► Full Reference: D. Gutmann, "Droit fiscal et obligation de compliance" (Tax Law and Compliance Obligation), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2024, to be published

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► English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The author takes up the hypothesis of a Compliance Law defined by its Monumental Goals, the realisation of which is entrusted to "crucial operators" and confronts it with Tax Law. The link is particularly effective since these operators possess what governments need in this area: relevant Information.

Going further, Compliance Law can give rise to two types of obligations on the part of these operators, either towards others operators who need to be monitored, corrected or denounced, or towards themselves, when they need to make amends.

In the first part of this contribution, the author shows that Compliance Obligation reproduces the mechanism of a Tax Law which, for large companies, is embroiled in a process of increasing Globalisation. It enables Governments to aspire to the "Monumental Goals" of combating tax optimisation and impoverishing governments, victims of the erosion of the tax base, in the face of the strategies of companies that are more powerful than they are themselves, by using this very power of firms to turn it against them. Companies become the willing or de facto allies of governments, particularly when it comes to recovering tax debts, or assist them in their stated ambition to achieve social justice.  In this way, the State "manages" Tax Law by cooperating with companies.

In the second part, the author outlines the contours of this business Compliance Obligation, which is no longer simply a matter of paying tax. Beyond this financial obligation, it is more a question of mastering Information, particularly when multinational companies are subject to specific tax reporting obligations and are required to reveal their tax strategy, presumed to be transparent and coherent within the group : this legal presumption gives rise to obligations to seek information and ensure coherence, since a single tax strategy is not self-evident in a group.

The author emphasises that companies have accepted the principles governing these new compliance obligations and are tending to transform these obligations, particularly Transparency, into a communication strategy, in line with the ESG criteria that have been developed and a desire for fruitful relations with stakeholders. Therefore the tax relations developed by major companies are being extended not only to the tax authorities, but also to NGOs, by incorporating a strong ethical dimension. This is leading to new strategies, particularly in the area of Vigilance.

The author concludes: "A n’en pas douter, l’obligation de compliance existe bel et bien en matière fiscale." ("There is no doubt that the Compliance Obligation does exist in tax matters").

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📕read the general presentation of the book, L'obligation de Compliance, in which this contribution is published

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► Full Reference: J.-B. Blanc, "La loi, source de l’Obligation de Compliance" ("The Law, source of the Compliance Obligation"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, "Régulations & Compliance" Serie, to be published

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📕lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, L'Obligation de Compliance, dans lequel cet article est publié

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► Summary of this contribution  (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance) :

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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The Independent Administrative Authority (IAA) is the legal form that the legislator has most often chosen to build regulatory authorities. The IAA is only its legal form, but French law has attached great importance to it, following the often formalistic tradition of public law. They are thus independent administrative authorities, especially in the legal systems of continental law like France, Germany or Italy.

The essential element is in the last adjective: the "independent" character of the organism. This means that this organ, which is only administrative so has a vocation to be placed in the executive hierarchy, does not obey the Government. In this, regulators have often been presented as free electrons, which posed the problem of their legitimacy, since they could no longer draw upstream in the legitimacy of the Government. This independence also poses the difficulty of their responsibility, the responsibility of the State for their actions, and the accountability of their use of their powers. Moreover, the independence of regulators is sometimes questioned if it is the government that retains the power to appoint the leaders of the regulatory authority. Finally, the budgetary autonomy of the regulator is crucial to ensure its independence, although the authorities having the privilege of benefiting from a budget - which is not included in the LOLF - are very few in number. They are no longer referred to as "independent administrative authorities" but as "Independent Public Authorities", the legislator making a distinction between the two (French Law of 20 January 2017).

The second point concerns the second adjective: that it is an "administrative" body. This corresponds to the traditional idea that regulation is the mechanism by which the State intervenes in the economy, in the image of a kind of deconcentration of ministries, in the Scandinavian model of the agency. If we allow ourselves to be enclosed in this vocabulary, we conclude that this administrative body makes an administrative decision which is the subject of an appeal before a judge. Thus, in the first place, this would be a first instance appeal and not a judgment since the administrative authority is not a court. Secondly, the natural judge of the appeal should be the administrative judge since it is an administrative decision issued by an administrative authority. But in France the Ordinance of 1 December 1986 sur la concurrence et la libéralisation des prix (on competition and price liberalization), because it intended precisely to break the idea of ​​an administered economy in order to impose price freedom on the idea of ​​economic liberalism, required that attacks against the decisions of economic regulators taking the form of IAA are brought before the Court of Appeal of Paris, judicial jurisdiction. Some great authors were even able to conclude that the Paris Court of Appeal had become an administrative court. But today the procedural system has become extremely complex, because according to the IAA and according to the different kinds of decisions adopted, they are subject to an appeal either to the Court of Appeal of Paris or to the Conseil d'État (Council of State) . If one observes the successive laws that modify the system, one finds that after this great position of principle of 1986, the administrative judge gradually takes again its place in the system, in particular in the financial regulation. Is it logical to conclude that we are returning to a spirit of regulation defined as an administrative police and an economy administered by the State?

Finally, the third term is the name itself: "authority". It means in the first place an entity whose power holds before in its "authority". But it marks that it is not a jurisdiction, that it takes unilateral decisions. It was without counting the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the judicial judge! Indeed, Article 6§1 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that everyone has the right to an impartial tribunal in civil and criminal matters. The notion of "criminal matter" does not coincide with the formal traditional concept of criminal law but refers to the broad and concrete factual concept of repression. Thus, by a reasoning which goes backwards, an organization, whatever the qualification that a State has formally conferred on it, which has an activity of repression, acts "in criminal matters". From this alone, in the European sense, it is a "tribunal". This automatically triggers a series of fundamental procedural guarantees for the benefit of the person who is likely to be the subject of a decision on his part. In France, a series of jurisprudence, both of the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation), the Conseil d'État (Council of State) or the Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) has confirmed this juridictionnalization of the AAI.

