The liberal professions such as lawyers, doctors or accountants are organized into professional bodies and consider that they can not be reduced to mere companies operating in markets because the service they offer includes a human and moral dimension, translated by ethics, under the supervision of their internal professional organization, particularly through ex ante their power to adopt their own standards of behavior, and in ex post, the disciplinary power of their professional order.

Competition law refutes this organization from the Old Regime and simply considers the "markets of legal or medical services, firms having to compete with each other and not having to organize the sector, by  or fixing Numerus clausus, etc.

In the perspective of regulation, the liberal professions are, on the contrary, the ones most pertinento organize self-regulation in a globalized economy from the moment they give rise to a credible surveillance system and thus deserve the confidence of customers and public regulators.

The notion of "Common Goods" refers to a political conception insofar as it concerns objectively commercial goods such as cultural goods or medical services, but which the community is going to demand that everyone should have access to it even though the individual does not have the ability to pay the exact price. It is then the taxpayer - present or future - or the social partners who bear the cost, or even some companies, through the corporal social social responsibility mechanism.

This protection of Common Goods can be done by the State in the name of the interest of the social group for which it is responsible and whose it expresses the will, particularly through the notion of the general interest. In this now restricted framework which is the State, this reference runs counter to the principle of competition. This is particularly clear in Europe, which is based on a Union built on an autonomous and integrated legal order in the Member States in which competition continues to have a principled value and benefits from the hierarchy of norms. The evolution of European Law has balanced the principle of competition with other principles, such as the management of systemic risks, for example health, financial or environmental risks and the creation of the banking union shows that the principle of competition is no longer an apex in the European system.

But it still remains to an economic and financial conception of Europe, definition that the definition of the Regulatory Law  when it is restricted to the management of the market failures feeds. It is conceivable that Europe will one day evolve towards a more humanistic conception of Regulatory  Law, the same one that the European States practice and defend, notably through the notion of public service. Indeed and traditionally, public services give people access to common goods, such as education, health or culture.

Paradoxically, even though Law is not set up on a global scale, it is at this level that the legal notion of "common goods" has developed.

When one refers to goods that are called "global goods", one then seeks goods that are common to humanity, such as oceans or civilizations. It is at once the heart of Nature and the heart of Human Being, which plunges into the past and the future. Paradoxically, the concept of "global goods" is still more political in substance, but because of a lack of global political governance, effective protection is difficult, as their political consecration can only be effective nationally or simply declaratory internationally. That is why this balance is at present only at national level, which refers to the difficulty of regulating globalization.

Thus, the "common goods" legally exist more under their black face: the "global evils" or "global ills" or "global failures", against which a "Global Law" actually takes place. The notion of "global evils" constitutes a sort of mirror of Common Goods. It is then observed that countries that develop legal discourse to regulate global evils and global goods thus deploy global unilateral national Law. This is the case in the United States, notably in financial regulatory Law or more broadly through the new Compliance Law, which is being born. Companies have a role to play, particularly through Codes of Conduct and Corporate Social Responsibility.

► Full Reference: S. Pottier, "In Favour of European Compliance, a Vehicle of Economic and Political Assertion", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, 2023, pp. 459-468

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📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (donne by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC): Today's monumental goals, particularly environmental and climatic ones, are of a financial magnitude that we had not imagined but the essential stake is rather in the way of using these funds, that is to determine the rules which, to be effective and fair, should be global. The challenge is therefore to design these rules and organize the necessary alliance between States and companies.

It is no longer disputed today that the concern for these monumental goals and the concern for profitability of investments go hand in hand, the most conservative financiers admitting, moreover, that concern for others and for the future must be taken into account, the ESG rating and the "green bonds" expressing it.

Companies are increasingly made more responsible, in particular by the reputational pressure exerted by the request made to actively participate in the achievement of these goals, this insertion in the very heart of the management of the company showing the link between compliance and the trust of which companies need, CSR also being based on this relationship, the whole placing the company upstream, to prevent criticism, even if they are unjustified. All governance is therefore impacted by compliance requirements, in particular transparency.

Despite the global nature of the topic and the techniques, Europe has a great specificity, where its sovereignty is at stake and which Europe must defend and develop, as a tool for risk management and the development of its industry. Less mechanical than the tick the box, Europe makes the spirit of Compliance prevail, where the competitiveness of companies is deployed in a link with States to achieve substantial goals. For this, it is imperative to strengthen the European conception of compliance standards and to use the model. The European model of compliance arouses a lot of interest. The duty of vigilance is a very good example. It is of primary interest to explain it, develop it and promote it beyond Europe.

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► Full Reference: L. Aynès, "How International Arbitration can reinforce the Compliance Obligation", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, to be published

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📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC): The author takes as his starting point the observation that International Arbitration and Compliance are a natural fit, since they are both a manifestation of globalisation, expressing an overcoming of borders, with arbitration being able to take on the Compliance Monumental Goals, since it has engendered a substantially global arbitral order.

But the obstacle lies in the fact that the source of arbitration remains the contract, with the arbitrator exercising only a temporary jurisdiction whose mission is given by the contract. Yet the advent of the global arbitral order makes this possible, with the arbitrator drawing on norms that may include the Compliance monumental goals and corporate commitments. In so doing, the arbitrator becomes an indirect organ of this emerging compliance law.

The contribution then suggests a second development, which could make the arbitrator a direct organ of compliance. For this to happen, the arbitrator must not only compel the fulfillment of an obligation to act, as is already the case with provisional measures, but also have a broader conception of the conflict for which a solution is required, or even free himself somewhat from the contractual source that surrounds it. This may well be taking shape, mirroring the profound transformation of the judge's office.

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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Référence générale, Cohendet, M.-A. et Fleury, M., Droit constitutionnel et droit international de l'environnement, Revue française de droit constitutionnel , PUF, » 2020/2, n°122, p.271-297. 

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Résumé de l'article : 

Référence complète : Salah, M., La mondialisation vue de l'Islam, in Archives de Philosophie du Droit, La mondialisation entre illusion et utopie, tome 47, Dalloz, 2003, 27-54.

