► Référence complète : CE, Avis consultatif rendu au Gouvernement relatif à la portée de l'obligation de déclaration prévue à l'article I.551-15 du Code monétaire et financier, 5 février 2025.

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📝Lire l'avis

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► Référence complète : Autorité de la concurrence (ADLC), avis 24-A-05 du 28 juin 2024 relatif au fonctionnement concurrentiel du secteur de l’intelligence artificielle générative, juin 2024, 104 p.

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📜lire l'avis

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📰lire le communiqué de presse accompagnant la publication de l'avis

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► Full reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, Audition by the French National Assembly's Law Commission on the confidentiality of legal advice  (the "Legal Privilege à la française"), 8 April 2024.

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I had expressed my opinion on the need for French legal system to better ensure the confidentiality of legal opinions drawn up by internal lawyers in companies, in an article published in 2023 in the French academic journal Recueil Dalloz: "La compliance, socle de la confidentialité nécessaire des avis juridiques élaborés en entreprise (Compliance Law, the cornerstone of the necessary confidentiality of legal opinions drawn up by companies". Compliance, the cornerstone of the necessary confidentiality of legal opinions drawn up by companies). 

Following on from this article, and as a specialist in Regulatory and Compliance Law, I was invited by the French National Assembly's Law Commission to give my opinion on the proposed law n°2022 on the confidentiality of consultations by in-house lawyers ( Proposition de loi n°2022 relative à la confidentialité des consultations des juristes d'entreprises), often named in French Legal privilege à la française.

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► Summary of this presentation: I have shown that we must start not from the person (external lawyer / in-house lawyer, for instance) and not even centrally from the information in question (branch of Law by branch of Law), but from the Goals pursued, i.e. from Compliance Law.

In this respect, we must not be misled. We could do so by confusing mechanical "conformity" with this new branch of Law: Compliance Law. Conformity is merely a tool of Compliance Law. Out of concern for the correct use of the French language, as "Compliance" appears to many to be an American term, the proposed law uses the term "conformité" but refers to Compliance Law. Conformity" is merely the mechanical obligation to obey the applicable rules, which is the fate of any subject of law, subject to the mandatory rules, a passive position common to everyone in a State governed by the Rule of Law.

Compliance Law is quite different, with conformity being just one of its tools. On the one hand, Compliance Law imposes an active obligation, and on the other, it targets only certain legal subjects: companies.  For them, it is a matter of ensuring that certain goals set by the legislator are actually achieved, which becomes effectively and efficiently possible thanks to the power of companies (financial power, organizational power, management power, information power, location power, information power). These "Monumental Goals" are either negative (preventing systems from collapsing) or positive (ensuring that systems improve).

For companies to play this role - a role that is not required of other "ordinary" people, as they are not "in a position" to take on such a burden, particularly in terms of finance and organization - those in charge of organizing themselves and taking action, i.e. companies, must "detect and prevent" system failures (as required by laws such as US FCPA, French so-called Sapin 2 and Vigilance laws, European CSRD and CS3D, etc.). To "detect and prevent", which is an order from the Legislator, companies need to know the weaknesses of their organization and of the people they answer to, in order to remedy them: "remediation" is a "remedy" to ensure the "sustainability" of "systems".

This set of key concepts lies at the heart of Compliance Law, the branch of law That focuses on the future.

It is the legal opinions, for example, and in particular the report resulting from internal investigations, that enable those who decide and control this organization (the managers) to fulfill the role entrusted to them by the State. If these opinions are not confidential, the result is not the remediation and preservation of global systems (competitive, climatic, digital, energy, banking, financial systems, etc.): the effective managerial solution in Ex-Ante then consists not in seeking information but, conversely, in not seeking this information, since obtaining it will lead to the weakening of the company through the sanction that the information produces, for lack of confidentiality.

The interests of the system, the State and the company are disjointed, because Compliance Law implies their alliance, which is what the confidentiality of legal opinions produces.

This is why Compliance Law must, by its very nature, ensure the confidentiality of legal advice.

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When asked about the actual text of the proposal, I felt that the explanatory memorandum was particularly relevant, since the link between Compliance Law (admittedly called "conformité" in the proposed bill by a rather too mechanical respect for the French legal language, from which the French legislator has so far been unable to dispense....) is clear, that this confidentiality is attached to the document, that the company can waive it, and that it is clearly distinct from professional secrecy, all three of which should be approved.

For my part, I've suggested a change to the procedure, which must be open to the confidentiality process.

Indeed, public authorities, such as Competition and Regulatory Authorities, are rather hostile to this confidentiality.

Having contributed a great deal to the development of Regulatory Law, and continuing to do so, I believe that Competition and Regulatory Authorities have a logic that needs to be understood. It is as follows: Regulatory Authorities are Ex-Ante (this was less true for the Competition Authorities, but it too is increasingly so) and are in a situation of information asymmetry. Their first concern is to combat this asymmetry. If we translate this into legal terms, it means that in order to carry out their mission of general interest, they must seek out all available information. However, legal opinions, and in particular the internal investigation report, are what I have described as "evidence treasure". In their logic, the Competition and Regulatory Authorities want to seize it.

