The goal for which a mechanism, a solution an institution or a rule is adopted, instituted or elaborated, is in principle external to them. Knowledge of this goal is a tool to better understand them and is only that.

On the contrary, in Regulation Law, the goal is the heart itself. By definition, Regulation Law is a set of instruments that articulate to take their meaning in relation to a goal. Moreover, these instruments are legitimate to represent a constraint only because they realize a goal which is itself legitimate. The interpretation of Regulation Law is based on the aims pursued: the reasoning is teleological.

This teleological nature explains that efficiency is no longer merely a concern - as for ordinary legal mechanisms, but rather a principle of Regulation Law. It explains the welcome, especially through the European Union Law of the theory of the useful effect. This link between rules, which are only means, and aims, refers to the principle of proportionality, which requires that constraints and exceptions be applied only when they are necessary, proportionality being the form off the classic principle of necessity.

Because the aim is the center, it must be expressed by the author of the Regulation standards, and this is all the more so if they are of a political nature, being not limited to mitigating technical failures of markets. This goal can be varied: the management of systemic risks, but also the consideration of the fundamental rights of people, the preservation of the environment, public health, civilization, education, etc. The silence of the legislature, which limits itself to the making of rules whereas these are merely instruments, without explicating the goal whereas the latter is a political decision, is a fault in the legislative art.

Moreover, in order that the person who applies the Regulation norm, in particular the Regulator and the Judge, has no excessive margin for interpretation and does not substitute for political power, the author of the Regulation norm needs to aim specifically for one goal : in this way, the one who applies the norm will be constrained. Or, if the author targets several purposes, then he must articulate them in relation to each other, by hierarchizing them for example. If he fails to do so, the institution which applies the regulatory standards will itself have to choose the purpose and exercise a power which he does not possess.

This express designation of purpose has been made for the European Banking Union,  this Regulation and Supervision construction, whose primary aim is to prevent systemic risks and resolve crises. Similarly, the purpose of the Regulation of essentiel infrastructures is to provide third parties access to the network. Similarly, in the case of a transitional regulation introduced following liberalization, the aim is to establish competition, the principle of which has been declared by the liberalization law. When this is not clearly stated, there is a lapse in the legislative art.

 

 

► Full Reference: R. Sève, "Compliance Obligation and changes in Sovereignty and Citizenship", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, to be published

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📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC): 

The contribution describes "les changements de philosophie du droit que la notion de compliance peut impliquer par rapport à la représentation moderne de l’Etat assurant l’effectivité des lois issues de la volonté générale, dans le respect des libertés fondamentales qui constituent l’essence du sujet de droit." ("the changes in legal philosophy that the notion of Compliance may imply in relation to the modern representation of the State ensuring the effectiveness of laws resulting from the general will, while respecting the fundamental freedoms that constitute the essence of the subject of law").

The contributor believes that the definition of Compliance is due to authors who « jouer un rôle d’éclairage et de structuration d’un vaste ensemble d’idées et de phénomènes précédemment envisagés de manière disjointe.  Pour ce qui nous occupe, c’est sûrement le cas de la théorie de la compliance, développée en France par Marie-Anne Frison-Roche dans la lignée de grands économistes (Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole) et dont la première forme résidait dans les travaux bien connus de la Professeure sur le droit de la régulation. » ( "play a role in illuminating and structuring a vast set of ideas and phenomena previously considered in a disjointed manner.  For our purposes, this is certainly the case with the theory of Compliance, developed in France by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche in the tradition of great economists (Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole) and whose first form was in her well-known work on Regulatory Law").

Drawing on the Principles of the Law of the American Law Institute, which considers compliance to be a "set of rules, principles, controls, authorities, offices and practices designed to ensure that an organisation conforms to external and internal norms", he stresses that Compliance thus appears to be a neutral mechanism aimed at efficiency through a move towards Ex Ante. But he stresses that the novelty lies in the fact that it is aimed 'only' at future events, by 'refounding' and 'monumentalising' the matter through the notion of 'monumental goals' conceived by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, giving rise to a new jus comune. Thus, "la compliance c’est l’idée permanente du droit appliquée à de nouveaux contextes et défis." ("Compliance is the permanent idea of Law applied to new contexts and challenges"). 

So it's not a question of making budget savings, but rather of continuing to apply the philosophy of the Social Contract to complex issues, particularly environmental issues. 

This renews the place occupied by the Citizen, who appears not only as an individual, as in the classical Greek concept and that of Rousseau, but also through entities such as NGOs, while large companies, because they alone have the means to pursue the Compliance Monumental Goals, would be like "super-citizens", something that the digital space is beginning to experience, at the risk of the individuals themselves disappearing as a result of "surveillance capitalism". But in the same way that thinking about the Social Contract is linked to thinking about capitalism, Compliance is part of a logical historical extension, without any fundamental break: "C’est le développement et la complexité du capitalisme qui forcent à introduire dans les entités privées des mécanismes procéduraux d’essence bureaucratique, pour discipliner les salariés, contenir les critiques internes et externes, soutenir les managers en place" ("It is the development and complexity of capitalism that forces us to introduce procedural mechanisms of a bureaucratic nature into private entities, in order to discipline employees, contain internal and external criticism, and support the managers in place") by forcing them to justify remuneration, benefits, and so on.