La mondialisation apparaît comme une occidentalisation des cultures et du droit. L'Islam qui prend forme juridique devrait se l'approprier sans se dénaturer. La réussite d'un tel processus difficile dépendra de la qualité de la régulation qui sera mise en place.

Lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage dans lequel l'article a été publié.

Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent via le drive lire l'article dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation".

► Référence complète : D. Esty et M. Hautereau-Boutonnet, "Derrière les procès climatiques français et américains : des systèmes politique, juridique et judiciaire en opposition", D.2022, p.1606 et s.

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Complete reference : Archives de Philosophie du Droit (APD), Le droit international, tome 32, ed. Sirey, 1987, 442 p. 

Read the table of contents.

Read the summaries of the articles in English. 

See the presentation of other volumes of Archives de Philosophie du Droit.

Référence complète Fox, E., The new world order, in Mélanges Joël Monéger, Liber Amicorum en l'honneur du Professeur Joël Monéger, LexisNexis, 2017, 818 p.  

► Référence complète : S. Manacorda, "La dynamique des programmes de conformité des entreprises : déclin ou transfiguration du droit pénal des affaires ?", in A. Supiot (dir.), L'entreprise dans un monde sans frontières. Perspectives économiques et juridiques, coll. "Les sens du droit", Dalloz, 2015, p. 191-208.

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► Résumé de l'article : 

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🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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The distinction between "Public Law" and "Private Law" is important. In the systems of Continental Law, or still called under Roman-Germanic Law, or even called Civil Law systems, it is even around it that legal systems are built: it can be a basic distinction, a summa divisio, as it it in the Civil Law systems. In the so-called Common Law or Anglo-American systems, the distinction is less fundamental, but it remains, justifying in particular that the rules and disputes concerning the administration call for special rules and are apprehended by special tribunals.

In principle, this distinction is based on the nature of the persons whose legal situation is examined. Under"Public Law" a legal situation involving a person who is itself a public-law entity: the State, a local authority, a public undertaking, etc. That is why, for example, the contract which may be concluded will be of public law, and the judge who may be seized of it will be an administrative court. If the situation does not involve a person governed by public law, then it will be governed by "Private Law". There are a thousand exceptions, but this is the starting and basic and fondamental principle.

Two essential remarks, bearing a system of values, explaining that the systems of Civil Law and Common Law are in fact confronting each other.

The two bodies of rules and institutions are not of equal strength because one of the categories is "closed", corresponding to one criterion (the "public person"), while the other is open: Public Law is a closed category; on the contrary, Private law becomes "active" as soon as there is no public person (a "private person" who or which must define himself or itself as a "non-public person").

One can consider this articulation between Public Law and Private Law in two ways, radically opposed. It may express a mark of inferiority in disfavour of private law: we are all "ordinary" persons in "ordinary" situations with "ordinary" activities (this will be the French conception ....). On the contrary, Public Law is the mark of the State, of Public Order, of Sovereignty, of public power, of the general will, in the interstices of which individuals slip in to act and satisfy their small particular interests

On the contrary, Private Law can be considered as the expression of the "common law": people are free and do what they want, through ownership and contract. As an exception and because they have elected people to do so, the rulers (whom they control), by exception, enact norms that constrain them. But this is an exception, since repression - public law and criminal law, which has the same status in this respect - is only a tribute to the freedom of persons, since this freedom remains wholly in the form of the private enterprise on the market.

It is then measured that the articulation between Public and Private Law profoundly reflects a philosophy and a political position. If it is considered that Regulation is the underlying order by which the Sovereign allows the deployment of his subjects who also benefit from a long-term policy constructed by the autonomous and measured political will, then Public Law in Is the master, the Regulation Law expressing a renewed search for efficiency, this but only this. If we believe that Regulation is whereby economic rationality manages to protect persons and companies from risks and to compensate for market failures, a market whose liberal principle remains the ideal, then Private Law is the core, whith contract and private property as basis tools.

France and the Latin countries adhere rather to this metaphysics of values which entrusts to the Public Authorities and the State the legitimacy and the power to express the general interest by Public Law, Regulators and Constitutional Courts, expressing it on a technical form renewed by the Regulatory tools: incitations, soft law, etc. The legal systems whose history draws on British history put more trust in the person of the entrepreneur and conceive of Regulation Law as an efficient outsourcing of functions to administrations that are efficient, informed and impartial.

Certainly, in the technical daily of the Law of Regulation and following the different sectors, Public and Private Law mix up:  public companies take the form of publicly traded companies under private law or private companies will be entrusted with missions of public service, instituting them as second-level regulators as are the infrastructure network operators.

But the fundamental conception of systems (rooted in the history of the people) and practice marry. In the silence of regulations (and the more they are gossiping and the more the judge must interpret them, which amounts to a "silence"), what sense to give to the system?

To take only a few questions, frequent in practice:

•      What judge to seize? The administrative judge or the civil judge? What is the "natural judge" of the Regulatory Law?
•      What standard to apply? The contractual will? The implicit will of the legislator? What is the "natural author" of the Law of Regulation?
•      Does the silence of the text prohibit action for operators or on the contrary does silence mean their freedom to act?

The absence of a firm and shared definition of what is the Law of Regulation does not facilitate practice. Hesitations in translations from one language to another increase confusion.

For the time being, there is a tendency to refer to Public Law in the sectors where whe take precedence over public operators' monopolies, such as telecommunications, energy, railways, air and postal services, and to refer to Private Law in the sectors which have long been the subject of competition between operators, namely banking, finance and insurance.

It should be recognized that the criterion of distinction has little economic rationale. The notion of risk would be a clearer and more manageable criterion. But it would then lead to a greater challenge to the distinction between Public and Private Law. Because the Law of Regulation, impregnated with Economy and Economic Analysis of Law, has sometimes little basis of legal tradition, it put in question of this summa divisio. If this were to be the case, it would be the totality of the legal systems which would be upset, especially in its judicial organization, since the judicial civil and commercial system is so distinctly distinguished (that of "ordinary" persons, that of "common law ) and the administrative judge (the "natural judge" of the State). It is then realized that the Law of Regulation challenges the whole Law, especially in the Latin countries and the Civil Law systems.

