Nov. 18, 2020

Conferences

Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance Law, an adequate legal framework for GAIA-X, in "The World with GAIA-X", Pan-European GAIA - X Summit November 2020, 18 November 2020.

 

See the general presentation of the Summit.

 

Summary  of the intervention  in the Round-Table with professors Jacques Crémer and Achim Wambach:

Europe may offer an adequate legal framework for the GAIA-X project through Compliance Law. Compliance Law is a new forme a Regulatory Law, driven by "Monumental Goals", negative Monumental Goals, for instance prevention of systemic failures, and positive Monumental Goals, for instance innovation or stability. This very new branch of Law works on these Monumental Goals, which must be explicit and internalized in Crucial Enterprises. These Crucial Enterprises concretize these Goals, supervised by public Authorities. 

European Compliance Law already works, for instance about Personal Data protection (case law and GDPR) or prevention banking systemic failures (Banking Union), Compliance Tools being in balance with Competition principle. European Union Law is moving from the Ex Post Competition Law to the Ex Ante Compliance Law, internalizing Monumental Goals in Crucial Enterprises. 

There is a perfect adequacy between European Compliance Law and GAIA-X. This project built by Crucial Enterprises must be supervised by public authority, maybe a specific or the European Commission. The governance of GAIA-X must be transparent and accountable. This private organization must use it powers in respect of the proportionality principle, controlled by the public supervisory body. The legal framework is required but it is sufficient. 

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See the slides, basis of this intervention.

 

See the video of this intervention. 

Aug. 24, 2020

Publications : Newsletter MAFR - Law, Compliance, Regulation

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., The control by regulator of the essential infrastructure manager's investment plan: example of electric network and the notion of "doctrine"Newsletter MAFR - Law, Compliance, Regulation, 24th of August 2020

Read by freely subscribing other news of the Newsletter MAFR - Law, Compliance, Regulation

 

Summary of the news

On 31st of July 2020, the Commission de Régulation de l'Energie (CRE and French energy regulator) has examined the investment plan of the French electric network manager (RTE) as it does every year. This investment plan is an economic document but it also contains societal purposes, especially the adaptation of the electric network in order to integrate renewable energies. 

The control by the CRE is not a financial control. The crucial operator (RTE) is free to decide the way it wants to manage its budget. The CRE just advices on the financial side by recommending for exemple to be more flexible in its financial strategies. The true CRE's control is about the investment plan's general orientations, the methodology of needs analysis and crucial operator's investment choices which must be aligned with those of the regulator.

Such a control leads to the emergence of an "investment doctrine" from the side of the crucial operator, mixing its own choices and the regulator's guidelines. Beyond this, the elaboration of the investment plan is the result of a true co-writing between the regulator and the firm which discuss together, exchanges points of view and methods. Such a method, expressing a kind of coregulation, could be used in other sectors. 

June 23, 2019

JoRC

The European Banking Union is based on supervision as much as on regulation: it concerns the operators as much as the structures of the sector, because the operators "hold" the sector.

This is why the "regulator - supervisor" holds the operators by the supervision and is close to them.

He meets them officially and in "soft law" relations. This is all the more necessary since the distinction between the Ex Ante and the Ex Post must be nuanced, in that its application is too rigid, in that it involves a long time (first of all the rules, then to apply them, then to notice a gap between rules and behaviors, then to repair it) is not appropriate if the system aims at the prevention of systemic crises, whose source is inside the operators.

This is why the body in charge of solving the difficulties of the systemic banks for the salvation of the systeme meets the banking sector itself, to ensure that they are permanently "resolvable", so that the hypothesis of their resolution never arises. This is the challenge of this system: that it is always ready, for never be applying.

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In the European Banking Union, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) is in charge of "resolve" the difficulties of European systemic banks in difficulty. It is the public body of the second pillar of the Banking Union. The first pillar is the prevention of these difficulties and the third is the guarantee of deposits. The resolution is therefore more like an Ex Post mechanism.

But in this continuum through these three pillars between the Ex Ante and the Ex Post, the SRB does not wait passively - as would a traditional judge do - that the file of the troubled bank reaches it. Like a supervisor - which brings it closer to the first public in the system (Single Supervisory Board -SSB), which supervises all the banks, it is in direct contact with all the banks, and it approaches the hypothesis of a bank in trouble by a systemic perspective: it is therefore to the entire banking system that the SRB addresses itself.

As such, it organizes meetings, where he is located: in Brussels.

