before: Digital has made time disappear. This violation of the natural order of things has justifed the injection of the only weapon that human beings have against this disappearance of time: rights.

For instance, death is certainly feared by everyone but it is also what protects everyone because in this way what we have done is forgotten, our loved ones being spared the endless memory that would be kept of their ancestors. But because Digital techniques preserve all, legislations haved created what is qualified as the "right to digital death" !footnote-2031 , sort of legal way to make the right to be forgotten coincide with the natural disappearance which is death, forcing digital operators to erase the accounts of deceased people on social networks. 

It thus appears through this last example that we are today so helpless face of this new technological power that only rights can be an effective protection. They are therefore today the first "tools" of Compliance Law.

 

B. THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE BLOOMING OF RIGHTS THROUGH THE CONCRETE CONCRETIZATION OF MONUMENTAL GOALS: RIGHT AS A PURE TOOL

Even if one does not appreciate the litigants who multiply in the "contentious societies"!footnote-1956 or that one fears the government of judges with increasing influence, whose presence is all the more disapproved if these judges are "foreign"!footnote-2011, the topic of the extraterritoriality of Compliance Law often intersecting with the illegitimacy of judges!footnote-1957, the multiplication of rights leading by nature to powerful judges since they give concrete form to these rights!footnote-1958, rights are justified as "Compliance Tools" in that they make possible to achieve monumental goals, which States are struggling to achieve.

Indeed, such prerogatives must be distributed for obtaining the effectiveness not only of the means but also of the goals, since the means are themselves only tools. The use of persons as means is only a return to Roman Law, which created the notion of personality as a tool (persona being a mask, a theatrical megaphone) without direct consideration for the human being. (the inseparability of the two coming later!footnote-2012), for making trade and the institutions efficient functioning!footnote-1996. In this, English having replaced Latin, rights attached to any subject of Law constitute the perfect example of private enforcement (1). This is imperative for Information, Compliance Law being a system of centralization and transmission of Information, which leads to giving rights to those who seek Information and transmit it, as does the whistleblower, key figure in this branch of Law (2). In a system  struggling to achieve its goals, taking charge of rights by others would be effective, as shown by the class action mechanism, but the evolution, as for the whistleblower, is slow (3).

 

1. Rights, a technique of "private enforcement"

Compliance Law only finds its consistency and unity through the monumental goals that define it!footnote-1959. The effectiveness of its various tools is therefore decisive. The application of the Law it is not spontaneous, except that the subjects of Law are inhabited by the love of Laws postulated by Rousseau, or because the legal prescription resulting from the text or of the contract would correspond exactly to their particular interests, in particular because the authors of this one conceived it through an incentive mechanism!footnote-1960. Law requires force, through techniques of enforcement. The link between Law and force is so significant that it is common to define Law by the force which is attached to the rule, but it is about a potential force, the "binding force" and not the effective force. effective leading to an effective implementation. The "force publique", the public enforcement, is therefore required.

Without developing more this point, Compliance Law of Compliance, because it is concentrated in global "monumental goals", poses that their effective achievement is not a question which is secondary to the enactment of the rule but is first, since the various compliance techniques developed are themselves only tools. However, these goals are not only gigantic, for example to put an end to corruption, or to establish equality between women and men, but they are not limited to the territory in which the State deploys its power (which is why Compliance Law extraterritoriality finds its legitimacy).

Due to the weakness of public enforcement in terms of Compliance, a weakness inherent in its definition (goals so monumental...), private enforcement will be much more effective. Indeed, if faced with powerful American enterprises accumulating Information and building an industry on these data, Law firstly creates a right of control of this data by the person who is "concerned", which is the definition of "personal data", then Law secondly creates a substantial right to be forgotten, which is activated by its association with a right of access to the judge, the Regulatory Authority itself being juridictionalized to fulfill this office, all the Regulatory Law could work beyond territories, inside enterprises by Compliance Law: this is how the Regulation of the digital space, which seemed unattainable other than through the ethical spontaneity of the companies that designed and mastered it, becomes possible!footnote-1961.  

Thus all Compliance Law is being transformed by the insertion in each person of substantive rights, to which is associated procedural rights, for making effective a Regulation Law exhausted by the power allowed by the immateriality of technologies. It is also in this direction that the American legislator went by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, the exact title of which is Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which in the comprehensive reform of the Financial Markets Regulatory Law distributes rights to each investor and for their effectiveness creates a specific institution, ensuring the protection of their rights, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). This agency provides consumers of financial products with Information to protect them in Ex Ante and allow them to act in Ex Post if their rights have been infringed.

More generally, Behavioral Economics consists of betting on people by providing them with Information, by giving them an interest in acting, in the more concrete sense that Procedural Law gives to the general remarks of the theory of incentives.  The famous nudge theory!footnote-1962  has many points of contact with Procedural Law ...and often requires a procedural right: because for an incentive to obtain Information shall be active, it often needed to transform the incentive into a right to be informed, to produce an obligation for someone to satisfy it, while  doubling that by a right to take legal action before a court, or a  Regulatory or Supervisory Authority for obtaining it by constraint.

