Food for thoughts

► Full Reference: M. Larouer, "La manifestation des mécanismes incitatifs dans le Droit français de la Compliance" ("The Manifestation of Incentives Mechanisms in French Compliance Law"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 99-106.

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📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The author develops in the introduction the idea that Law itself accepts the notion of incentive as being consubstantial with it, relying in particular on codes of conduct.

Then the article develops demonstrations of incentive Law as a tool of complicity, first of all in the fight against corruption: the decision of the Sanctions Commission of the Agency Française Anticorruption (French Anti-Corruption Agency) shows that the recommendations of this Agency encourage the company to comply, protecting it from a sanction if it submits to it but does not prevent it from organizing in any other way. In addition, the judgment of the Commercial Chamber of the Court de Cassation (cassation court) stated that the breach of a contractual obligation which is however only the resumption of a constraint lodged in a compliance program which targets a third party justifies the termination of the contract. .

More generally, the author shows that the legal system encourages companies to integrate Compliance by publishing vigilance plans and extra-financial performance, while noting that companies do not always do so.

The article also concludes that French Compliance Law in its use of incentives is only at its "beginnings".

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► Full Reference: L. Benzoni and B. Deffains, "Approche économique des outils de la Compliance: finalité, mesure, effectivité de la Compliance "subie" et "choisie"" ("Economic approach of Compliance Tools: purpose, measurement, efficiency of Compliance "undergone" and "chose""), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, pp. 39-50.

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📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published. 

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): Authors refer to economic analysis of Law general works to say that firms can have an interest in showing by anticipation that they comply to Law in a long term strategy of reputation and reliability, this internalization imposed by Compliance and transformed by the Corporate Social Responsibility benefiting to the firm and its choice being related thus to rationality and not to emotion. 

Thus the mechanisms of Compliance stop to be "imposed", the firm just minimizing the perspective of a future sanction, to be "chosen", the firm taking freely a responsibility, for example in the environnemental or human rights protection fields, going beyond legal requirements (what "monumental goals" corresponds to, which goes beyond the interest of partners and of the legal obligation). The investment calculus is more difficult for the second one, hardly measurable, than for the first one (probability calculus). The loi PACTE leaves room to a "chosen Compliance" but we badly measure its effectivity: we wait case law in its use of obligation Law. Moreover, if the status of "entreprise à mission" is adopted, the goal becomes statutorily binding and the governance of the firm must be modified for the internal control of means implemented. But, supposing that companies only search competitive avantages, it is only about, through this general interest service, conquering new benefits, the lucrative purpose of chosen Compliance showing the liberal character of Compliance. 

The authors underline that this "chosen Compliance" implies evaluation and analysis tools different from those used for "imposed Compliance". In "imposed Compliance", it is about, taking back Gary Becker's works, considering risk aversion, the firm calculating its likelihood to be punished or not with regards to the gain obtained with the infringement (dependent on those who conceive Law to design it according to the model of incentives) and to the cost generated by the intern Compliance tools. The authors underline that the uncertainty of legal solutions, and there the importance of soft law, makes these calculus harder and that rationality of agents is not total, the perspective of being punished being rejected in itself while the respect of the rule is rather natural, the firms being so "honest" (theory of cognitive bias) and not wanting to be singled out (name and shame). Behavioral economics thus privileges "imposed Compliance", beyond cost-advantage calculus. 

In the case of "chosen Compliance", it is competition economics which draws solutions, because the firm imposes to itself a constraint to get a competitive advantage of it, in that these self-imposed constraints meet societal demands, external (for example, environnement) or internal (for example, cohesion into the firm). The external gains are the positive image of the firm with regards to the reputation of its competitors. These investments lose their efficacy because all the firms adopt the same, what by the way transform these practices in common legal norms. Internal gains are measured in organizational sociology by the adhesion to the firm's project, reducing the internal inefficiency in a superior to investment profit.  