The goal for which a mechanism, a solution an institution or a rule is adopted, instituted or elaborated, is in principle external to them. Knowledge of this goal is a tool to better understand them and is only that.

On the contrary, in Regulation Law, the goal is the heart itself. By definition, Regulation Law is a set of instruments that articulate to take their meaning in relation to a goal. Moreover, these instruments are legitimate to represent a constraint only because they realize a goal which is itself legitimate. The interpretation of Regulation Law is based on the aims pursued: the reasoning is teleological.

This teleological nature explains that efficiency is no longer merely a concern - as for ordinary legal mechanisms, but rather a principle of Regulation Law. It explains the welcome, especially through the European Union Law of the theory of the useful effect. This link between rules, which are only means, and aims, refers to the principle of proportionality, which requires that constraints and exceptions be applied only when they are necessary, proportionality being the form off the classic principle of necessity.

Because the aim is the center, it must be expressed by the author of the Regulation standards, and this is all the more so if they are of a political nature, being not limited to mitigating technical failures of markets. This goal can be varied: the management of systemic risks, but also the consideration of the fundamental rights of people, the preservation of the environment, public health, civilization, education, etc. The silence of the legislature, which limits itself to the making of rules whereas these are merely instruments, without explicating the goal whereas the latter is a political decision, is a fault in the legislative art.

Moreover, in order that the person who applies the Regulation norm, in particular the Regulator and the Judge, has no excessive margin for interpretation and does not substitute for political power, the author of the Regulation norm needs to aim specifically for one goal : in this way, the one who applies the norm will be constrained. Or, if the author targets several purposes, then he must articulate them in relation to each other, by hierarchizing them for example. If he fails to do so, the institution which applies the regulatory standards will itself have to choose the purpose and exercise a power which he does not possess.

This express designation of purpose has been made for the European Banking Union,  this Regulation and Supervision construction, whose primary aim is to prevent systemic risks and resolve crises. Similarly, the purpose of the Regulation of essentiel infrastructures is to provide third parties access to the network. Similarly, in the case of a transitional regulation introduced following liberalization, the aim is to establish competition, the principle of which has been declared by the liberalization law. When this is not clearly stated, there is a lapse in the legislative art.

Legally, the State is a public law subject defined by territory, people and institutions. It acts in the international space and emits norms. Politically, it has the legitimacy required to express the will of the social body and to exercise the violence of which it deprives the other subjects of law. It is often recognizable by its power: its use of public force, its budgetary power, its jurisdictional power. These three powers, declining or being challenged by private, international and more satisfying mechanisms, some predicted the disappearance of the State, to deplore it or to dance on its corpse.

With such a background, in current theories of Regulation, primarily constructed by economic thought and at first sight one might say that the State is above all the enemy. And this for two main reasons. The first is theoretical and of a negative nature. The advocates of the theory of regulation deny the State the political qualities set out above. The State would not be a "person" but rather a group of individuals, civil servants, elected officials and other concrete human beings, expressing nothing but their particular interests, coming into conflict with other interests, and using their powers to serve the former rather than the latter as everyone else. The Regulation theory, adjoining the theory of the agency, is then aimed at controlling public agents and elected representatives in whom there is no reason to trust a priori.

The second reason is practical and positive. The State would not be a "person" but an organization. Here we find the same perspective as for the concept of enterprise, which classical lawyers conceive as a person or a group of people, while economists who conceive of the world through the market represent it as an organization. The state as an organization should be "efficient" or even "optimal". It is then the pragmatic function of the Regulation Law. When it is governed by traditional law, entangled by that it would be an almost religious illusions of the general interest, or even the social contract, it is suboptimal. The Regulation purpose is about making it more effective.

To this end, as an organization, the State is divided into independent regulatory agencies or independent administrative authorities that manage the subjects as close as possible, which is fortunate in reducing the asymmetry of information and in reviving trust in a direct link. The unitary, distant and arrogant State is abandoned for a flexible and pragmatic conception of a strategic state (without capital ...) that would finally have understood that it is an organization like any other ...

Competition law adopts this conception of the State, which it posed from the beginning that it was an economic operator like any other. This is how this conception which would be  more "neutral" of the world is often presented.

Successive crises, whether sanitary or financial, have produced a pendulum effect.

Now, the notions of general interest or common goods are credited of an autonomous value, and the necessity of surpassing immediate interests and of finding persons to bear superior interests or to take charge of the interests of others, even a non-immediate one, emerged.

Thus, the State or the public authority, reappears in the globalization. The Compliance Law or the Corporal Social Responsibility of the crucial companies are converging towards a consideration of the State, which can not be reduced to a pure and simple organization receptacle of externalities.

Paradoxically, the notion of conflict of interest seems to be at the center of Economic Law only recently in Economic Law, in both Corporate and Public Law. This is due to the philosophy which animates these two branches of Law, very different for each, and which has changed in each.

In fact, and in the first place in Public Law, in the Continental legal systems and especially in French legal tradition, on the side of the State, the one who serves it, by a sort of natural effect,, makes the general interest incarnated by the State pass before its personal interest. There is an opposition of interests, namely the personal interest of this public official who would like to work less and earn more, and the common interest of the population, who would like to pay less taxes and for example benefit trains that always arrive on time and the general interest which would be for example the construction of a European rail network.

But this conflict would be resolved "naturally" because the public official, having "a sense of the general interest" and being animated by the "sense of public service", sacrifices himself to serve the general interes. He stays late at his office and gets the trains on time. This theory of public service was the inheritance of royalty, a system in which the King is at the service of the People, like the aristocracy is in the "service of the King." There could therefore be no conflict of interest, neither in the administration nor in the public enterprises, nor to observe, manage or dissolve. The question does not arise ...

