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📝 Go to the general presentation of the book, Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, in which this article is published.

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Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Rapport de synthèse (Conclusion) in André C., Frison-Roche, M.-A., Malaurie, M. and Petit, B., Les Buts monumentaux de la Compliance (Compliance Monumental Goals), Colloquium co-organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Laboratoire Dante of Paris-Saclay University,

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📅  September 16, 2021.

🧭 Maison du Barreau, 12 place Dauphine 75004 Paris

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► Conclusions' Summary: Based on the multiple contributions of the day, the first part of this synthesis focuses on the practical interest of having Monumental Goals attached to compliance techniques.Conceptually defining these Monumental Goals as normative legal rules of Compliance Law has the first practical advantage of making clear this scattered and almost incomprehensible material, allowing us to better understand it.  The second practical advantage is to bring together the various branches of law in that they all contain compliance mechanisms, the points of contact thus discerned leading to a unification of technical legal rules.  The third practical advantage is to provide the various sources of law concerned with a means of applying and interpreting the law. The fourth practical advantage is to give meaning to all these technical provisions.

In the second part of this synthesis, it appeared that these practical considerations therefore justify undertaking the "conceptual adventure". This one can take three pillars, in this "cathedral" that Dominique de la Garanderie designed, this "monument" corresponding well to the adjective Monumental which is better suited to these Goals than does the adjective "Fundamental", because it is a question of building, of building for a future which is not fatal. The first conceptual pillar consists in conceptualizing the Monumental Goals so that the Compliance Law finding a substantial meaning thus gives in a normative way a meaning to all the technical provisions which serve it in an instrumental way. The second conceptual pillar consists of giving everyone their place, that of public authority, that of the company and that of the population, each concerned and each not having to take the place of the other in the determination of the monumental goals, the company being in particular free in the design of the means while the political authority being in charge of drawing the Goals, the company being able to copy them on its own account. This conception does not depend on legal systems but on goals and legitimacy, in particular on the definition chosen for what is a company. The third conceptual pillar derives precisely from the humanist conception that one can claim to have of the Compliance Monumental Goal, risk management being only a means to achieve it. Humanism effectively carried by Compliance, taken on their own account by the companies alone capable of making them concrete, is what makes it possible to distinguish texts that are nevertheless technically similar, depending on whether they apply in  Rule of Law systems or in systems which are note governed by the Rule of Law Principle.

This is why the technical future of Compliance Law lies in this conceptual adventure that it is necessary to lead.

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📝 read the program of this colloquium 

🎥 see Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's conclusion in video (in French, with English subtitles)

✏️ read the notes translated in English on which this conclusion is based 

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📅 This colloquium is part of the Cycle of colloquium 2021 organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its partners around Compliance Monumental Goals.  

📘 This manifestation is in French but the interventions will be part of an English collective book directed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Compliance Monumental Goals, co-edited by the JoRC and Bruylant.

📕 An equivalent book in French, Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, directed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, will be co-published by the JoRC and Dalloz. 

► Full Reference: Maistre, R.-O.,  What monumental goals for the Regulator in a rapidly changing audiovisual and digital landscape?, ​in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.),Compliance Monumental Goals, series "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, to be published.

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► Article Summary (done by the JoRC editor):  In France, since the law of 1982 which put an end to the State monopoly on the audio-visual area, the landscape has profoundly evolved and diversified. In view of the multitude of players who are now established there, the Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisuel - CSA (French High Audiovisual Council) must ensure the economic balance of the sector and the respect for pluralism, in the interest of all audiences. The growing societal responsibilities of audiovisual media and new digital players have multiplied the "monumental goals" on which the CSA (soon to be Arcom) is watching.

Its competences have gradually been extended to the digital space and the successive laws concerning its missions aim at new objectives, in particular in terms of protection of minors, fight against online hate or against disinformation. The emergence of a new European model of Regulation makes it possible to give substance to these additional goals, the Regulator adopting a systemic perspective and calling on soft law tools to fulfill its new missions.

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📝 see the general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published

► Full Reference: Malaurie, M., Les buts monumentaux du droit du marché. Réflexion sur la méthode, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), Les buts monumentaux de la Compliance, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, to be published.

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► English Summary of the Article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance):  The analysis done by this article is about Competition Law, and the methodology needed to be adopted for the technical functioning of this branch of Law. Taking up the various economic and legal theories on this subject, conceptions which have succeeded and clashed, the author develops that the monumental goal of Market Law is to develop an economic environment favorable to businesses and consumers, then asks the question if it could integrate an ethical dimension and more broadly non-economic considerations, in particular humanistic ones.

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📕go to the general presentation of the book, Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, in which this article is published.

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► co-organized between Laboratoire DANTE and the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC), this colloquium) is the core manifestation of the 2021 series of colloquia devoted to the general theme of Compliance Monumental Goals.

It will take place on 16th of September 2021, at the Maison du Barreau, in Paris.

This first work is in French but  will be the basis of the book in English : Compliance Monumental Goals,

   This book will be published in the Compliance & Regulation Series, co-published by the JoRC and Bruylant.

► Presentation of the colloquium Thematic: To understand the notion of "Monumental Goals", it is firstly necessary to take crossed perspectives on them, particularly through the prism of Labor Law, Environmental Law and Enterprise Law. Many questions appear. Does the notion of “Monumental Goals” present any substance in Law? Is it uniformly understood, or do specificities appear, forged by specific cultures and disciplinary practices? What are the sources and implicit references or echoes? Because even if we admit the part of novelty, there is undoubtedly an anchoring in traditional legal concepts, like the general interest or sovereignty. How does the shift from meta-legal (prima facie introduced by the concept) to legal take place, and where do any operational difficulties lie when legal actors are called upon to act? The question of a possible categorization of "Monumental Goals" will thus be explored, through these three legal disciplines whose historicity, goals and implications for firms differ.  

These reflections allow to ask why and how these "Monumental Goals" are developed. Indeed, what is the relevance of the association of "Monumental Goals" and Compliance? Beyond theoretical considerations relating to the meaning of Law, is this really an effective alloy encouraging companies to behave differently? By what ways? These questions arise in particular with regard to the imperatives of legal certainty and the operative nature of the concept. The question of "Monumental Goals" will thus be explored by the operational actors of compliance, both those who act within companies and those who act from the lato sensu State sphere, for understanding whether this notion is a pure rhetoric figure or constitutes a particularly promising lever for the evolution of market behavior.

