►Full Reference: Delalieu, G., La loi sur le devoir de vigilance des sociétés multinationales : parcours d’une loi improbable, Droit et Société, 2020/3, n°106, p.649-665.

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►English Summary of the Article (done by the Author): (Corporate Duty of Vigilance in France: The Path of an Improbable Statute). This article offers an analysis of the resistance encountered by defenders (NGOs and trade unions) of the French Law on Corporate Duty of Vigilance. These actors sought to behave as institutional entrepreneurs deploying intense advocacy and lobbying efforts to successfully have this bill tabled, examined, and ultimately passed by the French government. Considering this case, the concept of “institutional entrepreneurship” is discussed and then relativized using Machiavelli’s notion of “Fortuna,” to describe the “improbable” adoption of this statute. The results tend to put into perspective the importance that individual actors, including collective ones, can have in the explanation of institutional change, in favor of a multilevel analysis of change (micro, meso, macro).

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► Référence complète : M. Caffin-Moi, "L’imprégnation des branches du droit par les mécanismes de compliance : le contrat", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), Compliance et contrat, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", à paraître

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📕lire une présentation de l'ouvrage, Compliance et contrat, dans lequel cet article est publié

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► Résumé de l'article (fair par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC) : L'auteure commence par montrer que les contrats sont de plus en plus présents dans le Droit de la Compliance, celui-ci n'étant plus ce qui est seulement exprimé par des lois d'ordre public, tandis que le contrat ne porterait que les intérêts privés de deux parties particulières. Elle expose comment concrètement aujourd'hui, et chaque jour davantage, les contrats sont utilisés comme un instrument de diffusion de la Compliance, la Vigilance étant exemplaire de cela, les textes incitant les entreprises à le faire, la CS3D mettant "le contrat à l'honneur" par la mise en place de "cascades contractuelles", le contrat agissant à la fois en surface et en profondeur.

Mais il ne faut pas que le contrat soit un moyen de restreindre la responsabilité, et l'on trouve des points de "friction" entre Contrat et Compliance.

Tout d'abord, parce que les réglementations, voire la jurisprudence, obligent les entreprises à contracter, par exemple avec des fournisseurs de rang 2, ce qui est une atteinte à la liberté de ne pas contracter.

En outre, les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance institutionnalisent une relation contractuelle qui peut être déséquilibrée, voire engendrer une concurrence déloyale si une entreprise s'y plie et l'autre pas, la Compliance conférant de plus des prérogatives exorbitantes à l'entreprise.

Pour ne pas provoquer trop de conflits, et l'auteure souligne que le premier est certainement celui sur la compétence juridictionnelle entre le tribunal de commerce et le Tribunal judiciaire de Paris, il faut impérativement un dialogue des juges.

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► Full Reference: J.-Ph. Denis & N. Fabbe-Costes, "Legal Constraints and company Compliance Strategies", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, to be published

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📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC): 

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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► Full Reference: L. Rapp, "Compliance, Value Chains and Service Economy", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, to be published

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📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the author, translated by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC): Based on an analysis of the value chains of companies in the space sector and their recent evolution, this contribution examine the role, place and current transformations of compliance policies and strategies in the context of an industrial transformation that has become essential: the transition from an industrial economy to a service economy.

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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The Independent Administrative Authority (IAA) is the legal form that the legislator has most often chosen to build regulatory authorities. The IAA is only its legal form, but French law has attached great importance to it, following the often formalistic tradition of public law. They are thus independent administrative authorities, especially in the legal systems of continental law like France, Germany or Italy.

The essential element is in the last adjective: the "independent" character of the organism. This means that this organ, which is only administrative so has a vocation to be placed in the executive hierarchy, does not obey the Government. In this, regulators have often been presented as free electrons, which posed the problem of their legitimacy, since they could no longer draw upstream in the legitimacy of the Government. This independence also poses the difficulty of their responsibility, the responsibility of the State for their actions, and the accountability of their use of their powers. Moreover, the independence of regulators is sometimes questioned if it is the government that retains the power to appoint the leaders of the regulatory authority. Finally, the budgetary autonomy of the regulator is crucial to ensure its independence, although the authorities having the privilege of benefiting from a budget - which is not included in the LOLF - are very few in number. They are no longer referred to as "independent administrative authorities" but as "Independent Public Authorities", the legislator making a distinction between the two (French Law of 20 January 2017).

The second point concerns the second adjective: that it is an "administrative" body. This corresponds to the traditional idea that regulation is the mechanism by which the State intervenes in the economy, in the image of a kind of deconcentration of ministries, in the Scandinavian model of the agency. If we allow ourselves to be enclosed in this vocabulary, we conclude that this administrative body makes an administrative decision which is the subject of an appeal before a judge. Thus, in the first place, this would be a first instance appeal and not a judgment since the administrative authority is not a court. Secondly, the natural judge of the appeal should be the administrative judge since it is an administrative decision issued by an administrative authority. But in France the Ordinance of 1 December 1986 sur la concurrence et la libéralisation des prix (on competition and price liberalization), because it intended precisely to break the idea of ​​an administered economy in order to impose price freedom on the idea of ​​economic liberalism, required that attacks against the decisions of economic regulators taking the form of IAA are brought before the Court of Appeal of Paris, judicial jurisdiction. Some great authors were even able to conclude that the Paris Court of Appeal had become an administrative court. But today the procedural system has become extremely complex, because according to the IAA and according to the different kinds of decisions adopted, they are subject to an appeal either to the Court of Appeal of Paris or to the Conseil d'État (Council of State) . If one observes the successive laws that modify the system, one finds that after this great position of principle of 1986, the administrative judge gradually takes again its place in the system, in particular in the financial regulation. Is it logical to conclude that we are returning to a spirit of regulation defined as an administrative police and an economy administered by the State?