► Référence complète : M. M. Mohamed Salah, "Conclusions", in J. Andriantsimbazovina (dir.), Puissances privées et droits de l'Homme. Essai d'analyse juridique, Mare Martin, coll. "Horizons européens", 2024, pp. 297-314

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► Résumé de l'article :

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🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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Le plan est  actualisé chaque semaine au fur et à mesure que les leçons se déroulent en amphi.

Il est disponible ci-dessous.

Retourner à la présentation générale du cours.

(Avant le début des enseignements de Droit de la Régulation bancaire et financière, un aperçu du plan général du Cours avait été mis à disposition.)

► Référence complète : B. Lecourt, "Des obligations d'information en matière de droit de l'homme et d'environnement au devoir de vigilance", in B. Lecourt (dir.) Lebvre - Dalloz, coll. "Thèmes et commentaires", 2025, pp

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📗lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Le devoir européen de vigilance, dans lequel cet article est publié

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🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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► Full Reference: L. Rapp, "Compliance, Value Chains and Service Economy", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, to be published

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📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the author, translated by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC): Based on an analysis of the value chains of companies in the space sector and their recent evolution, this contribution examine the role, place and current transformations of compliance policies and strategies in the context of an industrial transformation that has become essential: the transition from an industrial economy to a service economy.

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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► Référence complète : Fr. Berrod, "Introduction au DMA : un esprit pionnier de la régulation des plateformes numériques", Dalloz IP/IT, 2023, pp. 266-271

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► Résumé de l'article (fait par l'auteur) : "Le Digital Markets Act (DMA) a été proposé en même temps que son jumeau le Digital Service Act et ils ont été négociés en parallèle et stabilisés par la présidence française de l'Union européenne. Il est applicable à partir du 2 mai 2023. Sa négociation fut menée de façon remarquablement rapide (moins de seize mois pour obtenir l'accord politique sur la proposition de la Commission du 15 déc. 2020), si l'on rappelle la difficulté de ces deux textes, tant technique que juridique. Le DMA vient modifier les directives (UE) 2019/1937 et (UE) 2020/1828. Le titre technique choisi reflète l'ambition de ce texte, consacré « aux marchés contestables et équitables dans le secteur numérique ». Nous retracerons dans cette contribution les principaux éléments de compréhension du DMA.".

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🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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► Référence complète : J.-Fr. Bohnert, "Les conditions de réussite de l'enquête interne dans les rapports entre le parquet national financier et l’entreprise mise en cause – l’enquête interne au soutien de la défense de l’entreprise", in M.-A. Frison-Roche et M. Boissavy (dir.), Compliance et droits de la défense. Enquête interne – CJIP – CRPC, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", à paraître.

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📕consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance et droits de la défense - Enquête interne, CIIP, CRPC, dans lequel cet article est publié

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► Résumé de l'article (fait par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC) : Dans une présentation très proche des lignes directrices du Parquet national financier (PNF) de 2023 et du droit souple produit avec l'Agence française anticorruption (AFA), l'auteur expose la façon dont l'entreprise doit dans un climat de confiance et de collaboration. Il s'agit pour l'entreprise de rechercher objectivement ce qui pourrait engager sa responsabilité pénale d'une façon transparente et loyale en gardant à l'esprit la collaboration possible dans la perspective d'une CJIP avec le PNF et la valorisation que celui-ci fait des diligences de l'entreprise dans la menée d'une enquête interne, de la même façon que des attitudes contraires sont logiquement considérés comme des éléments inverses dans le calcul.

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🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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► Full Reference: V. Magnier, "The transformation of governance and due diligence", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, to be published

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📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC): The author develops the tensions caused by Compliance Law and the Duty of Vigilance on corporate governance.

The French "Sapin 2" law targets corruption, while the French "Vigilance" law has a broader scope in terms of risks and the entire value chain. It is logical that this should create tensions in terms of governance, given the monumental goals involved. Companies need to take ownership of the powers delegated to them, which means rethinking their governance and the way in which they exercise their corporate mandates, with the corporate interest, the judge's compass, having to be combined with the adoption of new standards of behaviour formalised voluntarily by ethical charters in line with international standards. On this voluntary and supervised basis, the company must adapt its structure and then contractualise these norms.

This ethical approach has an impact on the role of corporate organs, not only in terms of transparency and risk prioritisation, but also proactively in terms of the adoption of commitments whose sincerity will be verified, as reflected, for example, in corporate governance codes (cf.in France the AFEP-MEDEF Code), the setting up of ad hoc committees and the presence of stakeholders, who will be consulted when the vigilance plan is drawn up.

She stresses that this creates tensions, that dialogue is difficult, that business secrecy must be preserved, but that stakeholders must become Vigilance watchdogs, a role that should not be left to the public authorities alone.

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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The insurance sector has always been regulated in that it presents a very high systemic risk, since the economic operators' strength is required for the operation of the sector and the bankruptcy of one of them may weaken or even collapse all. In addition, insurance is the sector in which moral hazard is the highest, since the insured will tend to minimize the risks to which he is exposed in order to pay the lowest premium possible, even though ehe company is engaged to cover an accident whose size can not be measured in advance. Thus, the science of insurance is above all that of probabilities.

The recent challenge of regulating insurance, both institutional, the construction and the powers of the regulator of the sector, and also functional, namely the relations that it must have with the other bodies and institutions, lies mainly in the relationship between the insurance regulator and the bank regulator, which refers to the concept of "interregulation." If the formal criteria are followed, the two sectors are distinct and the regulators must be similarly separated. There was the case in France before 2010. En 2010, considering activities, sensitive to the fact that insurance products, for example life insurance contracts, are mostly financial products, and moreover, through the notion of "bank-insurance", the same companies engage in both economic activities, the solution of an unique body has been chosen.

A part from the fact that in Competition Law companies are defined by market activity, the main consideration is that the risk of contamination and spread is common between insurance sector and banking sector. For this reason, the French  Ordinance of 21 January 2010 created the Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel -ACP (French Prudential Supervisory Authority), which covers both insurance companies and banks, since their soundness must be subject to similar requirements and to an organization common. The law of July 2013 entrusted this Authority with the task of organizing the restructuring of these enterprises, thus becoming the Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution - ACPR  (French Prudential Control and Resolution Authority).