► with : 

🎤 Christophe André, maître de conférences à l'Université Paris - Saclay (lecturer at the Paris-Saclay University)

🎤 Guillaume Beaussonie, professeur à l'Université Toulouse-1-Capitole (law professor at Toulouse-1-Capitole University)

🎤 Regis Bismuth, professeur de droit à Sciences po, Paris (law professor at Sciences po Paris)

🎤 Marie-Emma Boursier, doyen  de l'Université Paris - Saclay (dean of the Paris-Saclay University)

🎤 Muriel Chagny, professeur l'Université Paris - Saclay, directrice du Laboratoire Dante (Professor at the Paris-Saclay University, director of the Laboratory Dante)

🎤 Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, professeur à Sciences po (Paris) (Professor at Sciences Po Paris)

🎤 Isabelle Gavanon, avocate à la Cour d'Appel de Paris (attorney before the Paris Court of Appeal)

🎤 Emma Guernaoui, ATER à l'Université Paris II Panthéon-Assas (ATER at Paris II Panthéon-Assas University)

🎤 Dominique Heintz, avocat à la Cour d' appel de Paris (attorney before the Paris Court of Appeal)

🎤 Christian Huglo, avocat à la Cour d' appel de Paris (attorney before the Paris Court of Appeal)

🎤Dominique de La Garanderie, avocat à la Cour d'appel de Paris (attorney before the Paris Court of Appeal) 

🎤 Anne-Valérie Le Fur, professeur à l'Université Paris - Saclay (Professor at Paris-Saclay University)

🎤 Anne Le Goff, secrétaire générale déléguée d'Arkéa (Deputy Secretary general at Arkéa)

🎤 Roch-Olivier Maistre, président du Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisuel (President of the French audiovisual regulation authority)

🎤 Marie Malaurie, professeur à l'Université Paris-Saclay (professor at the Paris-Saclay University)

🎤 Jérôme Marilly, avocat général à la Cour d'Appel de Paris (General attorney before the Paris Court of Appeal)

🎤 Benoît Petit, maître de conférences (HDR) à l'Université Paris-Saclay (lecturer at the Paris-Saclay University) 

🎤 Jean-François Vaquieri, Secrétaire Général d'Enedis (Secretary General of Enedis)

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Read a detailed presentation below:

► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.A., Le Droit de la concurrence : des choix politiques pour son état futur - rapport de synthèse - ( ("Competition Law: political choices for its future state - Conclusion") , in Claudel, E. (ed.), Le Droit de la concurrence dans tous ses états ("Competition in all its states"), special issue, Gaz. Pal. , 15 Sept. 2021.

This publication is in French, but the Working Paper which is the basis of this article is bilingual. 

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📅 this article follows the colloquium of the French Association Droit & Commerce in Deauville (France), the 25th  et 26th June 2021.

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✏️ It is based on  the bilingual Working Paper built on the notes taken during the colloquium for establishing the conclusion which has been provided.

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Article English Summary: All of these contributions on the issue of the "Competition in all its states" highlighted the choices available for what could be this branch of Law tomorrow: choice of a political nature between various possible definitions of Competition Law. 

In method, the main thing is that this definition be clear. For this, this definition must be based on a principle and that the goal pursued by competition law is simple, so that in a second step, competition law can be easily articulated on the one hand with other branches of law. (by the care of the judge, in particular), on the other hand with "policies", such as "competition policy", then other policies (by the care of political authorities, especially European).

In essence, two conceptions of principle are opposed: either Competition Law will want to appropriate the goals of other branches, such as those of Regulatory and Compliance Law, or Competition Law will have the modesty to remain anchored in its definition as Market Law.

This is the crossroads where we are.

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►  La lecture de la ➡️📝 Convention judiciaire d'intérêt public signée le 26 août 2021 par le procureur de la République financier près le tribunal judiciaire de Paris et la filiale française de la banque d'affaire américaine JP Morgan, validée par l'➡️📝Ordonnance rendue par le Président du Tribunal judiciaire de Paris du 2 septembre 2021, est instructive à plusieurs titres.

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On peut la lire sur le fond et au regard croisé du droit fiscal et du droit des sociétés, entre l'abus de droit et le montage, puisque les faits reprochés concernant un montage très sophistiqué élaboré par les cadres de l'entreprise Wendel ayant abouti à n'être pas soumis à une taxation immédiate, ce à l'égard de quoi l'administration fiscale a réagi en demandant la condamnation des intérêts pour fraude fiscale. 

Prenons plutôt du côté de la Convention judiciaire d'intérêt public (CJIP). Elle résulte de discussion entre le Parquet national financier et la banque d'affaire qui a conseillé les cadres dirigeants de Wendel dans "la phase finale des discussions avec les concepteurs de l'opération" et qui a prêté les fonds.

Celle-ci souligne qu'elle n'était pas partie prenante dans le montage et qu'on lui avait soutenu que le risque de requalification en abus de droit était relativement faible. Qu'il ne convient pas de prononcer d'amende à son endroit, puisqu'elle n'a quant à elle tiré aucun profit fiscal de tout cela.

Le ministère public estime que, même si la banque n'a pas été impliquée dans la construction de l'opération, il faut retenir la qualification pénale de "complicité de fraude fiscale par fourniture de moyens".

Il passe donc directement au calcul de l'amende d'intérêt public : il le calcule, selon les termes de l'article 41-1-2 du Code de procédure pénale qui se réfère aux "avantages tirés des manquements", et ce dans la limite de 30% du chiffre d'affaires!footnote-2123. 

I. LE MANIEMENT DU PRINCIPE DE PROPORTIONNALITE DANS LE CALCUL DE L'AMENDE D'INTERET PUBLIC

Le principe de proportionnalité a un rôle central dans le Droit de la compliance. Il requiert que les différents instruments, par exemple les punitions, soient non pas tant limités mais au contraire utilisés pour atteindre efficacement leur but, par exemple dissuader les auteurs de recommencer et les opérateurs qui observent la sanction d'en être dissuadés pareillement (sur le principe de proportionnalité comme technique d'efficacité de la Compliance, v. Frison-Roche, M.-A., ➡️📝Proportionnalité et Compliance, 2021) : c'est pourquoi l'amende d'intérêt public doit être proportionnée à l'avantage retiré du manquement.

Puisque la Convention judiciaire d'intérêt public a pour but de clore l'affaire avant sa phase proprement juridique, le procureur n'étant pas un juge, elle n'a pas pour fonction principale de punir mais de réparer le dommage causé à la société et aux victimes et d'améliorer la situation à l'avenir par la technique du programme de compliance, en évitant le coût de la procédure. Ainsi la Convention judiciaire d'intérêt public fut présentée comme une sophistication du pouvoir d'opportunité des poursuite, le procureur maniant toujours son pouvoir de poursuivre, et donc aussi de ne pas poursuite, sans entamer l'apanage du juge du siège : le pouvoir de juger, le pouvoir de punir.

Il s'agit aussi de créer un effet dissuasif, pour que les tiers voient qu'il n'est pas avantageux de violer la loi, le procureur représentant la loi, la société et l'Etat, le Droit de la Compliance reposant sur la rationalité des acteurs, qui calculent l'opportunité de se conformer à la règle ou de la méconnaître, et non pas sur leur amour de la loi (Sur l'analyse économique des deux branches de cette alternative, qui fait par ailleurs les délices des philosophes, v. Benzoni, L. et Deffains, B., ➡️📝  Approche économique des outils de la Compliance : Finalité, effectivité et mesure de la compliance subie et choisie, 2021).

C'est pourquoi l'article 41-2-1 du Code de procédure pénale dispose donc : " Le montant de cette amende est fixé de manière proportionnée aux avantages tirés des manquements constatés".

Dans la Convention du 26 août 2021 liant la banque Morgan Stanley,  le parquet fait bien référence au ratio de 30% chiffre d'affaire d 'affaire de la banque, à savoir environ 30 millions de dollars, mais c'est aux avantages  financiers non pas retirés par elle mais retirés par ses clients, à savoir environ 78 millions de dollars qu'il se réfère pour calculer la proportionnalité de l'amende.