There is therefore a conflict between two general interest logics: the general interest of the Monumental Goals of Compliance Law actively served by companies, at the behest of the Legislation, which requires the confidentiality of legal opinions, and the general interest of the action of Regulators who fight against information asymmetry and seek to seize the evidential treasures of legal opinions.

For the reasons given above, I believe that the Monumental Goals of Compliance must prevail. All the more so as the rights of the defence converge to this end.

Ultimately, however, it is up to the Judge, in the event of open conflict, to balance these two claims, which are based on the service of the general interest. 

However, reading the proposition, it seems to me that the rather complicated procedure entrusts this to a multiplicity of judges... But since it is indeed Compliance Law which is the best basis for "legal privilege à la française", Compliance Law, which is the extension of Regulatory Law and whose advanced point is the Vigilance duty, it would be more appropriate and logical to entrust this litigation to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Paris Judicial Court. This court has already the exclusive competence for litigation about Vigilance.

This would have another fortunate effect: on appeal, the dispute would be brought before the Paris Court of Appeal, which has exclusive jurisdiction (barring exceptions) over disputes concerning decisions on French Competition and Regulatory Authorities. The judges of the "Pôle 5" (12 chambers specializing in economic law) of the very specific court are seasoned and would be well-suited to strike the necessary balance between the two general interests involved.

I think a procedural amendment to the proposed text along these lines would be welcome.

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► See in my work those that may be of interest with regard to this hearing (all with English summary, many with bilingual working paper) ⤵️

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Le rôle du juge dans le déploiement du Droit de la Régulation par le Droit de la Compliance, in 📗Conseil d'État et Cour de cassation, De la Régulation à la Compliance : quel rôle pour le Juge ?, 2024.  

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance et conformité : les distinguer pour mieux les articuler, 2024.

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.),📕L'obligation de compliance, 2024.

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche et M. Boissavy (dir.), 📕Compliance et droits de la défense, 2024.

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📕Compliance et droits de la défense, Les Buts Monumentaux de la compliance,  2022.

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Contrat de compliance, clauses de compliance, 2022.

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Le Droit de la compliance, 2016.

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► Référence complète : M. Paulet, Les notes de crédit produites par les agences de notation financière. Contribution à l'étude des notions juridiques d'opinion et d'avis en droit privé, préf. M.-L. Coquelet & M. Pichard, Dalloz, coll. "Nouvelle Bibliothèque de Thèses", vol. 226, 2023, 592 p.

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📗lire la 4ième de couverture

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📗lire le sommaire de l'ouvrage

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📗lire la table des matières de l'ouvrage

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► Résumé de l'ouvrage (fait par l'éditeur) : "Le règlement (CE) n° 1060/2009 du 16 septembre 2009 relatif aux agences de notation est généralement lu à partir du postulat selon lequel celles-ci exerceraient un pouvoir exorbitant sur les investisseurs. Dans ce cadre, la réglementation des agences est conçue comme un corps de normes exceptionnel, apprécié à l’aune de son aptitude à encadrer ce pouvoir et à protéger les intérêts des investisseurs. Cette approche théorique ne rend cependant pas compte de la véritable rationalité de la réglementation des agences, laquelle se borne à organiser l’activité de notation et le statut des agences en appliquant aux notes le régime juridique conforme à leur double nature : elles sont des opinions – qui plus est des opinions financières à raison de leur objet –, c’est-à-dire des affirmations subjectives exprimant des vérités relatives quant au risque de défaut d’un émetteur de titres financiers ; elles sont des avis, c’est-à-dire des opinions consacrées par le droit aux fins d’éclairer une décision, en ce qu’elles sont inscrites dans des procédures décisionnelles du législateur en matière bancaire et financière.

Comme toute opinion, les notes peuvent être librement exprimées, sous réserve d’être fondées sur une base factuelle suffisante afin de protéger les intérêts des personnes sur lesquelles elles portent, à savoir les émetteurs de titres financiers. Comme toute opinion financière, elles se voient appliquer la réglementation relative aux abus de marché dès lors qu’elles revêtent une valeur informationnelle afin de protéger les marchés financiers.

Comme tout avis, elles sont soumises à un principe d’intégrité qui vise à préserver la subjectivité technique des agences qui est déterminante de la consécration de leurs notes au rang d’avis.".

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► Full Reference: J. Heymann, "La nature juridique de la "Cour suprême" de Facebook" ("The legal nature of Facebook's "Supreme court""), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, p. 151-167. 

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📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► The summary below describes an article following the colloquium L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance , co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Faculté de Droit Lyon 3. This manifestation was designed under the scientific direction of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Christophe Roda and took place in Lyon on June 23, 2021.