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► Full Reference : L. Pailler, "Les outils technologiques, la Compliance by design et le RGPD : la protection des données dès la conception" ("Technological tools, Compliance by design and GDPR: the protection of personal data from design"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 279-286.

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📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The author considers that the GDPR has changed the "paradigm" of data protection for the bearer in Compliance, in that the data controllers must ensure the effectiveness of the rules defined by the Regulation, which they make accounts. In addition, the data, processed by the algorithm, is a “means of compliance” described and is used for vigilance plans and all the other tools, this brick being common to all Compliance Law. To respect Law, and in particular to protect people, Compliance by design continues to integrate "compliance" from the design of its tools through standard techniques (Privacy Enhancing Technologies - Pet's), legalized by the GDPR.

The author analyzes the technological means of data protection from the design of the tool, which complement Law and the contract. They are part of the "measures" required to protect people, for example transfers to third countries, these technological means being classified according to their degree of effectiveness. If the principle is free in the choice of technology, but Law requires and controls that it be not only effective but also robust, easy to use and compatible with the tools of use. The author emphasizes that the notion of "effectiveness" encompasses these particular requirements. This effectiveness, which must be proven a priori ("documented") is checked by the Authorities in the appropriateness of the measurement techniques, their effective implementation and their concrete effect.

Even if this is only subject to the state of the art, it must develop its technical resources, helped by the authorities (cf. "compliance pack" of the CNIL (French data regulator)). Even if the powers were aimed at optimizing costs, he must bear them, the context and the purpose of the processing do not ultimately become proportional. So if the risk is very high for people, it will be necessary to insert techniques and protectors other than those of Compliance Law.

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► Full Reference : L. Rapp, "Théorie des incitations et gouvernance des activités spatiales" ("Incentive Theory and Governance of Space Activities"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 73-88.

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📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the author): The article studies the conditions for an application of the theory of incentives to the problems currently posed by the governance of space activities. These activities have been enriched by the presence of numerous private operators, without the market that is being set up having yet been properly regulated. The accumulation of debris in close space highlights the difficulty of maintaining a situation where only national laws govern in the absence of a specialized international organization and in the insufficiency of the international treaties in force. This article shows the contributions of the behavioral approach in Law and economics and the interest that there would be in developing it.

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► Full Reference: S. Merabet, "La morale by design" ("Morality by design"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 287-298.

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📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): After having wondered about the relationship between Law and Morality, for which it is difficult to find points of contact, the author advances the hypothesis that the latter could find a space of concretization in the technology of artificial intelligence, even though many are worried about the deleterious effects of it. The author considering that Compliance is only a method while ethics would be the way in which morality is incorporated in a relaxed way in Law, the technology known as Artificial Intelligence could therefore express the moral rule ("compliance by design could be the appropriate tool to ensure the effectiveness of moral rules without falling into the excesses envisaged").

The author draws on examples to estimate that thus technology for on the one hand expressing the moral rule and on the other hand making it effective. The moral rule can thus be drawn up in a balanced way since it is jointly developed between the State and the economic operators, this collaboration taking the form of general principles adopted by the State using the means chosen by the company. Its content would also be characterized by the search for a "right balance", which would be found by this distribution between the primary moral principles whose expression would be the act of the State and the secondary moral principles whose expression would be delegated to companies.

Taking therefore what would be the principles of Compliance, the author applies them to Artificial Intelligence, showing that these technologies include not only the principle of neutrality but also the ethical principles of non-maliciousness, even of benevolence. (first principles) that companies then decline into secondary principles. Therefore, "compliance can usefully be used to convert these fundamental moral principles into derived moral rules, a source of greater effectiveness.".

Thus resulting in a "moral by design", the overall system has an additional effectiveness tool. This supposes that the fundamental and derived rules are of an acquired moral quality because for the moment the technological tool can only ensure their effectiveness and not the moral quality of the implemented rules. In determining the "moral rules of application", the company has margins of freedom, used through technological tools.