A partir de ce moment-là, le parquet fait jouer deux autres critères non visés par les textes, l'un classique et en faveur de l'entreprise, à savoir sa faible implication dans le montage, et l'autre moins classique et considéré comme une circonstance aggravante pour l'entreprise, critère t souvent visé en analyse économique du droit, à savoir la "complexité du montage" qui est visée en ces termes, dans le point 36 : "la complexité du montage fiscal justifie la prise en compte d'un facteur aggravant sa responsabilité".  En effet la complexité d'une opération la rend plus difficilement détectable pour le gardien de la règle et il faut donc sanctionner plus fort.

De cela, l'on peut souligner deux choses :

1️⃣L'interprétation que le parquet a de l'article 41-1-2 du Code de procédure pénale, la proportionnalité ne devrait donc pas viser que le profit retiré par la personne partie à la convention judiciaire d'intérêt public ; cela se conçoit car, même si l'interprétation littérale demeure la règle en matière pénale, puisqu'il s'agit encore d'une amende, cette référence à l'avantage retiré se superposant aux considérations classiques que sont l'implication (c'est-à-dire la faute...) et la difficulté à détecter ;

2️⃣ L'avantage retiré peut n'être pas celui de la personne partie à la convention judiciaire public mais, comme ici, l'avantage retiré par les intéressés principaux, clients de la banque.

C'est aller au-delà du texte, et dans sa lettre et dans son esprit, qui ne visait sans doute que les avantages retirés par la personne partie à la Convention. Cela aboutit à un amende de 25 millions, proche du maximum de 31 millions encourus.

Cela rejoint certes la définition de ce qu'est la complicité, puisque le complice encourt la même peine que l'auteur principal. C'est particulièrement sévère de faire jouer ce mécanisme qui va chercher dans les profits d'un autre le calcul de la sanction ainsi supportée et le principe de proportionnalité est d'un autre esprit que celui-ci.

Lors de l'audience qui s'est déroulée le 2 septembre 2021 devant le président du Tribunal judiciaire de Paris qui doit valider la Convention, l'établissement bancaire a indiqué n'avoir aucune remarque à formuler tandis que l'Ordonnance de validation indique que le ministère public "a été en mesure d'expliquer le calcul des avantages tirés des agissements constatés".

L'on ne sait pas à cette lecture si ce sont les agissements de la banque contrainte de payer l'amende d'intérêt public, tandis que ce sont les avantages d'un tiers, la formulation très générale masquant la distinction des deux qui pourtant caractérise ici la situation. 

Elle pourrait être d'importance dans de nombreux cas pour tous ceux qui "conseillent", "aident", "accompagnent", etc.

Mais est-ce que cela est conforme à ce qu'est la proportionnalité en matière de sanction ? Même s'il est difficile de cerner cette notion, il y a cette idée que la personne sanctionnée doit pouvoir supporter ce qu'on lui inflige, que cela ne doit pas être au-dessus de ces forces. C'est bien pour cela qu'au dehors de tout texte la jurisprudence a annulé les engagements "disproportionnés", parce qu'ils excèdent ce qu'une personne peut endurer, même si son consentement n'a pas été vicié!footnote-2125. Ici, le texte vise à amplifier l'amende en la proportionnant à l'avantage retiré, mais précisément c'est un avantage qui est retiré par un autre. Dès lors, la personne qui va payer l'amende n'est plus protégée que par le plafond visé des 30% de son chiffre d'affaire...

II. 10 ANS APRES, LA NON-OUVERTURE D'UNE PROCEDURE PAR LE PROCUREUR, A LA SUGGESTION DU JUGE D'INTRUCTION

Cette sévérité s'explique aussi par le temps qui s'est écoulé depuis les faits qui remontent à 2004, la plainte formée au pénal par l'administration fiscale datant de 2012. 

Après un arrêt de cassation, annulation une partie de la procédure, c'est le juge d'instruction qui, après de multiples investigation, a retransmis au procureur le dossier pour qu'une CJIP soit envisagée. 

Cette procédure a souvent été présentée comme ce qui permet d'éviter efficacement le coût et la lenteur des procédures.

L'on dira qu'il s'agit là d'un contre-exemple, puisque c'est l'Ex Post, par la volonté d'un juge d'instruction, qui aboutira, environ 10 ans, à finalement ne pas ouvrir le dossier. 

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► s'inscrire à la Newsletter MaFR ComplianceTech®

► Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A.,La nouvelle loi de protection des données en Chine est un « anti-RGPD », entretien avec Olivia Dufour, Actu-Juridique, 2 septembre 2021. 

► Lire l'entretien complet. 

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Les 3 questions posées étaient :

❓ La Chine a adopté fin août une grande loi de protection des données personnelles. Celle-ci est présenté dans les médias comme un équivalent de notre RGPD. Est-ce le cas ?

La réponse est : non.

(lire la réponse développée dans l'entretien)

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❓ S'agit-il de simples effets indésirables ou bien du but poursuivi par le Législateur ?

La réponse est : Le but du Législateur n'est pas d'armer l'individu contre le pouvoir de l'Etat, c'est au contraire d'accroître le pouvoir de l'Etat, éventuellement contre lui.

(lire la réponse développée dans l'entretien)

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❓ Si la compliance peut servir les intérêts d'Etats non-démocratiques, c'est donc qu'elle est potentiellement dangereuse ?

La réponse est : elle n'est dangereuse que définie comme "méthode d'efficacité des règles ; il faut définir le Droit de la Compliance par son "but monumental" qui est la protection des personnes. La contradiction de la loi chinoise nouvelle apparaît alors.

(lire la réponse développée dans l'entretien)

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►Par un article publié le 13 juillet 2021, "Targeted ads isolate and divide us even when they’re not political – new research"  des chercheurs ayant mené une étude à propos d'intelligence artificielle et d'éthique , rendent compte des résultats obtenus. Il ressort de cette étude empirique montre que les technologies, mises au point à des fins politiques pour capter les votes afin de faire élire Trump ou pour obtenir un vote positif pour le Brexit, utilisées à des fins commerciales, auraient deux effets sur nous : en premier lieu elles nous isolent ; en second lieu elles nous opposent.

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Le seul lien social qui a donc vocation à avoir serait donc l'agression.  

Certes l'usage ainsi fait de nos informations personnelles, auquel nous "consentons" tous, que cela soit pour obtenir notre adhésion à des discours ou à des produits, casse ce qu'Aristote appelait "l'amitiés" comme socle de la Cité Politique.
L'on mesure que la notion de "consentement", qui est une notion juridique, relativement périphérique dans le Droit des Obligations, que beaucoup voudraient mettre comme l'alpha et l'omega, ne nous protège en rien de cette destruction de nous-même et des autres, de cette perspective de la Cité.
Il est important de penser la régulation de la technologie, sur laquelle est construit l'espace digital sur une autre notion que le "consentement".
C'est pourquoi le Droit de la Compliance, qui n'est pas construit sur le "consentement", est la branche du Droit de l'avenir.
#droit #numérique #amitié #consentement #haine #politique

► An article from March 3, 2021, Smile for the camera: the dark side of China's emotion-recognition tech, then an article from June 16, 2021, "Every smile you fake" - an AI emotion - recognition system can assess how "happy" China's workers are in the office describes how a new technology of emotional recognition is able, through what will soon be out of fashion to call "facial recognition", to distinguish a smile that reflects a mind state of real satisfaction from a smile which does not correspond to it. This allows the employer to measure the suitability of the human being for his or her work. It is promised that it will be used in an ethical way, to improve well-being at work. But isn't it in itself that this technology is incompatible with any compensation through ethical support?