However, the substantive rules are not unified, on the one hand because the insurers are not in favor of such assimilation with banks, secondly because the texts, essentially the European Directive on the insolvency of insurance companies ("Solvency II") , eemain specific to them, and at a distance from the Basel rules applying to banks, which contradict the institutional rapprochement exposed before. European construction reflects the specificity of the insurance sector, the Regulation of 23 November 2010 establishing EIOPA, which is a European quasi-regulator for pension funds, including insurance companies.

The current issue of insurance regulatory system is precisely the European construction. While the Banking Union, the Europe of banking regulation, is being built, the Europe of Insurance Regulation is not being built. Already because, rightly, it does not want to merge into the banking Europe, negotiations of the texts of "Solvency II" stumbling on this question of principle. We find this first truth: in practice, it is the definitions that count. Here: Can an insurance company define itself as a bank like any other?

L'enjeu actuel de la Régulation assurantielle est précisément la construction européenne. Tandis que par l’Union bancaire, l’Europe de la régulation bancaire se construit, l’Europe de la Régulation assurantielle ne se construit. Déjà parce que, à juste titre, elle ne veut pas se fondre dans l’Europe bancaire, les négociations des textes de « Solvabilité II » achoppant sur cette question de principe. L’on retrouve cette vérité première : en pratique, ce sont les définitions qui compte. Ici : une compagnie d’assurance peut-elle se définir comme une banque comme une autre ?

In an ordinary market of goods and services, access to the market is open to everyone, whether it is the one who offers the good or service (potential supplier) or who wants to own it (potential applicant ). Freedom of competition presupposes that these new entrants can, at their will, become effective agents on the market, the potential supplier if its entrepreneurial dynamism drives him there, and the potential applicant if he has the desire and the tools to do it(money, Information and proximity, in particular ; but first of all, money). The absence of barriers to entry is presumed; a barrier resulting from anti-competitive behavior will be penalized ex post by the competition authority.

The barrier is therefore what undermines the principle of access to the market. This is why the World Trade Organization (WTO), in that it fights against barriers to ensure global free trade, can be regarded as a forerunner of a sort of World Competition Authority.

But it may happen that it is necessary to organize by the force of Law the market access in a first situation, when there has been a liberalization decision of a previously monopolistic sector, access can not be exercised solely by the strength of demand and the power of potential new entrants, notably prevented by the de facto power of the formerly monopolistic enterprises. The Regulatory Authority will build access to sectoral markets whose sole principle of Competition has been declared by Law. Secondly this necessity can also result from phenomena that definitely impede this ideal competitive functioning of the sector, such as natural monopolies or asymmetries of information: Law will make this access concrete by distributing rights of access to the interested operators.

This is the case in network industries for operators' access rights to essential infrastructure networks. Even if this act is carried out by contract, this contract merely crystallizes a right of access conferred by the Legislator to the operator in order this one can penetrate the market. This is particularly true in the energy and telecommunications sectors.

In a more political way and not directly related to a desire to set up competition or to compensate for a market failure, this access organization may still be required because there is a political decision to provide everyone with access to common goods. The decision then goes hand in hand with the notion of a "fundamental right", such as the fundamental right of access to the healthcare system or vital medicines, or the fundamental right of access to the digital system, which the Regulator becomes the guardian in Ex Ante but also in Ex Post.

► Full Reference: L. Aynès, "How International Arbitration can reinforce the Compliance Obligation", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, to be published

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📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC): The author takes as his starting point the observation that International Arbitration and Compliance are a natural fit, since they are both a manifestation of globalisation, expressing an overcoming of borders, with arbitration being able to take on the Compliance Monumental Goals, since it has engendered a substantially global arbitral order.

But the obstacle lies in the fact that the source of arbitration remains the contract, with the arbitrator exercising only a temporary jurisdiction whose mission is given by the contract. Yet the advent of the global arbitral order makes this possible, with the arbitrator drawing on norms that may include the Compliance monumental goals and corporate commitments. In so doing, the arbitrator becomes an indirect organ of this emerging compliance law.

The contribution then suggests a second development, which could make the arbitrator a direct organ of compliance. For this to happen, the arbitrator must not only compel the fulfillment of an obligation to act, as is already the case with provisional measures, but also have a broader conception of the conflict for which a solution is required, or even free himself somewhat from the contractual source that surrounds it. This may well be taking shape, mirroring the profound transformation of the judge's office.

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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Référence : Beauvais, P., Méthode transactionnelle et justice pénale, in  Gaudemet, A. (dir.), La compliance : un nouveau monde? Aspects d'une mutation du droit, coll. "Colloques", éd. Panthéon-Assas, Panthéon-Assas, 2016, pp. 79-90.

Voir la présentation générale de  l'ouvrage dans lequel l'article a été publié.

"Liberalization" refers to the process of the legal end of a monopolistic organization of an economy, a sector or a market, in order to open it up to Competition.

Since it is rare for an economy to be entirely monopolistic (which presupposes an extreme concentration of political power), the phenomenon is more particularly characteristic of public sectors. Liberalization, if it is translated into Law only by a declaration of openness to Competition, is actually achieved only by a much slower implementation of the latter, since the incumbent operators have the power to check the entry of potential new entrants. This is why the process of liberalization is only effective if strong regulatory authorities are established to open up the market, weakening incumbent operators where necessary and offering benefits to new entrants through asymmetric regulation .

This Regulation aims to build Competition, now permitted by law.

This is why, in a process of Liberalization, Regulation aims to concretizeCcompetition by constructing it. This transitional regulation is intended to be withdrawn and the institutions set up to disappear, for example by becoming merely specialized chambers of the General Competition Authority, Regulation being temporary when linked to liberalization.

It is distinct from the Regulation of essential infrastructures which, as natural monopolies, must be definitively regulated. Quite often, in liberal economies, the State has asked public enterprises to manage such monopolies, particularly in the network industries, to which it has also entrusted the economic activity of the entire sector. By the liberalization phenomenon, most States have opted to retain the management of infrastructure for this operator, now an incumbent operator competing on the competing activities offered to consumers. In this respect, the Regulator forces it in two ways: in a transitional way to establish competition for the benefit of new entrants, in a definitive way insofar as it has been chosen by the State to manage the economic monopoly of infrastructure.