Finally, the third term is the name itself: "authority". It means in the first place an entity whose power holds before in its "authority". But it marks that it is not a jurisdiction, that it takes unilateral decisions. It was without counting the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the judicial judge! Indeed, Article 6§1 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that everyone has the right to an impartial tribunal in civil and criminal matters. The notion of "criminal matter" does not coincide with the formal traditional concept of criminal law but refers to the broad and concrete factual concept of repression. Thus, by a reasoning which goes backwards, an organization, whatever the qualification that a State has formally conferred on it, which has an activity of repression, acts "in criminal matters". From this alone, in the European sense, it is a "tribunal". This automatically triggers a series of fundamental procedural guarantees for the benefit of the person who is likely to be the subject of a decision on his part. In France, a series of jurisprudence, both of the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation), the Conseil d'État (Council of State) or the Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) has confirmed this juridictionnalization of the AAI.

► Full Reference: J.-S. Borghetti, "The Relation between Tort Law and Compliance Obligation", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, to be published

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📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC): The Author points out that in order to establish civil liability, it is first necessary to find fault, i.e. a deviation from an obligation, which will trigger a secondary obligation, that of reparation. But it can also be argued that it is from liability that this primary obligation arises, civil liability then revealing an obligation which existed only implicitly. That establishes a two-way relationship between liability and obligation. The Compliance Obligation illustrates this, in particular through the Obligation of Vigilance conceived by the French law of 2017.

The author therefore devotes the first part of his contribution to civil liability as a result of an Compliance Obligation, especially the Obligation of Vigilance. issued of the French law of 2017. After discussing whether the constraints generated by compliance should be classified as 'obligations', since there is no creditor, which therefore opens the way to liability in tort, he examines the conditions for incurring such liability, which are difficult, particularly with regard to the burden of proof and the demonstration of the causal link. The requirement concerning the latter may evolve in French law towards the admission of proportional causality, as is now accepted in certain cases in German case law.

In the second part of his contribution, the author deals with the hypothesis of civil liability as an indicator of a Compliance Obligation. He points out that the claims made, particularly in the cases of TotalOuganda (France) and Milieudefensie v. Shell (Netherlands) seek to obtain from the judge a such "revelation".

The author considers that it is not possible to draw from the  French 2017 law which refers to article 1240 of the French Civil Code on the liability because this article is referred to only in order to organise the consequences of a breach of article L.225-102-4 of the French Commercial Code organising the Obligation of Vigilance (article 1240 being therefore under the secondary obligation described above) and not to feed what this article L.225-102-4 requires under the primary obligation (defined above). 

On the other hand, the Shell judgment derives directly from civil liability an obligation to act. This is understandable if one takes the perspective and the measure of the future challenges posed, in this case in the area of climate change. But the author considers that it is up to the legislator to decide on such a development in Liability Law. 

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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Network industries are built on transport infrastructure such as telecommunications waves or data, gas or electricity, which are essential facilities.

These essential infrastructures are monitored by regulators not only for the operators to have a concrete right of access but also for a complete network of these infrastructures to be built in a space, especially in Europe, for example to achieve a European railway system.

These infrastructures also exist in banking, financial and insurance matters, which it would be futile to oppose too easily to Network industries, as financial centers are based on huge computer systems, internalized clearing houses, which are themselves Infrastructure, deserving Regulation.

In this way, the optimal infrastructure solidity, the Regulator having its final responsibility in a permanent control over the manager, whether the State or an operator - whether the operator is an operator Public or a private operator -, and the competitive dynamism of the sector that the system can also entrust to the same regulator.

This is particularly the case in Financial Regulation, which aims to optimize the places, which compete with each other, and their respective security, which itself constitutes a competitive advantage, common to all operators.

Référence : Beauvais, P., Méthode transactionnelle et justice pénale, in  Gaudemet, A. (dir.), La compliance : un nouveau monde? Aspects d'une mutation du droit, coll. "Colloques", éd. Panthéon-Assas, Panthéon-Assas, 2016, pp. 79-90.

Voir la présentation générale de  l'ouvrage dans lequel l'article a été publié.

The procedural safeguards enjoyed by a person whose situation may be affected by a future judgment are principally the right to bring proceedings before the court, the rights of the defense and the benefit of the contradictory principle.

The legal action was for a long time considered as a "power", that is to say, a mechanism inserted in the organization of the judicial institution, since it was by this act of seizure, access by which the person enters the judicial machine, through the latter starts up.