The technology developed by a Chinese technology company and acquired by other Chinese companies with many employees, allows to have information on the actual state of mind of the person through and beyond his or her facial expressions and bodily behavior.

Previously, the technology of emotional recognition had been developed to ensure security, by fighting against people with hostile plans, public authorities using it for example in the controls at airports to detect the criminal plans which some passengers could have.

It is now affirmed that it is not about fighting against some evil people ("dangerousness") to protect the group before the act is committed ("social defense”) but that it is about helping all workers.

Indeed, the use that will be made of it will be ethical, because first the people who work for these Chinese companies with global activity, like Huawaï, do it freely and have accepted the operation of these artificial intelligence tools (which is not the case with people who travel, control being then a kind of necessary evil that they do not have to accept, which is imposed on them for the protection of the group), but even and above all, the purpose is itself ethical: if it turns out that the person does not feel well at work, that they are not happy there, even before they are perhaps aware, the company can assist.

Let’s take this practical case from the perspective of Law and let’s imagine that it is contested before a judge applying the principles of Western Law.

Would this be acceptable?

No, and for three reasons.

1. An "ethical use" cannot justify an unethical process in itself

2. The first freedoms are negative

3. "Consent" should not be the only principle governing the technological and digital space

I. AN "ETHICAL USE" CAN NEVER LEGITIMATE AN UNETHICAL PROCESS IN ITSELF

These unethical processes in themselves cannot be made "acceptable" by an "ethical use" which will be made of them.

This principle was especially reminded by Sylviane Agacinski in bioethics: if one cannot dispose of another through a disposition of his or her body which makes his or her very person available (see not. Agacinski, S., ➡️📗Le tiers-corps. Réflexions sur le don d’organes, 2018).

Except to make the person reduced to the thing that his or her body is, which is not ethically admissible in itself, that is excluded, and Law is there in order to this is not possible.

This is even why the legal notion of "person", which is not a notion that goes without saying, which is a notion built by Western thought, acts as a bulwark so that human beings cannot be fully available to others, for example by placing their bodies on the market (see Frison-Roche, M.-A., ➡️📝To protect human beings, the ethical imperative of the legal notion of person, 2018). This is why, for example, as Sylviane Agacinski emphasizes, there is no ethical slavery (a slave who cannot be beaten, who must be well fed, etc.).

That the human being agrees ("and what about if it pleases me to be beaten?") does not change anything.

II. THE FIRST FREEDOM IS THE ONE TO SAY NO, FOR EXAMPLE BY REFUSING TO REVEAL YOUR EMOTIONS: FOR EXAMPLE HIDING IF YOU ARE HAPPY OR NOT TO WORK

The first freedom is not positive (being free to say Yes); it is negative (being free to say No). For example, the freedom of marriage is having the freedom not to marry before having the freedom to marry: if one does not have the freedom not to marry, then the freedom to marry loses any value. Likewise, the freedom to contract implies the freedom not to contract, etc.

Thus, freedom in the company can take the form of freedom of speech, which allows people, according to procedures established by Law, to express their emotions, for example their anger or their disapproval, through the strike.

But this freedom of speech, which is a positive freedom, has no value unless the worker has the fundamental freedom not to express his or her emotions. For example if he or she is not happy with his or her job, because he or she does not appreciate what he or she does, or he or she does not like the place where he or she works, or he or she does not like people with whom he or she works, his or her freedom of speech demands that he or she have the right not to express it.

If the employer has a tool that allows him or her to obtain information about what the worker likes and dislikes, then the employee loses this first freedom.

In the Western legal order, we must be able to consider that it is at the constitutional level that the infringement is carried out through Law of Persons (on the intimacy between the Law of Persons and the Constitutional Law, see Marais , A., ➡️📕Le Droit des personnes, 2021).

III. CONSENT SHOULD NOT BE THE ONLY PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE TECHNOLOGICAL AND DIGITAL SPACE

We could consider that the case of the company is different from the case of the controls operated by the State for the monitoring of airports, because in the first case observed people are consenting.

"Consent" is today the central notion, often presented as the future of what everyone wants: the "regulation" of technology, especially when it takes the form of algorithms ("artificial intelligence"), especially in digital space.

"Consent" would allow "ethical use" and could establish the whole (on these issues, see Frison-Roche, M.-A., ➡️📝Having a good behavior in the digital space, 2019).

"Consent" is a notion from which Law is today moving away in Law of Persons, in particular as regards the "consent" given by adolescents on the availability of their body, but not yet on digital.

No doubt because in Contract Law, "consent" is almost synonymous with "free will", whereas they must be distinguished (see Frison-Roche, M.-A., ➡️📝Remarques sur la distinction entre la volonté et le consentement en Droit des contrats, 1995).

But we see through this case, which precisely takes place in China, that "consent" is in Law as elsewhere a sign of submission. It is only in a probative way that it can constitute proof of a free will; this proof must not turn into an irrebuttable presumption.

The Data Regulatory Authorities (for example in France the CNIL) seek to reconstitute this probative link between "consent" and "freedom to say No" so that technology does not allow by "mechanical consents", cut off from any connection with the principle of freedom which protects human beings, from dispossessing themselves (see Frison-Roche, M.-A., Yes to the principle of will, No to pure consents, 2018).

The more the notion of consent will be peripheral, the more human beings will be able to be active and protected.

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► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Monumental Goals, beating heart of Compliance Law, Working Paper, August 2021

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📝This Working Paper is the basis for the article, "Les buts monumentaux, cœur battant du droit de la compliance", constituting the introduction ⤵

📕in its French version, of the book Les buts monumentaux de la Compliance, in  the Series 📚Régulations & Compliance

 📘in its English version, of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in the Series 📚Compliance & Regulation

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► Summary of the Working Paper:

Compliance Law can be defined as the set of processes requiring companies to show that they comply with all the regulations that apply to them. It is also possible to  define this branch of Law by a normative heart: the "Monumental Goals". These explain the technical new legal solutions, thus made them clearer, accessible and anticipable. This definition is also based on a bet, that of caring for others that human beings can have in common, a universality. 

Through the Monumental Goals, appears a definition of Compliance Law that is new, original, and specific. This new term "Compliance", even in non-English vocabulary, in fact designates a new ambition: that a systemic catastrophe shall not be repeated in the future. This Monumental Goal was designed by History, which gives it a different dimension in the United States and in Europe. But the heart is common in the West, because it is always about detecting and preventing what could produce a future systemic catastrophe, which falls under "negative monumental goals", even to act so that the future is positively different ("positive monumental goals"), the whole being articulated in the notion of "concern for others", the Monumental Goals thus unifying Compliance Law.

In this, they reveal and reinforce the always systemic nature of Compliance Law, as management of systemic risks and extension of Regulation Law, outside of any sector, which makes solutions available for non-sector spaces, in particular digital space. Because wanting to prevent the future (preventing evil from happening; making good happen) is by nature political, Compliance Law by nature concretizes ambitions of a political nature, in particular in its positive monumental goals, notably effective equality between human beings, including geographically distant or future human beings.