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Résoudre la contradiction entre "sanction" et "incitation" sous le feu du Droit de la Compliance" ("Resolving the contradiction between "sanction" and "incentive" under the fire of Compliance Law"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 89-98

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📝read the article (in French)

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🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with more developments, technical references and hyperlinks 

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📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation and Compliance): Compliance and Incentives appear at first glance to be totally opposite. For two major reasons. Firstly, because sanctions have a central place in Compliance Law and that the incentives suppose an absence of constraint on the operators. Secondly, because the incentives are linked to self-regulation and that Compliance Law assumes a strong presence of public authorities. Thus, one should choose: either Compliance or Incentives! Either the effectiveness of one or the effectiveness of the others; either the techniques of one, or the techniques of others; either the philosophy of one or the philosophy of the other. Resign oneself to the waste that such a necessary choice would imply. But to put the terms in this way amounts to thinking poorly about the situations and reducing the fields of the solutions they call for. If we take a rich definition of Compliance Law, we can on the contrary articulate Compliance and Incentives. From this perspective, sanctions can no longer become what blocks the use of incentives but, on the contrary, what constitutes them. Even more, the coupling between the Incentives and the requirements of Compliance Law must be strongly encouraged, as soon as the public authorities supervise in Ex Ante all the initiatives taken by the "crucial operators".

This article deals with the first issue. Indeed, the so-called incentive theory targets mechanisms which do not directly resort to constraint. They would therefore have little place in Compliance Law. But it seems saturated with sanction procedures. We can even say that it seems to put them at the center, the public authorities presenting the number of sanctions as a sign of success, while the companies seem obsessed with their prospects, the two concerns ending in such a strange convergence that are the Convention Judiciaire d'Intérêt Public (non-prosecution agreement).

The honest observer cannot help but be immediately uneasy. Indeed, it can only raise the definition of the sanction as a "constraint" triggered Ex Post, at the very heart of a Compliance Law which is presented as a set of Ex Ante mechanisms. Based on this contradiction in terms, should we give up the association and think that it would be wrong against the spirit to think of the sanction as an incentive?

It is undoubtedly in this connection that one perceives most clearly the clash of two cultures, which do not communicate, while technically they apply to the same situations. Indeed, because Compliance was designed by Finance, everything is a tool for it. Therefore, the tendency to think of the sanction only as an incentive is very strong in Compliance Law, manifests itself continuously and will not stop (I). But whatever the reasons for conceiving it this way, the principles of the rule of law cannot disappear and if we do not want them to be erased, then they must be articulated (II). This is an essential game (II).

This is why we can literally say that Compliance has set Criminal Law on fire by its conception, logical but closed in on itself, of sanctions as simple incentives. In order for Law to remain, however, we must hold a very firm definition of Compliance Law centered on its Monumental Goal, which is the protection of the person.

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Référence complète: Frison-Roche, M.-A.,Compliance et Arbitrage : un adossement,  rapport de synthèse in Frison-Roche, M.-A. & Racine, J.-B. (dir.) Compliance et Arbitrage, Colloque coorganisé par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et le Centre de recherches sur la Justice et le Règlement des Conflits (CRJ) de l'Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris II), avec le soutien de la Cour Internationale d'Arbitrage, Paris, 31 mars 2021.

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🗓️ Lire le programme de ce colloque

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✏️Le rapport de synthèse a été réalisé au fur et à mesure que se déroulait le colloque : se reporter aux notes prises durant le colloque. 

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Voir le rapport de synthèse en vidéo

Voir l'intégralité du colloque en vidéo. 

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📅 Ce colloque s'insère dans le cycle de colloques 2021 organisé par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et ses partenaires autour de la Juridictionnalisation de la Compliance.

📕 Les interventions ont servi de première base à la réalisation d'un titre  dans l'ouvrage dirigé par Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, dont la version française,  La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, est co-édité par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz.

📘 Elles ont été de la même façon la première base pour la version anglaise de l'ouvrage, Compliance Juridictionalisation, co-édité par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant. 