Furthermore, in the words of the author, "Avec les buts monumentaux, - la prise en compte des effets lointains, diffus, agrégés par delà les frontières, de l’intérêt des générations futures, de tous les êtres vivants - ,  on passe, pour ainsi dire, à une dimension industrielle de l’éthique, que seuls de vastes systèmes de traitement de l’information permettent d’envisager effectivement." ("With the Monumental Goals - taking into account the distant, diffuse effects, aggregated across borders, the interests of future generations, of all living beings - we move, so to speak, to an industrial dimension of ethics, which only vast information processing systems can effectively envisage").

This is how we can find a division between artificial intelligence and human beings in organisations, particularly companies, or in decision-making processes.

In the same way, individual freedom does not disappear with Compliance, because it is precisely one of its monumental goals to enable individuals to make choices in a complex environment, particularly in the digital space where the democratic system is now at stake, while technical mechanisms such as early warning will revive the right to civil disobedience, invalidating the complaint of "surveillance capitalism".

The author concludes that the stakes are so high that Compliance, which has already overcome the distinctions between Private and Public Law and between national and international law, must also overcome the distinction between Information and secrecy, particularly in view of cyber-risks, which requires the State to develop and implement non-public Compliance strategies to safeguard the future.

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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Référence complète : Toth, A., Framework for the recognition of Competition Compliance programs and Dilemmas faced by Competition Authorities, Loyola Consumer Law Review, 2018, p.95-108.

The economic theory of incentives implicitly assumes that an operator can not be compelled to act against his will, or at least that it is more efficient to offer him advantages in such a way that he does what he wants . In this, this conception is opposed to the traditional conception of Law, which posits, on the contrary, that subjects obey the order dictated by the legal norm.

But in globalized markets, operators have the tools to disobey and the asymmetry of information diminishes the power of control of the Regulators, which raises doubts as to the effectiveness of the legal constraint: it is not enough that the Law orders. In these circumstances, texts, regulators and judges must produce conditions that encourage agents to adopt behaviors that are consistent with the aims sought by the Regulators because the operators themselves have an interest in them.

Thus, whilst regulatory systems in any sector become increasingly repressive, even in liberal economies, it is not so much to punish the perpetrator but to incite others who are tempted to commit crimes, To abandon them. It is the system of exemplarity. This thought prior to Beccaria participates in the re-feoadization of the Law, demonstrated by Pierre Legendre, associated with the decline of the State and to which the Regulation fully participates. Judgeshave little inclination to handle repression in this way, which creates a clash between Criminal Law and Regulatory Law, which nevertheless puts repression at its center.

In the same way, Regulatory Systems must inject positive incentives, for example rewards for communication of information, which encourages delation, or incentives done by the regulator for the network manager make investments in the maintenance of it, against the immediate interest of its shareholder. Finally, all patent law and economics are now thought of as an incentive to inn/en/article/innovation/ovate. But, some incentives have proven perverse such as stock-options or bonuses. As a result, new texts seek to regulate these.

► Référence complète : D. Esty et M. Hautereau-Boutonnet, "Derrière les procès climatiques français et américains : des systèmes politique, juridique et judiciaire en opposition", D.2022, p.1606 et s.

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Référence complète : Boursier, M.-E., L’irrésistible ascension du whistleblowing en droit financier s’étend aux abus de marché, Bulletin Joly Bourse, 1ier septembre 2016.

 

Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent lire l'article en accédant au dossier "MAFR - Régulation"

► Référence complète : J.-Ch. Roda, « Pouvoir économique et concurrence : le cas des Big Techs », in M. Fabre-Magnan et P. Lokiec (dir.), Les limites juridiques au pouvoir économique, Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. « Thèmes et Commentaires – Etudes », 2026, pp.117-141.

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► Référence complète : M. Caffin-Moi, "L’imprégnation des branches du droit par les mécanismes de compliance : le contrat", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), Compliance et contrat, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", à paraître

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📕lire une présentation de l'ouvrage, Compliance et contrat, dans lequel cet article est publié

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► Résumé de l'article (fair par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC) : L'auteure commence par montrer que les contrats sont de plus en plus présents dans le Droit de la Compliance, celui-ci n'étant plus ce qui est seulement exprimé par des lois d'ordre public, tandis que le contrat ne porterait que les intérêts privés de deux parties particulières. Elle expose comment concrètement aujourd'hui, et chaque jour davantage, les contrats sont utilisés comme un instrument de diffusion de la Compliance, la Vigilance étant exemplaire de cela, les textes incitant les entreprises à le faire, la CS3D mettant "le contrat à l'honneur" par la mise en place de "cascades contractuelles", le contrat agissant à la fois en surface et en profondeur.

