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Sept. 6, 2021

Teachings : Participation à des jurys de thèses

► Référence : Frison-Roche, M.-A., présidente et membre du jury de la thèse de Mamadou Diallo, , La transposition du pouvoir administratif exorbitant en droit de la régulation économiqueUniversité Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris I) ,  Salle Duroselle, centre Sorbonne, 6 septembre 2021, 14h30-17h30. 

 

► Autres membres du jury :  

  • Vidal, Laurent, maître de conférences HDR à l’Université de Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, directeur de la thèse ; 
  • Perroud, Th., professeur à l’Université Paris II Panthéon-Assas, rapporteur et membre du jury ; 
  • Marty, F., chargé de recherches CNRS, membre du Collège de l’Autorité de la concurrence, Professeur à l’Université de Nice, Rapporteur ; 
  • Marais, B. du, conseiller d’État, professeur à l’Université Paris Nanterre.

 

► Résumé de la  thèse : la thèse prend la force de deux tomes pour un volume de 708 pages. Sa première partie porte sur l'action particulière de l'Etat dans l'économie, tandis que sa seconde partie porte plus particulièrement sur la façon dont le droit de la régulation, dont le droit de la concurrence n'est pas vraiment distingué, exprime cette puissance de l'Etat par rapport aux entreprises privées, exprime la légitimité de l'Etat à obtenir de celles-ci qu'elles obéissent aux règles. La dimension procédurales des institutions ainsi créées, les autorités de régulation, et leur contrôle, est plus particulièrement développée. 

 

La thèse a été présentée et soutenue publiquement à l'Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris I), au sein de l'Ecole de Droit de la Sorbonne, dans le Département de Droit public et fiscal, le 6 septembre 2021 entre 14h30 et 17h30.

Au terme de la soutenance, le candidat a obtenu le titre de docteur en droit.

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Sept. 2, 2021

Interviews

► Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A.,La nouvelle loi de protection des données en Chine est un « anti-RGPD », entretien avec Olivia Dufour, Actu-Juridique, 2 septembre 2021. 

 

► Lire l'entretien complet. 

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Les 3 questions posées étaient :


❓ La Chine a adopté fin août une grande loi de protection des données personnelles. Celle-ci est présenté dans les médias comme un équivalent de notre RGPD. Est-ce le cas ?


La réponse est : non.

(lire la réponse développée dans l'entretien)

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❓ S'agit-il de simples effets indésirables ou bien du but poursuivi par le Législateur ?


La réponse est : Le but du Législateur n'est pas d'armer l'individu contre le pouvoir de l'Etat, c'est au contraire d'accroître le pouvoir de l'Etat, éventuellement contre lui.

(lire la réponse développée dans l'entretien)

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❓ Si la compliance peut servir les intérêts d'Etats non-démocratiques, c'est donc qu'elle est potentiellement dangereuse ?


La réponse est : elle n'est dangereuse que définie comme "méthode d'efficacité des règles ; il faut définir le Droit de la Compliance par son "but monumental" qui est la protection des personnes. La contradiction de la loi chinoise nouvelle apparaît alors.

(lire la réponse développée dans l'entretien)

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Aug. 10, 2021

Publications

► Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Le rôle du juge dans le Droit de la Compliance,  document de travail, aout 2021.

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🎤 ce document de travail a été élaboré pour préparer quelques éléments de l'intervention d'ouverture dans le colloque Quels juges pour la Compliance? , se tenant à l'Université Paris-Dauphine le 23 septembre 2021 et pour constituer la base d'un 📝article :

📕 cet article sera publié dans sa version française dans l'ouvrage La juridictionnalisation de la Compliancedans la collection 📚   Régulations & Compliance

 📘  dans sa version anglaise dans l'ouvrage Compliance Jurisdictionalisationdans  la collection 📚   Compliance & Regulation

July 23, 2021

Publications

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Programme de mise en conformité (Compliance), Dictionnaire de droit de la concurrence, Concurrences, Art. N° 12345, 2021

Read the definition (in French)

July 22, 2021

Publications

► Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Proportionality  and Compliance,  Working Paper, 22nd July  2021.

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🎤 this Working Paper is the basis for a conference in the colloquium Compliance and Proportionality. From the control of Proportionality to the proportionality of the control, to be helded in Toulouse, France, on the 14th October 2021.

