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Sept. 27, 2019

Conferences

Generale Reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Les solutions offertes par le Droit de la Compliance pour lutter effectivement contre les contrefaçons de masse (The solutions offered by Compliance Law  to fight effectively against mass counterfeiting) , in Seminar of the Association des Praticiens du Droit Droit des Marques et des Modèles (APRAM), La contrefaçon de masse : va-t-on un jour réussi à y mettre un frein ? Quelques nouvelles pistes de réflexion (How to stop the mass Counterfeiting?, some new ideas), Paris, September 27, 2019. 

Read the program of the Seminar. (in French)

This conference is based on the report given to the French Government and published in July2019 : The contribution of Compliance Law to the Governance of Internet.

It is also based on the new contribution to the new edition of the Grands Arrêts de la propriété intellectuelle : "Le maniement de la propriété intellectuelle comme outil de régulation et de compliance"(in French).  This publication is based on this Working Paper : The use of Intellectuel Property as a tool for Regulatory and Compliance Perspectives

 

 

Summary : In this seminar devoted to new ways of reacting to "mass counterfeiting", the idea here is to start from the observation of an increase in the ineffectiveness of intellectual property rights - and thus of the I.P. Law. Law being a practical art, it is not a simple inconvenience, it is a central question. This can be remedied by improving the Ex Post legal process, but we can think of finding Ex Ante mechanisms. The Regulatory Law is Ex Ante, but digital world is not a sector, it is the world itself. A promising direction is therefore Compliance Law, in that it is both Ex Ante and non-sectoral. The contribution shows how Compliance Law is already useful, could be developed and how it could be applied so that these specific rights could be effectively protected in a digital world, where for the moment counterfactors have in fact the means to ignore them.

 

See the slides. (in French)

 

Updated: Sept. 25, 2019 (Initial publication: June 17, 2019)

Publications

This working document is the basis for an article published in the Archives of Philosophy of Law (APD).

Summary: Painting so well that the canvas is a living object is a technical feat that was achieved by little!footnote-1680. Francis Bacon obtained from the canvas that it made it his business to preserve life in it, while Carbonnier, with a similar modesty before the canvas and the profession, obtained that the Law was only a framework, but that it did not however, leave this place to no one and especially not to public opinion, so that everyone can in their own way and within this framework make their own right, on which the legislator in his delicacy and to use the terms of the Dean n affixes only a "thin varnish". These two masters of art built frames with rudimentary principles so that on this canvas the movement could happen by itself. Thus the Legislator created by Carbonnier offered each family the freedom to weave their rights every day. However, the childhood of the art of stretching the canvas over the loom came back to the Legislator alone. It is then possible, as Bacon did, to obtain an immobile object which allows the mobile figures to constantly arise. Regulatory scribbles are a thousand miles from this Legislative Art.

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In numerous writings and interviews, The painter Francis Bacon explains his act as a painter: it is "preserving the vitality of the canvas". In the book he devoted to it, Gilles Deleuze pointed out that Bacon said that "the procedures used do not force the Figure to stand still"!footnote-1611.

 

With the same pedagogical friendliness, in numerous writings and interviews, the jurist Carbonnier explains his act as a legislator, in particular in his collection of texts Essais sur les lois: legislate well, and let life unfold through texts, well after their adoption, because posed on pages which are never white, written compositions which are only the "varnish" of the life which must be able to throb in these Laws which one presents however so often but so strangely as "engraved in marble ". While on the contrary it is only a question of "preserving" the vitality of what is under the letter of the Law, the life of each one, life which does not resemble that of the neighbor, to obtain that the web of the legislative system is so flexible that this system lives by itself after the promulgation of the texts.

But it may seem to force the line to find elements common to two characters who undoubtedly were unaware of their reciprocal existence or at least, although living at the same time, did not appear similar. Before showing how similar their action is, therefore, put them face to face beforehand.

PREREQUISITES REQUIRED: FACING FRANCIS BACON AND JEAN CARBONNIER

 

Thus, the family painted in broad outlines by a few new articles of the Civil Code written by Carbonnier could nevertheless flourish afterwards, in each family, without the need to rewrite the text. One might be surprised that Carbonnier expressly only likes the Law and not the judiciary, this association of the Right to the Law often being worth rigidity; yet - and the formula made him famous - he conceived of the Law as only "flexible", without recognizing the judge as a general source of the Law, without recognizing him the power to soften over time the edge of the adapted law formerly, then once. In fact, the Flexible Droit volume brings together almost only texts relating to laws, while in his latest work, Droit et passion du Droit sous la Vième République, he challenges the influence of the courts over the Law.

Carbonnier abides by the Law. These laws which we are constantly told us that their quality should be never to move .... And to evoke in order to convince us the imperative of legal certainty, predictability, etc., each new report on the subject saying the same thing as the previous one, this one serving as a reference for the next one.