Even in the only relationship between competitors, Regulation has difficulty to retreat, and this often due to the Regulator. Max Weber's sociological rules  administration show about administration that the regulatory authorities, even in view of the purpose of competitive development, for example in the field of telecommunications, seek to remain, even though competition has actually been built. It does it by finding new purposes (in the above sector, the regulator could be the guardian of Net Neutralityt) or by affirming to practice a permanent "symmetric Regulation".

Competition is the law of the market. It allows the emergence of the exact price, which is often referred to as "fair price". It means and requires that agents on the market are both mobile, that is to say free to exercise their will, and atomized, that is to say, not grouped together. This is true for those who offer a good or service, the offerers, as well as for those seeking to acquire them, the applicants: the bidders seek to attract the applicants so that they buy them the goods and services that they propose.  Bidders are in competition with each other.

In the competitive market, buyers are indulging in their natural infidelity: even if they have previously bought a product from an A supplier, they will be able to turn away from him in favor of a B supplier if the latter offers them a product more attractive in terms of quality or price. Price is the main signal and information provided by the suppliers on the market to excite this competitive mobility of the offerers. Thus, free competition accelerates market liquidity, the circulation of goods and services, raises the quality of products and services and lowers prices. It is therefore a moral and virtuous system, as Adam Smith wanted, a system which is the fruits of individual vices. That is why everything that will inject "viscosity" into the system will be countered by Competition Law as "non-virtuous": not only frontal coordination on prices but for example, exclusivity clauses, agreements by which companies delay their entry on the market or intellectual property rights which confer on the patentee a monopoly.

Admittedly, Competition Law can not be reduced to a presentation of such simplicity, since it admits economic organizations which deviate from this basic model, for example distribution networks or patent mechanisms on which, inter alia, is built the pharmaceutical sector. But the impact is probative: in the sphere of Competition Law, if one is in a pattern that is not part of the fundamental figure of the free confrontation of supply and demand, he has to demonstrate the legitimacy and efficiency of its organization, which is a heavy burden on the firm or the State concerned.

Thus, in the field of Regulation, if regulatory mechanis were to be regarded as an exception to competition, an exception admitted by the competition authorities, but which should be constantly demonstrated before them by its legitimacy and effectiveness in the light of the "competitive order", then public organizations and operators in regulated sectors would always face a heavy burden of proof. This is what the competition authorities consider.

But if we consider that regulated sectors have a completely different logic from competitive logic, both from an economic and a legal point of view, the Law of Regulation refers in particular to the notion of public service and having its own institutions, which are the regulatory authorities, then certain behaviors, in particular monopolies, are not illegitimate in themselves and do not have to justify themselves in relation to the competitive model, for they are not the exception ( Such as the public education or health service).

► Full Reference : E. Netter, "Les technologies de conformité pour satisfaire les exigences du droit de la compliance. Exemple du numérique" (Conformity technologies to meet the requirements of Compliance Caw. Digital example), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2024, forthcoming.

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📕read the general presentation of the book, L'obligation de Compliance, in which this contribution is published.

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► English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance) :The author distinguishes between Compliance, which refers to Monumental Goals, and conformity, which are the concrete means that the company uses to tend towards them, through processes, check-lists in the monitoring of which the operator is accountable (art. 5.2. GRPD). Technology enables the operator to meet this requirement, as the changing nature of technology fits in well with the very general nature of the goals pursued, which leave plenty of room for businesses and public authorities to produce soft law.

The contribution focuses firstly on existing technologies. Through Compliance, Law can prohibit a technology or restrict its use because it runs counter to the goal pursued, for example the technology of fully automated decisions producing legal effects on individuals. Because it is a perilous exercise to dictate by law what is good and what is bad in this area, the method is rather one of explicability, i.e. control through knowledge by others.

Regulators are nevertheless developing numerous requirements stemming from the Monumental Goals of Compliance. Operators must update their technology or abandon obsolete technology in the light of new risks or to enable effective competition that does not lock users into a closed system. But technological power must not become too intrusive, as the privacy and freedom of the individuals concerned must be respected, which leads to the principles of necessity and proportionality.

The author stresses that operators must comply with the regulations by using certain technologies if these technologies are available, or even to counteract them if they are contrary to the goals of the regulations, but this obligation of conformity is applied only if these technologies are available. The notion of "available technology" therefore becomes the criterion of the obligation, which means that its content varies with circumstances and time, particularly in the area of cybersecurity.

In the second part of this contribution, the author examines technologies that are only potential, those that Law, and in particular the courts, might require companies to invent in order to fulfill their conformity obligation. This is quite understandable when we are talking about technologies that are in the making, but which will come to fruition, for example in the area of personal data transfer to satisfy the right to portability (GRPD), or where companies must be encouraged to develop technologies that are of less immediate benefit to them, or in the area of secure payment to ensure strong authentication (SPD 2).

This is more difficult for technologies whose feasibility is not even certain, such as online age verification or the interoperability of secure messaging systems, two requirements which appear to be technologically contradictory in their terms, and which therefore still come under the heading of "imaginary technology". But Compliance is putting so much pressure on companies, particularly digital technology companies, that considerable investment is required to achieve it.

The author concludes that this is the very ambition of Compliance and that the future will show how successful it will be. 

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🦉This article is available in full texte for persons following Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche teaching.

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Référence générale, Cohendet, M.-A. et Fleury, M., Droit constitutionnel et droit international de l'environnement, Revue française de droit constitutionnel , PUF, » 2020/2, n°122, p.271-297. 

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Résumé de l'article : 

► Référence complète : L. d'Avout,  La cohérence mondiale du droit, Cours général de droit international privé, Académie de droit international de La Haye, t.443, 2025, 692 p.

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, to be published

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📕In parallel, a book in French L'Obligation de compliance, is published in the collection "Régulations & Compliance" co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz. 