Mais il ne faut pas que le contrat soit un moyen de restreindre la responsabilité, et l'on trouve des points de "friction" entre Contrat et Compliance.

Tout d'abord, parce que les réglementations, voire la jurisprudence, obligent les entreprises à contracter, par exemple avec des fournisseurs de rang 2, ce qui est une atteinte à la liberté de ne pas contracter.

En outre, les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance institutionnalisent une relation contractuelle qui peut être déséquilibrée, voire engendrer une concurrence déloyale si une entreprise s'y plie et l'autre pas, la Compliance conférant de plus des prérogatives exorbitantes à l'entreprise.

Pour ne pas provoquer trop de conflits, et l'auteure souligne que le premier est certainement celui sur la compétence juridictionnelle entre le tribunal de commerce et le Tribunal judiciaire de Paris, il faut impérativement un dialogue des juges.

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Référence complète : Boy, , "Réflexion sur le "droit de la régulation". A propos du texte de Marie-Anne Frison-Roche",  D., chron., 2001, p.3031 et s.

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Impartiality is the quality, maybe the virtue, that is demanded of the judge, not only the one who is called like that but also the one who has the function to judge the others (maybe without this name).

It can not be defined as the absolute positive aptitude, namely the total absence of prejudice, the heroic aptitude for a person to totally ignore his or her personal opinions and personal history. This heroic virtue is nonsense because not only is it inaccurate, impossible but it is also not desirable because a person is not a machine. It must not be so because good justice is human justice. In this respect, impartiality refers to a philosophical conception of what is justice and what is Regulation, not machines, but systems that must keep the human person in their center (Sunstein).

Thus Impartiality is articulated with the subjective nature of the assessment not only inevitable but also desirable that the judge makes of situations. Because Law is reasonable, Impartiality is defined only negatively: the absence of bias.

Impartiality is defined first and foremost as a subjective and individual quality, namely, the prohibition on the person who makes a decision affecting the situation of others (as is the case of a judge) to a a personal interest in this situation. The constitutional prohibition of being "judge and party" is thus the expression of the principle of impartiality. This definition is in line with the otherwise general requirement of no conflict of interests.

Impartiality is defined secondly as an objective and individual quality, namely the prohibition for a person who has already known of the case to know again (because he or she has already had an opinion about it, this having constituted an objective pre-judgment).

Impartiality is defined thirdly as an objective and structural quality, which obliges the organ which takes judgments to "give to see" a structure that makes it fit for this impartiality, objective impartiality that third parties can see and which generates confidence in its ability to judge without bias. This theory of English origin has been taken up by European law in the interpretation given to the European Convention on Human Rights. The expression "apparent impartiality" has sometimes given rise to misunderstandings. Indeed, far from being less demanding (in that it is "only" to be satisfied with an appearance of impartiality and not of a true impartiality), it is rather a matter of demanding more, not only of a true impartiality, but also of an impartiality which can be seen by all. This leads in particular to the obligation of transparency, to which the institutions, notably the State, were not necessarily bound by the law.

For a long time the Regulator, in that it took the form of an Administrative Authority, was not considered a jurisdiction, it was long considered that it was not directly subject to this requirement. It is clear from the case law that the national courts now consider that the regulatory authorities are courts "in the European sense", which implies a fundamental procedural guarantee for the operators concerned

Le plan est  actualisé chaque semaine au fur et à mesure que les leçons se déroulent en amphi.

Il est disponible ci-dessous.

 

 

Retourner à la présentation générale du cours, tel qu'il était bâti et proposé en 2018.

 

 

 

 

 

Le légicentrisme exprime avant tout une bataille de normes, puisque cette doctrine pose que la loi est la seule et unique expression de la souveraineté de la Nation. En cela, la loi dispose d'une autorité indépassable et c'est elle qui fonde l'État légal.

Ainsi, si l'on devait donner une figure au système juridique, ce serait un cercle avec en son cœur d'une façon unique la loi souveraine, à la fois autosuffisante dans son fondement (souveraineté) et dans sa production (principe de légalité).

Cette conception moniste (unité de la loi) a pour principale source la philosophie politique de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, c'est encore sur celui-ci que la France conserve le principe de souveraineté parlementaire (le Gouvernement est responsable devant le Parlement) et de souveraineté de la loi. Mais depuis la Révolution française, les esprits et les faits ont changé.

Ainsi, s'est construite une doctrine inverse : le "pluralisme juridique" qui pose en contradiction que le droit vient de nombreuses sources, comme la coutume, les pratiques, les jugements, etc. Il n'est pas étonnant que les auteurs qui affirment le pluralisme juridique ne viennent pas de la philosophie politique mais davantage de la sociologie comme Gurvitch ou Carbonnier.

