Sanction

▶ click on the image to watch the episode on YouTube - ► Full reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, “Leaving Conformity Behind”, in series of drawn videos Compliance in Motion, episode 1, 25 September 2026 - ► Summary of this episode of Compliance in Motion: Less than a minute, not a word spoken. A man is buried under files: he complies, with every regulation, every one of them. Then the machine takes his place and does better than he can — it files, it drafts, it will write the contracts, the judgments, the law. Above him stands the Compliance Ogre, who knows only one sentence: “Obey, or I will punish you!” If conformity were the goal of Compliance Law, the matter would be settled: the algorithm would achieve it better than we can. But that is not the goal. Compliance Law was invented to preserve the systems in which human beings live. Its Monumental Goals are its legal foundation; it is through them that it is distinguished from conformity, which is only its instrument. Leaving conformity behind is therefore not leaving Law behind: it is entering it. One episode every two weeks, in French and in English. The series also has its Instagram account: mafr.compliancetech. - 🌐 watch this episode of the series on YouTube: Compliance in Motion 🌐 watch this episode of the series on LinkedIn: Compliance in Motion 🎬 watch this episode of the series below Compliance in Motion ⬇️ - Compliance in Motion, by mafr the series of drawn videos devoted to Compliance Law ComplianceTech® - 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 🌐subscribe to the Video Newsletter MAFR Surplomb 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MaFR Droit & Art

► Full Reference: Y. Feldman,Can the Public Be Trusted?: On the Promise and Perils of Voluntary Compliance, Cambridge University Press, 2025.  - ► Presentation of the book (done by the Author) : "When do citizens voluntarily comply with regulations rather than act out of fear of sanctions? Can the Public Be Trusted? challenges prevailing regulatory paradigms by examining when democratic states can rely on voluntary compliance. Drawing on behavioral science, law, and public policy research, Yuval Feldman explores why voluntary compliance, despite often yielding superior and more sustainable outcomes, remains underutilized by policymakers. Through empirical analysis of policy implementation in COVID-19 response, tax compliance, and environmental regulation, Feldman examines trust-based governance’s potential and limitations. The book presents a comprehensive framework for understanding how cultural diversity, technological change, and institutional  shape voluntary cooperation.". -   📗Read the book