Because Compliance Law is based on Information!footnote-1963, Compliance Law has increased this private enforcement mechanism by inventing a new and very specific character: the whistleblower. But for that, it was also necessary to invent for the benefit of the latter a new right: a right to protection.

 

2. The particular quarrel around the rights of the Information provider: the activation of the whistleblower

The whistleblower is a famous and contested character. Its usefulness is recognized, since he/she transmits Information that would have remained inaccessible without him/her. This character of great potential utility will however only be active if he/her is endowed with two rights: firstly a right to protection, secondly a right to financial retribution. Both have been contested. They have not, moreover, been conferred in an equal manner and the effectiveness of Compliance Law as an information system to make monumental goals effective, for example the protection of women in enterprises suffers from it.

Without going back to its description from top to bottom!footnote-1964, two elements should be highlighted here. First of all, for instance the French law known as "Sapin 2" which establishes the status of the lanceur d'alerte (whistleblower), anticipating the European movement which does nothing more in this respect compared to French law!footnote-2013, defines the whistleblower by the protection due to him/her. Thus the protection of the one who transmits information, in particular against the one on whom he depends, for example his/her employer, whose faulty behavior he/she may have revealed, is not included in the whistleblower's simple regime but in his/her very definition. Far from being a drafting error, this legal definition of the whistleblower by his/her "right to protection" is well founded, because if he/sher is not protected, he/she will not transmit the Information. This right to protection is all the more required as certain legislations, including French law, have chosen to oblige the informed person to transmit the information within the enterprise before being authorized to communicate outside!footnote-2015

The second right, even more contested, is the "right to remuneration". In the United States, the laws, because reasoning from utility, have conferred this financial right to remuneration!footnote-2016.  At the federal level, it is the same Dodd-Frank Act which organizes a specifi program to protect whistleblowers, entrusted to a special office in the Securities & Exchanges Commission (SEC)!!footnote-1965, which allocates financial rewards to whistleblowers, the SEC sending annually a public report to the US  Congress, assessing the success of the whistleblowing mechanism at the aggregate amount of  these rewards!footnote-2014

European law, in particular in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights but also in the European Directive of October 2019  strengthening the protection of whistleblowers, refuses to recognize this whistleblower "right to be remunerated", many considering that the only "ethical alert" is the one without money. To stay with the only question of the effectiveness of rights, it is accepted that as long as Europe does not recognize the holder of information, whose transmission could endanger him/her, the benefit of not only a right to protection but still a right to remuneration, the system will lack Information.

The perspective is even clearer when it comes to the procedural right of action, because the all efficiency of the system presupposes its effectiveness.

 

3. The particular favor provided to collective mechanisms serving individual rights: class action

Indeed, by definition a legal mechanism understood as a tool only makes sense through its effective use (i.e. used) and efficient use (i.e. producing the expected concrete effects, in relation to the goals aimed by whoever built the mechanisme!footnote-1966). 

Substantive rights depend in their realization on the potential credible intervention of courts , Regulator and Supervisor being assimilated by Law to a "court" since it sanctions the failures , settles the disputes and builds Case Law. As procedural rights were the first to enter the Regulation and Compliance systems!footnote-1967, the whole structure of Regulation and Compliance Law therefore depends on the effectiveness of the procedural rights of action.

However, the people who are entitled to act in Compliance Law are hardly in a position to do so, because they are not informed of the substantive rights with which Law has endowed them, or even that, knowing them, they do not have the financial means to claim them!footnote-2017, or the legal situation does not lend themselves to it.

The latter case is particularly developed in Compliance Law because Compliance obligations weighing on "crucial entreprises", which are legally well-armed, they shape clauses in prewrited contracts binding the persons able to act against them, for example for defend their substantive right on their personal data. In fact and for this reason, no action takes place, for example in liability. In doing so, the entire Data Law is weakened.

For example the clauses which give exclusive jurisdiction to distant courts, for example a Californian or Irish ones, opposed to French or German co-contractors, de facto protect the very powerful enterprises managing  platforms from legal action from any action, and deprive de facto Compliance Law the disciplinary effect produced by liability actions. To fight against this, the Court of Justice of the European Union aims to give more effect to mechanisms specific to European Union Consumer Law, in particular the rule that this type of clause is deemed "unwritten" for making them unenforceable against small companies, so that they can hold accountable companies managing platforms in the digital space, even if having placed their head office in Dublin by effectively bringing them before a court within the jurisdiction of their own so little head officel!footnote-1968

Moreover, for the procedural right of action  to be able to activate the whole Compliance Law, it must itself be raised to the collective level. This is why the class action mechanism must cease to be excluded or admitted by exception to become the rule, not only in the U.S. but in every legal systems, as soons as Compliance Law, defined by its Monumental Goals, is at stake . Indeed in maney legal systems, a long time ago it was recalled that "no one can plead by prosecutor" (a Roman Law rule), that is to say that where the particular interest is concerned, that is to say a personal substantial right, this person only can activate the procedural right of action which corresponds to his/her substantive right.