Let us now take the side of the companies, seen by the Company Law. In the classical conception of corporate governance, corporate officers are necessarily shareholders of the company and the profits are mandatorily distributed among all partners: the partnership agreement is a "contract of common interest". Thus, the corporate officer works in the knowledge that the fruits of his efforts will come back to him through the profits he will receive as a partner. Whatever its egoism - and even the agent must be, this mechanism produces the satisfaction of all the other partners who mechanically will also receive the profits. Selfishness is indeed the motor of the system, as in the classical theory of Market and Competition. Thus, in the corporate mechanism, there is never a conflict of interest since the corporate officer is obligatorily associated: he will always work in the interest of the partners since in this he works for himself. As Company Law posits that the loss of the company will also be incurred and suffered by all partners, he will also avoid this prospect. Again, there is no need for any control. The question of a conflict of interest between the mandatary and those who conferred this function does not structurally arise...

These two representations both proved inaccurate. They were based on quite different philosophies - the public official being supposed to have exceeded his own interest, the corporate officer being supposed to serve the common interest or the social interest by concern for his own interest - but this was by  a unique reasoning that these two representations were defeated.

Let us take the first on Public Law: the "sense of the State" is not so common in the administration and the public enterprises, that the people who work there sacrifice themselves for the social group. They are human beings like the others. Researchers in economics and finance, through this elementary reflection of suspicion, have shattered these political and legal representations. In particular, it has been observed that the institutional lifestyle of public enterprises, very close to the government and their leaders, is often not very justified, whereas it is paid by the taxpayer, that is, by the social group which they claimed to serve. Europe, by affirming in the Treaty of Rome the principle of "neutrality of the capital of enterprises", that is to say, indifference to the fact that the enterprise has as its shareholder a private person or a public person, validated this absence of exceeding of his particular interest by the servant of the State, become simple economic agent. This made it possible to reach the conclusion made for Company Law.

Disillusionment was of the same magnitude. It has been observed that the corporate officer, ordinary human being, is not devoted to the company and does not have the only benefit of the profits he will later receive as a partner. He sometimes gets very little, so he can receive very many advantages (financial, pecuniary or in kind, direct or indirect). The other shareholders see their profits decrease accordingly. They are thus in a conflict of interest. Moreover, the corporate officer was elected by the shareholders' meeting, that is to say, in practice, the majority shareholder or the "controlling" shareholder (controlling shareholder) and not by all. He may not even be associated (but a "senior officer").

The very fact that the situation is no longer qualified by lawyers, through the qualifications of classical Company Law, still borrowing from the Civil Contract Law, the qualifications coming more from financial theories, borrowing from the theory of the agency, adically changed the perspective. The assumptions have been reversed: by the same "nature effect", the conflict of interest has been disclosed as structurally existing between the manager and the minority shareholder. Since the minority shareholder does not have the de facto power to dismiss the corporate officer since he does not have the majority of the voting rights, the question does not even arise whether the manager has or has not a corporate status: the minority shareholder has only the power to sell his securities, if the management of the manager is unfavorable (right of exit) or the power to say, protest and make known. This presupposes that he is informed, which will put at the center of a new Company Law information, even transparency.

Thus, this conflict of interests finds a solution in the actual transfer of securities, beyond the legal principle of negotiability. For this reason, if the company is listed, the conflict of interest is translated dialectically into a relationship between the corporate officer and the financial market which, by its liquidity, allows the agent to be sanctioned, and also provides information, Financial market and the minority shareholder becoming identical. The manager could certainly have a "sense of social interest", a sort of equivalent of the state's sense for a civil servant, if he had an ethics, which would feed a self-regulation. Few people believe in the reality of this hypothesis. By pragmatism, it is more readily accepted that the manager will prefer his interest to that of the minority shareholder. Indeed, he can serve his personal interest rather than the interest for which a power has been given to him through the informational rent he has, and the asymmetry of information he enjoys. All the regulation will intervene to reduce this asymmetry of information and to equip the minority shareholder thanks to the regulator who defends the interests of the market against the corporate officers, if necessary through the criminal law. But the belief in managerial volunteerism has recently taken on a new dimension with corporate social responsability, the social responsibility of the company where managers express their concern for others.

The identification of conflicts of interests, their prevention and their management are transforming Financial Regulatory Law and then the Common Law of Regulation, because today it is no longer believed a priori that people exceed their personal interest to serve the interest of others. It is perhaps to regain trust and even sympathy that companies have invested in social responsibility. The latter is elaborated by rules which are at first very flexible but which can also express a concern for the general interest. In this, it can meet Compliance Law and express on behalf of the companies a concern for the general interest, if the companies provide proof of this concern.

To take an example of a conflict of interest that resulted in substantial legal changes, the potentially dangerous situation of credit rating agencies has been pointed out when they are both paid by banks, advising them and designing products, While being the source of the ratings, the main indices from which the investments are made. Banks being the first financial intermediaries, these conflicts of interest are therefore systematically dangerous. That is why in Europe ESMA exercises control over these rating agencies.

The identification of conflicts of interest, which most often involves changing the way we look at a situation - which seemed normal until the point of view changes - the moral and legal perspective being different, Trust one has in this person or another one modifying this look, is today what moves the most in Regulation Law.
This is true of Public and Corporate Law, which are extended by the Regulation Law, here itself transformed by Compliance Law, notably by the launchers of alerts. But this is also true that all political institutions and elected officials.

For a rule emerges: the more central the notion of conflict of interest becomes, the more it must be realized that Trust is no longer given a priori, either to a person, to a function, to a mechanism, to a system. Trust is no longer given only a posteriori in procedures that burden the action, where one must give to see continuously that one has deserved this trust.

► Full Reference: Deffains, B., Compliance and International Competitiveness, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, series "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, to be published.

Référence complète : Lagarde, Ch., A regulatory Approch to FinTech, mai 2018. 

Lire l'article. 

► Référence complète : L. d'Avout,  La cohérence mondiale du droit, Cours général de droit international privé, Académie de droit international de La Haye, t.443, 2025, 692 p.

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'Obligation de Compliance, coll."Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, to be published.

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📘 At the same time, a book in English, Compliance Obligation, is published in the collection copublished by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Éditions Bruylant.

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🧮the book follows the cycle of colloquia 2023 organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its Universities partners.