But in particular since the work of René Cassin and Henri Motulsky, legal proceedings are considered as a subjective right, that is to say, a prerogative of any person to ask a judge to rule on the claim that the plaintiff articulates in an allegation, that is a story mixing the fact and the law in a building and on which he asks the judge to give an answer, such as the cancellation of an acte, or the award of damages, or the refusal to convict him (because the defense is also the exercise of this right of action).

The legal action is now recognized as a "right of action", the nature of which is independent of the application made to the court, a subjective procedural right which doubles the substantive subjective right (eg the right to reparation) and ensures the effectiveness of the latter but which is autonomous of it. This autonomy and this uniqueness in contrast with the variety of the sort of disputes (civil, criminal or administrative) makes the right of action a pillar of the "Procedural Law" on which a part of European and Constitutional Law are built. In fact, Constitutional Law in Europe is essentially constituted by procedural principles (rights of defense, impartiality, right of action), since the principle of non bis in idem is only an expression of the right of action. Non bis in idem is a prohibition of double judgment for the same fact which does not prohibit a double trigger of the action (and criminal, civil and administrative). This unified due process of Law has helped to diminish the once radical separation between criminal law, administrative law and even civil law, which are clearly separated from one another in the traditional construction of legal systems and which converge today in the Regulatory and Compliance Law.

Moreover, the subjective right of action is a human right and one of the most important. Indeed, it is "the right to the judge" because by its exercise the person obliges a judge to answer him, that is to say to listen to his claim (the contradictory resulting therefore from the exercise of the right of action ).

Thus the right of action appears to be the property of the person, of the litigant, of the "party". This is why the attribution by the law of the power for the Regulators to seize itself, which is understood by reason of the efficiency of the process, poses difficulty from the moment that this constitutes the regulatory body in "judge and party", since the Regulator is in criminal matters regarded as a court, and that the cumulation of the qualification of court and of the quality of party is a consubstantial infringement of the principle of impartiality. In the same way, the obligation that Compliance Law creates for operators to judge themselves obliges them to a similar duplication which poses many procedural difficulties, notably in internal investigations.

There is a classical distinction between public action, which is carried out by the public prosecutor, by which the public prosecutor calls for protection of the general interest and private action by a person or an enterprise, which seeks to satisfy its legitimate private interest. The existence of this legitimate interest is sufficient for the person to exercise his or her procedural right of action.

In the first place, the person could not claim the general interest because he or she was not an agent of the State and organizations such as associations or other non-governmental organizations pursued a collective interest, which could not be confused with the general interest. This procedural principle according to which "no one pleads by prosecutor" is today outdated. Indeed, and for the sake of efficiency, Law admits that persons act in order that the rule of law may apply to subjects who, without such action, would not be accountable. By this procedural use of the theory of incentives, because the one who acts is rewarded while and because he or she serves the general interest, concretizing the rule of law and contributing to produce a disciplinary effect on a sector and powerful operators, procedural law is transformed by the economic analysis of the law. The US mechanism of the class action was imported into France by a recent law of 2014 on "group action" (rather restrictive) but this "collective action" , on the Canadian model, continues not to be accepted in the European Union , Even if the European Commission is working to promote the mechanisms of private enforcement, participating in the same idea.

Secondly, it may happen that the law requires the person not only must have a "legitimate interest in acting" but also must have a special quality to act. This is particularly true of the various corporate officers within the operators. For the sake of efficiency, the legal system tends to distribute new "qualities to act" even though there is not necessarily an interest, for example in the new system of whistleblowers, which can act even there is no apparent interest.

► Full Reference: J.-B. Racine, "Compliance Obligation and Human Rights​", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, to be published

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📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC): The author asks whether human rights can, over and above the many compliance obligations, form the basis of the Compliance Obligation. The consideration of human rights corresponds to the fundamentalisation of Law, crossing both Private and Public Law, and are considered by some as the matrix of many legal mechanisms, including international ones. They prescribe values that can thus be disseminated.

Human rights come into direct contact with Compliance Law as soon as Compliance Law is defined as "the internalisation in certain operators of the obligation to structure themselves in order to achieve goals which are not natural to them, goals which are set by public authorities responsible for the future of social groups, goals which these companies must willingly or by force aim to achieve, simply because they are in a position to achieve them". These "Monumental Goals" converge on human beings, and therefore the protection of their rights by companies. 

In a globalised context, the State can either act through mandatory regulations, or do nothing, or force companies to act through Compliance Law. For this to be effective, tools are needed to enable 'crucial' operators to take responsibility ex ante, as illustrated in particular by the French law on the Vigilance Obligation of 2017.

This obligation takes the form of both a "legal obligation", expression which is quite  imprecise, found for example in the duty of vigilance of the French 2017 law, and in a more technical sense through an obligation that the company establishes, in particular through contracts.

Legal obligations are justified by the fact that the protection of human rights is primarily the responsibility of States, particularly in the international arena. Even if it is only a question of Soft Law, non-binding Law, this tendency can be found in the Ruggie principles, which go beyond the obligation of States not to violate human rights, to a positive obligation to protect them effectively. The question of whether this could apply not only to States but also to companies is hotly debated. If we look at the ICSID Urbaser v. Argentina award of 2016, the arbitrators accepted that a company had an obligation not to violate human rights, but rejected an obligation to protect them effectively. In European Law, the GDPR, DSA and AIA, and in France the so-called Vigilance law, use Compliance Lools, often Compliance by Design, to protect human rights ex ante.