Thus, all these numerous works explain to us that, in the ideal towards which one should tend, the Law does not move in the main lines while the judge, by "jurisprudence" comes to adapt it and that thanks to "dialogue ", even to the" dialectic "between legislation and jurisprudence", cahin-caha we arrive at something suitable. In practice. And here is legal security well served, since it would be the only concern. A universal model to apply everywhere , at everything.

 

But this presentation, now very common and also constituting the vulgate of the economic analysis of law, does not correspond to the conception of Carbonnier, who did not admit the creative power of the Judge, being, like Motulsky, above all a jurist . Because if he asked as a question "Any law in itself is an evil?", It is only to answer it firmly: No, going so far as to compare in this article the announcement of a new law with the announcement made by the angel Gabriel.

Perhaps it is his attachment to the Law, his refusal to consider the jurisprudence as the source of the law, his respect for the legal matter itself that make his work today less cited than the work of sociologists who do not know not more the legal technique than the economists who describe the "legal regulation" to adopt to be effective? It should also be noted that its legislative art is little used today!footnote-1606. When laws are written by experts who do not deem it useful to know the law (for example to reform collective procedures solely on the basis of economic knowledge), who even think it useful to not know it so as not to be captured by his technicality, there is no need to look on the side of Carbonnier.

 It is true that to make a painting, to have the strength to fade in front of your canvas, you must master the technicality to return to the childhood of art, ambition of all artists, all teachers, all the Masters. Francis Bacon, also a wise reader of writers, rejecting the modern opposition between painted lines and written texts, repeated at each interview that he awaits "the accident" which comes alone to get the flesh out of the skin that traps him!footnote-1659. This technicality of the accident, this unexpected preparedness that allows life to find its place in the stretched canvas. Carbonnier did not do anything else: stretch the canvas of the Law so that family life can, in each of the families we make up, unfold overflowing with the text which is only "varnished". But it is nevertheless a law, as Bacon never disputed making paintings.

 

The theme of Carbonnier Sociologie juridique's book is this necessary presence of law in a sociological analysis which would not betray the law presented while managing to keep its distance: that is to say, let it breathe, allowing us to watch live. This is why, like Truffaut, he took an interest in children's pocket money.

By a game of mirrors, Carbonnier explained, for example about the reform he conceived of the Law of matrimonial regimes and whose genesis he explained in an article in L'Année sociologique!footnote-1619, that the sociology of law must allow distant readers that we are faced with the only written sheet of the work to see the living law come out of the pages. As historians aspire, History being living matter, as the author of literature understands it. Carbonnier wrote a novel about himself. A novel about a legislator therefore. "Self-fiction". We know judges of absolute modernity who have brought this art to its excellence, similarly concerned with writing life.

Admittedly, one could underline that if Francis Bacon signed his tables, which attaches to him the work and holds the Figure which moves there, it was not the case for Carbonnier. You must already be a scholar to know that the author of the train of reforms of the XXth century which transformed the Civil Code has for patronym "Jean Carbonnier": the Legislator is an abstract character, who, like the State, always carries this same title , like the King, and passes indifferently from head to head, from the dead instant to the crowned instant. Whoever looks at the painting will attribute it to Francis Bacon because it is written on it, while on the contrary he will designate for example the law of July 15, 1975 as the law reforming the law of divorce, without referring to the human being who designed it. Yes, it is the Parliament, which, in the name of the People via the Representation, is the author of the Laws. And not such and such.

 

So the comparison would not be worth. But let's take a detour by Romain Gary. The action of this one showed what one could call "the right of the literature", ie what can go the power of this one. Its power is so great that the author can never appear in it!footnote-1614. Romain Gary not only wrote under pseudonym, which allowed him to pass under the radar of the legal standard of Gongourt which cannot be given twice - and which was it, but wrote himself a book supposedly written by his ghostwriter after the hoax discovered - and therefore supposedly finished, speaking ill of Romain Gary, against which he protested but nevertheless undertook legally not to complain in court. While he himself wrote the book. The author can be a ghost, which multiplies, ghost of the ghost, is discovered only to hide under his face that is believed to be discovered, etc. But by dint of covering the smoke with smoke, the author himself disappears: and then remains the pure work, the Figure which moves alone, perfectly free. Thus under the mask of the Legislator, it was Carbonnier who designed and wrote, without ever signing, because it is the Law who speaks, and never Carbonnier. No greater tribute a law clerk can pay to the Law than disappearing under his letter. Thus, an author does not recognize his signature, it is only a clue, not a condition.

There is no need to go to Law & Literrature, a current which dries up the Law rather to cover it with a conception of the Law as a fabric of strategic lies and retrospective narratives of justification of decisions. No, Carbonnier, far too erudite and far too good a jurist to go towards a thought above all critical of an object, made sociology to show us a living Law and at the same time had a sociological conception of Legislative Art , writing laws which capture in their austere lines the daily and various lives which will come after the writing of a law which writes only in capital letters, general, aiming nothing special so that the particular remains in the hands of each individual!footnote-1607.