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📚this volume is one of a series of books devoted to Compliance in this collection.

► read the presentations of the other books:

• further books:

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Le système probatoire de la Compliance, 2025

• previous books:

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche & M. Boissavy (eds.), 📕Compliance et droits de la défense. Enquête interne - CJIP - CRPC, 2023

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕La juridictionnalisation de Compliance, 2023

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, 2022

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Les outils de la Compliance, 2021

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Pour une Europe de la Compliance, 2019

🕴️N. Borga, 🕴️J.-Cl. Marin and 🕴️J.-Ch. Roda (eds.), 📕Compliance : l'Entreprise, le Régulateur et le Juge, 2018

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Régulation, Supervision, Compliance, 2017

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Internet, espace d'interrégulation, 2016

📚see the global presentation of all the books of the collection.

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► General presentation of this book: Compliance Compliance is sometimes presented as something that cannot be avoided, which is tantamount to seeing it as the legal obligation par excellence, Criminal Law being its most appropriate mode of expression. It is sometimes presented as something that the company does out of ethical concern, self-regulation which is the opposite of legal obligation. For the moment, therefore, there is no single vision of the Compliance Obligation. This is all the less the case because of the multitude of texts, themselves constantly evolving and changing, which inject such a wide range of compliance obligations that we give up trying to establish any unity, thinking that, on a case-by-case basis, we will define a regime and a legal constraint of greater or lesser strength, aimed at one subject or debtor or another, for the benefit of one or other.

This lack of unity, due to the absence of a definition of the Compliance Obligation, makes the application of the texts difficult to foresee and therefore makes the Judge fearful, even though he/she is going to take on more and more importance.

This book asks the practical questions: What is Compliance obliging? Who is obliged to comply? and How far are we obliged to comply? and provides answers, Compliance practices, constraints and innovations will be better mastered and anticipated by all those they affect: companies, stakeholders, technicians, lawyers, consultants, institutions and courts.

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🏗️general construction of this Book: The book opens with a double Introduction.  The first, which is freely accessible, consists of a summary of the book, while the second, which is substantial, deals with the unified conception that we can, and indeed should, have, of the "Compliance Obligation", without losing the concrete and active character that characterises this branch of law.

The first Part of the book aims to define the Compliance Obligation. To this end, Chapter I deals with the Nature of this obligation. Chapter II deals with the Spaces of the Compliance Obligation.

The Part II aims to articulate the Compliance Obligation with other branches of Law. 

The Part III of the book looks at the way in which the possibility of obliging and the means of obliging are provided.  To this end, Chapter I deals with the Convergence of the Sources of the Compliance Obligation. Chapter II considers International Arbitration as a reinforcement of the Compliance Obligation. To this end, Chapter I deals with the Convergence of the Sources of the Compliance Obligation. Chapter II considers International Arbitration as a reinforcement of the Compliance Obligation. 

The last Part of the book is devoted to Vigilance, the leading edge of the Compliance Obligation. Chapter I is devoted to a study of the various sectors, and analyses the Intensities of the Vigilance Obligation. Chapter II deals with the Variations in Tension generated by the Vigilance Obligation. Finally, Chapter III deals with the New Modalities of the Compliance Obligation, highlighted by the Vigilance Imperative.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

ANCRER LES OBLIGATIONS DE COMPLIANCE SI DIVERSES  

 DANS LEUR NATURE, LEURS REGIMES ET LEUR FORCE 

POUR DEGAGER  L'UNITE DE L'OBLIGATION DE COMPLIANCE

LA RENDANT COMPREHENSIBLE ET PRATIQUABLE 

(ANCHOR COMPLIANCE OBLIGATIONS, SO DIVERSE

 IN THEIR NATURE, THEIR REGIMES AND THEIR FORCE,

TO BRING OUT THE UNITY OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

MAKING IT COMPREHENSIBLE AND PRACTICABLE)

♦️ Obligation de Compliance : construire une structure de compliance produisant des effets crédibles au regard des Buts Monumentaux visés par le Législateur (Compliance Obligation: building a compliance structure that produces credible results with regard to the Monumental Goals targeted by the Legislator), by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

TITRE I.

CERNER L’OBLIGATION DE COMPLIANCE 

(IDENTIFYING THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION)

CHAPITRE I : LA NATURE DE L’OBLIGATION DE COMPLIANCE (THE NATURE OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION)

Section 1 ♦️ La volonté, le cœur et le calcul, les trois traits cernant l'Obligation de Compliance  (Will, Heart and Calculation, the three traits encercling the Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 2 ♦️ De la dette à l’obligation de compliance (From the Debt to the Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Bruno Deffains

Section 3 ♦️ Obligation de Compliance et droits humains (Compliance Obligation and Human Rights), by 🕴️Jean-Baptiste Racine

Section 4 ♦️ L'Obligation de Compliance et les mutations de la souveraineté et de la citoyenneté (Compliance Obligation and changes in Sovereignty and Citizenship), by 🕴️René Sève

Section 5 ♦️ La définition de l''obligation de compliance confrontée au droit de la cybersécurité (The definition of the Compliance Obligation in Cybersecurity Law) by🕴️Michel Séjean

CHAPITRE II : LES ESPACES DE L’OBLIGATION DE COMPLIANCE (SPACES OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION)

Section 1 ♦️ Entités industrielles et Obligation de compliance (Industrial entities and Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Etienne Maclouf

Section 2 ♦️ L'Obligation de Compliance dans les chaînes de valeur (The Compliance Obligation in Value Chains), by 🕴️Lucien Rapp

Section 3 ♦️ Compliance et conflits de lois. Le droit international de la vigilance-conformité à partir de quelques applications récentes sur le continent européen (Compliance and conflict of laws. International Law of Vigilance-Conformity, based on recent applications in Europe), by 🕴️Louis d'Avout 

TITRE II.