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► Full Reference: J.-B. Racine, "Compliance and arbitration. An attempt at problematisation", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", to be published. 

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📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published

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► The summary below describes an article that follows an intervention in the scientific manifestation Compliance et Arbitrage, co-organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the University Panthéon-Assas (Paris II). This conference was designed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Baptiste Racine, scientific co-directors, and took place in Paris II University on March 31, 2021. 

In the book, the article will be published in Title II, devoted to: Compliance et Arbitrage.

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► Summary of the article: Under the consideration of the "Compliance Jurisdictionalisation", it is necessary to study in the links between Compliance and Arbitration. The arbitrator is a judge, he is even the natural judge of international trade. Arbitration is therefore naturally intended to meet compliance which transforms the action of companies in an international context. However, the links between compliance and arbitration are not obvious. It is not a question of providing firm and definitive answers, but rather, and above all, of asking questions. We are at the start of reflection on this topic, which explains why there is, for the time being, little legal literature on the subject of the relationship between Compliance and Arbitration. It doesn't mean there aren't connections.  Quite simply, these relations may not have come to light, or they are in the making. We should research  the existing or potential bridges between two worlds that have long gravitated separately: Compliance on the one hand, Arbitration on the other. The central question is: is or can the arbitrator be a compliance judge, and, if so, how?

In any event, the Arbitrator is thus in contact with matters requiring the methods, tools and logic of Compliance. In addition to the prevention and suppression of corruption, three examples can be given.

• Arbitration has been facing economic sanctions (notably embargoes) for several years. The link with Compliance is obvious, insofar as texts providing for economic sanctions are often accompanied by compliance mechanisms, as in the United States. The arbitrator is concerned as to the fate he reserves in the treatment of the dispute with the measures of economic sanctions.
• Competition Law is a branch that came into contact with Arbitration from the end of the 1980s. The arbitrability of this type of dispute is now established and arbitrators apply it regularly. At the same time, Compliance has also entered Competition Law, admittedly more strongly in the United States than in France. The existence, absence or insufficiency of a compliance program aimed at preventing violations of the competition rules are thus circumstances which may assist the arbitrator in the assessment of anti-competitive behavior.
• Environmental Law is also concerned. There is environmental Compliance, for example with regard to the French law of March 27, 2017 on the duty of vigilance. Companies are thus responsible for participating in the protection of the environment, by internalizing these concerns in their internal and external operations (in their sphere of influence). As soon as an arbitrator is in charge for settling a dispute relating to Environmental Law, the question of the relationship to Compliance, from this angle, naturally arises.

It is therefore the multiple interactions between Compliance and Arbitration, actual or potential, which are thus open.

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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► Full Reference: E. Kleiman, "The objectives of compliance confronted with the actors of arbitration", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, coll. "Compliance & Regulation", to be published. 

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📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Author): International arbitration, which remains the preferred method for the resolution of disputes arising from international commercial relations, has been overtaken by compliance, the manifestations of which are everywhere: arbitral institutions, arbitrators and courts exercising curial supervision of the international regularity of awards are regularly called upon to take into account rules of compliance.

Compliance has undeniably got a hold on the arbitration community.  Being operators in an unregulated activity, arbitral institutions and arbitrators must generate trust; their ability to effectively self-regulate is a prerequisite for the success of arbitration and requires transparency and exemplarity.  This self-imposed compliance is nowadays consubstantial to arbitration and is illustrated in such classic fields as prevention of conflicts of interest and control of arbitrators' availability, but also in the more recent domains of parity and diversity as well as reduction of the carbon footprint.  Moreover, compliance has caught up with the ex post control of the international regularity of arbitral awards in matters involving allegations of corruption and money laundering.  There is room for debate, particularly in France, because of the porosity of the boundaries between the methods that are specific to those mandatory rules of compliance that intend to prevent the most serious offences, and the methods that are specific to the establishment of the constituent elements of such crimes before criminal courts.  This is an important issue, especially as the increasingly imperative nature of climate change and human rights regulations will extend the scope of these overlaps between compliance methods and the control of arbitral awards.