► Full reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Adéquation et inadéquation de la sanction comme outil de régulation financière et sa transformation par la Compliance" (Adequacy and inadequacy of sanctions as a tool of Financial Regulation and its transformation through Compliance)", contribution to the round-table discussion on"Quel rôle pour la sanction dans la Régulation ? (What role for sanctions in Regulatory System)", Annual conference of the Commission des sanctions (Enforcement Committee) of the Autorité des marchés financiers – AMF (French Financial Markets Authority), Paris,  14 October 2025. - ► see the general programme of this manifestation (in French) The event comprises two round tables. The theme of the first round table is: La preuve des abus de marché entre l’AMF et le juge pénal : vers une convergence ? (Proof of market abuse between the AMF and the criminal courts: towards convergence?) 🪑🪑🪑AutresOther participants in this 2nd round table, moderated by Sophie Schiller, member of the Enforcement Committe on the topic: Quel rôle pour la sanction dans la Régulation ? (What role for sanctions in Regulatory System?) 🕴🏻Sébastien Raspiller, Secretary General of the AMF 🕴🏻Martine Samuelian, Partner, Jeantet Law Firm 🕴🏻Vincent Villette, Secretary General of the CNIL (French Personal Data Regulatory Body) - ► Summary of this intervention : In the round-table discussion on the role of sanctions, a number of contributions will be made, depending on the nature of the discussion itself. They will be brief in nature and will be aimed at an audience with a good knowledge of financial regulation. It is the occasion for me to insist on 2 things, the first naturely and probably for ever attached to the role of sanctions in all Regulatory Systems, the secund very new. The first is the indissociability between Criminal Law and Sanction, even if sanctions is defined as a regulatory tools. The secund is the conception and the use of sanctions through Compliance Law. Therefore, in the first idea, my first intervention, aimed more at establishing the subject and describing the Intangible, is on the very idea that sanctions have a role to play in financial regulation. By its very nature. But this does not make it any less difficult. It is not obvious, because if penalties are seen as a 'regulatory tool', then it is the regulatory perspective that predominates and 'colours' the tool that is the penalty. Regulation, of which the texts on the basis which sanctions are issued are only one tool and which is not the set of applicable rules, Regulation which is an apparatus of institutions, rules and decisions aimed at establishing the equilibrium of a sector and maintaining this equilibrium, which is by nature unstable, over time, which the sector could not do by its own efforts alone (Regulatory Law, which is Ex Ante Law, thus distinguishing itself from Competition Law, which is Ex Post Law). From the perspective of Financial Regulatory System, as in other sectoral regulatory systems, and in the general Regulatory Law, sanctions are a tool (and a tool like any other, simply more powerful than the others. This is the pragmatic perspective adopted by the State and the Regulatory body itself, which will use it in conjunction with other tools, such as an Information, Education and Incentive mechanism. Moreover, it shall use sanction as informative tool, as educational tool, as incentive tool. However, the principle of the autonomy of Criminal Law, and the European concept of "Criminal Matters" mean that the sanction can be seen in terms of the autonomous criteria of the seriousness of the act imputed and the sanction imposed on the legal person. In this respect, the penalty is inseparable from the way in which it is imposed (Criminal Law is constitutionally inseparable from Criminal Procedure). In this respect, the sanction is not a tool coloured by the overall objective served by the Financial Markets Regulatory Body: the sustainability of the financial system. The Enforcement Committee is not the AMF's "armed wing"; it is a "court", as the Oury ruling reminded us. Therefore, the question is and I would like to ask it directly to the Enforcement Committed: Can you be both?   As they say, could you be both carp and rabbit? Depending on whether you are viewed from one angle or another, you will be seen as the body that makes financial markets effective (a tool among the tools) or as the body that punishes misconduct (a court among the courts). It is possible, and in practice it is often true. But if we are honest, we will admit that regulation feeds on information and that the procedure before a criminal court is built on secrecy and the weapons of those who, innocent or guilty, are at risk because they are, or will be, prosecuted. We've never got out of this difficulty. We always try to strike a balance between the fact that it is in itself a repressive sanction for a person who will suffer and the fact that it is also a systemic tool: there is a 'balance' between the search for systemic benefit (which reduces the protection of individuals for the benefit of the system) and the concern for the people involved (which reduces the present and future protection of the system). The balance goes more or less in one direction. It is often public opinion, the place, the legislator and, even above all,  the civil appeal judge (vertical dialogue) and those in dialogue, between the regulator and the criminal judge (horizontal dialogue) which cause the scales of diverse technical solutions. It is also the way in which the Enforcement Committee, in defining itself as the armed wing of the AMF (carp) or as a repressive court (rabbit), chooses in its procedural behaviour the role of sanctions in Financial Regulatory System, more or less instrumentalised (carp) or jurisdictionalised (rabbit). - The second point, if there is to be one, concerns the development of the role of sanctions in Financial Regulatory System . On the basis of these fundamentals, an evolution in the role of sanctions in financial regulatory system (an evolution that can be observed in all sectoral regulatory systems) consists of internalising sanctions (in their conception by the texts, their elaboration by the Sanctions Committees, their application) in the economic operators sanctioned, in the economic sectors concerned, in the opinion concerned (the figure of Peelmanian circles of the audiences applying). This internalisation transforms Regulatory mission of the administrative body (which deals with market structures) into Rupervision (which deals directly with market operators) since the sanction penetrates the operator, the operator adopting commitments. This concept corresponds to the new branch of Law known as Compliance Law.  Compliance Law uses sanctions as an "incentive like any other", and (we must be careful on this point), because it is systemic in nature, the concern for the system being internalised in the operator, it is relatively insensitive to procedural rights. With the emphasis on information, it is the principle of adversarial debate (which provides information) rather than the rights of the defence that is valued. The cooperation of the person being prosecuted is highly valued, and non-cooperation becomes incomprehensible. The internalisation of sanctions by operators has led to two major changes. Firstly, these economic operators themselves must sanction, detect and prevent market abuse. The number of special obligations of vigilance is increasing. The obligation of vigilance of operators themselves is becoming a pillar of Regulation, transformed in Supervision.  The other development is the liberalisation of regulatory system in relation to territory, thank to Compliance Law. As operators are less dependent on borders than are regulators and authors of legal texts (but soft law is spreading, including repression), market abuses can be apprehended in several jurisdictions at the same time, notably through global compliance programmes. - 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 🌐subscribe to the VideoNews  MAFR Surplomb 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MaFR Law & Art