ARTICULER L’OBLIGATION DE COMPLIANCE AVEC DES BRANCHES DU DROIT

(ARTICULATING THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION WITH BRANCHES OF LAW)

Section 1 ♦️ Dimensions constitutionnelles de l'Obligation de Compliance (Constitutional dimensions of the Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Stéphane Mouton

Section 2 ♦️ Droit fiscal et obligation de compliance (Tax Law and Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Daniel Gutmann

Section 3 ♦️ Le droit processuel, prototype de l'Obligation de Compliance (General Procedural Law, prototype of the Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 4 ♦️ Le droit des sociétés et des marchés financiers face à l'Obligation de Compliance (Corporate and Financial Markets Law facing the Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Anne-Valérie Le Fur

Section 5 ♦️ Le rapport entre le Droit de la responsabilité civile et l'Obligation de Compliance (The link between Tort Law and Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Jean-Sébastien Borghetti

Section 6 ♦️ Dimensions environnementales et climatiques de l'Obligation de Compliance (Environmental and Climatic Dimensions of the Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Marta Torre-Schaub

Section 7 ♦️ Droit de la concurrence et Droit de la Compliance (Competition Law and Compliance Law), by 🕴️Jean-Christophe Roda

Section 8 ♦️ L'Obligation de Compliance en Droit global (The Compliance Obligation in Global Law), by 🕴️Benoît Frydman & 🕴️Alice Briegleb

Section 9 ♦️ Transformation des relations de travail et obligation de vigilance (Transformation of Labour Relations and Vigilance Obligation), by 🕴️Stéphane Vernac

Section 11 ♦️ Les juges du droit des entreprises en difficulté et les obligations de compliance (Judges of Insolvency Law and Compliance Obligations), by 🕴️Jean-Baptiste Barbièri

TITRE III.

COMPLIANCE : DONNER ET SE DONNER LES MOYENS D’OBLIGER

(COMPLIANCE : GIVE AND TAKE THE MEANS TO OBLIGE)

CHAPITRE I : LA CONVERGENCE DES SOURCES (CONVERGENCE OF SOURCES)

Section 1 ♦️ Obligation sur obligation vaut (Compliance Obligation on Obligation works), by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 2 ♦️ Les technologies disponibles, prescrites ou proscrites pour satisfaire Compliance et Vigilance (Technologies available, prescribed or prohibited to meet Compliance and Vigilance requirements), by 🕴️Emmanuel Netter

Section 3 ♦️ La cybersécurité et l’Obligation de Compliance (Cybersecurity and Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Michel Séjean🕴️

Section 4 ♦️ Contrainte légale et stratégie des entreprises en matière de Compliance (Legal Constraint and Company Strategies in Compliance matters), by 🕴️Jean-Philippe Denis & Nathalie Fabbe-Costes

Section 5 ♦️ La loi, source de l’Obligation de Compliance (The Law, source of the Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Jean-Baptiste Blanc

Section 6 ♦️ Opposition et convergence des systèmes juridiques américains et européens dans les règles et cultures de compliance (Opposition and Convergence of American and European Legal Systems in Compliance Rules and Cultures), by 🕴️Raphaël Gauvain & 🕴️Blanche Balian

Section 7 ♦️ Ce à quoi les engagements engagent qu'est un engagement (What a ), by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

CHAPITRE II : L’ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL EN RENFORT DE L’OBLIGATION DE COMPLIANCE (INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN SUPPORT OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION)

Section 1 ♦️ Comment l'arbitrage international peut être un renfort de l'Obligation de Compliance (How International Arbitration can reinforce the Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Laurent Aynès

Section 2 ♦️ La considération par l'Arbitrage de l'Obligation de Compliance pour une place d'arbitrage durable (Arbitration' consideration of Compliance Obligation for a Sustainable Arbitration Place),  by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche 

Section 3 ♦️ L’usage de l’arbitrage international pour renforcer l’obligation de Compliance : l’exemple du secteur de la construction (The use of International Arbitration to reinforce the Compliance Obligation: the example of the construction sector), by 🕴️Christophe Lapp

Section 4 ♦️ L’arbitre, juge, superviseur, accompagnateur  ? (The Arbitrator, Judge, Supervisor, Support) , by 🕴️Jean-Baptiste Racine

TITRE IV.

LA VIGILANCE, POINTE AVANCÉE DE L’OBLIGATION DE COMPLIANCE

(VIGILANCE, SPEARHEAD OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION)

Section 1 ♦️ La Vigilance, pointe avancée et part totale de l'Obligation de Compliance (....), by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

CHAPITRE I : LES INTENSITÉS DE L’OBLIGATION DE VIGILANCE, POINTE AVANCÉE DU SYSTÈME DE COMPLIANCE (INTENSITIES OF THE VIGILANCE OBLIGATION, SPEARHEAD OF THE COMPLIANCE SYSTEM)

Section 2 ♦️ L’intensité de l’Obligation de Vigilance selon les secteurs : le cas des opérateurs financiers (Intensity of the Vigilance Obligation by Sectors: the case of Financial Operators), by 🕴️Anne-Claire Rouaud

Section 3 ♦️ L’intensité de l’Obligation de Vigilance selon les secteurs : le cas des opérateurs bancaires et d’assurance (Intensity of the Vigilance Obligation by Sectors: the case of Banking and Insurance Operators), by 🕴️Mathieu Françon

Section 4 ♦️ L’intensité de l’obligation de vigilance selon les secteurs : le cas des opérateurs numériques (Intensity of the Vigilance Obligation by Sectors: the case of Digital Operators), by 🕴️Grégoire Loiseau

Section 5 ♦️ L’Obligation de vigilance des opérateurs énergétiques (The Vigilance obligation of Energy Operators), by 🕴️Marie Lamoureux

Section 2 ♦️ Transformation de la gouvernance et obligation de Vigilance (Transformation of Governance and Vigilance Obligation), by 🕴️Véronique Magniermag

CHAPITRE II : LES DISPUTES AUTOUR DE L'OBLIGATION DE VIGILANCE, POINTE AVANCÉE DU SYSTÈME DE COMPLIANCE, DANS SON RAPPORT AVEC LA RESPONSABILITÉ

Section 1 ♦️ Le rapport entre le droit de la responsabilité civile et l'obligation de compliance, by 🕴️Jean-Sébastien Borghetti

