Updated: Jan. 14, 2021 (Initial publication: Dec. 14, 2020)
The Economic Attractiveness of Impartiality ("L'attractivité économique de l'impartialité"), in ""Economic Attractiveness, Judge Office and Impartiality. Thinking the judge Office" ("L'attractivité économique, l'office du juge et l'impartialité. Penser l'office du juge")
Full Reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., The Economic Attractiveness of Impartiality ("L'attractivité économique de l'impartialité"), in ""Economic Attractiveness, Judge Office and Impartiality. Thinking the judge Office" ("L'attractivité économique, l'office du juge et l'impartialité. Penser l'office du juge"),
This conference was held in French.
Read the colloquium program ( in French)
See the conference (in French)
This Working Paper is significantly different from the conference because it was conceived befor the colloquia cycle beginning. In addition, since this manifestation was a Round Table, the conference has taken more into account previous conferences and what said the other two speakers.
See the slides basis of the conference (in French)
The slides could not be shown during the conference. Orally, it was appropriate to more develop the introductory remarks for emphasizing the human and unique dimension of the Judge Office, expected in economic matters. As a result, the second part of the conference was not given orally, so slides therefore remain the only media available.
Summary of the conference : To fit into the ambition of this general colloquia cycle, which is to "Think the Judge Office" and in this round table which apprehends the imperative of economic attractiveness of this office, firstly emerges the seemingly contradictory relationship between this imperative and the distance that the judge must maintain. Thus it is often asserted that the judge should be internalized at this point in the "places", - an economic concept of great scope (to which the first part of the introduction is devoted, defining the "place" at the same time as a closed and porous space and as a "systemic litigant" -, that he/she should ipso facto lose his/her distance, that is to say his/her impartiality. As places are in competition, even if weighing on one hand the effectiveness of the place, and on the other hand the impartiality of a judge who is external to this place - Judge referring to the Law , Impartiality would necessarily emerge weakened. It would then be necessary on a case-by-case basis to get the judge to give the desired concessions...
The conference aim is to take the opposite position and to state that the Place - in particular because they must be strongly distinguished from the Markets, of which they were the ancestors - require a Judge, who is at the same time "singular", that is to say with a personality, a face, opinions, and in distance so that his/her imagination does not surprise Place. Indeed, these require a human Justice, and a not mechanical one and singular judges, of whom the juge des référés or the arbitrator are the epigone, meets this need. But for reducing their "margins of discretion", how Economy qualifies the Impartiality of a person who can never be neutral, the singular Judge's Office must be inserted into mechanisms reducing these margins. In this way, the Place may reach a Judge who is always more impartial, and in doing so the Place becomes always more attractive.
To achieve this in practice, the place expresses two legitimate expectations, as a "systemic litigant", whose satisfaction increases and the singular Judge's Impartiality and increases the Attractiveness of the Place as a space. This clearly shows that the Place's Attractiveness and the Judge's Impartiality, because judges are inserted into procedures, into institutions and into a "jurisdictional family", are not only not contradictory, but are on the contrary convergent, one fueling the other.
Concretely, and judicial practice shows it, it is necessary to consolidate the particular Judge's Impartiality by inserting him/her into collective processes. As it is necessary to promote a radiance of Impartiality by strengthening the "jurisdictional family".
To consolidate the singular Judge's Impartiality by inserting him/her into collective processes, it is necessary to admit without hesitation the subjectivity of the judge, to seek it even. The reduction of the margins of discretion, definition of impartiality, being obtained by the inclusion of the judge in a procedure of which he /her alone is the master but in which he/her is not alone. This has the technical consequence that he/her is himself/herself in an adversarial debate, not only during the proceedings, but also before (in the media), inside the judgment (and the decision of the Criminal Chamber of 25 November 2020 is a model of that) and after the judgment. By that, the Judge shows that by his/her office he/she is in the future, as climate justice will show. In addition, to limit his/her margins of discretion, the singular judge must fit into a rational principle of coherence, vertical and horizontal. Vertical coherence, because he/she integrates what it is said and the technique of the "determining opinion" is to be encouraged, the singular judge having to avoid it only if he/she has "strong reasons" to do it. This is to follow this general rule Comply or Explain (which is the very opposite of blind obedience). Horizontal coherence, because the singular judge either sticks to what he/she said, estoppel also being a rule of logic. But above all, the institution must extract as much as possible from " institutional doctrines", by all means, of which the annual reports are an example.