► Full Reference: G. Wright & L. Chetcuti, US Extraterritoriality: The Trump Card, Institut Montaigne, Explainer, December 2024, 62 p. - 📓read the Explainer - 📓read the English Summary of the Explainer - 📓read the presentation of this Explainer made on the Institut Montaigne's website - ► English Summary of the Explainer (done by the Authors): "Extraterritoriality — the application of national laws abroad — has grown exponentially over the last two decades. In a world characterized by strategic competition and weak international organizations, many countries are turning to law to secure their interests. None more than the United States. There are good and bad uses of US extraterritoriality. It has become a key tool to uphold international law and to safeguard the US’ interests. It has helped to sanction hostile states and combat corruption, money laundering, organized crime and terrorism. It has helped to reduce excessive risk-taking by companies and has been used to manage US-China systemic rivalry. However, the US has also been accused of using it as a way to assert market dominance. Could extraterritoriality be the next Trump Card the United States plays? During his first term, President Trump tightened export controls and expanded US laws to combat human rights abuses. At the same time, he rolled back banking regulations and asked his team to review US laws that created unnecessary red tape. Recently, he warned that he would remove any sanctions that weakened the dollar’s dominant position. The extent to which extraterritoriality is used to exert political pressure on EU countries is unclear. The EU must be better prepared. Companies that fail to comply with US rules risk huge fines, handover of sensitive data and exclusion from the US market. European companies often prefer to comply with US rules, rather than abide by European measures designed to block their application. This poses a direct challenge to the sovereignty of the EU and its member states. Institut Montaigne’s latest issue paper provides a framework for understanding all dimensions of US extraterritoriality and offers decision-makers and businesses a roadmap for an informed response. Understanding the implications of US extraterritoriality is crucial for governments and businesses, and should be integral to the EU's approach to economic security.". -

► Full Reference: M. Duchâtel & G. Wright, China’s Extraterritoriality: A New Stage of Lawfare, Institut Montaigne, Explainer, December 2024, 72 p. - 📓read the Explainer - 📓read the English Summary of the Explainer - 📓read the presentation of this Explainer made on the Institut Montaigne's website - ► English Summary of the Explainer (done by the Authors): "Extraterritoriality – the application of national laws abroad – is gaining traction. In a world characterized by strategic competition and weakened international organizations, many countries are turning to law to secure their interests. This includes China. Extraterritoriality has expanded under Xi Jinping. China no longer sees it as a relic of "the century of humiliation" during which foreign powers imposed consular jurisdiction on Chinese soil. Today, Chinese extraterritoriality has three aims: to defend against foreign interference and sanctions; to legitimize China’s foreign policy actions and strengthen its global influence; and as a way to deploy its public security agenda abroad. China is also exploring a more offensive approach to extraterritoriality in the form of economic sanctions  – though it has yet to use them. A more offensive use will depend on the willingness of the top leadership to employ such tactics during moments of international tension; a stronger international role for the renminbi and lower overall exposure to the dollar; and the countermeasures that third-countries could take to respond to Chinese extraterritorial norms. The EU must act. Europeans need to understand the risks associated with Chinese extraterritoriality and plan accordingly. The EU should continue working with like-minded partners and be ready to deny access to the EU single market in case of abuse. Losing access to the single market would be deeply damaging to China’s interests and constitute a powerful deterrent for the EU. Institut Montaigne’s latest issue paper provides a framework for understanding all dimensions of Chinese extraterritoriality and offers decision-makers and businesses a roadmap for an informed response. Understanding the implications of Chinese extraterritoriality is crucial for governments and businesses, and should be integral to the EU's approach to economic security.". -