Contracts, particularly through the inclusion of multiple clauses in often international contracts, express the "privatisation" of human rights. Care should be taken to ensure that appropriate sanctions are associated with them and that they do not give rise to situations of contractual imbalance. The relationship of obligation in tort makes it necessary to articulate the Ex Ante logic and the Ex Post logic and to conceive what the judge can order.

The author concludes that "la compliance oblige à remodeler les catégories classiques du droit dans l’optique de les adosser à l’objectif même de la compliance : non pas uniquement un droit tourné vers le passé, mais un droit ancré dans les enjeux du futur ; non pas un droit émanant exclusivement de la contrainte publique, mais un droit s’appuyant sur de la normativité privée ; non pas un droit strictement territorialisé, mais un droit appréhendant l’espace transnational" ("Compliance requires us to reshape the classic categories of Law with a view to bringing them into line with the very objective of Compliance: not just a Law turned towards the past, but a Law anchored in the challenges of the future; not a Law emanating exclusively from public constraint, but a Law based on private normativity; not a strictly territorialised Law, but a law apprehending the transnational space".

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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First of all, the Regulation and Compliance Law is difficult to understand in others languages than English, through translation, for example in French.  This corpus of rules and institutions suffers from ambiguity and confusion because of its vocabulary of Anglophone origin, in which words or expressions that are similar or identical have not the same meaning in English and, for example, in French..

To every lord all honor, this is the case for the term "Regulation".

In English, "regulation" refers to the phenomenon which the French language expresses by the term "Régulation". But it can also aim at the complete fitting of what will hold a sector reaching a market failure and in which regulation is only one tool among others. The expression "regulatory system" will be used with precision, but also the term "Regulation", the use of the capital letter indicating the difference between the simple administrative power to take texts ("regulation") and the entire system which supports the sector ("Regulation"). It is inevitable that in a quick reading, or even by the play of digital, which overwrites the capital letters, and the automatic translations, this distinction of formulation, which stands for a lower / upper case, disappears. And confusion arises.

The consequences are considerable. It is notably because of this homonymy, that frequently in the French language one puts at the same level the Droit de la Régulation ("regulatory law, Regulation") and the réglementation (regulation). It will be based on such an association, of a tautological nature, to assert that "by nature" the Regulatory Law  is "public law", since the author of the reglementation (regulation) is a person of public law, in particular the State or Independent administrative authorities such as Regulators. There remains the current and difficult justification for the considerable presence of contracts, arbitrators, etc. Except to criticize the very idea of Regulatory Law, because it would be the sign of a sort of victory of the private interests, since conceived by instruments of private law.

Thus two major disadvantages appear. First of all, it maintains in the Law of Regulation the summa divisio of Public and Private Law, which is no longer able to account for the evolution of Law in this field and leads observers, notably economists or international Institutions, to assert that the Common Law system would be more adapted today to the world economy notably because if it does indeed place administrative law, constitutional law, etc., it does not conceive them through the distinction Law Public / private law, as the Continental system of Civil Law continues to do.

Secondly, no doubt because this new Law draws on economic and financial theories that are mainly built in the United Kingdom and the United States, the habit is taken to no longer translate. In other languages, for example, texts written in French are phrases such as "le Régulateur doit être  accountable".

It is inaccurate that the idea of ​​accountability is reducible to the idea of ​​"responsibility". The authors do not translate it, they do not recopy and insert it in texts written in French.

One passes from the "translation-treason" to the absence of translation, that is to say to the domination of the system of thought whose word is native, here the U.K. and the U.S.A.

One of the current major issues of this phenomenon is in the very term of "Compliance". The French term "conformité" does not translate it. To respect what compliance is, it is appropriate for the moment to recopy the word itself, so as not to denature the concept by a translation. The challenge is to find a francophone word that expresses this new idea, particularly with regard to legal systems that are not common law, so that their general framework remains.

Référence complète : Boy, , "Réflexion sur le "droit de la régulation". A propos du texte de Marie-Anne Frison-Roche",  D., chron., 2001, p.3031 et s.

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance et Contrat ("Compliance and Contract"), coll."Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Editions Lefebvre-Dalloz, to be published.

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📘 At the same time, a book in English, Compliance and Contracts, is published in the collection copublished by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Editions Lefebre-Bruylant.

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🧮the book follows the cycle of colloquia organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its Universities partners in 2026

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📚this volume is one of a series of books devoted to Compliance in this collection.

► read the presentations of the other books:

• further books:

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Le système probatoire de la Compliance, 2027

 

• previous books:

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕L'obligation de compliance 2025

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche & M. Boissavy (eds.), 📕Compliance et droits de la défense. Enquête interne - CJIP - CRPC, 2024

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕La juridictionnalisation de Compliance, 2023

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, 2022

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Les outils de la Compliance, 2021

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Pour une Europe de la Compliance, 2019

🕴️N. Borga, 🕴️J.-Cl. Marin and 🕴️J.-Ch. Roda (eds.), 📕Compliance : l'Entreprise, le Régulateur et le Juge, 2018

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Régulation, Supervision, Compliance, 2017

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Internet, espace d'interrégulation, 2016

 

📚see the global presentation of all the books of the collection.