To consolidate the singular Judge's Impartiality by strengthening the notion and reality of the "Jurisdictional Family", it is necessary to have of it a broader conception, which could lead to "guidelines" common to various jurisdictions, and a stronger one, by integrating those surrounding the judge to lead to judgment. In this, the procedure before the Court of Justice of the European Union, working on a common file, is a model. If this community were even stronger, the Judge Office would be even more useful than it is already in the digital space.
Thus, Judges who are always human, always diverse, always singular, who listen, consider and adjust to the situation, who within a Jurisdictional Family fit into an Institutional Doctrine which transcends and supports them but which they transform if there is a strong reason to do so, a reason always expressed said: this is the embodied Impartiality that makes an economic and financial Place attractive.
Jan. 11, 2021
Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., "Let's Use the Power of GAFAMs in the Service of General Interest!" ("Utilisons la puissance des GAFAMs au service de l'intérêt général!"), interview done by Olivia Dufour, Actu-juridiques Lextenso, 11st of January 2021
Read the interview (in French)
Summary of the interview by Olivia Dufour:
Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Professor of Regulation and Compliance Law, reported to the government in 2019 about Internet governance. For this expert, giving a disciplinary power to GAFAMs is the only effective solution. And the suppression of Donald Trump's account is not likely to call this analysis into question.
The three questions (translated in English here by ourselves) asked by Olivia Dufour are:
To go further, especially about the logics that guide the Avia system, see:
Jan. 4, 2021
Teachings : Banking and Financial Regulatory Law - Semester 2021
Ce livret de cours décrit le contenu, la méthodologie et les objectifs du cours magistral de Droit de la Régulation bancaire et financière., tel qu'il se déroule au semestre de printemps 2021
Le cours magistral est assuré par Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, agrégée des Facultés de Droit et professeur des Universités, titulaire à Sciences Po.
Par ailleurs sont assurées des conférences par des maîtres de conférence.
Pour faciliter l'assimilation des techniques juridiques articulées à des techniques économiques et financières, est disponible un Dictionnaire bilingue de Droit de la Régulation et de la Compliance, en permanence disponible et actualisé.
Le livret détaille la façon dont les étudiants, qui suivent cet enseignement, situé dans le semestre de printemps de la première année du Master Finance et Stratégie de Science Po, sont évalués afin de valider ce module. Il précise la charge du travail requis.
Cet enseignement conçu et fondé par Marie-Anne Frison-Roche il y a plus de 10 ans était réparti entre 24 heures de cours d'ampli et 24 heures de conférence. La direction ayant demandé la réduction du volume global de cet enseignement, il a été décidé de réduire plutôt le volume du cours d'amphi.
Les 12 leçons, désormais archivées, ont été remplacées par 6 leçons, qui débutent immédiatement et d'une façon rassemblée pour que les conférences ne soient pas trop affectées par cette réduction.
Les thèmes des 6 leçons qui composent le cours d'amphi sont énumérés ci-dessous (se reporter au Plan détaillé du Cours MAFR)
Les lectures demandées sont précisées, appuyées sur une bibliographie générale, de la même façon que les sites pertinents sont indiqués.
Lire une présentation détaillée de l'enseignement ci-dessous.
Updated: Dec. 24, 2020 (Initial publication: July 15, 2020)
This Working Paper has been the basis for the first conference of the two conferences in the colloquium in Toulouse (France) under the scientific direction of Lucien Rapp, about Les incitations, outils de la Compliance ("Incitations, as Compliance Tools"), on December 12, 2019, the first one about The sanction as incitation and the second one about Incitations and Compliance Law (synthesis of this colloquium).