► Full reference:  M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Compliance et management : la médiation plutôt que la sanction ?" ("Compliance and management: mediation rather than punishment?"), interview conducted by Jean-Philippe Denis as part of a series of interviews on Compliance Law, in Fenêtres ouvertes sur la gestion (Open windows on management), broadcast by J.-Ph. Denis, Xerfi Canal, recorded December 12, 2023, released on May 22, 2024 - 🌐consult the December 2023 presentation of the interview on LinkedIn - 🌐read the MAFR. Law, Compliance, Regulation of April 2024 based on this interview  - 🧱consult the general presentation of this series of interviews on Compliance Law - 🎥view the full interview on Xerfi Canal - ► Starting point: Since 2016, Marie-Anne Frison-Roche has been building Compliance Law, notably through a collection co-published in French with Editions Dalloz and co-published in English with Editions Bruylant:  🧱lire la présentation de la collection en langue française, Régulations & Compliance ➡️click HERE  🧱read the presentation of the series in English, Compliance & Regulation ➡️click HERE - ► Summary of interview: Jean-Philippe Denis. Question: To put it bluntly, isn't Compliance Law expressed by the BNP Paribas fine? Marie-Anne Frison-Roche.  Answer: It is still through this fine that Compliance is often perceived. How regrettable… - Jean-Philippe Denis. Q.: At least, that's how the Politician realised there was a subject…. Marie-Anne Frison-Roche.  A. : This is true, and not just for politicians and firms since this case has had an impact on European public opinion. This matter has therefore become known for the violence of the sanctions, and the intervention of heads of State to reduce their consequences. But we're talking about sanctions. Meanwhile, others talk about compliance through soft law, soft co-regulation, charters and soft commitments, the contours of which are sometimes uncertain. Today, adjustments are made regarding the Monumental Goals of preserving the systems on which this Compliance Law is based, and tools are used on this basis, tools with which lawyers are very familiar: contracts. Through contracts, enterprises structure their compliance obligations. - Jean-Philippe Denis. Q.: You point out that Compliance Law is becoming more civilised and that more people are resorting to mediation. Marie-Anne Frison-Roche.  A.: Yes, Compliance Law is becoming more civilised, and civil law is becoming increasingly important, particularly through Contract Law, with stipulations being inserted to prevent human rights or environmental infringements. As Compliance Law operates on an ex-ante basis, the enterprise will organise dialogue with stakeholders, in particular when vigilance plans are drawn up, Vigilance mechanism being the spear head of Compliance Law. If the situation becomes litigious and the matter is referred to the courts, the civil courts, whose role is growing, will themselves organise mediation. Mediation, which is now part is an instrument for bringing the parties together and finding solutions. -

► Full Reference: A. Linden, "Motivation et publicité des décisions de la formation restreinte de la Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL) dans une perspective de compliance" ("Motivation and publicity of the decisions of the restricted committee of the French Personal Data Protection Commission (Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés–CNIL) in a compliance perspective"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 235-239.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation and Compliance): In the event of a breach of the personal data protection rules, the restricted formation of the French personal data protection Commission (CNIL) pronounces fines, injunctions of "compliance" or calls to order. It can order the publication of these measures, which can be contested before the French High Administrative supreme court (Conseil d'État). It is essential that these decisions be justified, not only in order to respect this principle of law but also concretely to obtain the public concerned, being very heterogeneous, understand them, the educational role of the CNIL also being applicable. The principle of publicity is handled with nuance, the data controllers often requesting a closed door and, in fact, very few public attending the hearing. The publicity of decisions is in itself a sanction. The publication may moreover not be total or may only have a time, anonymization often allowing the balance between necessary pedagogy and preservation of interests, the CNIL taking great attention to the very modalities of publication, even if it cannot control the circulation and the media use which is then made of it. -