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► General presentation of this book: The book, published in 2025 int the same series "Regulations & Compliance" series, demonstrates that the Obligation of Compliance—which falls upon crucial operators and those concerned with the future of systems and the present and future individuals involved in them—derives from laws and regulations, and is upheld by these operators themselves, regulators and judges. The role played by contracts is discussed therein. This book specifically examines the role that contracts play and will play in the conception, development and implementation of Compliance Law.  

This aspect is underestimated because Compliance Law is often analysed through the prism of laws and regulations designed to achieve Monumental Goals set by states and public authorities, to the realisation of which systemic economic operations contribute through compliance tools, rather than through the actors themselves. When they do act, this is referred to outside the realm of Law, generally to Ethics. However, the Contract, the binding legal instrument par excellence, will play an increasingly significant role within global and interconnected compliance systems.

In the European construction of Compliance Law, which places human beings at the heart of efforts to ensure the sustainability of systems, the Contract serves not only as the means by which the entity fulfils its legal obligations, forges relationships with stakeholders and implements the necessary innovations, but also as the means by which it exercises its autonomy to contribute to the realisation of the systemic ambitions in question. 

To describe and anticipate the practice and rules that link Compliance Law and Contracts, the book first examines how this new branch of Law, insofar as it draws on the political ideas of the Social Contract, renews Contract Law by embedding it within the strategy of economic operators, a task made all the easier for them as they have built value chains through contracts. These are ‘regulatory contracts’. This demonstrates that Public Law Contracts exemplify the incorporation by General Contract Law of the overarching perspective of compliance, normatively anchored in the Monumental Goals (Title I).

That explained, the book examines how General Contract Law interfaces with the techniques and objectives of Compliance Law. Whether through mandatory requirements, incentives or support, Compliance Law plays a role in contracts, helping to shape them in part, whether they relate to regulated or unregulated activities, with the points of contact with the principle of liberalism – and the limits to it – being determined by the courts. Conversely, however, General Contract Law contributes to Compliance Law and will do so increasingly. This applies equally to the stages of formation, execution, and sanctions, which may take the form of consolidations (Title II). 

In practical terms, the Contract itself serves as a Compliance Tol. As such, the company may choose to outsource the compliance function, which it is free to do provided it remains accountable for its performance to the legislator and the persons concerned: this is the concept of the ‘Compliance Contract’, which appears as a specific contract.  Furthermore, compliance can be incorporated into multiple contracts—contractual arrangements through which the contracting parties establish one or more obligations that will facilitate or enhance their legal obligations. In doing so, legal entities exercise their freedom, as permitted by general law, and this is also recognised by the Regulator, Supervisor and/or Judge in light of the normative Monumental Goals of Compliance Law (Title III). 

Precisely, a new field of ‘contractual compliance litigation’ is emerging. The primary topic here is to examine contractual judicial disputes in which an element of Compliance Law features in the proceedings. Indeed, a dispute concerning a claim for mandatory execution, termination or contractual liability may involve, in the claim itself or in an procedural exception or defence raised, an element of compliance law, ranging from an allegation of lack of jurisdiction to a request for the court to take into account a systemic teological norm that the contract judge should consider. Secondly, in certain emerging systemic compliance litigation, because the role of the judge is transformed and the procedure must be adapted, the contract appears as a particularly suitable tool, either as a ‘procedural framework’ through the contractualisation of the whole, or as a technique used in the strict sense, its ex ante nature allowing, in disputes concerning the future, the development of new adequate techniques (Title IV). 

 

 

 

 

 

 

► First presentation of the Table of Content  : 

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TABLE OF CONTENT 

 

REPORTING ON CONTRACTUAL PRACTICES WITHIN THE COMPLIANCE SYSTEM AND ENHANCING ITS EFFECTIVENESS AND HUMANITY COMPTE DES PRATIQUES CONTRACTUELLES DANS LE SYSTEME DE COMPLIANCE ET ACCROITRE L'EFFICACITE ET L'HUMANISME DE CELUI-CI  

(REPORTING ON CONTRACTUAL PRACTICES WITHIN THE COMPLIANCE SYSTEM AND ENHANCING ITS EFFECTIVENESS AND HUMANITY) 

 

 

 

 ♦️ sss, par 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

 

TITRE I.

CONTRAT SOCIAL, DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE ET STRATEGIE DES OPERATEURS ECONOMIQUES 

 

CHAPITRE I : CONTRAT SOCIAL ET DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE 

Section 1 ♦️ Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, guide d'action pour des opérateurs économiques au service d'une politique globale, par 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 2 ♦️ sss, par 🕴️René Sève

 

CHAPITRE II : AMBITIONS POITIQUES ET STRATEGIES D'ENTREPRISE DANS L'ORGANISATION CONTRACTUELLE DES CHAINES DE VALEUR

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CHAPITRE III : LES CONTRATS PUBLICS, PARANGONS DE L'ACCUEILS DES AMBITIONS POLITIQUES DANS LES STRATEGIES ET L'ALLIANCE DES INSTITUTIONS

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TITRE II.