This is why the defense of systems and of Law itself is entrusted to institutions, such as the Public Prosecutor's Office, which defends Law, to Regulatory Authorities, etc., which are holders of a procedural right of action since they defends the general interest, for which they are "prosecutors".

This traditional conception can be justified. It excludes that a person seizes a court to bring the claim of another, excluding in particular the creation of a business of legal actions, which in fact leads to the mechanism of class actions. But as soon as the effectiveness of private enforcement is admitted, that the victim is authorized to enter into the general functioning of the system because he/she activates it, there is no longer reason why  this role, attributed by the sole consideration of its efficiency and not the direct concern of the person!footnote-1969, could not be endorsed by another person and should not be if it produces more efficiency in the whole. That the intermediary takes his/her profit in passing is one cost among others.

It is thus remarkable that class actions are developing in Europe with regard to the Personal Data Law, making more easily possible, for example, to demand accounts from the platforms that operate the reservation of overnight stays in hotels, the responsibility of the hotel group being engaged. for the massive loss of personal datafootnote-1971. By chains of legal actions, legal actions grouped by others (class actions), as shown by the sanction pronounced by the British Regulatory Authority  Information Commissioner's Officer seized by a class action against the Marriott group in 2020, hotel groups are responding the platforms they set up within them to concentrate all bookings in all the hotels of their unified chain, in the same way that small isolated hotel companies can effectively hold a platform to account (in the e-booking case). 

Thus in the puzzle that seems to constitute the ambition of the "Regulation of platforms", rather than opposing them and the rights of people!footnote-1973, or even proposing to weaken these companies, rather than to take note of the weakness of ordinary people and small businesses to conclude that the only solution would be weakening of these new organizations that are the platforms, it is rather necessary to measure the power that constitute rights, the substantive and procedural ones, and distribute them widely. In the face of power, the response must be power. Through increased power thanks to new rights, the digital space could find a new balance.

For this, the European texts facilitating "collective action" on the model of the US and british class action must go much further!footnote-2019. This is yet another reason not to oppose American Law and European Compliance Law!!footnote-2018. This is all the more appropriate since Tort Law, which is the branch of Law through which courts generally welcome the people claims of - the economic analysis of the Law not being mistaken, which focuses above all on the jurisprudence in Liability Law and its Ex Ante counterpart that is Insurance Law - itself evolving to be an efficient tool for obtaining adequate behavior from enterprises. 

Therefore rights, which were nothing, are in the process of becoming if not all, at the very least first, because they are the Compliance Law driving force. This will be all the more accurate in the coming years because during these years Compliance Law will be built rights will appear as the "natural" tools of this new branch of Law.

 

II. RIGHTS, THE MOST NATURAL TOOLS OF COMPLIANCE LAW  DEFINED BY PEOPLE'S CONCERN

Rights of individuals are very effective for the deployment of Compliance Law, but they also act as a mirror of it. Indeed because Compliance Law is defined by the concern for human beings, then rights, prerogatives of people, in particular those that are sometimes called "human rights", must be understood as "natural" tools of this branch of Law (A). This technically means that they must be interpreted broadly and not marginally and that in the future new rights will be invented (B). 

 

A. THE LEGITIMACY OF RIGHTS - TOOLS, MIRRORS OF  COMPLIANCE LAW DEFINED BY PEOPLE'S CONCERN

If Compliance Law is defined as a simple mechanism for the effectiveness of rules, rights have no great place, especially since machines, computers and algorithms will always be more efficient for implement the rules, as the machine writing on the character's back did in the Kafka's Penal Colony!footnote-2020. But if Compliance Law is defined in relation to the concern to protect human beings (1) then all people's rights become active for concretizing this protection of human beings in a tautological relationship with Compliance Law.(2).

 

1. The definition of Compliance Law by its "Monumental Goal" of the  human beings' protection

Compliance Law was defined in 2016 as being what the public authorities internalize in entities in position to achieve "monumental goals", which converge to the protection of human beings!footnote-1975. This definition could be challenged in favor of a more procedural definition, Compliance being only a "process", a way of making the rules more effective.

It is a matter of preference: one can prefer the first concept or the other concept!footnote-1976. For my part, I maintain my definitive preference for a humanist definition of Compliance!footnote-2021,, which places the human being at the heart of the definition of this branch of Law, not only because the human being must be the measure of everything but because the observation of the adoption of a Compliance Law procedural definition, as instrument of effectiveness of the rules, for instance in China, led by processes of rating of human beings and their permanent observation , leads to destroy humanity. If Compliance Law received this definition, then I would not only adhere to it, but I would be the resolute opponent of Compliance Law!footnote-1977

Taking therefore this humanist definition of Compliance Law, such as Europe carries it, in particular through Compliance Law about data, the foundation of the Knowledge Economy which will be our future, Europe sharing it with American Law which also attaches Compliance Law to the protection of individuals, including in matters of Financial Compliance rules, the individual is thus placed at the heart of Compliance Law.

Rights then cease to be simply a "tool", a private enforcement: they become what the whole branch of law works for. They are the mirror of it.