But how, if we get the judge out of the normative game, can the law be "flexible"? If not by drawing up laws which "preserve" in themselves, in their "canvas" even their vitality, which allows them to move, in an ink which must never be dry or reach marble?

 

Why not make the connection between the two creators, Francis Bacon and Jean Carbonnier?

How even not to do it, the design and the method are so similar to them.

When Bacon paints scenes of daily life as a field of ruin, while Carbonnier aims only "the interest of the child", on which one glosses so much, only as "a key which opens on a vacant lot"!footnote-1608, how not to bring them together?

For the two authors, painting for one and the law for the other, both must tear them away from their static support so that there is expressed and "preserves" life in its mobility itself. Even more, it is thanks to this support, which we thought motionless, that the fluidity of life appears to us. Thus life is, for them, the common object of painting and the law. This definition is carried by few people, because we find so often in the presentations which are made of the Law the imperative of a choice to operate, to put on the side of the immobile or on the side of the mobile, but not this conception of mobility expressed by an immobile support (I). It must be recognized that few have the level of technical mastery and thinking of Bacon and Carbonnier.

But if we go back to Carbonnier's conception of the law, while at a distance, as would do, in his own words, in his own country a "foreign" legislator!footnote-1603 in relation to it, laws that 'he nevertheless made with a master's hand, was it not in terms of painter that he described it, evoking the "frame" that it constitutes and the "thin varnish" by which it must simply always cover life which always prevails, since it is the canvas? (II).

 

 

 

The two authors thus put life at the center, one of the tables, the other of the laws. Yet two motionless objects, some made of "canvas", others made of "marble".

But both wanted - emphasizing the difficulty of the task - forcibly reinserted into the materially intrinsic immobility of the object - the canvas of the table that the flaking of the paint by the passage of time will damage , the letter of the Law that subsequent reforms will challenge - life. That is to say, finally give them their true object. And yet impossible to restore. And they got there. Undoubtedly by their own qualities: mastered technicality, modesty, perseverance, effacement before life itself which unfolds and occupies all the space and "does its work" on the support, which becomes mobile. Thus Francis Bacon's paintings move as the laws written by Carbonnier live, which is natural since it was directly inserted. What modesty was it worth to fade to this point.

Achieve by technical prowess that life is still throbbing in the canvas, in the text published in the Official Journal. Only in what by nature is fixed: the canvas, the Law, not only does life still throb, as if by "inadvertence", as Francis Bacon says, because life has a hard life, but because the masters that they were so delicate and so masters of their Art that they made everything that it was the very object of their work: the canvas of the picture was for Francis Bacon what life was made of, the marble of the law was for Carbonnier that by law life was made.

 

So as when the Master of Sewing removes the thread, the canvas no longer exists, the diary has long been lost, but life is still there. This is no coincidence, as sociologists who seem to boast of knowing nothing about law seem to present, speak of a "legislative vacuum" and always ask for more "new laws", sometimes stressing that Carbonnier was also arbitrary in law that bad in sociology - because there is to say it.

On the contrary, it is the Law bringing to its perfection: practical art, the Law relates to life and if in advance, in its very conception, it knows how to fade in front of life, it then joins in practice the art of painting because it takes a painter to force life on canvas (I). This requires a painter, because we often talk about legislative art but it is also appropriate to talk about artists who hold the pen. These do not "regulate", they draw a picture which, through the effect of correspondence, can let life continue to unfold because the ink is never dry. Of this table, it is the law which forms the framework, a light framework which allows to keep contours to what is the Right and what is not. Carbonnier always knew that in relation to life, Law was only a "thin varnish". Like all great masters, it was modest, drawing up great pictures, that were the complete reforms of the Civil Code that he wrote, never forgetting to conceive them only as a varnish so that life always finds its way out, breathe, in the same movement of a woman coming down the stairs or of a Pope who rules on his throne (II).

Sept. 25, 2019

Editorial responsibilities : Direction de la collection "Cours-Série Droit privé", Editions Dalloz (33)

Référence complète : Pin, X., Droit pénal général, Coll. "Cours Dalloz-Série Droit privé", Dalloz, 1ière éd., 2005, 11ième éd., 2020, 567 p.

 

La nouvelle édition de cet ouvrage " à jour de la loi de programmation 2018-2022 et de réforme pour la justice" aborde dans un premier temps la "loi pénale", avec notamment sa détermination et son application, puis dans un second temps l'ouvrage aborde "l'infraction" avec sa qualification et son imputation pour finir sur "la peine".

 

Lire la quatrième de couverture.

Lire la table des matières.

 

Dans la même perspective voir dans la collection les ouvrages suivants

 

 

 

Consulter l'ensemble de la collection dans laquelle l'ouvrage a été publié.

Updated: Sept. 24, 2019 (Initial publication: Aug. 31, 2019)

Publications

This working paper is the basis for an article to be published in French in Les Petites Affiches.