Summary and Introduction of this Working Paper: At first glance, Compliance and Incentives appear to be totally opposite. For two major reasons. In the first place, because the sanctions have a central place in the Law of Compliance and the incentives suppose an absence of constraint on the operators. Secondly, because the incentives are linked to self-regulation and that Compliance Law assumes a strong presence of public authorities. Taking the first reason, one should choose: either Compliance or Incentives! Either the effectiveness of one or the effectiveness of the others; either the techniques of one or the techniques of others; either the philosophy of one or the philosophy of the others. Resign oneself to the loss that such a necessary choice would involve. But to put the terms thus amounts to think poorly about the situations and reduce the fields of the solutions which they call for. If we take a rich definition of Compliance Law, it is possible on the contrary to articulate Compliance and Incentives. From this perspective, sanctions can no longer become what blocks the use of incentives but, on the contrary, what constitutes them. Even more, the coupling between Incentives and the requirements of Compliance Law must be strongly encouraged, as soon as the public authorities supervise in Ex Ante all the initiatives taken by the "crucial operators".
This working document deals with the first issue!footnote-2045. Indeed, the so-called incentive theory targets mechanisms that do not directly use coercion. They would therefore have little place in Compliance Law. But Compliance seems saturated with sanction procedures. We can even say that it seems to put them at the center, the public authorities presenting the number of sanctions as a sign of success, while the companies seem obsessed with their prospects, the two concerns ending in such a strange convergence that are the D.P.O...
An honest observer can only feel immediately uneasy. Indeed, he can only raise the definition of the sanction as a "constraint" triggered Ex Post, at the very heart of Compliance Law which is presented as a set of Ex Ante mechanisms. Based on this contradiction in terms, should we give up the association and think that it would be wrong against the spirit to think of the sanction as an incentive?
It is undoubtedly in this connection that one perceives most clearly the clash of two cultures, which do not communicate, while technically they apply to the same situations. Indeed, because Compliance was firstly designed by Finance, everything is a tool for it. Therefore, the tendancy to think about the sanction only as an incentive is very strong in Compliance Law. It manifests itself continuously and will not stop (I). But whatever the reasons are to conceive it this way, the principles of the Rule of Law cannot disappear and if we do not want them to be erased, then they must be articulated (II). It’s an essential adjustment.
This is why we can literally say that Compliance has set Criminal Law on fire by its conception, logical but closed in on itself, of sanctions as simple incentives. For Law to remain, however, it is necessary to hold a very firm definition of Compliance Law centered on its Monumental Goal, which is the protection of the person.
Updated: Dec. 21, 2020 (Initial publication: Dec. 11, 2019)
This working document serves as the basis for two conference given in the symposium made under the direction of Lucien Rapp, Les incitations, outils de la Compliance ("Incitations: Compliance Tools").
Référence : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance et Incitations : un couple à propulser, in Faculté de droit de l'Université Toulouse-Capitole, et Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC),Les incitations, outils de la Compliance, 12 décembre 2019, Toulouse.
This Working Paper has been the basis for two conferences in the colloquium in Toulouse (France) under the scientific direction of Lucien Rapp, about Les incitations, outils de la Compliance ("Incitations, as Compliance Tools"), on December 12, 2019, the first one about The sanction as incitation and the second one about Incitations and Compliance Law (synthesis of this colloquium). sur le thème de la sanction comme incitation, la seconde en synthèse de ce colloque sur
Summary of this Working Paper: Compliance and Incentives appear at first glance to be totally opposite. Not only because sanctions are at the heart of Compliance and that sanction is associated with constraint while incentive is associated with non-constrained!footnote-2044, but also because incentives are linked to self-regulation and that Compliance Law requires a strong presence of public authorities. Thus, one should choose: either Compliance or Incentives! Either the effectiveness of one or the effectiveness of the others; either the techniques of one, or the techniques of others; either the philosophy of one or the philosophy of the others. Resign yourself to the waste that such a necessary choice would involve. But putting the terms thus is thinking poorly about the situations and reducing the fields of the solutions which they call for. If we take a rich definition of Compliance Law, we can on the contrary articulate Compliance and Incentives.
To do this, the concept of “incentive Compliance” should be developed. This concept is not only appropriate, but it is necessary in a new conception of Sovereignty. For example for the digital Europe.
Read the developments below.
Updated: Dec. 18, 2020 (Initial publication: Oct. 15, 2020)
Editorial responsibilities : Direction of the "Regulations & Compliance" series, JoRC & Dalloz
General reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) & Dalloz, 2020, to be published.
In parallel, a book in English Compliance Tools, is published in another collection co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance and Bruylant.