 

2. The legitimacy of all rights - tools for the realization of personal protection and their correct technical interpretation

All rights then find a "natural" legitimacy, since they allow people to exist. For example, the "right to privacy",  "right to secrecy", the "right to be forgotten" find their places in an information system, not by "exception" but by "nature", as soon as the person is better protected by non-transmission than by transmission.

There is not a principle which would be the transmission of Information and an exception which would be the non-transmission of Information. There is a principle which is the protection of human beings and which will involve the interpretation to be given to the various technical rules. For example, depending on whether it is the transmission of Information or the non-transmission of Information that protects the person, the first or the second principle must apply.

The invention of the "right to be forgotten" concretizes this primacy of the person. The legal ambiguity of the notion of "data" will thus reappear as soon as it concerns people. As professor François Rigaux had underlined, the rights of the personality constitute goods and what is described as "the attention"!footnote-1978 that people pay to such and such product or service, attention which is captured, manipulated and sold, therefore detached from the person and treated as a good, come up against the elementary distinction between personal rights and real rights.

It is accepted that the person, holder of  rights, can only exercise real rights over things. If Law states that, person cannot be the owner of a person, cannot have slaves, it is to exclude that she owns herself, to be a slave of herself, and cannot accept to be ceded, because there is always someone to offer us an "acceptable" price for that and we would always be tempted to "agree" to it.

The Authorities which supervise Digital are working not to let the notion of "consent" replace the notion of "will", because consent must remain the means of expression and the proof of a free will, but if if a system is allowed to function on the only mechanical consents, detached from the notion of will, then by one or two clicks human beings would cede themselve!footnote-1979

Operators are building the digital space on Property Law, presenting data as things, about which the distinction between personal data and non-personal data would be a secondary distinction. In the huge data market, the principle must be circulation. The secondary market is setting up, operators offering human beings to acquire their memories, their daily life, their taste, their anticipation of the coming days, for a fixed income. This proposal made by Google, followed by other smaller companies does not seem to have offended the public Authorities!footnote-2022

The uncertainty of the legal status of the data!footnote-2023 favors this untenable legal situation, sometimes treated as a good, sold by the "owners" that everyone would be and then everything becomes possible, what Europe excludes because its courts maintain their conception according to which the data is a projection of the person, qualification which founded the Google Spain judgment, which blocked this enterprise  by the invention of the "right to be forgotten".

These technological feats deserve to be blocked, including even within Compliance techniques centralizing information and dictating their behavior to people, if we want to protect human beings, by internalising in crucial operators, for example these of digital, this monumental goal of protecting people which justifies the importance that must be given to Compliance Law.

Consent will not be enough to protect human beings because they will consent to give everything of themselves, the most intimate of themselves, the most distant of their future. They must be conferred with new rights, allowing others to carry them for them (public authorities and stakeholders), rights which arm them for balancing enterprises which are otherwise legitimately powerful since they have been innovative, ttaking risks, being better organized than many States. Why blame them? Why weaken them and what to replace them with once they have been reduced or broken?

But so that human beings do not have the prospect of reifying themselves for mechanically serving the rules, in a formal and empty conception of Compliance, possibly developed by these same enterprises!footnote-1980, in Compliance systems the number of substantial rights must be increased, served by procedural rights (possibly activated by others through public actions or private collective actions).

To do this, the Regulatory and Supervisory Authorities must increase their educational function, particularly in digital matters, to inform people of all the rights they have!footnote-2024.  Indeed, since people have prerogatives, they have debtors who are the crucial operators!footnote-2025 and they can act against them to obtain their realization. The very heavy sanctions which are beginning to be pronounced against European enterprises which have not correctly implemented the GDPR!footnote-1981  illustrate the need for this concretization.

In this regard, it is regrettable that the European Court of Justice in its Google judgment of September 29, 2019!footnote-1982 refused to apply extraterritorially the obligations arising from this text, thereby invalidating the position adopted by the French Personal Data Regulatory Authority (Conseil National Informatique et Libertés - CNIL). Indeed, Compliance Law thought out rights could be more effective and these must be considered as being active wherever their holder is. This will be encouraged by the new principle that is developing in Regulatory and Compliance Law: portability.

"Portability" is an essential principle and  now a new right is proposed, which would be the "right to portability"!footnote-2026. It is even necessary to go further and consider that rights would be transportable with people in the indifference of places they are. It is true that the branch of Law that is Private International Law, which guards the borders of territories as firmly as Public International Law does, would be thwarted and it is indeed with respect for these traditional branches that the CJEU in its aforementioned judgment of September 29, 2019, Google, limited the extra-territorial effect of the protection of the Internet user, but example can be taken from American Law starting from its goals which, from the moment that they are not local, justifies the application of the rules everywhere.

Recognizing a "portability of rights", according to what was the method of Personality of the laws would make it possible to put at the heart of Compliance Law human beings, whose rights will be the most natural tools since they are also the goals. .

 

B. THE LINKED MULTIPLICATION OF RIGHTS-TOOLS AND FINAL RIGHTS 

Assuming that rights are not only an effective means of helping the proper development of a system which in principle would remain based on objective mechanisms created by States and handled by them but alslo correspond to the Compliance Law definition as what protects people, that is to say their effective rights, it is therefore always necessary to broadly interpret the rights that already exist (1). Moreover, we must not hesitate, as case law has done, to invent others, since they make the person fully deploy , which is the very definition of Compliance Law (2).