LE DROIT COMMUN DES CONTRATS CONFRONTE AU DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE

 

CHAPITRE I : DISTINGUER LE CONTRACTUEL DE CE QUI S'EN RAPPROCHE DANS LE SYSTEM DE COMPLIANCE 

Section 1 ♦️ La ronde des engagements et des contrats dans le droit de la compliance e, par 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 2 ♦️ sss,

 

CHAPITRE II : L'EMPRISE DU DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE SUR LE DROIT COMMUN DE DES CONTRATS 

Section 1 ♦️ sss

Section 2 ♦️ sss,

 

CHAPITRE III : L'APPORT DU DROIT COMMUN DES CONTRATS AU DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE

Section 1 ♦️ sss

Section 2 ♦️ sss, par 

 

 

 

TITRE III.

CONTRAT DE COMPLIANCE, CLAUSES DE COMPLIANCE

 

CHAPITRE I : LE "CONTRAT DE COMPLIANCE"

Section 1 ♦️ sss

Section 2 ♦️ sss,

 

CHAPITRE II : LES CLAUSES DE COMPLIANCE

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TITRE IV.

LE CONTENTIEUX CONTRACTUEL IMPLIQUANT LE DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE 

 

CHAPITRE I : CE 

Section 1 ♦️ sss

Section 2 ♦️ sss,

 

CHAPITRE II : CE 

Section 1 ♦️ sss

Section 2 ♦️ sss, par 

 

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► Full reference: M.A. Frison-Roche, “Considérer la géographie juridique africaine pour y réussi l'obligation de vigilance" (Taking into account the legal landscape in Africa to fulfil the Vigilance Obligation), in E. Da Allada (ed.), Devoir de vigilance, quelles perspectives africaines ? (The Vigilance Duty: what African perspectives?), Lefebvre-Dalloz, “Thèmes et Commentaires” series, 2026, pp. 235–235.

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📝Read the article (in French)

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🚧read the bilingual working document on which this article is based

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🎤read the presentation of the conference  which summarised this topic

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► Summary of the article: The French ‘Vigilance’ Act of 2017 incorporated the technical provisions and the spirit of the ‘Sapin 2’ Act of 2016. They share a common ambition. They have been, and remain, a source of both controversy and fervour. At their heart lies the establishment of a “compliance obligation”, for which vigilance techniques form the “vanguard” in serving a grand ambition: to protect systems from present and future risks in order to safeguard the people involved in them.

The passion that continues to surround the Vigilance Act – which gave rise to the CS3D Directive – is not a good thing, because the law and passion are never allies. Some are passionately committed to the triumph of vigilance by forcing companies to perform miracles, whilst others are passionately committed to the destruction of all the legislation that has established the very concept of this compliance law, built upon these monumental humanist goals.

But let us recognise that in these debates on the Duty of Care, which is being legally implemented across value chains,  Africa is often cited as an example in a general discussion. It is not often considered as a distinct case in its own right. No account is taken of its strengths or its own legal mechanisms, even though value chains – particularly industrial ones – so often lead to it, both now and in the future. Through analyses of the duty of care, Africa is perceived as a place of retribution or of a new form of paternalism, and when its future is considered, prospects seem to be lacking, even though the very purpose of compliance – and therefore of due diligence – is the future. 

If we take a less confrontational view and focus more on the ‘legal geography’ of African countries and their social and inter-state structures  social and inter-state structures, we can see that concern for others – both present and future – which ultimately constitutes the Monumental Aim of Compliance Law and thus of the Duty of Vigilance – is more prevalent in Africa than it is in Europe, which is now built upon legal individualism. This concern for others is reflected in legal mechanisms akin to mediation and various legal structures that our own institutions would do well to take on board – our legislators before adopting legislation, and our judges, who could listen to them as amici curiae before always reaching a decision.

If we turn our attention to the African continent, where a segment of the value chains operates, and to the way work is organised, it becomes clear that here too, legislation and sanctions are not the whole story. Compliance techniques that make use of soft law and the contractual arrangements underpinning the chains themselves can remove the element of abstraction that is, by its very nature, inherent in general legislation. Making progress through contracts, under the scrutiny and with the support of the courts, is an approach that could prove more fruitful than well-intentioned legislation – which served as a catalyst – given the prominent role of Contract Law within OHADA.

This serves to enhance the judge’s importance. The judicialisation of compliance is also linked to the growing connection between compliance and contracts. However, it appears that not only can European judges specialising in due diligence thus rule on matters concerning Africa – a continent they can only know from a distance (though it is the lot of every judge to be an outsider) – but African and inter-state courts, notably through OHADA, can address the duty of care because value chains are constituted by contracts. By developing it not as a foreign concept to be assimilated, but as something that expresses the very heart of the law in Africa: concern for others, solidarity, and the search for compromises and solutions to ensure that the social and environmental – that is to say, human – system continues to thrive tomorrow.

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► Full Reference: M.A. Frison-Roche, "La part du gracieux dans le traitement juridictionnel de la compliance (The role of Discretionary Jurisdictio in the judicial treatment of Compliance cases)", in Mélanges Dominique d'Ambra, Liber Amicorum, Lefebvre-Dalloz, 2026, pp.175-196.