Section 2 ♦️ Repenser le concept de responsabilité civile à l’aune du devoir de vigilance, pointe avancée de la compliance (Rethinking the Concept of Civil Liability in the light of the Duty of Vigilance, Spearhead of Compliance), by 🕴️Mustapha Mekki

Section 3 ♦️ Tensions et contradictions entre les instruments relatifs à la vigilance raisonnable des entreprises, by 🕴️Laurence Dubin

Section 4 ♦️ Compliance, Vigilance et Responsabilité civile : mettre en ordre et raison garde (Compliance, Vigilance  and Civil Liability: put in order and keep the Reason), by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

CHAPITRE III : LES MODALITÉS NOUVELLES DE L'OBLIGATION DE COMPLIANCE, MISES EN LUMIÈRE PAR L'IMPÉRATIF DE VIGILANCE (NEW MODALITIES OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION, HIGHLIGHTED BY THE VIGILANCE IMPERATIVE)

Section 1 ♦️ Clauses et contrats, modalités de l’obligation de vigilance (Clauses and Contracts, terms and conditions of implementation of the Vigilance Obligation), by 🕴️Gilles J. Martin

Section 2 ♦️ La preuve de la bonne exécution de la Vigilance au regard du système probatoire de Compliance (Proof that Vigilance has been properly carried out with regard to the Compliance Evidence System), by 🕴️Jean-Christophe Roda

TITRE V.

LE JUGE ET L'OBLIGATION DE COMPLIANCE

(THE JUDGE AND THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION)

Section 1 Section 1 ♦️ Devoir de vigilance et litiges commerciaux : une compétence à partager ?, par 🕴️François Ancel

Section 2 ♦️ Les enjeux présents à venir de l’articulation des principes de procédure civile et commerciale avec la logique de compliance (Present and Future Challenges of Articulating Principles of Civil and Commercial Procedure with the Logic of Compliance), by 🕴️Thibault Goujon-Bethan

Section 3 ♦️ Le juge de l’amiable et la compliance (The amicable settlement judge and compliance), by 🕴️Malik Chapuis

Section 4 ♦️ Le Juge requis pour une Obligation de Compliance effective (The Judge required for an Effective Compliance Obligation), by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

L’OBLIGATION DE COMPLIANCE : VISION D’ENSEMBLE

(COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION : OVERVIEW)

♦️ L'obligation de compliance, charge portée par les entreprises systémiques donnant vie au Droit de la Compliance. - lignes de force de l'ouvrage (The Compliance Obligation, a burden borne by Systemic Companies giving life to Compliance Law -  key points of the book (free access) by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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► Référence complète : L. Aynès, "Comment l’arbitrage international peut être un renfort de l’Obligation de Compliance", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2024, à paraître

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📕lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, L'Obligation de Compliance, dans lequel cet article est publié

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► Résumé de l'article (fait par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC) : L'auteur part du constat premier comme quoi l'arbitrage international et la compliance sont naturellement ajustés puisqu'ils sont tous deux une manifestation de la mondialisation, expriment un dépassement des frontières, l'arbitrage pouvant reprendre les buts monumentaux de la compliance puisqu'il a engendré un ordre arbitral substantiellement global.

Mais l'obstacle réside dans la source de l'arbitrage demeure le contrat, l'arbitre n'exerçant qu'une juridiction temporaire dont la mission est donnée par ce contrat. Pourtant l'avènement de l'ordre global arbitral permet ce dépassement, l'arbitre puisant dans des normes dont les buts monumentaux de la compliance et les engagements des entreprises peuvent faire partie. Ce faisant l'arbitre devient un organe indirect de ce droit de la compliance dont on voit l'émergence.

Puis la contribution évoque une seconde évolution, qui pourrait faire de l'arbitre un organe direct de concrétisation de la compliance. Pour cela, il faut que l'arbitre non seulement contraigne à l'exécution d'obligation de faire, ce qui est déjà le mouvement au titre des mesures provisoire, mais encore ait une conception plus ample ce qu'est le conflit pour lequel une solution est requise, voire se libère un peu de cette source contractuelle qui le cerne. Cela est possiblement en train de se dessiner, en miroir de la transformation profonde de l'office du juge.

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🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

► Full Reference: B. Frydman & A. Briegleb, "L'obligation de compliance en Droit global ("Compliance Obligation in Global Law)", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Éditions Lefebvre - Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2025, forthcoming.

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📕read a general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this contribution is published 

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► English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC): The authors stress that the Contracts Law and Tort Law are essential in Compliance Law, particularly in its global legal perspective, since it goes beyond the legal systems of States and develops new normativities, at the level of each company, but also allows a new expression of public power through the Monumental Goals that Compliance Law claims to achieve globally. The weaker the States, the greater the delegation to the first level is operating.

In concrete terms, the authors examine a series of situations in which various organisations use compliance techniques to appropriate global power over things or people, which has the effect, and sometimes the purpose, of reducing the freedoms of people controlled in this way. Thus CSR, which was initially non-binding, is now the source of binding obligations, and the moral obligation expressed in codes of conduct can become a civil obligation, as the Supreme Court of California decided in 2002 in the Nike case. 

In addition, "Comply or Explain" clauses are now commonplace, allowing the person subject to the legislation not to comply if they can justify it, which is the basis of the many information reports that companies are now required to publish.

Then, returning to the issue of liability, particularly in the digital environment, the article stresses the importance of 'conditional immunity from liability', taking the view from the European DSA that certain operators, such as hosting providers, are not liable unless they take on obligations, such as monitoring functions on contents published.

Finally, with regard to the duty of vigilance, it tends for the first time to align the scope of "responsibility" with the scope of "power", moral responsibility thus becoming legal responsibility, which would be like a new responsibility for others.

The result of all this is an "obligation to regulate others".

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🦉This article is available for people who follow the Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche teaching

► Full Reference: R. Gauvain & B. Balian, "Opposition et convergence des systèmes juridiques américains et européens dans les règles et cultures de compliance" ("Opposition and Convergence of American and European Legal Systems in Compliance Rules and Cultures"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Editions Lefebvre - Dalloz, "Régulations & Compliance" Serie, 2025, forthcoming.