 

1. The always broad interpretation of rights - media, mirror of the monumental goal served

Rather than taking the victim as the intruder coming into a system primarily entrusted to public authorities, it must be given full place. More so, as the Dodd-Frank Act conceived it, the rights of investors and other "affected persons", those who have the "right to say something", the persons who have the procedural place of "third-party" must have their rights fully recognized.

This implies firstly that a legal text is no needed for a prerogative to be recognized for a person who has not yet been referred to as a right beneficiary. A text is neither required to design a new sort of right.

Secondly, this implies that a right does not come as an exception to an objective principle, would therefore be justified in its existence and would be interpreted restrictively, while the principle applies in itself and is interpreted broadly. As explained above and for instance, the right to secrecy is just as powerful as the right to Information, secrecy is no exception compared to Information, Compliance Law must give them equal importance. This is how Personal Data Law has justified the General Court of the European Union, by an Order of October 29, 2020, blocked a request for the transmission of Information ordered by the European Commission against Facebook!footnote-2027

Thirdly, this implies taking all the "Compliance Tools" and understanding them through the notion of right. For example and to take the central tool of risk mapping!footnote-1983, it is not only a prevention tool imposed by particular laws but that it is is lthe result of an obligation given concrete expression to a right of the persons concerned in that they are exposed to particular risks. These people are therefore entitled to a right to be informed in time and in a useful way of this risk for measuring it and to be placed themselves in a position to choose whether or not to run it. This right to be concerned, particular form of the general right to Information and of the right to intelligibility is emerging.

In the same way, what the texts are beginning to designate as the principle of explainability of algorithms!footnote-1985 could therefore give rise to a "right to explainability". The use of such a term, preferred to the term of "intelligibility", which requires enterprises to use "explainable" algorithms has sometimes been presented as a "fundamental right"!footnote-1984 because an explanation requires a recipient.

Indeed, if the principle of "explicability" is not only a laid down by texts but a "right to explicabiity" is recognized, this metamorphoses the applicable legal regimes, in particular in the required probationary rules. They become much lighter for persons and heavier for crucial operators. Indeed, a substantial right (for example this "right to explainability") being supported by the procedural right, any person who has an interest in seizing a judge, a Regulator or a Supervisor (procedural right) only supports the burden of proving he/she holds this right. Not being in a de facto situation, for being successful he/she does not have to prove that there was a breach on the part of the operator under attack. It is necessary, but sufficient, for success to prove that he/she has a right and to demand that it be executed by th enterprise.

Thus the recognition of a right transforms the Cegulatory and Compliance systems because it removes the obligation to prove a breach, the one who seizes the judge or the Regulator having to prove only the existence of his/her right, the enterprise obligated by Law having to prove that it has actually fulfilled its obligation. In practice, this changes everything.

This is why, and to stay with this decisive example for the coming years, the explainability of algorithms is the new form taken by the principle of transparency of algorithms and is become a right, transforming the probationary rules. Because the principle of transparency is not effective enough, the right of explicability, in that it presupposes a beneficiary, imposes on operators an aptitude for the object (algorithm) to be understood, an aptitude whose demonstration - possibly by presumption - will be taken in charge by the operator, despite his procedural position of defendant in the proceedings, since the person, although plaintiff in the proceedings, insofar as he/shed can avail himself/herself of a right, can directly request its execution without having to provide proof other than his quality to act (for instance in a class action).

 

This is why rights are in practice the future of Compliance Law.

 

2. The invention of final Compliance Law rights

Law being the school of Imagination, it is therefore necessary to invent final rights, which will be served by rights-tools, these tools being made up of both substantive rights and processual rights. , which will be worn by people directly affected by legal situations or by others.

This is how the new branch of Law that is Compliance Law will be able to respond to the hopes that are set in its constitution.

_____________

 

1

L'on peut même considérer qu'il existe une tautologie entre la notion juridique de "personne" et la notion de "droit subjectif". En effet la personnalité juridique vise l'aptitude à être titulaire de droits subjectifs, au sens actif que sont les prérogatives et au sens passif que sont les obligations. C'est pour être actif dans le commerce juridique que les entreprises sont des "personnes" et c'est pour répondre de leurs actes, en être "responsables" que la jurisprudence a attaché la personnalité morale aux groupements, même dans le silence de la loi, et cela dès le XIXième siècle. V. le volume des Archives de philosophie du Droit consacré au thème Le sujet de droit. 

2

Sur la "pulvérisation" des principes généraux et abstraits, posés par la Loi, en une multitude de "droits subjectifs", Carbonnier, J., Droit et passion du droit sous la Vième République, 1995. 

3

Carbonnier, sous la Vième Répubique, 1995. 

4

L'article 544 du Code civil n'exprimant par sa lettre que ce sur quoi l'on s'accorde, dans une définition de ce droit par la plénitude de la puissance qu'il confère à la personne sur les choses : Le ....