En outre, les frontières nationales ont perdu de leur consistance, de fait et de droit. C'est pourquoi un auteur comme Mireille Delmas-Marty s'appuie sur le fait même de la construction de l'Europe des droits de l'homme d'une part et de la globalisation d'autre part pour affirmer que le légicentrisme a fait place à un pluralisme juridique généralisé.

Cependant, en droit positif les textes restent les mêmes. C'est ainsi que l'article 6 de la Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen de 1789, qui fait partie du bloc de constitutionnalité, dispose de la loi que "la loi est l'expression de la volonté générale".

De la même façon, l'article 5 du Code civil continue d'interdire au juge de rendre des jugements contraignants pour d'autres cas que celui particulier sur lequel il se prononce.

Cette permanence des textes les plus gradés, à savoir l'article 5 du Code civil et l'article 6 de la déclaration pose de nombreux problèmes aux juges. En effet, depuis l'arrêt du Tribunal des conflits Blanco, le droit administratif n'est plus lié par ce qui est posé par le Code civil et sans doute la puissance normative du Conseil d'Etat s'exprime plus ouvertement que celle de la Cour de cassation, qui feint de ne rendre que des arrêts de principe pour pouvoir affirmer qu'elle ne rend pas d'arrêt de règlement.

D'une façon plus complexe, le Conseil constitutionnel rappelle régulièrement que certes il est le gardien de la norme constitutionnelle supérieure à la loi mais quand le même temps, seul le législateur, puisque celui est le souverain, peut exprimer la volonté générale, ce à quoi le Conseil constitutionnel ne peut se substituer.

Mais le Droit de l'Union européenne, qui constitue un Ordre juridique à la fois autonome et dont les normes sont pourtant intégrées dans les ordres juridiques des Etats-membres, rend difficilement soutenable la conception du légicentrisme. Y a succédée une hiérarchie des normes complexes. Mais les fondements politiques de l'idée de légicentrisme alimente en grande partie l'hostilité à l'égard de l'Europe, aussi bien celle de l'Union que celle de la CEDH.

 

Référence complète Fox, E., The new world order, in Mélanges Joël Monéger, Liber Amicorum en l'honneur du Professeur Joël Monéger, LexisNexis, 2017, 818 p.  

 

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance et Contrat ("Compliance and Contract"), coll."Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Editions Lefebvre-Dalloz, to be published.

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📘 At the same time, a book in English, Compliance and Contracts, is published in the collection copublished by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Editions Lefebre-Bruylant.

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🧮the book follows the cycle of colloquia organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its Universities partners in 2026

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📚this volume is one of a series of books devoted to Compliance in this collection.

► read the presentations of the other books:

• further books:

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Le système probatoire de la Compliance, 2027

 

• previous books:

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕L'obligation de compliance 2025

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche & M. Boissavy (eds.), 📕Compliance et droits de la défense. Enquête interne - CJIP - CRPC, 2024

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕La juridictionnalisation de Compliance, 2023

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, 2022

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Les outils de la Compliance, 2021

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Pour une Europe de la Compliance, 2019

🕴️N. Borga, 🕴️J.-Cl. Marin and 🕴️J.-Ch. Roda (eds.), 📕Compliance : l'Entreprise, le Régulateur et le Juge, 2018

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Régulation, Supervision, Compliance, 2017

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Internet, espace d'interrégulation, 2016

 

📚see the global presentation of all the books of the collection.

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► General presentation of this book: The book, published in 2025 int the same series "Regulations & Compliance" series, demonstrates that the Obligation of Compliance—which falls upon crucial operators and those concerned with the future of systems and the present and future individuals involved in them—derives from laws and regulations, and is upheld by these operators themselves, regulators and judges. The role played by contracts is discussed therein. This book specifically examines the role that contracts play and will play in the conception, development and implementation of Compliance Law.  

This aspect is underestimated because Compliance Law is often analysed through the prism of laws and regulations designed to achieve Monumental Goals set by states and public authorities, to the realisation of which systemic economic operations contribute through compliance tools, rather than through the actors themselves. When they do act, this is referred to outside the realm of Law, generally to Ethics. However, the Contract, the binding legal instrument par excellence, will play an increasingly significant role within global and interconnected compliance systems.

In the European construction of Compliance Law, which places human beings at the heart of efforts to ensure the sustainability of systems, the Contract serves not only as the means by which the entity fulfils its legal obligations, forges relationships with stakeholders and implements the necessary innovations, but also as the means by which it exercises its autonomy to contribute to the realisation of the systemic ambitions in question. 

To describe and anticipate the practice and rules that link Compliance Law and Contracts, the book first examines how this new branch of Law, insofar as it draws on the political ideas of the Social Contract, renews Contract Law by embedding it within the strategy of economic operators, a task made all the easier for them as they have built value chains through contracts. These are ‘regulatory contracts’. This demonstrates that Public Law Contracts exemplify the incorporation by General Contract Law of the overarching perspective of compliance, normatively anchored in the Monumental Goals (Title I).