► Full Reference: A. Bruneau, "L'entreprise juge d'elle-même : la fonction compliance dans la banque" ("The company judge of itself: the compliance function inside the bank"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 115-131.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published     - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): First of all, it should be remembered that the compliance function was born within finance, and that by being structured, it has evolved to support the transition from regulatory law to compliance law. Through these changes, compliance has gone from an ex-post controlling function to an ex-ante binding function. The LIBOR crisis imperfectly illustrates the primacy of this transition. The evolution of this role is illustrated by concrete examples Firstly, the management of reputational risk is a fundamental part of the company as prosecutor and judge of itself. Reputational risk is a significant element for a financial institution, because it can have negative consequences on its capitalization, or even culminate in a systemic crisis. Avoiding a large-scale financial crisis is also part of the monumental goals of compliance. In order to avoid complex and inopportune scenarios, compliance law intervenes as early as possible and identifies issues that may impact reputation. The regulations require the implementation of certain ex ante mechanisms. The French law known as "Sapin 2" requires the implementation of tools that concern all companies (and not just banks). Indeed, beyond the risk of reputation, it is essential to consider the risk of corruption. Consideration of reputational risk may justify refusing to execute certain transactions. From this perspective, compliance must assess the potential consequences of entering into a relationship with a new client upstream, sometimes to decline the provision of services. The compliance function therefore unilaterally judges the relationship with a view to managing the company reputational risk. Secondly, the internal sanction mechanism established by compliance law is also discussed in this article, in particular the internal sanctions adopted by compliance in a financial institution. Compliance can act as a prosecutor via management committees set up within the business lines. In addition, compliance can determine and apply sanctions against employees. In this way, there is a dual role of prosecutor and judge for the compliance function within the framework of an extraordinary mechanism of ordinary law. Finally, the analysis deals with the case of the "judge-judged": following a decision by the bank, the regulator may take an even stricter position by believing that the bank is applying its guidelines incorrectly. Thus, the compliance law, which takes hold within the banking enterprise, finds itself under the judgment of its own regulator. The company finds itself judged and comes to be a prosecutor and judge of itself, but also of its clients. -

► Full Reference : G. Beaussonie, "Droit pénal et Compliance font-ils système ?" ("Do Criminal Law and Compliance form a system?"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2022, pp. 157-166. - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): By nature, Criminal Law is a system that is not intended to develop, principles which limit it being internal to it. Nevertheless if Proportionality is respected, its extension may be legitimate to preserve “fundamental social values” because Criminal Law is the branch of Law concerning what is grave, grave in consequences as in causes. Not always being concerned by Efficiency, the temptation is important to supplement Criminal Law with other repressive mechanisms , not only Administrative Repression but today Compliance which pursues concordant objectives and aims by the "Goals Monumental ”to what would be most important and therefore for which Efficiency would be required, in particular because victory (for example against corruption) should be global. Efficiency is obtained by the internalisation in powerful companies, but this efficiency comes at a price and Criminal Law should not impose too many obligations to do maintaining only a potential link with the commission of a "real offense ”. Its association with Compliance can therefore also only be exceptional and must not lead to forget  that Freedom must always remain the principle. -  

► Full Reference: Segonds, M., Compliance, Proportionality and Sanction. The example of the sanctions taken by the French Anticorruption Agency, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.),Compliance Monumental Goals, series "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, to be published. - ► Article Summary:  Before devoting the developments of his article to the sole perspective of sanctions imposed under "Anti-corruption Compliance", the author recalls in a more general way that, as is the sanction, Compliance is in essence proportional: Proportionality is inherent to Compliance as it conditions any sanction, including a sanction imposed under Compliance. This link between Proportionality and Compliance has been underlined by the French Anti-Corruption Agency (Agence française anticorruption – AFA) with regard to risk mapping, which must measure risks to arrive at effective and proportional measures. This same spirit of proportionality animates the recommendations of the AFA which are intended to apply according to the size of the company and its concrete organisation. It governs sanctions even more, in that punitive sanctions refer on one hand to Criminal Law, centered on the requirement of proportionality. Punitive sanctions It governs sanctions even more, in that punitive sanctions refer on the other hand to the disciplinary power of the manager who, from other sources of law, must integrate the legal requirement of proportionality when he/she applies external and internal compliance norms. -     📘see the general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published   -