Summary : In August 2019, about the fire devastating the Amazon, the French Minister of Ecology says that this fact "is not just the business of a state" (n'est pas que l'affaire d'un Etat). This assertion denies the postulates of Public International Iaw (I). This supposes a new system, based on the idea that the power of the State on its territory is erased when the object that is there is no longer related to this "part" but to the All that is Universe (II). Let's accept the augur. First question: if it is not only the case of a State, whose business is it? (III). Second question: to anticipate the other cases that fall under this regime, what should be the criteria in the name of which the All will have to prevail over the part and who will then take care of the case of which the "local" State is divested? (IV). Because the perspective goes beyond the environment, beyond Brazil, beyond the States. It leads to Compliance Law animated by "monumental goals" that are the concern for the Universe and humans, in a humanist spirit. Let's go.

 

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On August 27, 2019, on the French radio France Inter, Elisabeth Borne, French Minister of Ecology (Transition écologique) expresses it clearly:  "Quand on est sur un enjeu tel que l'Amazonie, ça n'est pas que l'affaire d'un État", that can be translated : "When we are on a stake such as the Amazon, it is not only the business of one State ".

Starting from one case, "the Amazon", the Minister, thus taking up the position of the French President, associates a general consequence: "it is not only the affair of one State".

This is not a trivial sentence.

 

This affirmation denies, and why not, the entire system of Public International Law (I). By a new reasoning based on the idea that the All prevails, as by an effect of nature, on the Part (II).

 

Admitting this, it leads to opening two sets of questions. The first is related to the following main question: if it is not only the case of one State, of which is this the concern (III)? The second set of questions revolves around the questioning of the criteria on behalf of which other cases must be seized in the name of "All " and how to do it (IV).

 
 
I. THE QUESTIONING OF THE CLASSIC SYSTEM OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
 
Since forever, but this is not suffcient to keep the system only for that, the world is legally organized around the concept of territory, which has as for corollary the notion - already more legal - of border. On this basis rests the postulate of International Law: parties, taking the legal form of States, which, if they have common interests, come into contact (A). Admittedly, the notion of "right of interference" has called into question that (B), but in the name of an altruism that does not destroy the territory. The new idea that appears here is that the territory would be no more than a part of an All, in the name of which one would be legitimate to speak, even to decide in the place of the State in whose territory an event takes place (C).
 

A. The postulate of Public (and Private) International Law: parties (States) which, because of common interests, are in contact

The notion of State includes in its very definition the notion of territory (a territory, a population, institutions).

Thus the State governs through its institutions what is happening on its territory. For example, if there is a fire, or a risk of fire, the State makes arrangements through all legal, financial, technical and human instruments available to it. It is accountable for what it does through its political and legal responsibility.

When what is happening on its territory exceeds this one, in fact (epidemic, catastrophe with the consequences exceeding the borders, migrations, etc.) either according to its own opinion or according to that of the other States, the States, being sovereign subjects of Law in  the international system, act together on a pre-built legal basis: bilateral or/and multilateral treaties!footnote-1675, having created legal integrated zones (like the European Union or the United States) or international institutions (like the IMF).

A particular technique has been developed for several millennia - but here again the seniority is not sufficient to keep the system: diplomacy, anchored in each state in a particular ministry: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which each national government has. If one State totally excludes one phenomenon in the territory of another, the progressive procedure of ceasing diplomatic ties begins.

This can result in wars.

In the "case of the Amazon" both the President of Brazil and the President of the United States stick to the classical construction of Law.

Indeed, the former asserted that the Amazon is in the territory of Brazil, thus falls under the jurisdiction of the power of the Brazilian State and the Brazilian Law, from which it follows that another State does not have to come to interfere. However, the French President takes the floor not as this forest extends also on a French territory but as it is the business of the World. On the contrary, the President of Brazil claims the closing effect, which excludes a third State from taking over directly something - even a difficulty - that takes place in the territory of another.

The President of the US federal State has said that these are joint decisions between the President of Brazil and other heads of State, sovereign subjects of Law, who must agree to organize a solution to solve a local problem . Because in the same way that States can declare war, they can help each other!footnote-1676.

The whole Public (and Private) International Law is therefore based on this assumption: "parts" of the world, on which sovereign parties (States) have taken contact, because circumstances make something that falls within one of them or several others.

This is precisely what is called into question. The notion of the "right of interference", whose evocation we hardly hear any more, had already done so. But on another basis.

 

B. The "right of interference": idea that somebody can directly interfere with what happens in a country , an idea that does not question the postulate of the International Maw, an idea that rests on something else: a " right for the other "

The "right of interference" is the idea that in certain territories, things happen that are inadmissible.

In memory of the jus cogens, a kind of "Natural Law" of Public International Law, Another, that could be another state, can come to meddle with what is happening in a territory that is closed, without declaring war. to the state that keeps its borders.