The practical consequences of this definition of Compliance Law by Monumental Goals are immense. A contrario, this makes it possible to avoid the excesses of a "conformity law" aimed at the effectiveness of all applicable regulations, a very dangerous perspective. This makes it possible to select effective Compliance Tools with regard to these goals, to grasp the spirit of the material without being locked into its flow of letters. This leads to not dissociating the power required of companies and the permanent supervision that the public authorities must exercise over them.

We can therefore expect a lot from such a definition of Compliance Law by its Monumental Goals. It engenders an alliance between the Political Power, legitimate to enact the Monumental Goals, and the crucial operators, in a position to concretize them and appointed because they are able to do so. It makes it possible to find global legal solutions for global systemic difficulties that are a priori insurmountable, particularly in climate matters and for the effective protection of people in the now digital world in which we live. It expresses values that can unite human beings.

In this, Compliance Law built on Monumental Goals is also a bet. Even if the requirement of "conformity" is articulated with this present conception of what Compliance Law is, this conception based on Monumental Law is based on the human ability to be free, while conformity law supposes more the human ability to obey.

Therefore Compliance Law, defined by the Monumental Goals, is essential for our future, while conformity law is not.

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Read the developments below⤵️

► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A, Reinforce the judge and the lawyer to impose Compliance Law as a characteristic of the Rule of Law, Working Paper, August 2021.

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🎤 this working document has been made to prepare some elements of the opening intervention in the symposium Quels juges pour la Compliance) ? (Which judges for Compliance?), co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance and the Institut Droit Dauphine, held at the Paris Dauphine University on September 23, 2021, constituting the first part of the intervention.

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📝it has been also the basis for an article: 

📕 published in its French version in the book La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in the collection📚Régulations & Compliance

 📘published in its English version in the book Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in the collection 📚Compliance & Regulation

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► Summary of the Working Paper: One can understand that the compliance mechanisms are presented with hostility because they seem designed to keep the judge away, whereas there is no Rule of Law without a judge. Solid arguments present compliance techniques as converging towards the uselessness of the judge (I). Certainly, we come across magistrates, and of all kinds, and powerful ones, but that would be a sign of imperfection: its ex-ante logic has been deployed in all its effectiveness, the judge would no longer be required... And the lawyer would disappear so with him...

This perspective of a world without a judge, without a lawyer and ultimately without Law, where algorithms could organize through multiple processes in Ex Ante the obedience of everyone, the "conformity" of all our behaviors with all the regulatory mass that is applicable to us, supposes that this new branch of Law would be defined as the concentration of processes which gives full effectiveness to all the rules, regardless of their content. But supposing that this engineer's dream is even achievable, it is not possible in a democratic and free world to do without judges and lawyers.

Therefore, it is imperative to recognize their contributions to Compliance Law, related and invaluable contributions (II).

First of all, because a pure Ex Ante never existed and even in the time of the Chinese legists📎!footnote-2689, people were still needed to interpret the regulations because a legal order must always be interpreted Ex Post by who must in any case answer the questions posed by the subjects of law, as soon as the political system admits to attributing to them the right to make claims before the Judge. Secondly the Attorney, whose office, although articulated with the Judge's office, is distinct from the latter, both more restricted and broader since he must appear in all cases where the judicial figure puts himself in square, outside the courts. However, Compliance Law has multiplied this since not only, extending Regulatory Law, it entrusts numerous powers to the administrative authorities, but it also transforms companies into judges, in respect of which the attorneys must deal with.

Even more so, Compliance Law only takes its sense from its Monumental Goals📎!footnote-2690. It is in this that this branch of the Law preserves the freedom of human beings, in the digital space where the techniques of compliance protect them from the power of companies by the way that the Compliance Law forces these companies to use their power to protect people. However, firstly, it is the Judges who, in their diversity📎!footnote-2691, impose as a reference the protection of human beings, either as a limit to the power of compliance tools📎!footnote-2692 or as their very purpose. Secondly, the Attorney, again distinguishing himself from the Judge, if necessary, reminds us that all the parties whose interests are involved must be taken into consideration. In an ever more flexible, soft and dialogical Law, everyone presenting himself as the "advocate" of such and such a monumental goal: the Attorney is legitimate to be the first to occupy this place.

🔓read the Working Paper developments below⤵️

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Programme de mise en conformité (Compliance), Dictionnaire de droit de la concurrence, Concurrences, Art. N° 12345, 2021

Read the definition (in French)

►Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Definition of Principe of Proportionality  and  definition of Compliance Law,  Working Paper, July  2021.

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🎤 this Working Paper is the basis for a conference in the colloquium Compliance and Proportionality. From the control of Proportionality to the proportionality of the control, to be helded in Toulouse, France, on the 14th October 2021.

📝It constitutes the basis for an article: 

📕 this article will be published in its French version in the book  Les buts monumentaux de la Compliance, in the Series    Régulations & Compliance

 📘  in its English version in the book Compliance Monumental Goals, in the Series    Compliance & Regulation

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► Working Paper Summary: Measuring the relationship between the Principle of Proportionality and Compliance Law depends entirely on the Definition chosen for Compliance Law. Let us first take the definition of Compliance Law as a simple "mode of effectiveness" of the rules to which we hold (I). The more we stick to this procedural definition of Compliance Law as a mode of effectiveness of the rules, the less it is easy to detect specificities in the application of the Principle of proportionality in compliance mechanisms. There are certainly many examples of the application of the principle of proportionality, but the addition and variety of examples are not enough to sculpt an original relationship between Proportionality and Compliance.

However, this exercise is not wasted. In fact, in the confusion which still marks the emergence of Compliance Law, the legal nature of the compliance mechanisms remains contested. However, the imposition of Proportionality, not only as it is an obligation but as a limitation of powers in this first definition focusing on Efficiency, recalls that Compliance, conceived as " process ", would then in any case be admissible at the very least as a" Procedure ", anchored in the Rule of Law Principle, therefore self-limititation expression.   But Proportionality is then like a cold shower in compliance, since it is defined by self-limitation in a Law which would be defined by effectiveness as its only definition...  Ineffectiveness In Efficiency...: it is no longer a relation, it is then an opposition which is established between the two terms ...

In this definition of Compliance Law, there is no other choice than to put process in this sort of  squaring circle because in this procedural Compliance Definition, as a method of effectiveness, of effectiveness and efficiency of the rules estimated more important more than others, it must however be admitted that Compliance Law, as any branch of the Law, without denying its very legal nature, must be anchored in the Rule of Law Principle.

By the principle of proportionality, this new branch of Law is forced to anchor classic solutions from Constitutional, Public or Criminal Law,  the Principle of Proportionality prohibiting the Compliance of be just a process. The Repression  Law  has a large part in this conception and the Proportionality Principle reminds it of the part that Criminal Law still takes (with difficulty and for the moment ...) in the admission of ineffectiveness that the Law demands, particularly in the face of Compliance technologies.