► Full Reference: E. Wennerström, "Some Reflections on Compliance and the European Court of Human Rights", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", to be published.  - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published   - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The development of the European Court of Human Rights case law, contributing to European integration, has incorporated the substantial concept of ​​"compliance" which goes beyond the idea of ​​legality with respect to which companies remain passive, and promotes legal orders as systems in interaction with one another. The author develops the spirit and scope of Protocol 15 by which both the principle of subsidiarity and the margins of appreciation the signatory States are organized, mechanisms governed by the principle of proportionality. Subsidiarity means that the States are in the best position to design the most adequate application of the Convention, the close links between the States allowing its effective application. In addition, the new opinion procedure which allows a national court to have during a case the non-binding opinion of the ECHR ensures better compliance with the objectives of the Convention. The case-law of the Court takes up this substantial requirement through its doctrine, in particular identified in the Bosphorus case, by stressing that the accession of a State to the European Union presumes its compliance when implementing EU law with the obligations arising from the ECHR, even if this presumption can be refuted if the protection is manifestly lacking, which was admitted in several cases, in particular concerning the right to an impartial tribunal in matters of economic regulation. The different legal orders are thus articulated.  The author concludes that the European Court of Human Rights, like the Court of Justice of the Union, contributes to the construction of Compliance Law in Europe, from an Ex Ante perspective favoring opinions rather than Ex Post sanctions and creating, in particular through the Bosphorus doctrine, elements of security and confidence for European integration around common values. -   🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses -

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, " Definition of Proportionality and Definition of  Compliance Law", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, series "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2023, p. - ► Article Summary: The use of Proportionality t always limit powers is only justified when it is about sanctions, but sanctions are only one tool among others in Compliance Law, intended moreover to have little place in this Ex Ante branch of Law. And returning to the very nature of Compliance Law, which relies on operators, private or public, because they are powerful, then using proportionality to limite powers is detrimental to Compliance Law.  However, nothing requires that. Compliance Law is not an exception that should be limited. On the contrary, it is a branch of Law which carries the greatest principles, aimed at protecting human beings and whose Normativity lies in its "Monumental Goals": detecting and preventing future major systemic crisis (financial, health and climate ones). However, literally the principle of Proportionality is: "no more powers than necessary, as many powers as necessary". The second part of the sentence is independent of the first: this must be used. Politics having fixed these Monumental Goals, the entity, in particular the company, must have, even tacitly, "all the necessary powers" to achieve them. For example, the power of vigilance, the power of audit, the power over third parties. Because they are necessary to fulfill the obligations that these "crucial operators" must perform as they are "in a position" to do so. So instead of limiting the powers, the Principe of Proportionality comes to support the powers, to legitimize them and to increase them, so that we have a chance that our future is not catastrophic, perhaps better. In this respect, Compliance Law, in its rich Definition, will itself have enriched the Principle of Proportionality. -   🚧read the Working Paper, with technical developments, references, and hypertext links. - 📘go to the general presentation of the book in which this article is published - ► read the presentations of the other Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's contributions in this book:  📝Compliance Monumental Goals, beating heart of Compliance Law,  📝 Role and Place of Companies in the Creation and Effectiveness of Compliance Law in Crisis,  📝 Assessment of Whistleblowing and the duty of Vigilance -