It is the need of others, for example those who die in mass on this territory, or the nature that is devastated in the indifference of the State on whose soil the disaster is happening, which founds this "right" of another state to come and take charge.

The foundation of this "right" is therefore a "duty".

 

C. The new idea: a territory is only part of the Globe, whose fate is everyone's concern

The idea is new because it is not based on altruism. And no more about self-interest. Yet, de facto and de jure , the Amazon is not on the sole territory of Brazil.

France is particularly well placed to say something about it since part of the Amazon is on French territory.

Thus the inaction of the main concerned Brazil directly affects the interest of France, a "forest" being a block that can not be divided. If we were in Property Law, we would say that we are in indivision with Brazil and that in this respect, with the other States on whose territories this forest extends, a solution must be found.

Because of the indivisibility of this particular object which is this particular fores!footnote-1644, it is necessary that the States whose territory is concerned have a say in the matter.

But this is not the argument put forward by France, particularly by the President of the Republic.

It is said that the whole world is concerned about the fate of the Amazon. It could be said that, in this respect, when what could be described as a "global forest" is well treated, its management does indeed fall within the power of Brazil, Brazilian companies and the Brazilian State, but when it is abused to the point of seeing its future compromised, when fires may make it disappear, then this forest appears not to be localized in Brazil but being located in the World, of which Brazil is only a part!footnote-1648.

This reasoning, which then gives voice to everyone, for in the world every state is included in it, is a new reasoning.

The economic-political theory of the "commons" does not account for it because it is not a very legal theory!footnote-1656

 

II. THE NEW REASONING THAT COVERS THE CLASSIC REASONING OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

The new reasoning adopted by the Minister consists in saying that the Amazon does not concern only Brazil. This forest should therefore be directly related to the World (A). This is a welcome change in the system but based on a paradox (B).

 

A. When the Amazon is in danger of death, then it should no longer be attached to this part of the World that is Brazil, but directly to the World

This forest is presented as the "lung" of the planet, it is the "future" of humanity. In this, it can concern only one State, not even the one on whose territory this "Humanity good" is located!footnote-1643

As such, without the need to declare war to Brazil, another State may speak, for example the French State through the one that represents it in the international order, that is to say its President, to say what to do, since according to him the President of Brazil does not say or do what it is absolutely necessary to do for the whole planet and for the future of Humanity.

This induces a complete renewal of international institutions.

Indeed a direct attachment to the World and no longer to Brazil gives the forest object a special status because of a goal that exceeds Brazil: save the Amazon would impose because it would save the world. Therefore, it can no longer be the subject of Brazil, which would be like "dispossessed" by a goal that is imposed on it: to save the Amazon rainforest, even though it is mainly on its territory, while other States become legitimate to dispose of this object, even if the forest would not be in part in their territory, even if they would not be affected in their own interests.

This contradicts all Public International Law!footnote-1645; because the agreement of the political representatives of Brazil is no longer required and no one yet evokes the need to declare war to Brazil, and fortunately!

Such an upheaval justifies that such an affirmation is accepted with difficulty. One understands better than first consequence, which is not so innocuous, one of the first rules of diplomacy which is the politeness, between the heads of state, with regard to the spouses of these , have be broken!footnote-1657, that the remarks have slipped on personal questions, etc.

 

B. A welcome but paradoxical change in the system

Why not change the system?

This is difficult to admit, not only because it is brutal, but because it is paradoxical.

The paradox is the following. It is recognized that the theme of the disappearance of borders by "globalization"!footnote-1647 no longer reproduces the reality of facts!footnote-1646, especially not the Chinese situation, the digitalization having on the contrary allowed the construction of even stronger boundaries. What we called "globalization" now belongs to the pastWhat we called "globalization" now belongs to the past!footnote-1660. So today we should recognize on one side the reality of borders - which had not disappeared or are reborn - but only to better step over them, since - based on the concern of the world - states, yet each in their borders, would be legitimate to go directly to intervene in the business of others. 

The paradox is therefore, on the one hand, the rejection of the allegation of a de facto disappearance of borders by an economic interdependence, technology having denied "globalization" as a fact !footnote-1649 and the linked resurgence of borders allowing States to affirm more than ever that they would be "sovereign masters at home", which should logically lead to let Brazil decide for the Amazon, while yet on the other side we witness the questioning of the postulate of Public International Law as recognition of sovereignty and construction from agreements between states, requiring the agreement of the state whose territory is concerned (except war), questioning which leads to allow all to meddle with the fate of the Amazon, as if there was no border.

This paradox leads to two questions.

The first question is: if "it's not juste one State affair", who's concerned?

The second question is: after the "case of the Amazon", what are the other cases? And how are we going to provide solutions, if we no longer have the solutions of Public International Law, that is to say, the agreement of the country whose territory is concerned and which we do not want not go to war?