That explained, the book examines how General Contract Law interfaces with the techniques and objectives of Compliance Law. Whether through mandatory requirements, incentives or support, Compliance Law plays a role in contracts, helping to shape them in part, whether they relate to regulated or unregulated activities, with the points of contact with the principle of liberalism – and the limits to it – being determined by the courts. Conversely, however, General Contract Law contributes to Compliance Law and will do so increasingly. This applies equally to the stages of formation, execution, and sanctions, which may take the form of consolidations (Title II). 

In practical terms, the Contract itself serves as a Compliance Tol. As such, the company may choose to outsource the compliance function, which it is free to do provided it remains accountable for its performance to the legislator and the persons concerned: this is the concept of the ‘Compliance Contract’, which appears as a specific contract.  Furthermore, compliance can be incorporated into multiple contracts—contractual arrangements through which the contracting parties establish one or more obligations that will facilitate or enhance their legal obligations. In doing so, legal entities exercise their freedom, as permitted by general law, and this is also recognised by the Regulator, Supervisor and/or Judge in light of the normative Monumental Goals of Compliance Law (Title III). 

Precisely, a new field of ‘contractual compliance litigation’ is emerging. The primary topic here is to examine contractual judicial disputes in which an element of Compliance Law features in the proceedings. Indeed, a dispute concerning a claim for mandatory execution, termination or contractual liability may involve, in the claim itself or in an procedural exception or defence raised, an element of compliance law, ranging from an allegation of lack of jurisdiction to a request for the court to take into account a systemic teological norm that the contract judge should consider. Secondly, in certain emerging systemic compliance litigation, because the role of the judge is transformed and the procedure must be adapted, the contract appears as a particularly suitable tool, either as a ‘procedural framework’ through the contractualisation of the whole, or as a technique used in the strict sense, its ex ante nature allowing, in disputes concerning the future, the development of new adequate techniques (Title IV). 

 

 

 

 

 

 

► First presentation of the Table of Content  : 

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TABLE OF CONTENT 

 

REPORTING ON CONTRACTUAL PRACTICES WITHIN THE COMPLIANCE SYSTEM AND ENHANCING ITS EFFECTIVENESS AND HUMANITY COMPTE DES PRATIQUES CONTRACTUELLES DANS LE SYSTEME DE COMPLIANCE ET ACCROITRE L'EFFICACITE ET L'HUMANISME DE CELUI-CI  

(REPORTING ON CONTRACTUAL PRACTICES WITHIN THE COMPLIANCE SYSTEM AND ENHANCING ITS EFFECTIVENESS AND HUMANITY) 

 

 

 

 ♦️ sss, par 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

 

TITRE I.

CONTRAT SOCIAL, DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE ET STRATEGIE DES OPERATEURS ECONOMIQUES 

 

CHAPITRE I : CONTRAT SOCIAL ET DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE 

Section 1 ♦️ Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, guide d'action pour des opérateurs économiques au service d'une politique globale, par 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 2 ♦️ sss, par 🕴️René Sève

 

CHAPITRE II : AMBITIONS POITIQUES ET STRATEGIES D'ENTREPRISE DANS L'ORGANISATION CONTRACTUELLE DES CHAINES DE VALEUR

Section 1 ♦️ sss

Section 2 ♦️ sss, par 

 

CHAPITRE III : LES CONTRATS PUBLICS, PARANGONS DE L'ACCUEILS DES AMBITIONS POLITIQUES DANS LES STRATEGIES ET L'ALLIANCE DES INSTITUTIONS

Section 1 ♦️ sss

Section 2 ♦️ sss, par 

 

TITRE II.

LE DROIT COMMUN DES CONTRATS CONFRONTE AU DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE

 

CHAPITRE I : DISTINGUER LE CONTRACTUEL DE CE QUI S'EN RAPPROCHE DANS LE SYSTEM DE COMPLIANCE 

Section 1 ♦️ La ronde des engagements et des contrats dans le droit de la compliance e, par 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 2 ♦️ sss,

 

CHAPITRE II : L'EMPRISE DU DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE SUR LE DROIT COMMUN DE DES CONTRATS 

Section 1 ♦️ sss

Section 2 ♦️ sss,

 

CHAPITRE III : L'APPORT DU DROIT COMMUN DES CONTRATS AU DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE

Section 1 ♦️ sss

Section 2 ♦️ sss, par 

 

 

 

TITRE III.

CONTRAT DE COMPLIANCE, CLAUSES DE COMPLIANCE

 

CHAPITRE I : LE "CONTRAT DE COMPLIANCE"

Section 1 ♦️ sss

Section 2 ♦️ sss,

 

CHAPITRE II : LES CLAUSES DE COMPLIANCE

Section 1 ♦️ sss

Section 2 ♦️ sss, par 

 

 

 

TITRE IV.