► Full Reference : A. Linden, "Motivation and publicity of the decisions of the Restricted formation of the French Data Protection Authority (Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés – CNIL) in a compliance perspective", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", to be published.  - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Complinace Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation and Compliance): In the event of a breach of the personal data protection rules, the restricted formation of the French personal data protection Commission (CNIL) pronounces fines, injunctions of "compliance" or calls to order. It can order the publication of these measures, which can be contested before the French High Administrative supreme court (Conseil d'État). It is essential that these decisions be justified, not only in order to respect this principle of law but also concretely to obtain the public concerned, being very heterogeneous, understand them, the educational role of the CNIL also being applicable. The principle of publicity is handled with nuance, the data controllers often requesting a closed door and, in fact, very few public attending the hearing. The publicity of decisions is in itself a sanction. The publication may moreover not be total or may only have a time, anonymization often allowing the balance between necessary pedagogy and preservation of interests, the CNIL taking great attention to the very modalities of publication, even if it cannot control the circulation and the media use which is then made of it. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses -

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Compliance et incitations: un couple à propulser " ("Compliance and incentives : a promising tandem"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, pp. 123-130. - 📝read the article (in French) - 🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with more developments, technical references and hypertext links - 📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation and Compliance): The theory of incentives targets the mechanisms which do not use directly constraint (except to present sanctions themselves as incentives) but which leads nevertheless to expected behaviors. To appreciate the links which must or must not be done between incentives and Compliance, we should proceed in two times.  First, the association appears natural between incentive mechanisms and "Compliance Law" since the later is defined in a dynamic way. Indeed, if it is defined placing its legal normativity in its "monumental goals", as the end of corruption, the detection of money laundering in order to underlying criminality disappears, or as the effective protection of environment or the concrete care of human beings, then what matters is not the means in themselves but the effective tension towards these "monumental goals". In this perspective, what was related to public policies led by States, because they are definitively not able to do it, the charge is internalized in the firms which are able to tend towards this goals: "crucial operators" because they have the geographical, technological, informational and financial means.  In this perspective, the internalization of public willingness provoking a split with the concept of State linked to a territory which deprives Politics of its constraint power, incentive mechanisms appear as the most efficient mean to reach these monumental goals. They appear as this "natural" mean both negatively and positively defined. Negatively in which they do not need in Ex Ante institutional localizable sources and sanction power in Ex Post: it is enough to substitute the interest to obligation. Positively, incentives relay through operators' strategies what was the so critical and joked form of public action: the "plan". The duration is thus injected thanks to Compliance mechanisms, as we can see it through the development of it in the care for environment ("plan climat") or through the educational mechanism, which could be conceived only in duration.   However, the opposition seems radical between Compliance Law and Incentives. And this because of three convictions often developed and that we have to overcome. First, the idea that in a general way, there would be a Law only if there is a mechanism of immediate constraint which is associated to the norm. As long as the incentive is not based on obligation, then it will be nothing… Secondly, and as if that were a kind of consolation …, Compliance would not be really Law either … We so often say that it is only about a methodology, a range of processes without sense, procedures to follow without trying to understand, process that algorithms integrate in a mechanic without end and without sense or that on the contrary, Compliance would be full of sense by Ethics and Morality, which are far from Law. While incentives talk to the human spirit which calculate, Compliance would be so a process through which machines will be connected to other machines, so an extra soul, where calculation has no place… Thirdly, solutions would be to be find in Competition Law because it can do without States, submit them and approach what is a-sectorial, especially finance and digital, the world being financialized and digitalized. The violence of Competition Law which comes in Ex Ante thanks to "Compliance sanctions" applying for example to essential infrastructures Law, by continuing to deny the salience of the duration and taking care of the "market power" would be also not compatible with a marriage with incentive mechanisms which rely on duration and power of those to which it is applied, converging towards goals, which are set by what Competition Law ignores: the project. This project which pretends to build the future is the one of politics and of companies, which use their deployed power in time to concretize it. It is without any doubt there that the future of Europe is.  To overcome this triple difficulty, it is thus necessary, in a second time, to modify our conception of Law, especially thanks to Compliance Law, in which this new branch is autonomous from Competition Law, and even sometimes opposed to it, in order to the insertion of incentive mechanisms permit to unknown or against Competition Law organizations to reach "monumental goals" which are imperative to take into consideration. For example, the taking into consideration of climate challenges or the building of a sovereign identity of the data. This is expressly set by European Commission which supervises such initiatives, supervision being what is articulated with Compliance, in a couple that go beyond Regulation, and replaces in Ex Ante Competition Law, salient branch for Ex Post. All the texts which are in the process of expressing it are based on this reformed couple: Compliance and Incentive. This couple supposes that we recognize as such the existence of companies as project carriers, project which is the creation of marketed wealth circulating on a market, which could be an industrial project specific to a geographical zone both economical and political. Regulation is deployed to go away from the notion of sector and to transform itself in supervision of crucial firms in the correspondance between the project and the action, what refers to the notion of "plan". In this, banking supervision is just the advanced bastion of all thematic, energetic, climatic and health plans, or more broadly industrial and technological that could by incentive be implemented, this conception of Compliance permitting to build zones which are not reduced to immediate market exchange. The incentive corresponds to the fact that Compliance Law relies on the power of the firm to reach its own political goals, for example fighting against disinformation in the digital space or obtaining a healthy environnement. This supposes that Compliance stops to be only conceived as a model of rules effectivity, for example of Competition Law, to be recognized as a substantial branch of Law. A branch which expresses political goals. A branch which is anchored in crucial firms whose it recognizes the autonomy with regards to markets. This makes it possible, in particular through the coupling with incentive mechanisms leading to long-term collaborative operations supervised by public authorities, not to be governed by simple Competition Law, inapt to bring projects to fruition. -