 

📝It constitutes the basis for an article: 

📕 this article will be published in its French version in the book  Les buts monumentaux de la Compliancein the Series 📚   Régulations & Compliance

 📘  in its English version in the book Compliance Monumental Goalsin the Series 📚   Compliance & Regulation

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► Working Paper Summary: Measuring the relationship between the Principle of Proportionality and Compliance Law depends entirely on the Definition chosen for Compliance Law. Let us first take the definition of Compliance Law as a simple "mode of effectiveness" of the rules to which we hold (I). The more we stick to this procedural definition of Compliance Law as a mode of effectiveness of the rules, the less it is easy to detect specificities in the application of the Principle of proportionality in compliance mechanisms. There are certainly many examples of the application of the principle of proportionality, but the addition and variety of examples are not enough to sculpt an original relationship between Proportionality and Compliance.

 

However, this exercise is not wasted. In fact, in the confusion which still marks the emergence of Compliance Law, the legal nature of the compliance mechanisms remains contested. However, the imposition of Proportionality, not only as it is an obligation but as a limitation of powers in this first definition focusing on Efficiency, recalls that Compliance, conceived as " process ", would then in any case be admissible at the very least as a" Procedure ", anchored in the Rule of Law Principle, therefore self-limititation expression.   But Proportionality is then like a cold shower in compliance, since it is defined by self-limitation in a Law which would be defined by effectiveness as its only definition...  Ineffectiveness In Efficiency...: it is no longer a relation, it is then an opposition which is established between the two terms ...

In this definition of Compliance Law, there is no other choice than to put process in this sort of  squaring circle because in this procedural Compliance Definition, as a method of effectiveness, of effectiveness and efficiency of the rules estimated more important more than others, it must however be admitted that Compliance Law, as any branch of the Law, without denying its very legal nature, must be anchored in the Rule of Law Principle.

By the principle of proportionality, this new branch of Law is forced to anchor classic solutions from Constitutional, Public or Criminal Law,  the Principle of Proportionality prohibiting the Compliance of be just a process. The Repression  Law  has a large part in this conception and the Proportionality Principle reminds it of the part that Criminal Law still takes (with difficulty and for the moment ...) in the admission of ineffectiveness that the Law demands, particularly in the face of Compliance technologies.

In this first definition, the Proportionality Principle thus reminds Compliance, entirely held in the idea of ​​Efficiency that it is a "Law" of Compliance" and anchored in the Rule of Law Principle, it must limit its Effectiveness . It is therefore a kind of "price" that these techniques pay, with regret ..., to the Rule of Law and in particular to the freedoms of human beings. There is a strong temptation not to want to pay this price. For example by affirming that there is a new technological world, which the new system, entirely in algorithms, will promote in a move away from the Law, rejected towards the Old World. Frequently proposed, or set up for instance in China. Others say that we must "do the balance". But when you balance Efficiency performance and Efficiency self-limitation, you know very well who will win ...

 

But why not look rather on the side of a Definition of Compliance Law where, on the contrary, the two concepts, instead of opposing each other, support each other!

 

Indeed, Compliance Law is then defined as an extension of Regulatory Law as a set of rules, institutions, principles, methods and decisions taking their meaning and normativity for specific Goals. . In this definition, which is both specific and substantial, these "Monumental Goals" are systemic and require that all means be mobilized for them to be achieved. Future and negative in nature (events that must not happen) but also future and positive in nature (events that must occur), Compliance Law does not apply to all the rules whose  effectiveness required, but this specific type of "Monumental Goals", in an alliance between the political authorities in charge of the future of human groups and the entities in a position to mobilize its means. The method is then different. It is no longer a question of entrenching and the prospect of repression fades into the background.

A reversal occurs. Proportionality ceases to be what limits Efficiency to become what increases Efficiency. As soon as Goals have be precised, Proportionality is not the consequence of the limitation (as in the principle of "necessity" of Criminal Law, insofar as the latter is an exception), it is the consequence of the fact that any legal mechanism is a "Compliance Tool", which only has meaning in relation to a "Monumental Goal". It is therefore essential to set the "Goal Monumental Goals". As this is where the legal normativity of Compliance is housed, the control must first and foremost relate to that. Then all the Compliance Tools must adjust in a "proportionate way", that is to say effective to its goals: as much as it is necessary, not more than it is necessary. According to the principle of economy (which is also called the "principle of elegance" in mathematics).