Arbitration is also taking over compliance.  Arbitrators are called upon to rule on controversies arising from economic activities that are related to compliance: contracts relating to the implementation of preventive measures in the fields of anti-corruption, anti-money laundering and human rights as well as transactions relating to the reduction of the carbon footprint and climate change, etc.  Moreover, compliance is also an arbitrable matter and arbitrators must apply or take into consideration the observance or disregard of rules of compliance when adjudicating commercial or investment disputes.

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance et arbitrage. Rapport de synthèse: un adossement (Compliance and Arbitration: a Backing. Conclusion), in Frison-Roche, M.-A. & Racine, J.-B., Compliance et Arbitrage (Compliance and Arbitration), Colloquium co-organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Centre de recherches sur la Justice et le Règlement des Conflits (CRJ) of Panthéon-Assas University (Paris II), with the support avec the International Court of Arbitration, Paris, 31st of March 2021

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Read the program of this colloquium 

See Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's conclusion in video (in French, with English subtitles)

These notes of the conclusion have been written as the colloquium took place. 

See the video of the entire colloquium (in French, with English subtitles)

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This colloquium is part of the Cycle of colloquium 2021 organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its partners around the topic Compliance Juridictionnalization.  

This manifestation is in French but the interventions will be the basis for a specific chapter of the English collective book directed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Compliance Juridictionnalization, co-published by the JoRC and Bruylant.

An equivalent book in French, La Juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, directed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, will be co-published by the JoRC and Dalloz. 

Read the notes established for the conclusion below ⤵️

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Why do we regulate? If it is to prevent systemic risks, systemic "family offices" must be subject to it (Archegos case) (Pourquoi régule-t-on? Si c'est pour prévenir les risques systémiques, les "family offices" systémiques doivent y être soumis (cas Archegos)), Newsletter MAFR - Law, Compliance, Regulation, 30th of March 2021

Read by freely subscribing other news of the Newsletter MAFR - Law, Compliance, Regulation

Summary of the news: 

Archegos was a wealth management company whose activity consisted mainly in managing funds that were not themselves from the financial markets (hence its title of "family office"). Obviously, Archegos was proving to be too fragile financially in view of the highly speculative commitments it made on the financial markets and systemic banks were particularly deeply affected by the liquidation of large amounts by Archegos to be able to respond to margin calls.

As the mandate of the financial regulatory authorities is aimed almost exclusively at the protection of public savings, Archegos completely escaped the regulation and supervision of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). However, Regulation Law also aims to prevent and manage systemic risks, which are often multi-sectoral and even trans-sectoral, and this in a teleological way. In view of this and the increasingly important place taken by speculative behavior in the financial markets, the financial regulatory authorities must give up the condition of using public savings in their consideration of operators which should be regulated because even an operator not handling public savings can threaten the existence of financial markets. From this perspective, "family offices", not handling public savings but having a systemic dimension, must come under the regulation and supervision of financial regulatory authorities.

Full reference: Luguri, J. and Strahilevitz, L. J., Shining a Light on Dark Patterns, Journal of Legal Analysis, Vol. 13, Issue 1, 2021, 67p. 

Sciences Po's students can read this article via Sciences Po's Drive in the folder MAFR - Regulation & Compliance. 

Référence compléte : Cukierman, C., A. et Bonnecarrère, Ph., Rapport du Sénat, La judiciarisation de la vie publique, 2022.

Mme Cécile CUKIERMAN, Rapporteur M. Philippe BONNECARRÈRE

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Lire le Rapport. 

Référence complète : Haut Commissariat au Plan : Electricité : le devoir de lucidité , note du 26 mars 2021.

Lire la note. 

Référence : Cons. const., déc. QPC, 26 mars 2021, Aka Technologies.

Lire la décision

Consulter le dossier autour de la décision. 