► Full Reference: J.-B. Racine, "Compliance et Arbitrage. Essai de problématisation" ("Compliance and Arbitration : Problematisation", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, pp. 265-279.  - 📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published - ► The summary below describes an article that follows an intervention in the scientific manifestation Compliance et Arbitrage, co-organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the University Panthéon-Assas (Paris II). This conference was designed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Baptiste Racine, scientific co-directors, and took place in Paris II University on March 31, 2021.  In the book, the article will be published in Title II, devoted to: Compliance et Arbitrage. - ► Summary of the article (done by the author): Under the consideration of the "Compliance Juridictionalisation", it is necessary to study in the links between Compliance and Arbitration. The arbitrator is a judge, he is even the natural judge of international trade. Arbitration is therefore naturally intended to meet compliance which transforms the action of companies in an international context. However, the links between compliance and arbitration are not obvious. It is not a question of providing firm and definitive answers, but rather, and above all, of asking questions. We are at the start of reflection on this topic, which explains why there is, for the time being, little legal literature on the subject of the relationship between Compliance and Arbitration. It doesn't mean there aren't connections.  Quite simply, these relations may not have come to light, or they are in the making. We should research  the existing or potential bridges between two worlds that have long gravitated separately: Compliance on the one hand, Arbitration on the other. The central question is: is or can the arbitrator be a compliance judge, and, if so, how? In any event, the Arbitrator is thus in contact with matters requiring the methods, tools and logic of Compliance. In addition to the prevention and suppression of corruption, three examples can be given. Arbitration has been facing economic sanctions (notably embargoes) for several years. The link with Compliance is obvious, insofar as texts providing for economic sanctions are often accompanied by compliance mechanisms, as in the United States. The arbitrator is concerned as to the fate he reserves in the treatment of the dispute with the measures of economic sanctions. Competition Law is a branch that came into contact with Arbitration from the end of the 1980s. The arbitrability of this type of dispute is now established and arbitrators apply it regularly. At the same time, Compliance has also entered Competition Law, admittedly more strongly in the United States than in France. The existence, absence or insufficiency of a compliance program aimed at preventing violations of the competition rules are thus circumstances which may assist the arbitrator in the assessment of anti-competitive behavior. Environmental Law is also concerned. There is environmental Compliance, for example with regard to the French law of March 27, 2017 on the duty of vigilance. Companies are thus responsible for participating in the protection of the environment, by internalizing these concerns in their internal and external operations (in their sphere of influence). As soon as an arbitrator is in charge for settling a dispute relating to Environmental Law, the question of the relationship to Compliance, from this angle, naturally arises. It is therefore the multiple interactions between Compliance and Arbitration, actual or potential, which are thus open. -