In consequence, the rule contrary to the Principle of Proportionality is: the rule useless to achieve the goal. The unnecessary rule is the disproportionate rule: this is how the judicial review of excessive sanctions should be understood, not by the notion of "the limit" but not by the notion of "the unnecessary".

Everything then depends on the legal quality of the goal. De jure - and this would deserve to be a requirement at constitutional level, the goal must always be clear, understandable, non-contradictory, attainable.

This increases the office of the Judge. This renews the power of the Legislator in a conception which ceases to be discretionary.

But the Legislator retains the prerogative of determining the Monumental Goals, while the Judge controls the quality of the formulation that he makes of them, in order to be able to measure the proportionality of the means which are put in front by the State and the Companies, while Companies can rally to the Monumental Goals of the Politics by making an alliance with them, but certainly not instituting others in an autonomous way because they are not normative political entities, whereas they are free to determine the means necessary to achieve these goals, the Judge controling the proportionality mechanism that makes this new system work.

The case law of the German Constitutional Council expresses this conception. It is fully consistent with what Compliance Law is in what is the one Monumental Goal containing all the systemic Monumental Goals: the protection of the human being.

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July 3, 2021

MAFR TV

► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance Law Big Bang, talk show with Jean-Philippe Denis, July 3,  2021. 

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🎥 watch the emission totally in French 

🎥 watch the emission with English subtitles

June 26, 2021

Publications

► Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Notes taken for the summary report of the colloquium of Droit et Commerce, La concurrence dans tous ses états ("Competition in all its states"), June 26, 2021.

This text is the translation of the notes taken in French (this colloquium was in French.

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Notes' Summary: The opinions around the "Competition in all its states" highlighted the choices available for what could be this branch of Law tomorrow: choice of a political nature between various possible definitions of Competition Law. 

In method, the main thing is that this definition be clear. For this, this definition must be based on a principle and that the goal pursued by competition law is simple, so that in a second step, competition law can be easily articulated on the one hand with other branches of law. (by the care of the judge, in particular), on the other hand with "policies", such as "competition policy", then other policies (by the care of political authorities, especially European).

In essence, two conceptions of principle are opposed: either Competition Law will want to appropriate the goals of other branches, such as those of Regulatory and Compliance Law, or Competition Law will have the modesty to remain anchored in its definition as Market Law. This is the crossroads where we are.

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► Method: Because of the richness and diversity of the comments made, in order to keep to the time limit, some passages have not been repeated orally.

Because it is a synthesis, the document is only based on what was said and does not include technical references, nor does it refer to personal work.

 

► Articulation  of the notes taken while listening to the different interventions of the successive speakers:

During two days, listening to all the interventions on "Competition Law in all its states" has brought out the choices that are offered for what could be tomorrow this branch of law: they are choices of a political nature between various possible definitions of what should be Competition Law.

The most important thing is undoubtedly that this definition be clear; in order to be clear, it must be based on principle and the goal pursued by Competition Law must be simple, in order to be articulated with other branches of law (by the judge, in particular), and with "policies", such as "competition policy", and then other policies (by political authorities, in particular European ones).

The speakers proposed various, even opposing conceptions of what Competition Law should be, but all agreed on the fact that it has suffered many shocks and that, without a doubt, its recovery requires a common "culture" of Competition.

The evolution has attacked the very pillars of Competition Law in order to better reconstruct it by moving it from a mainly Ex Post perspective to a mainly Ex Ante perspective, by giving relevance to the objects themselves, notably to data, by taking into consideration human beings.

The evolution can take place by internalizing the perspectives of Regulation and Compliance in a Competition Law that becomes hypertrophied and political, which raises the question of the legitimacy of this "holistic" conception; it can also take place by a Competition Law that remains "self-centered" on its technical notions of market, price, etc., but articulates with the other branches of Law, economic or not. This is a political choice

It is in the hands not only of the States and the Parliaments, particularly with regard to the digital space, but also, and above all, in the hands of the supreme courts, a category to which the Court of Justice of the European Union belongs and to which everyone has constantly referred.

  • Read the notes below in full

June 26, 2021

Conferences

 ►Full reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Conclusion ("Rapport de synthèse"), in Droit et Commerce, La concurrence dans tous ses états, Deauville, 25th and 26th of June 2021.

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📅 This event was initially scheduled for June 22 and 23, 2020, then due to the health crisis, it was postponed to March 27 and 28, 2020; it finally takes place a year later.

 

📝  Read the general presentation of the colloquium and the program.  (in French)

 

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