Thus, on June 18, 2019, all banks came to discuss with the Single Resolution Board to know what it wants from the banks and for the banks, in what is called a "dialogue meeting".

To resolve in Ex Post the difficulties of a bank, it has to present a quality (a little known concept in Bankruptcy Law): "resolvability". How build it? Who build it ? In its very design and in its application, bank by bank.

For the resolution body vis-à-vis all players in the banking and financial sector, it's clear: "Working together" is crucial in building resolvability ".

In the projection that is made, it is affirmed that there can be a successful resolution only if the operator in difficulty is not deprived of access to what makes to stay it alive, that is to say the banking and financial system itself, and more specifically the "Financial Market Infrastructures", for example payment services.

Does the Single Resolution Board expect spontaneous commitments from the FMIs for such a "right of access"? In this case, as the Single Resolution Board says, this right of access corresponds to "critical functions" for a bank, the resolution situation can not justify the closure of the service.

By nature, these crucial operators are entities that report to regulators who oversee them. Who enforces - and immediately - this right of access? When one can think that it is everyone, it risks being nobody .... That is why the resolution body, relaying in this a concern of the Financial Stability Board, underlines that it is necessary to articulate the supervisors, regulators and "resolvers" between them.

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To read this program, since it is a proposed program of work for the banking sector, four observations can be made:

1. We are moving more and more towards a general "intermaillage" (which will perhaps replace the absence of a global State, but it is an similar nature because it is always to public authorities that it refers and not to self-regulation);

2. But as there is no political authority to keep these guardians, the entities that articulate all these various public structures, with different functions, located in different countries, acting according to different temporalities, these are the companies themselves that internalize the concern that animates those who built the system: here the prevention of systemic risk. This is the definition of Compliance, which brings back to companies, here more clearly those those which manage the Market Infrastructures, the obligations of Compliance (here the management of systemic risk through the obligation of giving access).

3. Even without a  single systemic guard, there is always a recourse. That will be the judge. There are already many, there will probably be more in a system of this type, more and more complex, the articulation of disputes is sometimes called "dialogue". And it is undoubtedly "decisions of principle" that will set the principles common to all of these particular organisms.

4. We then see the emergence of Ex Ante mechanisms for the solidity of the systems, and the solidity of the players in the systems, and then the Ex Post resolution of the difficulties of the actors according to access to the solidity of the infrastructures of these systems, which ultimately depend on judges (throughout the West) facing areas where all of this depends much less on the judge: the rest of the world.

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Nov. 18, 2015

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Référence complète : Barban, P., Les entreprises de marché. Contribution à l'étude d'un modèle d'infrastructure de marché, préface de France Drummond, Avant-propos de Jean-Jacques Daigre, LGDJ, nov. 2015.

Lire la quatrième de couverture.

Lire la préface.

Lire l'avant-propos.

Lire la table des matière.

May 21, 2009

Publications

Référence complète : FRISON-ROCHE, Marie-Anne, Le droit est-il un outil ou un obstacle à la régulation des infrastructures essentielles ? in Economie et droit de la régulation des infrastructures. Perspectives des pays en voie de développement, Banque Mondiale / Chaire régulation, coll. Droit et Economie, LGDJ, Paris, 2008, p. 37-49.

La Banque mondiale a montré que le développement économique des pays est lié à son développement juridique. Cela est aussi vrai pour les réseaux d'infrastructures, qui ne dépendent pas seulement des politiques publiques, mais encore du droit car il s'agit de biens essentiels pour lesquels il faut avoir un droit d'accès. Mais les pays en voie de développement souffrent d'une immaturité juridictionnelle car ils ne disposent pas d'une organisation juridictionnelle fiable et impartiale, alors que le droit a besoin d'un juge. On peut songer à deux pistes de solution : soit un tribunal internalisé dans le régulateur, sur le modèle de l'OMC, soit des pouvoirs et des taches de régulation confiées aux gestionnaires de réseau en ce qu'ils sont des "opérateurs cruciaux".

Accéder à l'article.

Lire la présentation générale de l'ouvrage dans lequel l'article a été publié.

Lire le résumé de l'article ci-dessous.

June 8, 1995

Conferences

Référence : FRISON-ROCHE, Marie-Anne, « Aspects juridiques des modalités de gestion des réseaux d’infrastructure essentielle », in La gestion des réseaux d’infrastructure essentielle, Atelier de la concurrence, DGCCRF, 8 juin 1995, Paris.