This volume is the continuation of the books dedicated to Compliance in this collection.
Read the other books ' presentations of the collection about Compliance:
General presentation of the book : The political dimension of Compliance Law resides in the monumental goals that it aims for and which define it. These goals are internalized in "crucial operators", who willingly or by force must structure themselves and act to achieve "monumental goals", as set by public authorities and which may coincide with the interests of the enterprise. This one designs and controls the Ex Ante reorganization that this implies, under the public authorities supervision. Enterprises, even if their activities are not regulated, thus become transparent and must show the Compliance Tools effectively deployed to effectively achieve these goals. It is a major transformation of economic life in all countries because the Compliance Tools are adopted everywhere and have a global effect
These appear to be very diverse but their unity is profound and bringing it out has the practical benefit of producing a legal regime that is as unified as possible, while allowing their adaptation country by country, sector by sector, entreprise by entreprise.
This book aims to understand these Compliance Tools to better anticipate the assessment that will be made by Regulators, Supervisors and Courts, as well as the new conceptions of the authors of legal texts which impose new ones every day, while companies must also imagine the most appropriate Compliance Tools.
This collective work specifically apprehends those on which we have few studies when we handle them on a daily basis, such as risk mapping or training or rights, letting more familiar tools shine through more transversal contributions, such as compliance programs, sanctions, whistleblowing or many sorts of settlements. agreements of public interest.
A first chapter takes a legal and economic approach. A second chapter emphasizes the role of risk mapping. A third chapter draws the game of incentives. A fourth chapter identifies the expertise required. A fifth chapter insists on geographic significance. A sixth chapter details the measurement of effectiveness. A seventh chapter explores training. The eighth chapter examines technological tools. The concluding article leads to rights.
Read the presentations of the articles of the book :
Dec. 9, 2020
Teachings : Generall Regulatory law
Au sens juridique, la responsabilité désigne le fait de "répondre", mais au sens commun la responsabilité désigne le fait d'avoir du pouvoir et de l'exercer dans les marges que donne la liberté d'action. Les deux sens doivent converger dans un système libéral.
Puisqu'il a été montré que les Régulateurs sont les maîtres des secteurs, ils seraient donc logiques qu'ils sont responsables. Mais, c'est encore un point commun qu'ils ont avec les juges, parce qu'ils sont consubstantiellement indépendants, ils ne peuvent pas voir leur responsabilité engagées. Cependant le droit positif a posé le principe de la Responsabilité de l'Etat du fait de leur Autorités de Régulation, tandis que leur irresponsabilité politique comparée à l'ampleur de leurs pouvoirs a souvent était le ferment de leur contestation.
Par ailleurs, le mécanisme général de la responsabilité est utilisé, notamment parce que les mécanismes du Droit de la Régulation sont eux-mêmes défaillants. En effet, comme l'a montré Alain Supiot, l'on peut "prendre la responsabilité au sérieux" et, si l'on applique cette perspective plus particulièrement à l'espace numérique, cela permettra de pallier les défaillances de la Régulation publique elle-même. En effet, il existe des sortes de "trous noirs régulatoires", dont relève encore notamment le numérique.
Mais cette violence de la responsabilité ainsi conçue ne doit pas s'appliquer à tous les opérateurs économiques. En effet, cette responsabilité "proactive" qui dépasse le mécanisme de l'Ex Post vers l'Ex Ante ne doit s'appliquer qu'aux opérateurs régulés, éventuellement aux "opérateurs cruciaux, pour qu'à travers leur personne, les buts de la régulation soient atteints (mécanisme de compliance). Les opérateurs ordinaires doivent demeurer dans un mécanisme Ex Post, la responsabilité ne devant pas engendrer des "devoirs généraux de prise en charge d'autrui", car l'entreprise ordinaire n'est pas de même nature que l'État.
D'une façon spécifique et au besoin :
D'une façon plus générale et au besoin :
Consulter ci-dessous la bibliographie spécifique à cette leçon portant sur la Responsabilité et la Régulation:
Updated: Dec. 3, 2020 (Initial publication: July 15, 2020)
Full Reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Rights, primary and natural Compliance Tools, Working Paper, July 2020.
This Working paper is the basis for an article to be published in the collective book Compliance Tools .