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📚This book is inserted in this series created by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche for developing Compliance Law.

 read the presentations of the other books of this Compliance Series:

• further books:

🕴️M.A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📘Compliance Probation system, 2027

• previous books:

​🕴️M.A. Frison-Roche (ed), 📘Compliance Juridictionnalisation, 2023

🕴️M.A. Frison-Roche (ed), 📘Compliance Monumental Goals, 2022

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Tools, 2021

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► go to the general presentation of this 📚Series ​Compliance & Regulation, conceived, founded et managed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, co-published par the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant. 

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🧮the book follows the cycle of colloquia 2023 organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its Universities partners.

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► general presentation of the book: Compliance is sometimes presented as something that cannot be avoided, which is tantamount to seeing it as the legal obligation par excellence, Criminal Law being its most appropriate mode of expression. However, this is not so evident. Moreover, it is becoming difficult to find a unity to the set of compliance tools, encompassing what refers to a moral representation of the world, or even to the cultures specific to each company, Compliance Law only having to produce incentives or translate this ethical movement. The obligation of compliance is therefore difficult to define.

This difficulty to define affecting the obligation of compliance reflects the uncertainty that still affects Compliance Law in which this obligation develops. Indeed, if we were to limit this branch of law to the obligation to "be conform" with the applicable regulations, the obligation would then be located more in these "regulations", the classical branches of Law which are Contract Law and Tort Law organising "Obligations" paradoxically remaining distant from it. In practice, however, it is on the one hand Liability actions that give life to legal requirements, while companies make themselves responsible through commitments, often unilateral, while contracts multiply, the articulation between legal requirements and corporate and contractual organisations ultimately creating a new way of "governing" not only companies but also what is external to them, so that the Monumental Goals, that Compliance Law substantially aims at, are achieved. 

The various Compliance Tools illustrate this spectrum of the Compliance Obligation which varies in its intensity and takes many forms, either as an extension of the classic legal instruments, as in the field of information, or in a more novel way through specific instruments, such as whistleblowing or vigilance. The contract, in that it is by nature an Ex-Ante instrument and not very constrained by borders, can then appear as a natural instrument in the compliance system, as is the Judge who is the guarantor of the proper execution of Contract and Tort laws. The relationship between companies, stakeholders and political authorities is thus renewed.

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🏗️general construction of the book

The book opens with a double Introduction.  The first, which is freely accessible, is a summary of the book, while the second, which is substantial, deals with the future development of the compliance obligation in a borderless economic system.

The first part is devoted to the definition of the Compliance Obligation. 

The second part presents commitments and contracts, in certain new or classic categories, in particular public contracts, and compliance stipulations, analysed and qualified regarding Compliance Law and the various relevant branches of Law.

The third part develops the responsibilities attached to the compliance obligation.

The fourth part refers to the institutions that are responsible for the effectiveness, efficiency, and efficacy of the compliance obligation, including the judge and the international arbitrator. 

The fifth part takes the Obligation or Duty of Vigilance as an illustration of all these considerations.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION : OVERVIEW

Section 1 ♦️ Main Aspects of the Book L'Obligation de Compliance, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 2 ♦️ Conceiving the unicity of the Compliance Obligation without diluting it, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

TITLE I.

IDENTIFYING THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

CHAPTER I: NATURE OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

Section 1 ♦️ Will, Heart and Calculation, the three marks surrounding the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 2 ♦️ Debt, as the basis of the compliance obligation, by 🕴️Bruno Deffains

Section 3 ♦️ Compliance Obligation and Human Rights, by 🕴️Jean-Baptiste Racine

Section 4 ♦️ Compliance Obligation and changes in Sovereignty and Citizenship, by 🕴️René Sève

CHAPTER II: SPACES OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

Section 1 ♦️ Industrial Entities and Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Etienne Maclouf

Section 2 ♦️ Compliance, Value Chains and Service Economy, by 🕴️Lucien Rapp

Section 3 ♦️ Compliance and conflict of laws. International Law of Vigilance-Conformity, based on recent applications in Europe, by 🕴️Louis d'Avout 

TITLE II.

ARTICULATING THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION WITH BRANCHES OF LAW

Section 1 ♦️ Constitutional dimensions of the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Stéphane Mouton

Section 2 ♦️ Tax Law and Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Daniel Gutmann

Section 3 ♦️ General Procedural Law, prototype of the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 4 ♦️ Corporate and Financial Markets Law facing the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Anne-Valérie Le Fur

Section 5 ♦️ The Relation between Tort Law and Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Jean-Sébastien Borghetti

Section 6 ♦️ Environmental and Climate Compliance, by 🕴️Marta Torre-Schaub

Section 7 ♦️ Competition Law and Compliance Law, by 🕴️Jean-Christophe Roda

Section 8 ♦️ The Compliance Obligation in Global Law, by 🕴️Benoît Frydman

Section 9 ♦️ Transformation of Labour Relations and Vigilance Obligation, by 🕴️Stéphane Vernac

Section 11 ♦️ Judge of Insolvency Law and Compliance Obligations, by 🕴️Jean-Baptiste Barbièri

TITLE III.

COMPLIANCE : GIVE AND TAKE THE MEANS TO OBLIGE

CHAPTER I: CONVERGENCE OF SOURCES

Section 1 ♦️ Compliance Obligation, between Will and Consent: obligation upon obligation works, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 2 ♦️ What a Commitment is, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 3 ♦️ Cybersecurity and Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Michel Séjean

Section 4 ♦️  Place of Hope in the Ability to Apprehend the Future, by 🕴️

Section 5 ♦️ Legal Constraint and Company Strategies in Compliance matters, by 🕴️Jean-Philippe Denis & Nathalie Fabbe-Costes

CHAPTER II: INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN SUPPORT OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

Section 1 ♦️ Reinforcing Compliance Commitments by referring Ex Ante to International Arbitration, by  

Section 2 ♦️ The Arbitral Tribunal's Award in Kind, in support of the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Eduardo Silva Romero

Section 3 ♦️ The use of International Arbitration to reinforce the Compliance Obligation: the example of the construction sector, by 🕴️Christophe Lapp & 🕴️Jean-François Guillemin

Section 4 ♦️ The Arbitrator, Judge, Supervisor, Support, by 🕴️Jean-Baptiste Racine

Section 5 ♦️ How International Arbitration can reinforce the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Laurent Aynès

TITLE IV.