If we have clear ideas on the answers to be given to these two sets of questions, then because indeed when the future of all is in progress it can not be the affair of a single State, it is necessary to question Public International Law. But do we have clear ideas on these two questions? And what are the possibilities for possible solutions?

 

See the text following below.

Sept. 24, 2019

Teachings : Generall Regulatory law

Consulter les slides servant de support à la Leçon

Accéder au Plan général du Cours de Droit commun de la Régulation.

Se reporter à la présentation générale du Cours de Droit commun de la Régulation.

 

Consulter le Dictionnaire bilingue du Droit de la Régulation et de la Compliance.

 

Consulter la Bibliographie générale du Cours de Droit commun de la Régulation

Consulter la bibliographie ci-dessous, spécifique à cette Leçon relative au Droit de la Régulation dans la perspective de la Concurrence

 

Résumé de la leçon.

Le Droit de la Régulation a du mal à trouver sa place dans le système juridique en ce qu'il oscille entre le Droit de la concurrence et le Droit public ...

Les difficultés à situer le Droit de la régulation dans le système juridique rejoint les difficultés de définition qu'il rencontre. Ces difficultés sont aujourd'hui accrues par les espérances de "Régulation du numérique", certains estimant qu'il faut construire une concurrence effective tandis que d'autres affirment que la solution est une reprise en main des Etats. 

Trois sens du terme "Régulation" sont effectivement  actuellement actifs dans le Droit de la Régulation. Le premier vise la Régulation comme "Voie vers la concurrence". Certains limitent le Droit de la Régulation à cela, la concurrence étant alors comme son "idéal", certes sans cesse retardé, son Graal.  Cela conduit à une application technique des règles qui posent la concurrence en principe, et non pas en son exception. Cela implique une méthodologie en matière d'interprétation des textes. 

Le deuxième sens  vise la Régulation comme mécanisme "adjacent" à un système concurrentiel, ce qui conduit à sur-estimer parfois ce qui ne sont que des insertions adjacents de mécanismes de droit de la concurrence dans des secteurs économiques par principes régulés.Ainsi et pour prendre un exemple les mécanismes techniques constituant des monopoles économiquement naturels sont régulés, tandis que tous les autres comportements ou structures du secteurs relèvent de l'ordinaire, c'est-à-dire du Droit de la concurrence, qui constitue le "Droit commun". La question qui peut alors se poser est le régime juridique des contrats d'accès aux facilités essentielles, lesquelles ne sont pas le seul apanage des réseaux de transport. Les enjeux de qualification sont ici préalables et majeurs. 

En troisième lieu la Régulation peut se définir non plus en perspective mais en part égale voire en préférence à la concurrence, lorsque des raisons de durée, confiance, dangers, risques, conduisent à concevoir la Régulation comme un équilibre instable et durable entre le principe de concurrence entre d'autres principes, un équilibre entre le principe de concurrence et d'autres soucis. Il peut s'agir de principes que la technicité même de l'objet requiert mais cela peut être aussi que le regarde qui est porté sur cet objet lui fait porter : par exemple le souci de soin que l'on fait porter au médicament, le souci d'inclusion que l'on fait porter à la banque, le souci de chaleur partagée que l'on fait porter à l'électricité, le souci de civilisation, que l'on fait porter à une entreprise, où que l'on voit à travers un bien marchand mais dans lequel l'on a injecte un "droit de propriété intellectuelle" qui est lui-même un instrument de Régulation. Là encore, la propriété intellectuelle comme instrument de Droit de Régulation est un enjeu majeur, et cela plus qu jamais. 

Mais qui est légitime à porter ce regard juridiquement créateur : le juge ? l'entreprise (socialement responsable) ? le législateur national ? l'organisme international ? 

Ou bien, parce que ce sont des "choix", un politique, mis à cette position de choisir par le Peuple ? 

Sept. 24, 2019

Teachings : Compliance Law

Consulter les slides servant de support à la Leçon

 

Se reporter à la Présentation générale du Cours de Droit de la Compliance.

 

Consulter le Dictionnaire bilingue du Droit de la Régulation et de la Compliance.

 

Consulter la Bibliographie générale du Cours de Droit de la Compliance

 

Consulter la bibliographie ci-dessous, spécifique à cette Leçon relative aux relations entre le Droit de la concurrence et le Droit de la compliance

 

Résumé de la leçon.

A première vue, le Droit de la concurrence et le Droit de la compliance sont étrangers l'un à l'autre. En effet tandis que, dans son acception classique le premier est Ex Post le second est Ex Ante (se rapprochant ainsi du Droit de la Régulation). Plus encore le Droit de la concurrence est attaché à un organisme spécifique, "l'Autorité de concurrence", ce qui va le rapprocher du Droit de la Régulation, lequel se "repère" par l'institution d'une "Autorité de régulation", alors que le Droit de la compliance est à ce point peu institutionnalisé que l'on continue à douter même de son existence. En troisième lieu, par nature le Droit de la concurrence s'applique à toutes les "entreprises", notion très large en ce qu'elle est directement construite sur la notion d'activité, alors que le Droit de la compliance prend comme sujets de droit les "opérateurs cruciaux". 