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📝read this article (in French) 

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🚧read the bilingual Working Paper, base of this article

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► English summary of this article: Based on the definition of Judicial Office, the procedural principles that derive from it and the consequent powers that judges exercise, the objet of this study is to measure the degree of discretion that exists in the judicial treatment of compliance, without direct consideration for the dispute between litigants. This part is very ignored, when it should be given top priority. Indeed, because Systems are involved in compliance cases brought before civil or commercial judges, we are seeing a development of this discretionary element in judicial fonction. Discretionary matters differ from unilateral discretionary procedures, and this discretionary element relates to what the judge examines, possibly in the context of a dispute.

The first part of this contribution therefore aims to describe the natural development of the discretionary power of the judge to deal with compliance cases brought before them. This role stems from the fact that, even when triggered by a dispute, what is submitted to the judge is a situation composed of a system, which cannot defend its interests before the civil or commercial judge in this Systemic Litigation arising from the very nature of Compliance Law and the Compliance Obligations it engenders on systemic entites. Moreover, it is the Future whose interests must be considered and protected, which the judge must do directly.

This leads to the second part of the contribution, calling for a rethinking of the procedure and the role of the Compliance Judge, so that ex gratia matters can be dealt with. The judge must therefore verify that there are no conflicts of interest between the litigants, including hidden ones, and must learn about the systems involved. The inquisitorial principle must therefore be strengthened. But at the same time, since the primary aim is not to settle a dispute but to resolve a systemic problematic situation, the judge must facilitate the movements of the parties, and the adversarial principle must also be strengthened. Must be encouraged this activation of a powerful and discretionary approach, not as an exception but as a principle fully articulated with a contentious principle, with the dispute being only a means used by the necessary parties to enable systemic compliance situations to be resolved.

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► Full reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "La définition juridique du Contrat de compliance (The legal definition of the compliance contract)", in Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) published by the Centre for Research on Justice and Conflict Resolution (CRJ) and the Centre for Research in Economics and Law (CRED) at Panthéon-Assas University (Paris II), Le "Contrat de compliance" (The "Compliance Contract"),  Paris II Lecture Theatre -  82 Rue Notre Dame des Champs, Paris, 12 June  2026.

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🧮view the full programme for the event

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📶view the slides (in French)

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🌐read the presentation made on LinkedIn

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🚧Read the bilingual working paper on which this conference is based

 

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📝This lecture will form the basis of a contribution to the book, 📕Compliance et Contrat (Compliance and Contracts), 

To be published in the 📚Regulations & Compliance series, a book co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz.

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► Overview of this lecture : The lecture is divided into three parts.

In the first part, the aim is to describe the reality of the “Compliance Contract”, which can be defined as the decision taken by an entity subject to a “Compliance Obligation” (most often a company, but it may also be a administrative organisation) to entrust the fulfilment of that obligation to a third party. This does not diminish the entity’s obligation to be accountable for the compliance structure, nor for its ability to produce the expected outcomes, in particular the behaviours that will contribute to achieving the Monumental Systemic Goals for which the compliance frameworks were adopted. This outsourcing is lawful; its contractual form falls under Contract Law and the principle of contractual freedom.

Even if one considers that, since the subject matter of the contract is Compliance itself, it would constitute a ‘Systemic Contract’—just as Compliance Litigation is ‘Systemic Litigation’—its fundamental nature is indeed a bilateral relationship between a client and a professional (who is often subject to professional rules and codes of conduct).

Indeed, there are legal consequences to this practice of “Compliance Contracts”, because it is the Compliance System that is thereby served: on the one hand, “regulatory clauses” will be inserted, whilst others will be removed (“deemed unwritten”). Contractual freedom remains the guiding principle, however.

In Contract Law, it would be appropriate for the contracting parties to refer to this contribution to the Monumental Goals, which constitute the  fundamental legal norm of the Compliance System, if only to guide the contract Judge who may be called upon in the event of a dispute, as the interpretation of the parties’ intentions must be carried out in a teleological manner.

In the second part, the relationship between this "Compliance Contract" and the various "Compliance Clauses" is analysed. The two should certainly not be confused, since, quite apart from these highly specific contracts through which the various compliance techniques are entrusted, in their drafting and management, to third parties, who thus become the experts, there are also clauses inserted into numerous contracts (sales, distribution, manufacturing, service, etc.), clauses which aim, amongst many other clauses serving different purposes, to incorporate compliance considerations into the contract.

But first and foremost, the Compliance Contract contains numerous clauses specific to it, which often derive from compliance system, since Compliance concretisation is the very purpose of this specific contract, et nothing else: it is therefore logical that, by way of a ‘transparency effect’, the legal Compliance Systemic requirements should be incorporated into the isolated contract.

Secondly, and more significantly, many various contracts contain clauses that provide for the triggering of a “Compliance Ccontract”. For example, when an audit clause is linked to a specific event and the provision stipulates that a contract will then be entered into with a particular expertal body or person, this will generate a Compliance Contract in a second time. The link between the two may give one of the contracting parties control over the other, notably if the expert is close to them. If the links between Compliance Contracts and Compliance Clauses are developping, this could lead to a return to vertical integration. Competition Law may be justified in looking into this. 