VIGILANCE, SPEARHEAD OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

CHAPTER I: INTENSITIES OF THE VIGILANCE OBLIGATION, SPEARHEAD OF THE COMPLIANCE SYSTEM

Section 1 ♦️ Systemic Articulation between Vigilance, Due Diligence, Conformity and Compliance: Vigilance, Total Share of the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 2 ♦️ Intensity of the Vigilance Obligation by Sectors: the case of Financial Operators, by 🕴️Anne-Claire Rouaud

Section 3 ♦️ Intensity of the Vigilance Obligation by Sectors: the case of Banking and Insurance Operators, by 🕴️Mathieu Françon

Section 4 ♦️ Intensity of the Vigilance Obligation by Sectors: the case of Digital Operators, by 🕴️Grégoire Loiseau

Section 5 ♦️ Intensity of the Vigilance Obligation by Sectors: the case of Energy Operators, by 🕴️Marie Lamoureux

CHAPTER II: VARIATIONS OF TENSIONS GENERATED BY THE VIGILANCE OBLIGATION, SPEARHEAD OF THE COMPLIANCE SYSTEM

Section 1 ♦️ Rethinking the Concept of Civil Liability in the light of the Duty of Vigilance, Spearhead of Compliance, by 🕴️Mustapha Mekki

Section 2 ♦️ The transformation of governance and due diligence, by 🕴️Véronique Magnier

Section 3 ♦️ Technologies available, prescribed or prohibited to meet Compliance and Vigilance requirements, by 🕴️Emmanuel Netter

CHAPTER III: NEW MODALITIES OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION, HIGHLIGHTED BY THE VIGILANCE IMPERATIVE

Section 1 ♦️ How the Vigilance Imperative fits in with International Legal Rules, by 🕴️Bernard Haftel

Section 2 ♦️ Contracts and clauses, implementation and modalities of the Vigilance Obligation, by 🕴️Gilles J. Martin

Section 3 ♦️ Proof that Vigilance has been properly carried out with regard to the Compliance Evidence System, by 🕴️Jean-Christophe Roda

TITLE V.

THE JUDGE AND THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

Section 1 ♦️ Present and Future Challenges of Articulating Principles of Civil and Commercial Procedure with the Logic of Compliance, by 🕴️Thibault Goujon-Bethan

Section 2 ♦️ Mediation, the way forward for an Effective Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Malik Chapuis

Section 3 ♦️ The Judge required for an Effective Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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►Full Reference: M.A. Frison-Roche, "Droit de la compliance et Contentieux systémique" (Compliance Law and Systemic Litigation), in Chroniques Droit de la Compliance (Compliance Law Chronicles), Recueil Dalloz, 6 November 2025 

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🚧read the bilingual Working Paper on which this article is based, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks

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►read the English presentation of the previous chronicles:

• "Compliance et conformité : les distinguer pour mieux les articuler", 2024
• "La loi, la compliance, le contrat et le juge: places et alliances", 2023
• "Contrat de compliance, clauses de compliance", 2022
• "L'aventure de la compliance", 2020
• "Compliance et personnalité", 2019
• "Théorie juridique de la cartographie des risques", 2019

►read the English presentation of the whole chroniques

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►English summary of this article: Legal systems have changed, and Compliance Law, in its uniqueness, reflects this change and plays a powerful role in it. Through new sets of compliance rules, particularly at European level, in areas such as data protection (GDPR), anti-money laundering (AMLA), climate balance protection (CS3D) and banking and financial system sustainability (Banking Union), techniques (always the same) have been developed and imposed on large companies, which must implement them: alerts, mapping, assessment, sanctions, etc. These new regulatory frameworks only make sense in relation to their ‘Monumental Goals’: to detect systemic risks Ex Ante and prevent crises so that the systems in question do not collapse, but ‘sustain". All the legal instruments in the corpus are normatively rooted in these Monumental Goals, which are the core that unifies Compliance Law (I).

Judges are the guardians (II) of this new and highly ambiguous normative framework, which relies on the practical ability of companies to do just that. They ensure that the technical provisions are applied teleologically in each of these compliance blocks, and that the regulatory frameworks are mutually supportive, for it is always the same systemic goal that all compliance regulations serve: to ensure that systems (banking, financial, climate, digital, energy, etc.) do not collapse, that they are sustainable, and that present and future human beings are not crushed by them but, on the contrary, benefit from them. This unity is still little perceived, as regulations pulverize this profound unity of compliance law in the myriad of changing provisions. Entrusting the "regulatory mass" to algorithms increases this pulverization, making the whole increasingly incomprehensible and therefore impossible to handle.  Acknowledging the judge's rightful place, i.e. at the heart of the matter, will enable us to master this new branch of law. But it's not the judge's job alone to restore clarity to a whole covered in the dust of his own technicality.

The systemic object of Compliance Law is transferred to Litigation. Indeed, the Litigation that emerges from the new Compliance Law is also fundamentally new, by transitivity. Indeed, the aim of Compliance Law is to make systems sustainable (or sustainable, or resilient, the vocabulary varies). The result is litigation which is itself "systemic litigation" (III), most often initiated by an organization against a systemic operator. The place and role of each are transformed (IV).

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► Full reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Adéquation et inadéquation de la sanction comme outil de régulation financière et sa transformation par la Compliance" (Adequacy and inadequacy of sanctions as a tool of Financial Regulation and its transformation through Compliance)", contribution to the round-table discussion on"Quel rôle pour la sanction dans la régulation ? (What role for sanctions in Regulatory System)", Annual conference of the Commission des sanctions (Enforcement Committee) of the Autorité des marchés financiers - AMF (French Financial Markets Authority), Paris,  14 October 2025.

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► see the general programme of this manifestation (in French)

The event comprises two round tables. The theme of the first round table is: La preuve des abus de marché entre l’AMF et le juge pénal : vers une convergence ? (Proof of market abuse between the AMF and the criminal courts: towards convergence?)

🪑🪑🪑AutresOther participants in this 2nd round table, moderated by Sophie Schiller, member of the Enforcement Committe on the topic: Quel rôle pour la sanction dans la régulation ? (What role for sanctions in Regulatory System?)