Mais l'efficacité des techniques de Compliance a été repérée par les Autorités de concurrence qui, notamment à travers les techniques d'engagement et de "programmes" ont eu à partir des années 1990, sur le modèle du contrôle des concentrations, partie Ex Ante du Droit de la concurrence, développé d'une façno prétorienne des outils de compliance, par du "droit souple", puis les ont sécurisé en les insérant au sein même des procédures juridiquement organisées de sanction, les Autorités pouvant utiliser leur double qualité d'autorité de sanction et d'autorité de poursuite. Sans doute ce cumul d'un fonctionnement contractuel au sein de procédure juridictionnelle, par l'utilisation de programmes qui constituent à la fois des engagements spontanés mais sont aussi des contreparties d'autorisation de concentration, voire de contrepartie de clémence, voire des parties insécables de prononcés de sanction, posent à la fin des difficultés juridiques. 

Il demeure que par l'insertion du Droit de la compliance c'est un mixte de contrat et de contrainte qui est ainsi inséré. 

Par le contrat, qui libère l'Autorité de toute référence à son pouvoir par mécanisme de délégation dans la hiérarchie des normes, l'Autorité peut se transformer en Autorité de Régulation. C'est ce que les Autorités de concurrence sont en train de faire vis-à-vis des opérateurs numériques. 

Mais les Autorités de concurrence sont-elles légitimes à emprunter tout d'abord à une contrainte par le biais procédural neutre de l'accroissement d'efficacité, pour ensuite passer à une véritable contractualisation, ce qui permet de disposer des finalités pour la satisfaction desquelle elles ont été instituées ? N'est-ce pas à l'Etat, à travers un Gouvernement responsable politiquement qui doit fixer des finalités qui cessent d'être économiques? 

En effet les Autorités de concurrence rendent compte de l'exercice de leurs pouvoirs devant les juridictions du recours. Mais s'agit-il d'un contrôle de légalité externe ou d'un contrôle substantiel ? Cette question qui s'est posée à propos du contrôle des concentrations ne pose de nouveau d'une façon plus générale si la finalité du Droit de la concurrence, telle qu'elle est posée à travers ce que la Commission se permet d'appeler la "politique de la concurrence" devient à ce point politique, sans pour autant engager de responsabilité. 

Les Autorités de concurrence qui deviennent ainsi en matière numérique des "superviseurs" alors qu'elles ne sont pas des régulateurs, peuvent prétendre que le Droit de la concurrence serait une des voies pour remettre de l'ordre dans l'espace numérique.

 

Sept. 19, 2019

Law by Illustrations

Les fables de La Fontaine sont source inépuisable pour aborder puis approfondir le Droit.

Prenons une Fable moins connue que d'autres : Les oreilles du lièvre. (les expressions plus particulièrement mises en rouge le sont par nos soins, anticipant la pertinence qu'elles présentent dans une perspective plus juridique),

Un animal cornu blessa de quelques coups
            Le lion, qui plein de courroux,
            Pour ne plus tomber en la peine,
            Bannit des lieux de son domaine 
Toute bête portant des cornes à son front.
Chèvres, Béliers, Taureaux aussitôt délogèrent,
            Daims et Cerfs de climat changèrent ;
            Chacun à s'en aller fut prompt.
Un lièvre, apercevant l'ombre de ses oreilles,
            Craignit que quelque Inquisiteur
N'allât interpréter à cornes leur longueur,
Ne les soutînt en tout à des cornes pareilles.
Adieu, voisin grillon, dit-il, je pars d'ici.
Mes oreilles enfin seraient cornes aussi ;
Et quand je les aurais plus courtes qu'une Autruche,
Je craindrais même encor. Le Grillon repartit :       
Cornes cela ? Vous me prenez pour cruche ;
            Ce sont oreilles que Dieu fit.
            On les fera passer pour cornes,
Dit l'animal craintif, et cornes de Licornes
J'aurai beau protester ;  mon dire et mes raisons          
Iront aux Petites-Maisons.

 

II. LA DIFFICULTE DU CAS, POURTANT A PREMIERE VUE SIMPLE : LE LIEVRE DEVRAIT POUVOIR DORMIR SUR SES DEUX OREILLES

Le cas ne devrait pas poser difficulté.

La règle est claire : sont objet de sanction les animaux à corne. Et le lièvre n'a pas de corne. 

Ainsi, en application de l'article 5 du Code civil qui exprime un principe général, lorsque la règle posée par le Législateur, ici visé par le "Lion", et qu'elle n'ait ni obscure, contradictoie ou incomplète, ce qui obligerait à la compléter pour l'appliquer d'une façon particulière (article 4 du Code civil), le lièvre n'est pas concerné par une telle règle.