Cette définition est maintenue par la jurisprudence constitutionnelle. 

5

Sur la question immense de la propriété publique et des entreprises publiques, dans leur rapport avec l'intérêt général et la régulation des secteurs, question qui ne sera pas abordée ici car excédant le champ de cette étude centrée sur le Droit de la Compliance, v. not. Sauvé, J.-M., Les entreprises publiques, 2018. 

6

Sur la responsabilité de l'Etat du fait des Autorités de Régulation et de Supervision, pourtant Autorités qui, d'une façon consubstantielle et en application d'une règle constitutionnelle, ne peuvent être qu'indépendantes du Gouvernement qui conduit l'action publique économique des secteurs, sujet très important puisque l'obligation de répondre est l'autre face des droits (v. infra) mais qui ne sera pas non plus abordé en tant que tel dans cette présente étude centrée sur le Droit de la Compliance, v. par exemple, Frison-Roche, M.-A., ....

7

Frison-Roche, M.-A., Du Droit de la Régulation au Droit de la Compliance, 2017.

Même s'il est vrai que le Droit de la Compliance s'est développé depuis d'une façon autonome (Le Droit de la Compliance, au-delà du Droit de la Régulation, 2019), cet ancrage explique beaucoup de ses mécanismes. 

8

Sur cette question, l'ouvrage de référence est l'ouvrage dirigée par Aurore Laget-Annameyr, L'ordre public économique, 2018. 

9

Sur l'idée récusée d'un "droit à la concurrence", v. ...

10

Ce qui explique l'éloignement pendant des décennies entre l'Europe de l'Union européenne à base de libertés et l'Europe de la Convention européennes des droits de l'Homme à base de droits subjectifs. Aujourd'hui, notamment parce que la Cour de justice change (v. infra), les deux Europes se rapprochent pour mettre les êtres humains au centre. C'est notamment par sa définition humaniste que le Droit de la Compliance peut y contribuer (par exemple par la technique du lanceur d'alerte (v. infra). 

11

Voir les trois définition du Droit de la Régulation, soit comme voie de construction d'un marché concurrentiel (en cas de libéralisation d'un secteur) ou comme insertion de gestion des "défaillances de marché", les deux premières conceptions prenant toujours comme idéal le principe de Concurrence, ou bien sa définition comme la mise en équilibre entre un principe de concurrence et d'autres soucis pour des activités dont on pose que cet équilibre est requis, dans son établissement et son maintien dans le temps. L'on peut penser que cette troisième définition est la plus adéquate, notamment en raison de la violence des relations économique. Il est très importante de faire un choix sur ce qu'est le Droit de la Régulation, dans la mesure où le Droit de la Compliance est lui-même l'internalisation dans les "opérateurs cruciaux" du Droit de la Régulation. La troisième définition de la Régulation étant celle qui prend en considération l'être humain de la façon la plus centrale, c'est celle-là qui doit être considérée, et insérée de gré ou de force dans les entreprises, dans une conception elle-aussi humaniste du Droit de la Compliance. 

12

Sur l'Etat-actionnaire, empêché d'être un instrument de Régulation, v. Larget, A.... ; ... 2019, ....

13

Sur la justice définie par les "façons de faire", v. Baranès, W. et Frison-Roche, M.-A., La justice, ....

14

Conseil d'Etat, Le juge administratif et les Autorités de régulation économique, 2016. 

15

Sur la notion de 'Ex Ante cognitif", v. ...

16

V. par ex. Coppens, K., ....

17

V. le cycle de colloques "La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance", 2021. 

18

Sur l'entreprise juge d'elle-même par l'effet du Droit de la Compliance, v. ...., Lyon, 8 avril 2021. 

19

Sur l'articulation des "outils de compliance" entre eux, car ils ne peuvent pas s'additionner les uns sur les autres, sans corrélation, v. Frison-Roche, M.-A., ....

20

Sur "le droit à l'électricité", v. par ex. Frison-Roche M.-A., "Droit de l'électricité, droit à l'électricité", ....

21

Il est résulte une mixité des clauses contractuelles, certaines étant liées à ce droit, dont la volonté des parties ne peuvent pas entièrement disposer, et d'autres par lesquelles les parties au contrat peuvent ajouter et aménager. La façon dont le juge ou l'Autorité de régulation tranche un différent entre les parties ou sanctionne une inexécution change suivant la nature de diverses stipulations. 

22

V. d'une façon générale, L'accès 

23

Par exemple le Règlement européen de 2016 sur "L'internet ouvert" qui offre à l'utilisateur de pouvoir « d’accéder aux informations et aux contenus et de les diffuser, d’utiliser et de fournir des applications et des services et d’utiliser les équipements terminaux de leur choix, quel que soit le lieu où se trouve l’utilisateur final ou le fournisseur, et quels que soient le lieu, l’origine ou la destination de l’information, du contenu, de l’application ou du service, par l’intermédiaire de leur service d’accès à l’internet ».  

24

v. plus haut, I.A.1,....