🕴🏻Sébastien Raspiller, Secretary General of the AMF

🕴🏻Martine Samuelian, Partner, Jeantet Law Firm

🕴🏻Vincent Villette, Secretary General of the CNIL (French Personal Data Regulatory Body)

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► Summary of this intervention : In the round-table discussion on the role of sanctions, a number of contributions will be made, depending on the nature of the discussion itself. They will be brief in nature and will be aimed at an audience with a good knowledge of financial regulation.

It is the occasion for me to insist on 2 things, the first naturely and probably for ever attached to the role of sanctions in all Regulatory Systems, the secund very new. The first is the indissociability between Criminal Law and Sanction, even if sanctions is defined as a regulatory tools. The secund is the conception and the use of sanctions through Compliance Law.

Therefore, in the first idea, my first intervention, aimed more at establishing the subject and describing the Intangible, is on the very idea that sanctions have a role to play in financial regulation. By its very nature. But this does not make it any less difficult. It is not obvious, because if penalties are seen as a 'regulatory tool', then it is the regulatory perspective that predominates and 'colours' the tool that is the penalty. Regulation, of which the texts on the basis which sanctions are issued are only one tool and which is not the set of applicable rules, Regulation which is an apparatus of institutions, rules and decisions aimed at establishing the equilibrium of a sector and maintaining this equilibrium, which is by nature unstable, over time, which the sector could not do by its own efforts alone (Regulatory Law, which is Ex Ante Law, thus distinguishing itself from Competition Law, which is Ex Post Law).

From the perspective of Financial Regulatory System, as in other sectoral regulatory systems, and in the general Regulatory Law, sanctions are a tool (and a tool like any other, simply more powerful than the others.

This is the pragmatic perspective adopted by the State and the Regulatory body itself, which will use it in conjunction with other tools, such as an Information, Education and Incentive mechanism. Moreover, it shall use sanction as informative tool, as educational tool, as incentive tool.

However, the principle of the autonomy of Criminal Law, and the European concept of "Criminal Matters" mean that the sanction can be seen in terms of the autonomous criteria of the seriousness of the act imputed and the sanction imposed on the legal person. In this respect, the penalty is inseparable from the way in which it is imposed (Criminal Law is constitutionally inseparable from Criminal Procedure).

In this respect, the sanction is not a tool coloured by the overall objective served by the Financial Markets Regulatory Body: the sustainability of the financial system. The Enforcement Committee is not the AMF's "armed wing"; it is a "court", as the Oury ruling reminded us.

Therefore, the question is and I would like to ask it directly to the Enforcement Committed: Can you be both?

  As they say, could you be both carp and rabbit? Depending on whether you are viewed from one angle or another, you will be seen as the body that makes financial markets effective (a tool among the tools) or as the body that punishes misconduct (a court among the courts).

It is possible, and in practice it is often true.

But if we are honest, we will admit that regulation feeds on information and that the procedure before a criminal court is built on secrecy and the weapons of those who, innocent or guilty, are at risk because they are, or will be, prosecuted.

We've never got out of this difficulty. We always try to strike a balance between the fact that it is in itself a repressive sanction for a person who will suffer and the fact that it is also a systemic tool: there is a 'balance' between the search for systemic benefit (which reduces the protection of individuals for the benefit of the system) and the concern for the people involved (which reduces the present and future protection of the system). The balance goes more or less in one direction. It is often public opinion, the place, the legislator and, even above all,  the civil appeal judge (vertical dialogue) and those in dialogue, between the regulator and the criminal judge (horizontal dialogue) which cause the scales of diverse technical solutions.

It is also the way in which the Enforcement Committee, in defining itself as the armed wing of the AMF (carp) or as a repressive court (rabbit), chooses in its procedural behaviour the role of sanctions in Financial Regulatory System, more or less instrumentalised (carp) or jurisdictionalised (rabbit).

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The second point, if there is to be one, concerns the development of the role of sanctions in Financial Regulatory System .

On the basis of these fundamentals, an evolution in the role of sanctions in financial regulatory system (an evolution that can be observed in all sectoral regulatory systems) consists of internalising sanctions (in their conception by the texts, their elaboration by the Sanctions Committees, their application) in the economic operators sanctioned, in the economic sectors concerned, in the opinion concerned (the figure of Peelmanian circles of the audiences applying).

This internalisation transforms Regulatory mission of the administrative body (which deals with market structures) into Rupervision (which deals directly with market operators) since the sanction penetrates the operator, the operator adopting commitments. This concept corresponds to the new branch of Law known as Compliance Law. 

Compliance Law uses sanctions as an "incentive like any other", and (we must be careful on this point), because it is systemic in nature, the concern for the system being internalised in the operator, it is relatively insensitive to procedural rights. With the emphasis on information, it is the principle of adversarial debate (which provides information) rather than the rights of the defence that is valued. The cooperation of the person being prosecuted is highly valued, and non-cooperation becomes incomprehensible.

The internalisation of sanctions by operators has led to two major changes. Firstly, these economic operators themselves must sanction, detect and prevent market abuse. The number of special obligations of vigilance is increasing. The obligation of vigilance of operators themselves is becoming a pillar of Regulation, transformed in Supervision.

 The other development is the liberalisation of regulatory system in relation to territory, thank to Compliance Law. As operators are less dependent on borders than are regulators and authors of legal texts (but soft law is spreading, including repression), market abuses can be apprehended in several jurisdictions at the same time, notably through global compliance programmes.

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► Référence complète : M.-A. Frison-Roche, Audition par le collège thématique "RSE" de l'Observatoire des litiges judiciaires de la Cour de cassation, " Points de contact entre le Droit de la Compliance et la RSE", Cour de cassation, 2 octobre 2025.

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► Résumé de la présentation : La présentation dure une demie-heure. Elle est construite en deux temps, tout d'abord une présentation générale sur les "points de contact entre Droit de la compliance et RSE", en ce qu'ils dépendent de la conception que l'on a en pratique du Droit de la compliance, puis, dans la mesure où cette perspective intéresse plus particulièrement le collège thématique, un approfondissement sur les conséquences processuelles qu'il convient d'en tirer.