In this first definition, the Proportionality Principle thus reminds Compliance, entirely held in the idea of ​​Efficiency that it is a "Law" of Compliance" and anchored in the Rule of Law Principle, it must limit its Effectiveness . It is therefore a kind of "price" that these techniques pay, with regret ..., to the Rule of Law and in particular to the freedoms of human beings. There is a strong temptation not to want to pay this price. For example by affirming that there is a new technological world, which the new system, entirely in algorithms, will promote in a move away from the Law, rejected towards the Old World. Frequently proposed, or set up for instance in China. Others say that we must "do the balance". But when you balance Efficiency performance and Efficiency self-limitation, you know very well who will win ...

But why not look rather on the side of a Definition of Compliance Law where, on the contrary, the two concepts, instead of opposing each other, support each other!

Indeed, Compliance Law is then defined as an extension of Regulatory Law as a set of rules, institutions, principles, methods and decisions taking their meaning and normativity for specific Goals. . In this definition, which is both specific and substantial, these "Monumental Goals" are systemic and require that all means be mobilized for them to be achieved. Future and negative in nature (events that must not happen) but also future and positive in nature (events that must occur), Compliance Law does not apply to all the rules whose  effectiveness required, but this specific type of "Monumental Goals", in an alliance between the political authorities in charge of the future of human groups and the entities in a position to mobilize its means. The method is then different. It is no longer a question of entrenching and the prospect of repression fades into the background.

A reversal occurs. Proportionality ceases to be what limits Efficiency to become what increases Efficiency. As soon as Goals have be precised, Proportionality is not the consequence of the limitation (as in the principle of "necessity" of Criminal Law, insofar as the latter is an exception), it is the consequence of the fact that any legal mechanism is a "Compliance Tool", which only has meaning in relation to a "Monumental Goal". It is therefore essential to set the "Goal Monumental Goals". As this is where the legal normativity of Compliance is housed, the control must first and foremost relate to that. Then all the Compliance Tools must adjust in a "proportionate way", that is to say effective to its goals: as much as it is necessary, not more than it is necessary. According to the principle of economy (which is also called the "principle of elegance" in mathematics).

In consequence, the rule contrary to the Principle of Proportionality is: the rule useless to achieve the goal. The unnecessary rule is the disproportionate rule: this is how the judicial review of excessive sanctions should be understood, not by the notion of "the limit" but not by the notion of "the unnecessary".

Everything then depends on the legal quality of the goal. De jure - and this would deserve to be a requirement at constitutional level, the goal must always be clear, understandable, non-contradictory, attainable.

This increases the office of the Judge. This renews the power of the Legislator in a conception which ceases to be discretionary.

But the Legislator retains the prerogative of determining the Monumental Goals, while the Judge controls the quality of the formulation that he makes of them, in order to be able to measure the proportionality of the means which are put in front by the State and the Companies, while Companies can rally to the Monumental Goals of the Politics by making an alliance with them, but certainly not instituting others in an autonomous way because they are not normative political entities, whereas they are free to determine the means necessary to achieve these goals, the Judge controlling the proportionality mechanism that makes this new system work.

The case law of the German Constitutional Court expresses this conception. It is fully consistent with what Compliance Law is in what is the one Monumental Goal containing all the systemic Monumental Goals: the protection of the human being.

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► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance Law Big Bang, talk show with Jean-Philippe Denis, July 3,  2021. 

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🎥 watch the emission totally in French 

🎥 watch the emission with English subtitles

► Référence complète : Assemblée Nationale, Bâtir et promouvoir une souveraineté numérique nationale et européenne, Rapport d'information, Warsmann, J.-L., (prés.) et Latombe, Ph., (rapp.), 29 juin 2021 (2 t.).

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📓Lire le rapport.

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► Full Reference: Heymann, J., La nature juridique de la "Cour suprême de Facebook", in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, to be published. 

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► The summary below describes an article following the colloquium L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance , co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Faculté de Droit Lyon 3. This manifestation was designed under the scientific direction of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Christophe Roda and took place in Lyon on June 23, 2021.

In the book, the article will be published in Title I, devoted to: The Entreprise instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law.

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► Article Summary (done by the author) : Taking place in the general theme aiming at making “words and things coincide”, the article offers some thoughts on the “conditions of the discourse” – in the sense in which Foucault understood it in his Archéologie des sciences humaines – relating to the phenomenon of “jurisdictionalization” of Compliance.

            The thoughts are more specifically focusing on the nature of the so-called “Supreme Court” that Facebook instituted to hear appeals of decisions relating to content on the digital social networks that are Facebook and Instagram. Is this really a “Supreme Court”, designed in order to “judge” the Facebook Group?

            A careful examination of the Oversight Board – i.e. the so-called “Supreme Court” created by Facebook – reveals that the latter, in addition to its advisory mission (which consists of issuing policy advisory opinions on Facebook’s content policies), exercises some form of adjudicative function. This is essentially conceived in terms of compliance assessment, of the content published on the social networks Facebook or Instagram with the standards issued by these corporations on the one hand, of content enforcement decisions taken by Facebook with the Law on the other hand. The legal framework of reference is yet rather vague, although its substantial content seems to be per se evolutive, based on the geographical realm where the case to be reviewed is located. An adjudicative function can therefore be characterized, even if the Oversight Board can only claim for a limited one.

            The author can ultimately identify the Oversight Board as a preventive dispute settlement body, in the sense that it seems to aim at avoiding any referral to state courts and ruling before any court’s judgement can be delivered. Some questions are thus to be raised, relating with both legitimacy and authority of such a Board. But whatever the answers will be, the fact remains that the creation of the Oversight Board by a private law company already reveals all the liveliness of contemporary legal pluralism.

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📝 Consulter une présentation générale du volume dans lequel l'article est publié.

► Full Reference: Merabet, S., La vigilance, être juge et ne pas juger ("Vigilance, to be a judge and not to judging"), in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, to be published. 

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► Article Summary (done by the Author) : Vigilance presents two diametrically opposed dangers. The company is caught in the crossfire. On the one hand, there is a risk that it exercises its role at a minimum, so that the obligations imposed on it are ineffective, thereby risking its own liability.   On the other hand, the danger is that the company oversteps its role and takes the place of the Judge. Does Vigilance always present the same dangers? Does it systematically involve the same role of the company? To be vigilant, is it to judge? The answer to these questions depends on the content of the obligations involved in Vigilance. However, these now seem very diverse.

How to distinguish between the various duties of Vigilance? A first approach could consist in considering a formal identification which leads to distinguish stricto sensu Vigilance, that which is envisaged by the French so-called "Sapin 2" law and identified as such, and the related obligations, such as for example the duty of moderation of companies on social networks, which without being baptized "duty of vigilance", nevertheless come close. The extension of Compliance obligations blurs the line between what exactly falls under Vigilance and what not. A more substantial approach should be taken to consider the degree of control exercised by the company. Understood in this way, it is possible to distinguish two categories: Negative Vigilance, which implies the identification of a risk, and Positive Vigilance, which even more supposes the neutralization of the risk. The first assumes a limited role for the company, while the second encourages it to act positively, even before an Authority has spoken. In this case, the role of the company is closer to that of the judge. That shows that all the obligations of vigilance cannot therefore be understood in a unitary manner.