In the book, the article will be published in Title I, devoted to: The Entreprise instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law.

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► Summary of the article (done by the author): Taking place in the general theme aiming at making “words and things coincide”, the article offers some thoughts on the “conditions of the discourse” – in the sense in which Foucault understood it in his Archéologie des sciences humaines – relating to the phenomenon of “jurisdictionalization” of Compliance.

            The thoughts are more specifically focusing on the nature of the so-called “Supreme Court” that Facebook instituted to hear appeals of decisions relating to content on the digital social networks that are Facebook and Instagram. Is this really a “Supreme Court”, designed in order to “judge” the Facebook Group?

            A careful examination of the Oversight Board – i.e. the so-called “Supreme Court” created by Facebook – reveals that the latter, in addition to its advisory mission (which consists of issuing policy advisory opinions on Facebook’s content policies), exercises some form of adjudicative function. This is essentially conceived in terms of compliance assessment, of the content published on the social networks Facebook or Instagram with the standards issued by these corporations on the one hand, of content enforcement decisions taken by Facebook with the Law on the other hand. The legal framework of reference is yet rather vague, although its substantial content seems to be per se evolutive, based on the geographical realm where the case to be reviewed is located. An adjudicative function can therefore be characterized, even if the Oversight Board can only claim for a limited one.

            The author can ultimately identify the Oversight Board as a preventive dispute settlement body, in the sense that it seems to aim at avoiding any referral to state courts and ruling before any court’s judgement can be delivered. Some questions are thus to be raised, relating with both legitimacy and authority of such a Board. But whatever the answers will be, the fact remains that the creation of the Oversight Board by a private law company already reveals all the liveliness of contemporary legal pluralism.

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► Full Reference: E. Wennerström, "Quelques réflexions sur la Compliance et la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme" ("Some Reflections on Compliance and the European Court of Human Rights"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, p. 479-489.

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📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The development of the European Court of Human Rights case law, contributing to European integration, has incorporated the substantial concept of ​​"compliance" which goes beyond the idea of ​​legality with respect to which companies remain passive, and promotes legal orders as systems in interaction with another. 

The author develops the spirit and scope of Protocol 15 by which both the principle of subsidiarity and the margins of appreciation the signatory States are organized, mechanisms governed by the principle of proportionality. Subsidiarity means that the States are in the best position to design the most adequate application of the Convention, the close links between the States allowing its effective application. In addition, the new opinion procedure which allows a national court to have during a case the non-binding opinion of the ECHR ensures better compliance with the objectives of the Convention.

The case-law of the Court takes up this substantial requirement through its doctrine, in particular identified in the Bosphorus case, by stressing that the accession of a State to the European Union presumes its compliance when implementing EU law with the obligations arising from the ECHR, even if this presumption can be refuted if the protection is manifestly lacking, which was admitted in several cases, in particular concerning the right to an impartial tribunal in matters of economic regulation. The different legal orders are thus articulated. 

The author concludes that the European Court of Human Rights, like the Court of Justice of the Union, contributes to the construction of Compliance Law in Europe, from an Ex Ante perspective favoring opinions rather than Ex Post sanctions and creating, in particular through the Bosphorus doctrine, elements of security and confidence for European integration around common values.

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Référence complète : Equinet : Pour une IA européenne protectrice et garante du principe de non-discrimination, Avis établissant des recommandations et des principes essentiels pour la future législation européenne portant sur l'intelligence artificielle, 21 juin 2022.

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Lire l'avis. 

► Full Reference: E. Wennerström, "Some Reflections on Compliance and the European Court of Human Rights", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", to be published. 

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📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The development of the European Court of Human Rights case law, contributing to European integration, has incorporated the substantial concept of ​​"compliance" which goes beyond the idea of ​​legality with respect to which companies remain passive, and promotes legal orders as systems in interaction with one another.

The author develops the spirit and scope of Protocol 15 by which both the principle of subsidiarity and the margins of appreciation the signatory States are organized, mechanisms governed by the principle of proportionality. Subsidiarity means that the States are in the best position to design the most adequate application of the Convention, the close links between the States allowing its effective application. In addition, the new opinion procedure which allows a national court to have during a case the non-binding opinion of the ECHR ensures better compliance with the objectives of the Convention.

The case-law of the Court takes up this substantial requirement through its doctrine, in particular identified in the Bosphorus case, by stressing that the accession of a State to the European Union presumes its compliance when implementing EU law with the obligations arising from the ECHR, even if this presumption can be refuted if the protection is manifestly lacking, which was admitted in several cases, in particular concerning the right to an impartial tribunal in matters of economic regulation. The different legal orders are thus articulated. 

The author concludes that the European Court of Human Rights, like the Court of Justice of the Union, contributes to the construction of Compliance Law in Europe, from an Ex Ante perspective favoring opinions rather than Ex Post sanctions and creating, in particular through the Bosphorus doctrine, elements of security and confidence for European integration around common values.

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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