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📕read the general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published

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► English Summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC) : Les auteurs appréhendent la Compliance à travers ses outils, principalement les programmes de compliance par lesquels les entreprises se conforment aux réglementations et les investigations menées par les entreprises sur la demande des autorités publiques pour repérer des risques et les nouveaux modes de défense consistant à nouer des accords avec les autorités de poursuite. 

L'article souligne l'inspiration américaine qui a porté ce mouvement par lequel l'Etat, principalement à fin d'efficacité, transfère aux entreprises la charge de poursuivre des "buts monumentaux". A partir de cela et dans un premier temps, est montré l'importation de mécanismes américains en Europe, notamment en France,  la CJIP reprenant bien des caractéristiques du DPA, même si les particularismes demeurent, par exemple dans les mécanismes de l'alerte.   Dans un second temps est montrée la convergence entre les 2 systèmes car à travers les obligations de compliance qui constituent le cœur de ces outils de compliance c'est toujours les valeurs occidentales qui sont exprimées, valeurs communes au Droit américain et au Droit européen et des pays européens. Elle a permis cette importation et l'on mesure aujourd'hui que ces valeurs sont portées plus fortement par l'Europe, notamment à travers l'obligation de vigilance et le DSA. 

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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► Référence complète : G. Beaumier & L. Gjesvik, "Digital Governance in a Rubber Band: Structural Constraints in Governing a Global Digital Economy", Global Studies Quarterly, vol. 5, issue 2.

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📝lire l'article

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► Résumé de l'article (fait les auteurs) : L’on représente souvent les États-Unis, l’Union européenne et la Chine comme l’incarnation de trois modèles de gouvernance numérique qui s’opposent. Leurs approches « de marché », « démocratique » et « autoritaire » refléteraient leurs préférences respectives s’agissant des acteurs qui devraient contrôler le développement et l’utilisation des technologies numériques. Nous affirmons qu’outre le fait de représenter différentes préférences, chaque modèle se distingue par la façon dont il résout les tensions inhérentes au gouvernement d’une économie numérique dans un contexte mondial. Lors de la création de nouvelles politiques numériques, les juridictions doivent composer avec les tensions pour atteindre trois objectifs: le maintien d’une autonomie réglementaire, la promotion de la compétitivité sur le marché et le soutien d’écosystèmes numériques ouverts et interopérables. Chose remarquable, plus elles s’efforcent d’atteindre au moins l’un de ces objectifs, plus il est difficile de progresser sur les autres, mécanisme qui met en évidence un « effet d’élastique ». Nous utilisons cet argument pour comprendre les changements de politique numérique au cœur de chaque juridiction, soulignant ce faisant qu’elles font montre de plus de dynamisme que l’on ne l’imagine généralement.

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The United States, the European Union, and China are often portrayed as representing three competing models of digital governance. Their so-called market, democratic, and authoritarian approach supposedly reflects their respective preferences over which actors should control the development and use of digital technologies. We argue that more than representing different preferences, each model differs in how it resolves inherent tensions associated with governing a digital economy in a global context. When devising new digital policies, jurisdictions must navigate tensions between achieving three policy objectives: maintaining regulatory autonomy, promoting market competitiveness, and supporting open and interoperable digital ecosystems. Significantly, the more they push to achieve one or more of these objectives, the harder it becomes to pursue the other(s), reflecting what we call a “rubber band” effect. We use this argument to make sense of changes in the digital policy in each jurisdiction, highlighting in the process their greater dynamism than often assumed.

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Con frecuencia, se tiende a presentar a Estados Unidos, la Unión Europea y China como representantes de tres modelos de gobernanza digital que compiten entre sí. Sus respectivos enfoques (de mercado, democrático y autoritario) reflejan, supuestamente, sus respectivas preferencias con respecto a qué actores deben controlar el desarrollo y el uso de las tecnologías digitales. Argumentamos que, más que representar preferencias diferentes, cada modelo difiere en la forma en que resuelve las tensiones inherentes asociadas con la gobernanza de una economía digital en un contexto global. A la hora de diseñar nuevas políticas digitales, las jurisdicciones deben sortear las tensiones entre el logro de tres objetivos en materia de políticas: mantener la autonomía regulatoria, promover la competitividad del mercado y apoyar ecosistemas digitales abiertos e interoperables. Resulta significativo que cuanto más se esfuerzan los Gobiernos por lograr uno o más de estos objetivos, más difícil se vuelve perseguir el otro o los otros, lo que se refleja en lo que llamamos un efecto de «banda elástica». Utilizamos esta hipótesis con el fin de dar sentido a los cambios en materia de política digital de cada jurisdicción, destacando, en el proceso, que tienen un mayor dinamismo de lo que muchas veces se supone.

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🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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► Référence complète : J.-L. Halpérin et A.D. Kessler,  Les échanges en matière de droit pénal entre les Etats-Unis et l'Europe / Transatlantic Engagement with Criminal Law, Clio Thémis, Open Edition, mai. 2025, en numérique et accès libre.

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📓lire le dossier

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► sommaire :

• Jean-Louis Halpérin et Amalia D. Kessler
  Introduction [Texte intégral]
• Jean-Louis Halpérin
  Quelle connaissance et quel impact du droit criminel américain dans la France du xixe siècle ? [Texte intégral]
• Sylvia Kesper-Biermann
  Atlantic Knowledge Transfer. U.S. Criminal Law in 19th Century Germany [Texte intégral]
• Amalia D. Kessler
  French and American Histories of Animal Prosecutions: Criminal Punishment and Animal Rights through the Prism of the Past [Texte intégral]
• Luigi Lacchè
  Criminal Justice in Italy between the End of the Liberal State and Fascism: Transnational Perspectives between the USA and Italy (1919-1945) [Texte intégral]
• Aniceto Masferrer
  Why and How Sexual Freedom Changed Western Criminal Law (19th and 20th centuries) [Texte intégral]

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