PREALABLE. DISTINGUER NETTEMENT LE DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE DE LA RSE, SEULE VOIE POUR LES ARTICULER

1. ne pas confondre la morale, source d'inspiration du Droit, et le Droit. 

Le Droit a des sources multiples, économiques, sociales, morales et religieuses. Les impératifs moraux inspirent le Droit, guident ceux qui adoptent des règles juridiques, guident les comportements. Mais ce sont deux ordres différents. Kelsen a construit sa "théorie pure" du Droit pour protéger le système juridique afin qu'il ne soit qu'inspiré par des valeurs qui sont dans une Norme fondamentale hors du système juridique. Ce que l'on appelle RSE est une norme qui inspire de nombreux blocs de compliance, par exemple Sapin 2, la loi Vigilance, la CSRD, la CS3D, etc. mais, de la même façon que la responsabilité juridique ne transforme pas le Deutéronome en Droit, ces textes ne transforment pas la RSE en Droit. Le Droit demeure autonome, n'est pas l'agent d'efficacité de l'éthique, qui trouverait enfin la puissance du Droit à son service.

De la même façon que le Droit économique n'est pas la façon dont des "lois économiques" trouvent une plus grande efficacité. Cela serait une erreur de pénétration entre deux ordres, et une vassalisation pour le Droit qui deviendrait l'agent d'effectivité d'une norme qui lui est hétéronome. Les économistes ne veulent pourtant au bénéfice de ce qui serait la loi économique. Carl Schmitt le voulait au bénéfice de ce qui serait la loi politique. Il est impératif dans un Etat de Droit que le Droit garde son autonomie par rapport à l'économie, à la politique et à l'éthique (ESG, RSE).

2. la loi peut, pour des motifs moraux, imposer à l'entreprise des obligations juridiques légales

Le Droit l'a toujours fait.

3. la responsabilité morale et la responsabilité juridique sont distinctes : la première n'entraîne pas ipso facto la seconde

4 l'entreprise peut par sa volonté s'imposer des obligations qui expriment des choix moraux, dès l'instant qu'ils ne contredisent pas la loi : elle juridicise sa responsabilité morale, les deux obligations se superposant

🔴mafr, 📝"Obligation sur obligation vaut", 2025

I. CE QU'EST EN PRATIQUE LE DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE, BATI SUR L'OBLIGATION DE COMPLIANCE A LAQUELLE L'ENTREPRISE EST ASSUJETTIE 

1. définition faible et définition forte de la compliance : ne pas réduire le Droit à une peau de chagrin, aider par sa "juridictionnalisation" à ce que la branche naissante du Droit de la compliance grandisse dans sa conception européenne

🔴 mafr  (dir.),📕  Pour une Europe de la Compliance, 2019

🔴 mafr  (dir.),📕  Les buts monumentaux de la compliance, 2022

🔴 mafr  (dir.),📕  L'obligation de compliance , 2025

2. le rôle central du juge dans le droit européen de la compliance, en construction

🔴 mafr  (dir.),📕  La juridictionnalisation de la compliance , 2024

3. l'obligation de vigilance, pointe avancée de l'obligation de compliance, 

🔴mafr, 📝La vigilance, pointe avancée et part totale de l'obligation de compliance, 2025

II. POINTS DE CONTACT ENTRE L'OBLIGATION DE COMPLIANCE DES ENTREPRISES CRUCIALES ET LA RESPONSABILITE SOCIETALE DES ENTREPRISES 

1. définition de l'obligation de compliance à laquelle l'entreprise cruciale est assujettie

🔴mafr, 📝Obligation de compliance : construire une structure de compliance produisant des effets crédibles au regard des Buts Monumentaux visés par le législateur, 2025 

2. "Obligation sur obligation vaut"

🔴mafr, 📝"Obligation sur obligation vaut", 2025

3. cumul possible des deux natures, engagement de droit, engagement de fait : régime juridique (ex. La Haye, 12 nov. 2024, Shell)

🔴mafr, 📝A quoi engagent les engagements, 2025

4. ll n'existe pas d'obligation juridique générale de veiller sur autrui ; il existe des obligations spéciales, une obligation spéciale sur l'entreprise maîtresse de sa chaine de valeur et, par exemple un souci éthique que l'entreprise, par sa volonté, peut juridiciser

🔴mafr, 📝Compliance, vigilance et responsabilité civile : mettre en ordre et raison garder, 2025

III. PERSPECTIVE PROCESSUELLES DES POINTS DE CONTACT ENTRE DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE ET RSE 

1. Nature transitivement systémique du contentieux de la compliance

🔴mafr, 📝Les causes systémiques portées devant le juge, 2021

🔴mafr,  📝Droit de la compliance et contentieux systémique, 2025

🔴mafr (dir.), 📕 Contentieux systémique émergent, 2025

2. Double primauté : trouver des solutions ; avoir souci du futur

🔴🧮Dans l’espace de justice, les pratiques juridictionnelles au service du futur, 2024

🔴Th. Goujon-Bethan, 📝Les enjeux présents et à venir de l'articulation des principes de procédure civile et commerciale avec la logique de compliance, 2025

3. Régression de la méthode punitive, efficacité du principe contradictoire et de l'accusatoire comme mode d'obtention des informations, engagements et "programmes"

🔴F. Ancel, 📝Devoir de vigilance et litiges commerciaux : une compétence à partager ?, 2025

🔴M. Chapuis, 📝Le juge de l'amiable et la compliance, 2025

🔴Th. Goujon-Bethan, 📝Les enjeux présents et à venir de l'articulation des principes de procédure civile et commerciale avec la logique de compliance, 2025

4. Préserver les droits de la défense et la sagesse probatoire dont les pavés sont attaqués dans le paradis de la RSE

🔴mafr, 📝Le juge, l'obligation de compliance et l'entreprise. Le système probatoire de la Compliance, 2023

🔴 mafr et M. Boissavy (dir.),📕 Compliance et droits de la défense. Enquêtes internes, CJIP, CRPC, 2024 

🔴J.-Ch. Roda, 📝La preuve de la bonne exécution de la vigilance au regard du système probatoire de compliance,2025

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