Sept. 16, 2021
Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Rapport de synthèse (Conclusion) in André C., Malaurie, M. and Petit, B., Les Buts monumentaux de la Comliance (Compliance Monumental Goals), Colloquium co-organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Laboratoire Dante of Paris-Saclay University, Institut d'études avancées, Hôtel de Lauzun, 7th of April 2021
Read the program of this colloquium (in French)
See Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's conclusion in video (in French)
Read the bilingual working paper on which this conclusion is based
This colloquium is part of the Cycle of colloquium 2021 organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its partners around Compliance Monumental Goals.
This manifestation is in French but the interventions will be part of an English collective book directed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Compliance Monumental Goals, co-edited by the JoRC and Bruylant.
An equivalent book in French, Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, directed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, will be co-edited by the JoRC and Dalloz.
June 26, 2021
Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Rapport de synthèse, in Droit et Commerce, La concurrence dans tous ses états, Deauville, 25 et 26 juin 2021.
Cette manifestation avait été initialement programmée pour les 22 et 23 juin 2020, puis en raison de la crise sanitaire a été reportée aux 27 et 28 mars 2020.
Lire la présentation générale du colloque.
Lire le programme.
May 17, 2021
Référence complète: Frison-Roche, M.-A., La place des entrepreneurs dans la création et l'effectivité du Droit de la Compliance en cas de crise in (dir.) Les normes publiques et la Compliance en temps de crise : les buts monumentaux à l'épreuve, colloque coorganisé par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et la Faculté de droit de Montpellier, 17 mai 2021.
Ce colloque s'insère dans le cycle de colloques 2021 organisé par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et ses partenaires autour des Buts monumentaux de la Compliance.
Les interventions serviront de première base à la réalisation d'un ouvrage dirigé par Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, dont la version française, Les Buts monumentaux de la Compliance, est co-éditée par le JoRC et Dalloz et dont la version anglaise, Compliance Monumental Goals, est co-éditée par le JoRC et Bruylant.
April 27, 2021
Law by Illustrations
Academics did a study on how people who work in investment banks kill themselves on the job.
The death of a 21-year-old intern, having worked three days without sleeping, in the Goldman Sachs bank, the testimonies of young people explaining that they work non-stop, undoubtedly contributed to testimonies, relayed in the press, specialized or generalist, but also university studies.
Indeed, two academics published a research no longer on the rules applicable within investment banks, which took measures to force their employees and their interns (since the victim was an intern) to rest on Sundays but on journeys based on data accessible by taxi companies.
As a result, the reaction of the people was not to rest: it was to increase the daily working time, to leave even later after dark.
Research shows that this phenomenon increases during the summer, that is to say precisely when the people who work are more trainees, that is to say those who want to "prove themselves": As the authors say: "Cette analyse, menée avec mon ex-collègue de doctorat de la Aalto University School of Business (Finlande), montre que, lorsque les banques ont mis en place des politiques de travail sans samedi, cela a incité les employés à travailler tard le soir en semaine pour compenser. Ces résultats sont plus marqués pendant les semaines de stages d’été, lorsque les banques d’investissement emploient un grand nombre d’étudiants désireux de faire leurs preuves en travaillant dur." (“This analysis, conducted with my ex-doctoral colleague from Aalto University School of Business (Finland), shows that when banks implemented work policies without Saturday, it prompted employees to work late nights on weekdays to compensate. These results are most marked during the summer internship weeks, when investment banks employ large numbers of students eager to prove themselves by working hard. ")
Let's go back to the Industry series.
An expert has shown all the points on which it does not correspond to "reality", on such and such a point.
The cinema is reality — not even in the reconstitution of such or such a point, it reproduces it by throwing on the screen what is the idea which moves in the facts.
This series begins with the death of a trader, who died of work.
It tells exactly the life, how to qualify it ..., let's say "the crazy life" of those who work there.
It is hardly bearable to watch.
In any case, it is exactly the image of what these two academics are saying.
April 21, 2021
April 12, 2021
Full reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Dresser des cartographies des risques comme obligation et le paradoxe des "risques de conformité" , in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, serie "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance and Dalloz, 2021, p.
Summary of the article
There are few synthetic or theoretical studies on Risk Mapping even though it is in fact the Compliance central tool, perhaps because it is more a management tool than a legal one. Risk Mapping is often described but does not receive any other legal qualifications than being a "modality", suffering in this respect from an evil which affects the whole of Compliance, still little understood by Law, attention often so focused on the Ex Post (sanctions) while Compliance is by nature in the Ex Ante. Going from disarray to incomprehension, everyone can note the existence of "compliance risks" among the mapped risks, because if as so many affirm that it would be necessary to speak only of simple conformity as obedience, demonstrated in Ex Ante, to Law, how a sub-set of a tool would therefore have the same object as the set of Law that this tool serves ... This aporia can only be resolved if Compliance Law is defined substantially by its "monumental goals" which exceed obedience to regulations.
Consequently, Law taking up Risk Mapping, this mechanism may first appear as an ancillary obligation to the main obligation consisting in achieving "monumental goals". The ancillary obligation to draw up the maps is an obligation of result, while the main obligation to achieve the monumental goals is an obligation of means. These cartographies being very diverse and being only occasionally targeted by specific laws, it can also constitute only a legal fact or, through the play of various charters, a unilateral legal commitment. But it isnbecoming the basis of an autonomous legal obligation incumbent on enterprises in position to know certain risks, obligation referring to the existence of a subjective right tof knowing and measuring them ("right to be worried") which the third parties who are going to run them would hold, thus allowing them to choose to run them, or not.