As soon as the company is led - if not to take the place of the Judge - to act before the Judge even has the opportunity to pronounce himself/herself, then it seems legitimate to supervise the implementation of the company's duty of Vigilance, through a form of proceduralisation of Compliance. The company, as its employees or partners, would benefit from more Vigilance supervision. Insofar as all Vigilance obligations do not call the same role of the company, it is necessary to consider guiding principles of Vigilance, more or less intense depending on whether it is Negative or Positive Vigilance. 

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📝 go to the general presentation of the book in which this article is published.

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► Full Reference: Bruno, A., La façon dont les entreprises du secteur bancaire s'organisent et se comportent pour assumer leur rôle de "procureurs et juges d'elles-mêmes, ("The way in which compagnies in the banking sector organize themselves and behave in order to fulfill their role as "prosecutor and judges of themselves"), in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, to be published. 

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► Article English Summary (fait par l'auteur) : First of all, it should be remembered that the compliance function was born within finance, and that by being structured, it has evolved to support the transition from regulatory law to compliance law. Through these changes, compliance has gone from an ex-post controlling function to an ex-ante binding function. The LIBOR crisis imperfectly illustrates the primacy of this transition. The evolution of this role is illustrated by concrete examples

Firstly, the management of reputational risk is a fundamental part of the company as prosecutor and judge of itself. Reputational risk is a significant element for a financial institution, because it can have negative consequences on its capitalization, or even culminate in a systemic crisis. Avoiding a large-scale financial crisis is also part of the monumental goals of compliance.

In order to avoid complex and inopportune scenarios, compliance law intervenes as early as possible and identifies issues that may impact reputation. The regulations require the implementation of certain ex ante mechanisms. The French law known as "Sapin 2" requires the implementation of tools that concern all companies (and not just banks). Indeed, beyond the risk of reputation, it is essential to consider the risk of corruption. Consideration of reputational risk may justify refusing to execute certain transactions. From this perspective, compliance must assess the potential consequences of entering into a relationship with a new client upstream, sometimes to decline the provision of services. The compliance function therefore unilaterally judges the relationship with a view to managing the company reputational risk.

Secondly, the internal sanction mechanism established by compliance law is also discussed in this article, in particular the internal sanctions adopted by compliance in a financial institution.

Compliance can act as a prosecutor via management committees set up within the business lines. In addition, compliance can determine and apply sanctions against employees. In this way, there is a dual role of prosecutor and judge for the compliance function within the framework of an extraordinary mechanism of ordinary law.

Finally, the analysis deals with the case of the "judge-judged": following a decision by the bank, the regulator may take an even stricter position by believing that the bank is applying its guidelines incorrectly. Thus, the compliance law, which takes hold within the banking enterprise, finds itself under the judgment of its own regulator. The company finds itself judged and comes to be a prosecutor and judge of itself, but also of its clients.

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📝 read the general presentation of the book, La Juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, à paraître. 

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► Résumé de l'article (fait par l'auteur) : Tout d’abord il faut rappeler que la fonction compliance est née au sein de la finance, et qu’en se structurant, elle a évolué pour accompagner le passage du droit de la régulation au droit de la compliance. Par le biais de ces mutations, la compliance est passée d’une fonction contrôlante ex-post à une fonction contraignante ex-ante. La crise du LIBOR illustre imparfaitement la primauté de cette transition. L’évolution de ce rôle est illustrée par des exemples concrets.

Dans un premier temps, est étudiée la gestion du risque de réputation élément fondamental de l’entreprise procureur et juge d’elle-même. Le risque de réputation est un élément non négligeable pour un établissement financier, car celui-ci peut engendrer des conséquences négatives sur sa capitalisation, voire culminer en crise systémique. L’évitement de la crise financière de grande ampleur s’inscrit également dans les buts monumentaux de la compliance.

Afin d’éviter des scénarios complexes et inopportuns, le droit de la compliance intervient le plus en amont possible et identifie les sujets susceptibles d’impacter la réputation. La réglementation impose la mise en place de certains dispositifs ex ante. La loi Sapin 2 exige la mise en place d’outils qui concernent l’ensemble des entreprises (et non pas seulement les banques). En effet, au-delà du risque de réputation, il est essentiel de considérer le risque de corruption. La considération du risque de réputation peut justifier le refus d’exécuter certaines opérations. Dans cette optique la compliance doit évaluer les potentielles conséquences de l’entrée en relation avec un nouveau client en amont, pour parfois décliner la prestation de services. Ainsi la fonction compliance juge de façon unilatérale la relation en vue de gérer son risque de réputation.

En second lieu, le mécanisme de sanction interne institué par le droit de la compliance est également abordé, notamment les sanctions internes adoptées par la compliance dans un établissement financier.

La compliance peut agir en tant que procureur via des comités conduite mis en place au sein des métiers. En outre, la compliance peut déterminer et appliquer des sanctions à l’encontre des collaborateurs. De la sorte, on constate un double rôle de procureur et juge pour la fonction compliance dans le cadre d’un dispositif extraordinaire du droit commun.

Enfin, l’analyse traite du cas du jugeant-jugé : à la suite d’une décision de la banque, le régulateur peut prendre une position d’autant plus stricte en estimant que la banque applique mal ses lignes directrices. Ainsi, le droit de la compliance qui s’installe au sein de l’entreprise bancaire, se retrouve lui-même sous le jugement de son propre régulateur. L’entreprise se retrouve jugée et est amenée à être procureur et juge d’elle-même, de ses clients.

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📕 Consulter une présentation générale du volume dans lequel l'article est publié.

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► Full Reference: Jourdan-Marques, J., O., L’arbitre, juge ex ante de la compliance ? ("The arbitrator, ex ante judge of compliance?"), in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, series "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, to be published. 

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► The summary below describes an article which follows an intervention in the scientific manifestation L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance ("The company instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law"), co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the  Faculty of Law Lyon 3. This colloquium was designed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Christophe Roda, scientific co-directors, and took place in Lyon on June 23, 2021.

Due to the very close proximity of the content of this article to a scientific manifestation that was held previously, in the same series of colloquia, manifestation on Compliance and Arbitration, designed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Baptiste Racine, and which took place in Paris on March 31, 2021 in Paris, it was decided with the author and the scientific managers of the scientific events concerned to publish the article not in Title I of the book, devoted to the topic of the Company instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law, but in Title III, devoted to the topic of Compliance and International Arbitration.

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► Article Summary (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance) :  The article begins with a long introduction relating to the general relationship between Compliance and Arbitration.

Then the author in a first part examines the place of the Arbitration upstream of the occurrence of the dispute, aiming at the relations of the company in its organization with other companies for its economic activities, for example commercial agents. The author examines the way in which Arbitration can resolve difficulties which arise between them, including when these issues are otherwise apprehended by Compliance Law and the institutions in charge of it, in particular because of the facts of corruption are alleged and the fact is alleged by the debtor himself when payment has not yet been requested by the creditor. The legal question then becomes whether or not there is a "dispute".

Being even further upstream, the author takes the hypothesis of the adoption of a compliance program in which recourse to arbitration would be inserted by the Company, insertion which could then be at the origin of exemption from criminal liability, an arbitration award being able to produce such an effect if it is recognized in the legal order. 