LE CONTENTIEUX CONTRACTUEL IMPLIQUANT LE DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE 

 

CHAPITRE I : CE 

Section 1 ♦️ sss

Section 2 ♦️ sss,

 

CHAPITRE II : CE 

Section 1 ♦️ sss

Section 2 ♦️ sss, par 

 

​

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► Full reference: M.A. Frison-Roche, “Considérer la géographie juridique africaine pour y réussi l'obligation de vigilance" (Taking into account the legal landscape in Africa to fulfil the Vigilance Obligation), in E. Da Allada (ed.), Devoir de vigilance, quelles perspectives africaines ? (The Vigilance Duty: what African perspectives?), Lefebvre-Dalloz, “Thèmes et Commentaires” series, 2026, pp. 235–235.

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📝Read the article (in French)

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🚧read the bilingual working document on which this article is based

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🎤read the presentation of the conference  which summarised this topic

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► Summary of the article: The French ‘Vigilance’ Act of 2017 incorporated the technical provisions and the spirit of the ‘Sapin 2’ Act of 2016. They share a common ambition. They have been, and remain, a source of both controversy and fervour. At their heart lies the establishment of a “compliance obligation”, for which vigilance techniques form the “vanguard” in serving a grand ambition: to protect systems from present and future risks in order to safeguard the people involved in them.

The passion that continues to surround the Vigilance Act – which gave rise to the CS3D Directive – is not a good thing, because the law and passion are never allies. Some are passionately committed to the triumph of vigilance by forcing companies to perform miracles, whilst others are passionately committed to the destruction of all the legislation that has established the very concept of this compliance law, built upon these monumental humanist goals.

But let us recognise that in these debates on the Duty of Care, which is being legally implemented across value chains,  Africa is often cited as an example in a general discussion. It is not often considered as a distinct case in its own right. No account is taken of its strengths or its own legal mechanisms, even though value chains – particularly industrial ones – so often lead to it, both now and in the future. Through analyses of the duty of care, Africa is perceived as a place of retribution or of a new form of paternalism, and when its future is considered, prospects seem to be lacking, even though the very purpose of compliance – and therefore of due diligence – is the future. 

If we take a less confrontational view and focus more on the ‘legal geography’ of African countries and their social and inter-state structures  social and inter-state structures, we can see that concern for others – both present and future – which ultimately constitutes the Monumental Aim of Compliance Law and thus of the Duty of Vigilance – is more prevalent in Africa than it is in Europe, which is now built upon legal individualism. This concern for others is reflected in legal mechanisms akin to mediation and various legal structures that our own institutions would do well to take on board – our legislators before adopting legislation, and our judges, who could listen to them as amici curiae before always reaching a decision.

If we turn our attention to the African continent, where a segment of the value chains operates, and to the way work is organised, it becomes clear that here too, legislation and sanctions are not the whole story. Compliance techniques that make use of soft law and the contractual arrangements underpinning the chains themselves can remove the element of abstraction that is, by its very nature, inherent in general legislation. Making progress through contracts, under the scrutiny and with the support of the courts, is an approach that could prove more fruitful than well-intentioned legislation – which served as a catalyst – given the prominent role of Contract Law within OHADA.

This serves to enhance the judge’s importance. The judicialisation of compliance is also linked to the growing connection between compliance and contracts. However, it appears that not only can European judges specialising in due diligence thus rule on matters concerning Africa – a continent they can only know from a distance (though it is the lot of every judge to be an outsider) – but African and inter-state courts, notably through OHADA, can address the duty of care because value chains are constituted by contracts. By developing it not as a foreign concept to be assimilated, but as something that expresses the very heart of the law in Africa: concern for others, solidarity, and the search for compromises and solutions to ensure that the social and environmental – that is to say, human – system continues to thrive tomorrow.

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► Full Reference: M.A. Frison-Roche, "La part du gracieux dans le traitement juridictionnel de la compliance (The role of Discretionary Jurisdictio in the judicial treatment of Compliance cases)", in Mélanges Dominique d'Ambra, Liber Amicorum, Lefebvre-Dalloz, 2026, pp.175-196.

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📝read this article (in French) 

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🚧read the bilingual Working Paper, base of this article

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► English summary of this article: Based on the definition of Judicial Office, the procedural principles that derive from it and the consequent powers that judges exercise, the objet of this study is to measure the degree of discretion that exists in the judicial treatment of compliance, without direct consideration for the dispute between litigants. This part is very ignored, when it should be given top priority. Indeed, because Systems are involved in compliance cases brought before civil or commercial judges, we are seeing a development of this discretionary element in judicial fonction. Discretionary matters differ from unilateral discretionary procedures, and this discretionary element relates to what the judge examines, possibly in the context of a dispute.