April 12, 2021
Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., La formation : contenu et contenant du Droit de la Compliance, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Les Outils de la Compliance, serie "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p.
Summary of the article
Firstly, as Training is a specific Compliance tool, it is supervised by Regulators. It becomes mandatory when it is contained in Compliance programs or sanction decisions. Since effectiveness and efficiency are legal requirements, what is the margin of companies to design them and how to measure the result?
Secondly, as long as each Compliance tool includes, more and more, an educational dimension, we can take each of them to identify this perspective. So even condemnations and prescriptions are so many lessons, lessons given, lessons to be followed. The question is then to know who, in this so pedagogical Compliance Law, are the "teachers"?
This article is based on a bilingual Working Paper, including additional technical developments, pop-up notes and hypertext links.
April 12, 2021
Full reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Incitation et Compliance, un couple à propulser pour accroître l'utilité du Droit de la Compliance, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, serie "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p.
Summary of the article: The theory of incentives targets the mechanisms which do not use directly constraint (except to present sanctions themselves as incentives) but which leads nevertheless to expected behaviors. To appreciate the links which must or must not be done between incentives and Compliance, we should proceed in two times.
First, the association appears natural between incentive mechanisms and "Compliance Law" since the later is defined in a dynamic way. Indeed, if it is defined placing its legal normativity in its "monumental goals", as the end of corruption, the detection of money laundering in order to underlying criminality disappears, or as the effective protection of environment or the concrete care of human beings, then what matters is not the means in themselves but the effective tension towards these "monumental goals". In this perspective, what was related to public policies led by States, because they are definitively not able to do it, the charge is internalized in the firms which are able to tend towards this goals: "crucial operators" because they have the geographical, technological, informational and financial means.
In this perspective, the internalization of public willingness provoking a split with the concept of State linked to a territory which deprives Politics of its constraint power, incentive mechanisms appear as the most efficient mean to reach these monumental goals. They appear as this "natural" mean both negatively and positively defined. Negatively in which they do not need in Ex Ante institutional localizable sources and sanction power in Ex Post: it is enough to substitute the interest to obligation. Positively, incentives relay through operators' strategies what was the so critical and joked form of public action: the "plan". The duration is thus injected thanks to Compliance mechanisms, as we can see it through the development of it in the care for environment ("plan climat") or through the educational mechanism, which could be conceived only in duration.
However, the opposition seems radical between Compliance Law and Incentives. And this because of three convictions often developed and that we have to overcome. First, the idea that in a general way, there would be a Law only if there is a mechanism of immediate constraint which is associated to the norm. As long as the incentive is not based on obligation, then it will be nothing... Secondly, and as if that were a kind of consolation ..., Compliance would not be really Law either ... We so often say that it is only about a methodology, a range of processes without sense, procedures to follow without trying to understand, process that algorithms integrate in a mechanic without end and without sense or that on the contrary, Compliance would be full of sense by Ethics and Morality, which are far from Law. While incentives talk to the human spirit which calculate, Compliance would be so a process through which machines will be connected to other machines, so an extra soul, where calculation has no place... Thirdly, solutions would be to be find in Competition Law because it can do without States, submit them and approach what is a-sectorial, especially finance and digital, the world being financialized and digitalized. The violence of Competition Law which comes in Ex Ante thanks to "Compliance sanctions" applying for example to essential infrastructures Law, by continuing to deny the salience of the duration and taking care of the "market power" would be also not compatible with a marriage with incentive mechanisms which rely on duration and power of those to which it is applied, converging towards goals, which are set by what Competition Law ignores: the project. This project which pretends to build the future is the one of politics and of companies, which use their deployed power in time to concretize it. It is without any doubt there that the future of Europe is.
To overcome this triple difficulty, it is thus necessary, in a second time, to modify our conception of Law, especially thanks to Compliance Law, in which this new branch is autonomous from Competition Law, and even sometimes opposed to it, in order to the insertion of incentive mechanisms permit to unknown or against Competition Law organizations to reach "monumental goals" which are imperative to take into consideration. For example, the taking into consideration of climate challenges or the building of a sovereign identity of the data. This is expressly set by European Commission which supervises such initiatives, supervision being what is articulated with Compliance, in a couple that go beyond Regulation, and replaces in Ex Ante Competition Law, salient branch for Ex Post. All the texts which are in the process of expressing it are based on this reformed couple: Compliance and Incentive.
This couple supposes that we recognize as such the existence of companies as project carriers, project which is the creation of marketed wealth circulating on a market, which could be an industrial project specific to a geographical zone both economical and political. Regulation is deployed to go away from the notion of sector and to transform itself in supervision of crucial firms in the correspondance between the project and the action, what refers to the notion of "plan". In this, banking supervision is just the advanced bastion of all thematic, energetic, climatic and health plans, or more broadly industrial and technological that could by incentive be implemented, this conception of Compliance permitting to build zones which are not reduced to immediate market exchange. The incentive corresponds to the fact that Compliance Law relies on the power of the firm to reach its own political goals, for example fighting against disinformation in the digital space or obtaining a healthy environnement. This supposes that Compliance stops to be only conceived as a model of rules effectivity, for example of Competition Law, to be recognized as a substantial branch of Law. A branch which expresses political goals. A branch which is anchored in crucial firms whose it recognizes the autonomy with regards to markets. This makes it possible, in particular through the coupling with incentive mechanisms leading to long-term collaborative operations supervised by public authorities, not to be governed by simple Competition Law, inapt to bring projects to fruition.