The second part of the article considers Arbitration in the absence of multiple parties, which could correspond to the acts issued by the Oversight Board of Facebook, this kind of tribunal and judge not being seized by parties to a litigation. It might be adequate to qualify this mechanism as an arbitration, even if this qualification is difficult to retain. In any case, if we did so by admission that a unilateral request gives rise to a jurisdictional mission, there should be guarantees surrounding such institutionalization. They can go through specific bodies for Compliance cases, outside or within existing arbitration institutions, which must then become the driving force in the matter. In addition, the choice of arbitrators should undoubtedly go through the institution itself so that impartiality remains unchallenged and profiles of arbitrators would be truly varied. The procedure would also have vocation to be inflected because of the absence of real litigation, justifying the adjustment of the adversarial principle (in the narrow sense of this one, linked to the debate) in particular by the intervention of amicus curiae and to avoid the fraud through arbitration and in procedure. In the absence of an adversary, the procedural office of the arbitrator could be reconsidered: without modifying the terms of the case, it would be appropriate for the arbitrator to have more power to decide on the adequate measures to be taken to remedy the non- conformity with compliance requirements. Finally, publicity seems to the author essential so that the arbitration is not instrumentalised by the parties, publicity which could also concern the debates and the documents produced. These admittedly very high requirements would in return give great credibility to the resulting award, justifying its scope, and one could consider labeling such a result, a label that the company could claim. 

The author concludes that these transformations would move away so much from Arbitration that it would denature it, in particular because of the absence of litigation, but this allows Companies to outsource the management of the more and more heavier responsibility engendered by Compliance Law, by offering Compagnies the assistance of a judicial authority, as soon as the procedural guarantees are reinforced.

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📝read the general presentation of the book, 📕La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published.

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► Full Reference: Bavitot, A., C., Le façonnage de l'entreprise par les accords de justice pénale négociée (("Shaping the company through negotiated Criminal Justice Agreements"), in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, à paraître. 

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► Article Summary (done by the author): Negotiated justice is "the situation in which the criminal conflict is the object of a trade in the etymological sense of the term negotio, i.e. a debate between the parties to reach an agreement".

Thus, the French legislator has succumbed to globalized mimicry by creating the Convention judiciaire d'intérêt public (Public Interest Judicial Agreement), first in matters of probity and then in environmental matters. What is the nature of this deal of justice? Validated by a judge's order, it does not entail any declaration of guilt, has neither the nature nor the effects of a judgment of conviction and is not registered in the judicial record. Possible at the investigation stage as well as at the pre-trial stage, the Public Interest Judicial Agreement is original in that it makes it possible to avoid either the prosecutor's proceedings or the judge's wrath.

A detailed study of the agreements signed shows that in order to negotiate in the best possible way, the company can and must shape itself. The company will shape the facts of its agreement, shape its charge and, finally, shape its sentence. The article offers a concrete analysis of these three dimensions of corporate shaping to better approach understanding the legal nature of negotiated criminal justice agreements.

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📝 Consulter une présentation générale du volume dans lequel l'article est publié.

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► Full Reference: Siproudhis, J.-B.,, C., The transfer of responsibility from the regulator and the judge to the company: demonstration by the whistleblowing mechanism, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, series "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, to be published. 

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► Article summary (done by the author) : From the practitioner perspective, compliance is geared towards a gradual transfer of responsibilities from both regulators and judges. 

 In France, the whistleblowing mechanism imposed by the so-called "Sapin 2" and "Duty of Vigilance" laws illustrates this evolution. Indeed,  internal alerts management follows key judiciary process milestones : admissibility, investigations, dismissal or sanction.

This turns corporations duties into prosecutors or judges’, provided that they respect a specific framework contributing to respect the rules of a fair trial.

This requirement raises several legal and sociological challenges to which the author devotes his developments.

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📝 to the general presentation of the book in which this article is published

► Full Reference: Siproudhis, J.-B.,, C.,  Le transfert de responsabilité du régulateur et du juge vers l’entreprise : la démonstration par le système d’alerte ("The transfer of responsibility from the regulator and the judge to the company: demonstration by the whistleblowing mechanism"), in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, à paraître. 

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► Article Summary (done by the Author) : From the practitioner perspective, compliance is geared towards a gradual transfer of responsibilities from both regulators and judges. 

 In France, the whistleblowing mechanism imposed by the so-called "Sapin 2" and "Duty of Vigilance" laws illustrates this evolution. Indeed,  internal alerts management follows key judiciary process milestones : admissibility, investigations, dismissal or sanction.

This turns corporations duties into prosecutors or judges’, provided that they respect a specific framework contributing to respect the rules of a fair trial.

This requirement raises several legal and sociological challenges to which the author devotes his developments.

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📝 go to the general presentation of the book in which this article is published.

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This requirement raises several legal and sociological challenges to which the author devotes his developments.

► Full Reference: Lapp, Ch.,  La façon dont l'entreprise fonctionne pour concrétiser le Droit de la Compliance : Les statuts du process ("How a Company works to make Compliance Law a reality: the statues of processes"), in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, à paraître. 

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► The summary below describes an article following the colloquium L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance (The Entreprise instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law) , co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Faculté de Droit Lyon 3. This manifestation was designed under the scientific direction of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Christophe Roda and took place in Lyon on June 23, 2021. During this colloquium, the intervention was shared with Jan-Marc Coulon, who is also a contributor in the book (see the summary of the Jean-Marc Coulon's  Article).

In the book, the article will be published in Title I, devoted to:  L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance (The Entreprise instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law ).

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► Article Summary (done by the Author) : The Company is caught in the grip of Compliance Law, the jaws of which are those of Incitement (1) and Sanction that the Company must apply to ensure the effectiveness of its processes to which it is itself subject (2 ).

First, the Company has been delegated to fabricate reprehensible rules that it must apply to itself and to third parties with whom it has dealings. To this end, the Company sets up "processes", that is to say verification and prevention procedures, in order to show that the offenses that it is likely to commit will not happened.

These processes constitute standards of behavior to prevent and avoid that the facts constituting the infringements are not themselves carried out. They are thus one of the elements of Civil Liability Law in its preventive or restorative purposes.

Second, the sanction of non obedience of Compliance processes puts the Company in front of two pitfalls. The first  dimension place the company, with regard to its employees and its partners, in the obligation to define processes which also constitute the quasi-jurisdictional resolution of their non-compliance, the company having to reconcile the sanction it pronounces with the fundamental principles of classical Criminal Law, constitutional principles and all fundamental rights. The processes then become the procedural rule.

The second dimension is that the Company is accountable for the effectiveness of the avoidance by its processes of facts constituting infringements. By a reversal of the burden of proof, the Company is then required to prove that its processes are efficient. at least equivalent to the measures defined by laws and regulations, the French Anti-Corruption Agency (Agence Française Anticorruption - AFA), European directives and various communications on legal tools to fight breaches of probity, environmental attacks and current societal concerns. The processes then become the constitutive element, per se, of the infringement.

Thus, in its search for a balance between Prevention and Sanction to which it is itself subject, the Company will not then be tempted to favor the orthodoxy of its processes over the expectations of the Agence Française Anticorruption - AFA , regulators and judges, to the detriment of their efficiency?

In doing so, are we not moving towards an instrumental and conformist Compliance, paradoxically disempowering with regard to the Compliance Monumental Goals of Compliance?

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📝 go to the general presentation of the book in which this article is published.