The first part of this contribution therefore aims to describe the natural development of the discretionary power of the judge to deal with compliance cases brought before them. This role stems from the fact that, even when triggered by a dispute, what is submitted to the judge is a situation composed of a system, which cannot defend its interests before the civil or commercial judge in this Systemic Litigation arising from the very nature of Compliance Law and the Compliance Obligations it engenders on systemic entites. Moreover, it is the Future whose interests must be considered and protected, which the judge must do directly.

This leads to the second part of the contribution, calling for a rethinking of the procedure and the role of the Compliance Judge, so that ex gratia matters can be dealt with. The judge must therefore verify that there are no conflicts of interest between the litigants, including hidden ones, and must learn about the systems involved. The inquisitorial principle must therefore be strengthened. But at the same time, since the primary aim is not to settle a dispute but to resolve a systemic problematic situation, the judge must facilitate the movements of the parties, and the adversarial principle must also be strengthened. Must be encouraged this activation of a powerful and discretionary approach, not as an exception but as a principle fully articulated with a contentious principle, with the dispute being only a means used by the necessary parties to enable systemic compliance situations to be resolved.

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► Full reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "La définition juridique du Contrat de compliance (The legal definition of the compliance contract)", in Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) published by the Centre for Research on Justice and Conflict Resolution (CRJ) and the Centre for Research in Economics and Law (CRED) at Panthéon-Assas University (Paris II), Le "Contrat de compliance" (The "Compliance Contract"),  Paris II Lecture Theatre -  82 Rue Notre Dame des Champs, Paris, 12 June  2026.

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🧮view the full programme for the event

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📶view the slides (in French)

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🌐read the presentation made on LinkedIn

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🚧Read the bilingual working paper on which this conference is based

 

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📝This lecture will form the basis of a contribution to the book, 📕Compliance et Contrat (Compliance and Contracts), 

To be published in the 📚Regulations & Compliance series, a book co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz.

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► Overview of this lecture : The lecture is divided into three parts.

In the first part, the aim is to describe the reality of the “Compliance Contract”, which can be defined as the decision taken by an entity subject to a “Compliance Obligation” (most often a company, but it may also be a administrative organisation) to entrust the fulfilment of that obligation to a third party. This does not diminish the entity’s obligation to be accountable for the compliance structure, nor for its ability to produce the expected outcomes, in particular the behaviours that will contribute to achieving the Monumental Systemic Goals for which the compliance frameworks were adopted. This outsourcing is lawful; its contractual form falls under Contract Law and the principle of contractual freedom.

Even if one considers that, since the subject matter of the contract is Compliance itself, it would constitute a ‘Systemic Contract’—just as Compliance Litigation is ‘Systemic Litigation’—its fundamental nature is indeed a bilateral relationship between a client and a professional (who is often subject to professional rules and codes of conduct).

Indeed, there are legal consequences to this practice of “Compliance Contracts”, because it is the Compliance System that is thereby served: on the one hand, “regulatory clauses” will be inserted, whilst others will be removed (“deemed unwritten”). Contractual freedom remains the guiding principle, however.

In Contract Law, it would be appropriate for the contracting parties to refer to this contribution to the Monumental Goals, which constitute the  fundamental legal norm of the Compliance System, if only to guide the contract Judge who may be called upon in the event of a dispute, as the interpretation of the parties’ intentions must be carried out in a teleological manner.

In the second part, the relationship between this "Compliance Contract" and the various "Compliance Clauses" is analysed. The two should certainly not be confused, since, quite apart from these highly specific contracts through which the various compliance techniques are entrusted, in their drafting and management, to third parties, who thus become the experts, there are also clauses inserted into numerous contracts (sales, distribution, manufacturing, service, etc.), clauses which aim, amongst many other clauses serving different purposes, to incorporate compliance considerations into the contract.

But first and foremost, the Compliance Contract contains numerous clauses specific to it, which often derive from compliance system, since Compliance concretisation is the very purpose of this specific contract, et nothing else: it is therefore logical that, by way of a ‘transparency effect’, the legal Compliance Systemic requirements should be incorporated into the isolated contract.

Secondly, and more significantly, many various contracts contain clauses that provide for the triggering of a “Compliance Ccontract”. For example, when an audit clause is linked to a specific event and the provision stipulates that a contract will then be entered into with a particular expertal body or person, this will generate a Compliance Contract in a second time. The link between the two may give one of the contracting parties control over the other, notably if the expert is close to them. If the links between Compliance Contracts and Compliance Clauses are developping, this could lead to a return to vertical integration. Competition Law may be justified in looking into this. 

It appears that, once we have distinguished between Compliance Contracts and Compliance Clauses, and then linked them together, we can arrive at a Contractual Compliance Strategy that is both legitimate and effective, provided that it contributes to the achievement of the Compliance Monumental Goals set by the political and public authorities. 