Plus encore, il s'agit d'une règle de sanction, puisque celui qui est visé par elle est "banni" : nous sommes donc en "matière pénale". Ainsi, la méthode de l'interprétation restrictive, et selon un principe constitutionnel applicable, un cas qui n'est pas prévu par le texte d'incrimination ne peut pas être sanctionné. Ainsi si les "animaux cornus" sont visés, comme un lièvre n'a pas de corne, alors comme il est clair qu'il n'a pas de corne, il n'est pas concerné.

Cela est clair, puisque "Dieu", c'est-à-dire à la fois la nature même et la Raison, le montre. 

Il n'y a pas d'ambiguité.

Et les voisins le disent au lièvre, qui ne devrait donc pas modifier son comportement, du fait d'un texte qui ne saurait le concerner.

 

III. MAIS IL Y A DEUX OMBRES : L'OMBRE DE L'INQUISITEUR ET L'OMBRE DE L'OREILLE PROJETEE

La première ombre est que si c'est le "Lion" qui a pris la nouvelle règle, c'est "l'Inquisiteur" qui la mettra en oeuvre. 

Certes, le Lion fût sans doute excessif pour réagir à un cas particulier qui l'a meurtri lui, mais enfin c'est Lui, et donc à partir de sa blessure propre, il tire une règle générale et abstraite qui frappe toutes les "bêtes cornues", dont il est aisé, dans une dialectique montante puis descendante de faire une énumération non limitative. 

Puisqu'on connait la définition de la "corne". Et qu'il s'agit d'un "animal".

Mais ce n'est pas l'hubris ou la colère du Politique qui pose la règle qu'il faut craindre, c'est le "raisonnement" de l"Inquisiteur, c'est son "raisonnement" qui balayera toutes les "raisons" du liévre, ce que celui-ci sait par avance.

En effet, l'Inquisiteur est un personnage sans pouvoir directement légitme, il n'est pas Roi. Il tire son pouvoir du texte général et abstrait du bannisement. Mais il va utiliser celui-ci pour frapper qui il veut, par exemple un lièvre, s'il en a envie, s'il n'aime pas celui-là, ou s'il n'aime aucun lièvre (et l'on se soucie de la fabre Le loup et l'agneau : "si ce n'est toi, c'est donc quelqu'un des tiens").

Comment pourrait-il le faire sans dévoiler sa partialité ? son excès de pouvoir (roitelet caché sous le costume de l'exécutant) ? 

Il va le faire par "l'interprétation".

Pour cela, et l'on retrouve ici l'article 4 du Code civil, il faut trouver une "ombre", cette ombre qui obscursit le texte à appliquer et "oblige" alors l'exécutant à exercer du pouvoir.

Et justement, comme nous le dit la Fable, les oreilles font une ombre ! et cette ombre ont la forme d'une corne ! A ce compte-là, il suffit de quitter le soleil, de tourner son regard vers l'ombre, vers le côté obscur de l'interprétation, et l'on voit alors se dessiner une corne. Ainsi, le lièvre se met à entrer dans la catégorie du texte.

Par le jeu de la technique de la qualification, il est qualifié d'animal cornu, puisque les animaux concrets cités ne l'étaient qu'à titre d'exemples, la liste n'était pas close. Et peu importe la longueur, comme le précise le déjà saisi par la Justice, même aussi courtes que les oreilles d'une autruche, l'ombre sera encore là. 

D'analogie en analogie, le texte étend son emprises et l'Inquisiteur son pouvoir. Sous couvert d'interprétation.

La réalité n'est pas un obstacle, si la forme de la corne est retrouvée. Ainsi, le texte visant "toute bête portant des cornes", ce que l'ombre valide pour le lièvre, à n'en pas douter, n'exige pas qu'il s'agisse d'un animal réel et véridique et la licorne fera aussi l'affaire, l'imaginaire n'étant plus soustrait à l'imperium de l'Inquisiteur.

C'est ainsi que le raisonnement analogique fait suivre le lièvre parce que face à la souplesse du raisonnement juridique manié par celui qui veut exercer le pouvoir que le Droit offre, même à celui qui n'est pas le Lion, aucune justification ne peut plus tenir car le résultat du procès est déjà contenu dans la qualification.

____

L'on mesure ici que, pour le meilleur et ici pour le pire, l'art et la puissance du Droit tient dans la qualification du réel. 

En Droit, les lions ne sont pas irascibles, les objets ne sont pas saisis par leur ombre et les inquisiteurs ne jugent pas avant d'interpréter  textes et faits pour y voir des licornes ; ils retiennent leurs pouvoirs pour respecter l'Etat de Droit et la liberté des lièvres. 

____

 

Sept. 18, 2019

Thesaurus : Soft Law

Référence complète : Auer, R., Embedder supervision: how to build regulation into blockchain finance,  Bank for International Settlements, Monetoary and Economic Department, working paper n°811, september 2019.

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