There was a time when Regulatory techniques were above all only calculations of the best tarifications, taken up by monopolistic companies, while Compliance techniques were only obedience to all rules governing us. All this could therefore only be business of abacus and badine, used by engineers and consisted only of mechanical reflexes of "conformity" to all kinds of rules with the corset ensuring that everyone is bent in front of them!footnote-1946. In the perspective of a Regulation and Compliance thus conceived, that is to say effective, it would not be necessary to insert prerogatives for people, since these could only be sources of inefficiency, of cost. and protest, where the order would come from figures set in advance and controlled processes.
Systems have since evolved to integrate these prerogatives of each person: rights. Is this evolution really acquired? Maybe more effectively in Regulation Law than in its extension which is Compliance Law. This may be surprising since Compliance Law, in that it extends Regulatory Law in enterprises should, on the contrary, promote rights by meeting the enterprise, which is a group of people ....!footnote-1986 . But the modern reluctance to define the enterprise (and the company) as a group of people and the preference given to a definition of the company (and the enterprise) as an "asset", a "good" of which investors would be the owners, maybe explains the sidelining of rights not only in Regulatory Law but also in Compliance Law even though it is being deployed in the space of the enterprise!footnote-1987.
In addition, if Regulation has long been the subject of a branch of Law in which rights have full place, the presentation of Compliance as "conformity", that is to say the proven assurance of obedience to all the applicable rules, leaves no space for the prerogatives of people, which appear rather as resistance to the obedience that would be expected of them. There again, the expectation of what would be a good ratio of conformity between behaviors and prescriptions would be obtained by a "design", data processing being the new form of calculation, improved by precision tools where the being human is not required!footnote-1989. His fallibility and the little confidence which one can place in him leads even to exclude the people and to conceive Compliance system between machines, not only to alert of the failures, but also to manufacture the "regulations" and to connect those. here, in a "regulatory fabric" without a jump stitch, entirely enveloping human beings!footnote-1990.
It would therefore be with regret, and probably because some constitutional jurisdictions still attach some value to fundamental rights that the systems of "conformity" of behavior to the rules make some room for the prerogatives of people, their more essential rights. It is sometimes said that this is part of the cost. It would therefore be as by "forcing" that rights would exist in Compliance systems, a kind of price that the effectiveness of Compliance must pay as a tribute to the Rule of Law principle!footnote-1991.
If in a poor definition Compliance is conceived in this only "conformity", leading to a landscape in which the behaviors of the people adjust to the rules governing the situations, Compliance being only the most "effective way" to ensure the application of the rules, in a mechanical perspective of Law, then it would effectively be necessary to reduce the prerogatives of people to a minimal part, because any "additional cost" is intended to disappear, even if it is produced here by constitutional requirements. In the looming battle between the effectiveness of the application of rules and the concern for the legal prerogatives of people who should above all obey and not claim their rights, especially their right not to obey , or their right to keep secret in Compliance techniques which is based on the centralization of information, the effectiveness of efficiency could only, by the very power of this tautology, prevail!footnote-1988...
The defeat would not be total, however, collaboration would still be possible and active between people availing themselves of their rights and Compliance Law. Indeed, in many respects, if rights have been recognized in Compliance systems, it is not only because Compliance Law, like any branch of Law, can only be deployed with respect for fundamental rights. kept by fundamental legal texts, but also because of the effectiveness of rights as " Compliance Tools".
Indeed, because they constitute a very effective "tool" to ensure the entire functioning of a system whose goals are so difficult to achieve, because every effort must be made to achieve these goals, the public authorities not only rely on the power of crucial operators, but also distribute prerogatives to people who, thus encouraged, activate the Compliance system and participate in the achievement of the "monumental goals". Rights can prove to be the most effective tools to effectively achieve the goals set, to such an extent that they can be considered as "primary tools" (I).
But it is necessary to be more ambitious, even to reverse the perspective. Indeed because all the Monumental Goals by which Compliance Law is defined can be reduced to the protection of people, that is to say to the effectiveness of their prerogatives, by a mirror effect between rights. given by Law to persons and the rights which constitute the very purpose of all Compliance Law, in particular the protection of all human beings, even if they are in a situation of great weakness, rights become a "natural tool" of Compliance Law (II).
Rights are the Compliance Law future.