Indeed, as soon as we distinguish between “conformity” – which is intended solely to compel the operator to obey all applicable regulations blindly and mechanically – and “Compliance Law”, which is legally guided by Monumental Systemic Goals, this contractual strategy becomes essential.

 

Part Three sets out to clarify the scope of this Compliance Contract.

The first implication concerns the Compliance System itself, of which it forms a part; the Compliance Contract having the welcome effect of increasing the operator’s contribution to the achievement of the Monumental Systemic Goals (ensuring that systems – banking, financial, transport, energy, climate, digital, etc.—do not collapse and do not crush human beings, but rather benefit the human beings who are involved in them, whether willingly or not).

To this end, the contract must enable the operator – where necessary by means of express provisions – to demonstrate its credibility in contributing to the achievement of these Monumental Goals. Reliable pathways and credible structures must be established. In the cas of technical implementation is outsourced by a Compliance Contract, this obligation to provide evidence may be undermined. To compensate for this, the Compliance Contract may itself include provisions relating to portable technical information, support available through the client's accountability mechanism, or even in the event of legal proceedings.

The second aspect concerns the contractors themselves, who adapt their intentions and are bound, above all, by this “little law” which is any contract for the parties. This perspective is surprisingly underdeveloped in practice, no doubt because in Law, when considering Compliance, reference is made to unilateral “regulations” and the vertical relationship of obedience that it engenders in the operator.  This changes with the transformation of "conformity" (which is that) in "Compliance Law" (which is based on Monumental Systemic Goals and justifies contracts).

The third aspect concerns third parties, namely the stakedholders (and competitors...). These third parties benefit from Compliance Contracts because they are integrated into the Compliance System and because of the transparency between this system and the Compliance Contracts. In fact, and more technically speaking, this specific Cgreement provides them not only with a accountable(the company, the public body, the State), but also with a contractual debtor. Stakeholders may assert rights against the latter.

However, because the contracts themselves are also enforceable against third parties, they can anticipate these relationships with third parties – not only the competitors of the entity subject to the Compliance Obligation, but also its own relationship with stakeholders, and even its relationship with public authorities. Indeed, the object (and effect) of the Compliance Contract is to produce and build up Information that is of interest to everyone. The result is a ‘treasure trove of evidence’. A key question is how, and whether, this treasure trove can remain within the circle of the contracting parties or not.

Indeed, the fourth area concerns Public Authorities. As the bodies that “uphold” the compliance system, they consider the Compliance Contract to be legitimate and one of the most effective means of ensuring that regulations are effective, efficient and properly enforced; however, they also wish to benefit from the outcome of the contract’s implementation: to access the systemic information it generates. The contracting parties do not always share this view, but the Compliance Contract is not a means of “obeying” regulations. It is the Judge who will certainly address this question of principle, which relates to the very definition of Compliance Law.

This brings us to the fifth area of application, which concerns the Courts. Indeed, a number of courts are responsible for hearing such cases: the contract courts, the competition courts, the courts overseeing the various systems whose sustainability is thus safeguarded, and the courts specialising in vigilance legal duty  (which is the cutting edge of Compliance Law). 

The issue of the “natural judge” was examined at the symposium held on 29 May 2026 on: Contractual litigation involving compliance: procedural and jurisdictional aspects. The judge hearing the contract case (civil or commercial judge) will tend to refer first and foremost to the contract. This is also why the Compliance Contract conceptor would be well advised to include provisions in its terms regarding its relationship with the Compliance System, so that it is not the authorities of that system who do so in a too much discretionary manner.

In understanding the "Compliance Contract", as Iit was emphasised in 2022, in the judge’s interpretation of the contract, the judge is required to reconcile the parties’ intentions with a teleological approach, that is to say, to establish that the parties intended to serve the purpose of the expertise thus requested and developed (for the operator and ultimately for the stakeholders and for the system itself). 

By establishing this convergence, the judge gives full effect to the Cmpliance Contract. Rather than framing the issue, as is so often done when reasoning in terms of ‘conformity’, as a conflict between contractual freedom and public policy (conformity serving a public policy that would be contrary to the contract, inferior norm in the vertical normative hiercharchy). 

It must be accepted as a fundamental principle that contractual freedom, freedom of contract and a competitive market for compliance expertise are the most effective means of developing a Compliance System that will safeguard interconnected  different systems and protect the people involved in them.

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⛏️Find out more  :

🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance contract, compliance clauses, 2022

🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, ⚙️Compliance and Contracts,

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► Référence complète : E da Allada. (dir.), Devoir de vigilance. Quelles perspectives africaines ?, Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. "Thèmes & Commentaires, 2026, sous presse.

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►Voir notamment la présentation des contributions :

 

► Référence complète  : Conseil constitutionnel, déc.  n°25-1184 QPC, 6 mars 2026, Conseil national des barreaux et autres

[Expérimentation d’une contribution pour la justice économique due pour chaque instance devant le tribunal des activités économiques]

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►lire la décision

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