25

V. Richet, L., Le pouvoir de réglement des différents ...

26

V. l'analyse cohérente de Pierre Delvolvé, La cour d'appel de Paris, juridiction administrative, ....

27

Sur l'arrêt Google Spain, point de départ du Droit européen de la Compliance, lire Koen Laernart, ....

28

Supiot, A., La gouvernance par les nombres, 2015. 

29

For instance in France the Loi pour une République Numérique.

But if it is not the case, it could be a "terrible legal mess" (for instance, in Japan). 

30

Sur la critique par ailleurs fondée de la "société contentieuse", visant les Etats-Unis, Cadiet, L., La spectre de la société contentieuse, 

31

Grief implicite ou explicite qui frappe d'ailleurs l'ensemble du Droit de la Compliance (Frison-Roche, M.-A., Le Droit de de la Compliance, 2016).

V. le développement d'un tel grief par le parlementaire A. Gauvain, ....

32

Sur le croisement entre la critique  du pouvoir juridictionnel dans le Droit de la compliance et la critique de l'application extraterritorial du Droit américain de la Compliance (appliquée par les juridictions américaines), v. ....

33

Sur le jugement comme mode de génération des droits subjectifs, la démonstration a été faite par le thèse de Motulsky : Principes de réalisation méthode du droit. Elements général des droits subjectifs, 1948. 

34

Foucault, M., Le sujet ....

35

Ellul, J. ..., in Le sujet de droit, ....

36

Frison-Roche, M.-A., l'unité des outils ....

37

Tardieu, H., ....

38

V. d'une façon générale, Frison-Roche, M.-A., L'apport du Droit de la Compliance à la gouvernance d'Internet, 2019. Depuis la rédaction de ce rapport qui décrit ce mouvement disciplinant, les lois multipliant les droits subjectifs et les jurisprudences leur donnant effet se sont multipliés. 

39

Sur la prise en considération de cette conception et d'une façon plus générale des apports de l'économie comportementale en Droit de la Compliance, précisément lorsque le Droit de la Régulation trouve ses limites en raison des territoires et que le Droit de la Compliance, qui le prolonge et le dépasse, peut constituer une solution pour construire en Ex Ante des Régulations, v. Rapp, L. ....

40

Sur le lien entre Compliance et Information, v. son rapport paradoxal puisque le Droit de la Compliance implique soit le droit de transmettre, soit le droit de bloquer toute transmission, le Droit de la Compliance donnant effectivité à chacun de ces deux droits subjectifs parfois pour une bonne information. Voir par exemple à propos d'une information à caractère personnel, dont la connaissance serait pourtant pertinente pour la sanction de comportements anticoncurrentiels, v. l'ordonnance rendue par le président du Tribunal de l'Union européenne le 29 octobre 2020, dans la contestation par Facebook de l'ordre de transmission d'informations émis par la Commission européenne à son encontre, .....

41

Pour une description en droit comparé du lanceur d'alerte, v. ..., et notamment Frison-Roche, M.-A., L'impossible unicité du lanceur d'alerte....

42

Directive d'octobre 2019 sur la protection du lanceur d'alerte. 

43

Il est d'ailleurs remarquable que l'étude menée par le Conseil d'Etat sur le lanceur d'alerte à l'occasion de la loi dite "Sapin 2", est plutôt réservée sur le mécanisme et que si dans sa version française cet examen qualifie l'ensemble par "Le droit d'alerte : ..." , cette référence à un droit subjectif disparait dans la traduction anglaise de l'étude, également disponible sur le site du Conseil d'Etat dont l'intitulé est : "Whistleblowing: reporting, handling and protecting". 

44

Le droit britannique exclut le mécanisme de récompense mais admet la compensation des pertes subies par le  whistleblower (Public Interest Disclosure Act, 1998).

45

La SEC rend compte chaque année de l'effectivité et de l'efficacité du travail du ... office . Sur le rapport rendu pour 2020, v. Frison-Roche, M.-A., .... ; le succès du programme est mesuré à la hauteur des récompenses attribuées. 

46

Lire l'article intéressant de Johanna Schwartz Miralles: Les récompenses financières des lanceurs d'alerte portent-elles atteinte aux droits fondamentaux ? Le cas américain, in Les lanceurs d'alerte et les droits de l'homme. Apport du droit comparé et international, Revue des droits de l'homme, 2016, 

47

Frison-Roche, M.-A., L'unicité des outils ...

48

V. supra sur l'entrée des droits subjectifs processuels dans le Droit de la Régulation. 

49

En cela, la définition très classique, plutôt issue du Droit public, du droit d'action comme étant le droit substantiel "en l'état de guerre" avait de la pertinence, avant qu'elle ne soit plutôt oubliée au profit de la conception, mise en lumière par Motulsky, insérée dans le Droit positif d'un droit subjectif processuel autonome du droit subjectif substantiel qui sera l'objet d'un jugement. La jurisprudence, notamment celle de la Cour européenne des droits de l'Homme, fait tout de même un lien entre les deux en validant l'absence de droit d'action lorsque la personne qui prétend saisir le juge n'a manifestement aucun droit substantiel dont elle pourrait se prévaloir. 

50

Jurisprudence de la CJUE, E-Booking, novembre 2020. 