Référence complète : Association Droit et Commerce (sous la direction de Marc Ringlé), Le droit des affaires, instrument de gestion et de sortie de crise. Les entreprises à l'épreuve de la pandémie, LGDJ, 2021, 453 p.

Lire le sommaire.

Full reference: Bayrou, F., Electricité: le devoir de lucidité (Electricity: the duty of lucidity), note n°4 from the Haut-Commissariat au Plan (French government planification agency), 23rd of March 2021, 37 p.  

Read the note (in French)

Read the summary of the note done by the Haut-Commissariat au Plan on is official website (in French)

Cet enseignement se déroule au semestre de printemps 2021, à la suite du cours semestriel qui a porté sur le "Droit commun de la Régulation".

Comme pour celui-ci, il est entièrement assuré par Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, professeur d'Université, titulaire à Sciences po.

Comme de nombreux étudiants qui suivent ce présent cours-séminaire n'ont pas suivi ce cours, il est important de se reporter au matériau du cours de Droit commun de la Régulation.  Dans la mesure où ce présent séminaire est le prolongement de ce cours qui, en raison des nombreux retours des principes de droit commun dans diverses matières juridiques, s'est souvent éloigné du Droit de la Régulation, cette consultation peut demeurer utile même pour les étudiants ayant suivi ce premier cours.

La crise sanitaire actuelle rendant plus difficile l'apprentissage, il apparaît nécessaire ne pas débuter directement le cours-séminaire sur les problématiques spécifiquement sectorielles : les trois premières séances seront donc consacrées à des bases de Régulation dès l'instant qu'elles se retrouvent dans chacun des secteurs et que si certains sont classiques (comme l'existence et le fonctionnement des "Autorités de Régulation" ou des "Autorités de Supervision", certaines problématiques sont naissantes et déterminantes pour l'avenir : comme le renouvellement de la pertinence de la référence au secteur, ou l'internalisation de la Régulation dans les Entreprises, ou les buts communs ou spécifiques de la Régulation ce qui conduit à reclasser les secteurs. 

Cela opéré et ayant donné lieu à discussion, le Cours de Droit sectoriel de la Régulation vise à montrer la persistance de la spécificité de tel et tel secteurs. Il ne peut les examiner tous mais il s'agit de mesurer à quel point les spécificités sectorielles imprègnent les règles. Ainsi chaque secteur est à la fois gouverné par des règles communes à tous (ce "droit commun" qui donna lieu à un cours complet précédent et dont la perspective aura été reprise dans la perspective sectorielle) et par ce qui lui est propre, sans doute avant tout ce qui est afférent à l'objet technique lui-même (le rail, le téléphone, la monnaie, etc.). Le Cours fait place également  à la "régulation du numérique", bien que l'espace digital ne puisse plus guère être analysé comme un "secteur", ni en conséquence sa régulation comme une "régulation sectorielle". Cette question sera reprise dans le semestre 3 d'automne dans le cours-séminaire de Droit de la Compliance . 

En raison de l'hétérogénéité des étudiants inscrits, il est concevable que le choix des secteurs étudiés plutôt que d'être arrêté par avance puissent être arrêtés directement avec les étudiants lors de la première séance. 

Ce livret détaille la façon dont les étudiants, qui suivent cet enseignement situé dans l'École d'affaires publiques de Science po, sont évalués afin de valider cet enseignement. Il précise la charge du travail qui est demandé.

Les thèmes des  leçons qui composent successivement  le cours sont énumérés. Comme il s'agit d'une perspective thématique les bibliographies sont insérées dans les leçons et non plus dans une bibliographie générale, laquelle allait de soi pour la présentation du "Droit commun de la Régulation" et peut continuer un intérêt dans une perspective sectorielle..

A partir de ce livret, chaque document propre à chaque leçon est accessible.

Voir ci-dessous plus de détails sur chacun de ces points, ainsi que la liste des leçons et les annales des sujets d'examen.