It appears that, once we have distinguished between Compliance Contracts and Compliance Clauses, and then linked them together, we can arrive at a Contractual Compliance Strategy that is both legitimate and effective, provided that it contributes to the achievement of the Compliance Monumental Goals set by the political and public authorities. 

Indeed, as soon as we distinguish between “conformity” – which is intended solely to compel the operator to obey all applicable regulations blindly and mechanically – and “Compliance Law”, which is legally guided by Monumental Systemic Goals, this contractual strategy becomes essential.

 

Part Three sets out to clarify the scope of this Compliance Contract.

The first implication concerns the Compliance System itself, of which it forms a part; the Compliance Contract having the welcome effect of increasing the operator’s contribution to the achievement of the Monumental Systemic Goals (ensuring that systems – banking, financial, transport, energy, climate, digital, etc.—do not collapse and do not crush human beings, but rather benefit the human beings who are involved in them, whether willingly or not).

To this end, the contract must enable the operator – where necessary by means of express provisions – to demonstrate its credibility in contributing to the achievement of these Monumental Goals. Reliable pathways and credible structures must be established. In the cas of technical implementation is outsourced by a Compliance Contract, this obligation to provide evidence may be undermined. To compensate for this, the Compliance Contract may itself include provisions relating to portable technical information, support available through the client's accountability mechanism, or even in the event of legal proceedings.

The second aspect concerns the contractors themselves, who adapt their intentions and are bound, above all, by this “little law” which is any contract for the parties. This perspective is surprisingly underdeveloped in practice, no doubt because in Law, when considering Compliance, reference is made to unilateral “regulations” and the vertical relationship of obedience that it engenders in the operator.  This changes with the transformation of "conformity" (which is that) in "Compliance Law" (which is based on Monumental Systemic Goals and justifies contracts).

The third aspect concerns third parties, namely the stakedholders (and competitors...). These third parties benefit from Compliance Contracts because they are integrated into the Compliance System and because of the transparency between this system and the Compliance Contracts. In fact, and more technically speaking, this specific Cgreement provides them not only with a accountable(the company, the public body, the State), but also with a contractual debtor. Stakeholders may assert rights against the latter.

However, because the contracts themselves are also enforceable against third parties, they can anticipate these relationships with third parties – not only the competitors of the entity subject to the Compliance Obligation, but also its own relationship with stakeholders, and even its relationship with public authorities. Indeed, the object (and effect) of the Compliance Contract is to produce and build up Information that is of interest to everyone. The result is a ‘treasure trove of evidence’. A key question is how, and whether, this treasure trove can remain within the circle of the contracting parties or not.

Indeed, the fourth area concerns Public Authorities. As the bodies that “uphold” the compliance system, they consider the Compliance Contract to be legitimate and one of the most effective means of ensuring that regulations are effective, efficient and properly enforced; however, they also wish to benefit from the outcome of the contract’s implementation: to access the systemic information it generates. The contracting parties do not always share this view, but the Compliance Contract is not a means of “obeying” regulations. It is the Judge who will certainly address this question of principle, which relates to the very definition of Compliance Law.

This brings us to the fifth area of application, which concerns the Courts. Indeed, a number of courts are responsible for hearing such cases: the contract courts, the competition courts, the courts overseeing the various systems whose sustainability is thus safeguarded, and the courts specialising in vigilance legal duty  (which is the cutting edge of Compliance Law). 

The issue of the “natural judge” was examined at the symposium held on 29 May 2026 on: Contractual litigation involving compliance: procedural and jurisdictional aspects. The judge hearing the contract case (civil or commercial judge) will tend to refer first and foremost to the contract. This is also why the Compliance Contract conceptor would be well advised to include provisions in its terms regarding its relationship with the Compliance System, so that it is not the authorities of that system who do so in a too much discretionary manner.

In understanding the "Compliance Contract", as Iit was emphasised in 2022, in the judge’s interpretation of the contract, the judge is required to reconcile the parties’ intentions with a teleological approach, that is to say, to establish that the parties intended to serve the purpose of the expertise thus requested and developed (for the operator and ultimately for the stakeholders and for the system itself). 

By establishing this convergence, the judge gives full effect to the Cmpliance Contract. Rather than framing the issue, as is so often done when reasoning in terms of ‘conformity’, as a conflict between contractual freedom and public policy (conformity serving a public policy that would be contrary to the contract, inferior norm in the vertical normative hiercharchy). 

It must be accepted as a fundamental principle that contractual freedom, freedom of contract and a competitive market for compliance expertise are the most effective means of developing a Compliance System that will safeguard interconnected  different systems and protect the people involved in them.

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⛏️Find out more  :

🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance contract, compliance clauses, 2022

🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, ⚙️Compliance and Contracts,

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► Référence complète : E da Allada. (dir.), Devoir de vigilance. Quelles perspectives africaines ?, Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. "Thèmes & Commentaires, 2026, sous presse.

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►Voir notamment la présentation des contributions :

 

► Référence complète  : Conseil constitutionnel, déc.  n°25-1184 QPC, 6 mars 2026, Conseil national des barreaux et autres

[Expérimentation d’une contribution pour la justice économique due pour chaque instance devant le tribunal des activités économiques]

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►lire la décision

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