51

sur cette dimension-là, v. infra, car les droits subjectifs sont non seulement premiers (parce qu'ils sont les plus "efficaces" dans les systèmes de Régulation et de Compliance), mais "naturels" car le Droit de la Compliance a pour but la protection des personnes, et qu'il est donc naturel que les droits subjectifs de celles-ci y aient la première place. 

52

Sur le cas Marriott, v. ....

53

Rapport du Conseil d'Etat, Les droits subjectifs et Internet, ....

54

Pour l'instant, les directives européennes progressent lentement. La directive de 2018 va être réformée, selon une proposition faite en 2020 renforçant les mesures de contraintes que les consommateurs peuvent ainsi obtenir. Comme cela est souligné la raison en est que l'Union européenne n'est pas qu'un marché mais également un espace dans lequel les droits des utilisateurs finaux, c'est-à-dire les consommateurs, doivent être effectifs. Bientôt, l'Union européenne découvrira la notion de droits subjectifs. 

55

Droits que l'on oppose si souvent à propos de l'extraterritorialité du Droit américain, qu'il faudrait "bloquer", pour lutter contre "l'impérialisme" américain, alors que l'Europe et les Etats-Unis partagent, à travers leurs systèmes juridiques, la considération profonde pour les individus, leurs libertés et leurs droits, conception qui n'est pas partagée partout dans le monde et qu'il convient de conforter et de défendre. 

56

Sur le Droit dans La colonie pénitentiaire, v. ... ; sur la façon dont Kafka a représenté le Droit et la façon dont le Droit est ainsi éclairé, sinistrement, par cet auteur, objet de multiples études, v. notamment l'étude d'Alain Supiot, Kafka, artiste de la Loi, 2019. 

57

Frison-Roche, M.-A., Le Droit de la Compliance, 2016. 

58

V. le colloque du 22 janvier 2021, ....

59

V. par exemple Frison-Roche, M.-A., Pour une définition humaniste du Droit de la Compliance, ....

60

C'est parce que l'on présente souvent le Droit de la Compliance comme un instrument d'efficacité Ex Ante de toutes règles auxquelles l'Etat accorde de l'importance que des auteurs aussi important qu'Alain Supiot se déclare totalement opposé au Droit de la Compliance. S'i l'on définit le Droit de la Compliance d'une façon humaniste, ce qui limite le Droit de la Compliance puisque l'être humain devient sa mesure, et qu'il doit se limiter puisqu'il doit cesser de concentrer les informations puisqu'il doit aussi garder les secrets lorsque cela est requis pour protéger les personnes, alors cette branche du Droit se met à confluer avec l'objet notamment du Droit social. 

61

Kessous, L'attention ....

62

Sur cette bataille juridique en cours entre la "volonté" et le "consentement", v. Frison-Roche, M.-A., La distinction entre la volonté et le consentement, 1995 ; puis "La volonté, le consentement, la Régulation, 2002, puis "contre les consentements mécaniques, 2018. 

63

Cette petite entreprise a publié sur Internet la proposition suivante : "« ET SI ON CHANGEAIT LA DONNE ENSEMBLE ? Tous les jours, les acteurs d’internet utilisent tes données personnelles à ton insu et se font de l’argent sur ton dos ! Avec Tadata, dis STOP : reprends le contrôle de tes données perso et gagne de l’argent avec ».

L

64

Frison-Roche, M.-A., Concevoir le monde à partir de la notion de donnée, 2017. 

65

Pour une critique de la "responsabilité sociétale" par laquelle les entreprises édictent des règles, ce qui leur permet d'être les législateurs, obligeant ensuite les êtres humains à s'y "conformer" mécaniquement si l'on adopte une conception formelle de la "compliance", v. Supiot, A., Du selft-normatif... ; Fabre-Magnan, Responsabilité sociétale et Droit des contrats, ... ; Teubner, G., Le pouvoir ... ; Farjat, G., Les codes de conduites privées, 1978. 

66

Frison-Roche, M.-A., La formation, élement du Droit de la Compliance ....

67

Sur la notion-clé d' "opérateur crucial" dans le Droit de la Régulation et le Droit de la Compliance, Frison-Roche, M.-A., Proposition pour une notion : l'opérateur crucial, 2006. 

68

Deux sanctions de Carrefour par la CNIL pour non-application correcte du RGPD, novembre 2020. 

69

CJUE, 29 septembre 2019 refusant l'application extraterritoriale du RGDP, Google. 

70

V. par exemple le colloque de la CNIL, Le droit à la portabilité, décembre 2020. 

71

Pour l'analyse technique de cette décision remarquable, v. Frison-Roche, M.-A., .....

72

Sur la cartographie des risques, v. d'une façon générale Guillaume, N. , ...

Sur la cartographie des risques comme base d'un droit subjectif dont sont titulaires les tiers, le droit subjectif à être inquiétés, v. Frison-Roche, M.-A., ....

73

Sur les textes qui imposent le principe de l'explicabilité des algorithmes, v. ....

74

Dans ce sens, Maxwell, W. , L'explicabilité des algorithmes est-elle un droit fondamental ? 

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