Dec. 11, 2019
MAFR TV : MAFR TV - case
By its decision "Morgan Stanley International" of December 4, 2019, the French Financial Markets Authority Sanctions Committee specifies the interpretation of both restrictive but tacit texts and the system of evidence of breaches of breach of breach through that of price manipulation
Watch the video that presents, analyzes and measures the scope of the Commission des sanctions de l'Autorité des marchés financiers - AMF (French Financial Markets Authority Sanctions Committee) of December 4, 2019, Morgan Stanley International.
The bank, through its British subsidiary, had to answer before the Sanctions Committee of the Authority of the financial markets where it contested a notification of price manipulation grievances on financial instruments based on specific securities (OAT) issued by the Public Treasury French and put on the regulated market, these first various financial instruments being themselves built elsewhere and offered on various national financial markets, for example for France FOAT, which are futures on these OAT not traded on a regulated market.
The sentencing decision of 4 December 2019 is instructive. On the very principle of the competence of the administrative sanctioning authority (I) and on the evidentiary mechanism of the facts (II). This corresponded to the "3 elements of the infringement", which should in principle be found in the repressive administrative law, which is a "criminal matter." But as expressly stated in the decision, the intentional element is not required for market abuse.
There remains therefore the legal element, which requires that the behavior be precisely targeted by a text, and the material element.
Let's see their fate.
I. LE PRINCIPE DE LEGALITE DES DELITS ET DES PEINES N'ENTRAVE PAS L'EFFET NATUREL DE LA DEFINITION "NATURELLE" DU COURS DU TITRE SOUS-JACENT AFFECTE PAR LA MANIPULATION
En premier lieu la Banque contestait la compétence même du Régulateur à en connaître car ce n'est que postérieurement aux faits reprochés que les textes applicables ont dit qu'étaient sanctionnables les agissement sur des instruments financiers "liés" aux instruments financiers émis sur un marché réglementé. Au nom du principe d'analyse restrictive et de la non-rétroactivité des textes d'incrimination qui gouvernent la matière pénale, la Banque soutenait n'être pas apte à être poursuivie.
La Commission des sanction écarte le moyen en affirmant qu'elle respecte ces principes inhérents à la matière pénale, mais qu'il faut regarder la finalité des textes. Or la manipulation de cours, manquement ici en cause, est un manquement parce que l'agissement a pour objet ou pour effet de perturber le cours du titre qui est sur le marché réglementé. En agissant sur un instrument financier, même situé sur un marché non-réglementé, dont le sous-jacent est sur un marché réglement, le cours de celui-ci est perturbé, alors la manipulation du premier ayant pour effet de perturbé le cours du second justifie la pourrsuite et la sanction. Sans qu'il y ait rétroactivité des textes.
II. LES PRESOMPTIONS SIMPLES D'AGISSEMENTS LEGITIMES OU ILLEGITIMES SUR LES TITRES ET LE "FAIT JUSTIFICATIF DE COMPLIANCE"
En second lieu, la Banque soutient que son action sur les différents instruments financiers sur les différents marchés a été justifiée par son intérêt légitime démontré en raison de l'absence de liquidité du titre et pour dénouer une position déficitaire appelant une intervention massive dans un temps très court de sa part sur plusieurs marchés en même temps et que si le cours en a été modifié, il n'en est pas devenu pour autant "anormal", ce qui est un élément matériel du manquement.
La Commission des sanctions pose tout d'abord que l'opérateur peut à la fois avoir des motifs légitimes démontrés d'agir sur un titre et néanmoins opérer sur celui-ci une manipulation de cours.
Revenant sur la définition de la manipulation de cours, la Commission ne reprend pas la notion d'"anormalité" dans le sens où il faudrait que le cours ne soit pas conforme aux attentes, il faut mais il suffit qu'il soit inattendu : le "normal" est donc dans le sens de l'inhabituel. Si la Banque parvient à justifier son action, comme elle arrive à le faire pour un titre (le FGBL et FGBX), alors il n'y a pas de sanction (n°90 de la décision) mais dans les autres cas la Commission estime que les agissements ont eu pour effet de faire varier le cours des sous-jacents émis par le Trésor public français (OAT), ne s'expliquent pas autrement, les autres opérateurs agissant comme si la hause de la valeur des OAT avait une autre origine. Or, la Banque avant cet effet a revendu immédiatement les OAT. L'ensemble des agissements ayant duré moins d'un quart d'heure, la Commission considère que l'élément matériel de la manipulation de cours est constitué.
Pourtant la Banque se prévalait d'une sorte de fait justificatif : elle avait agi en "conformité" avec "une pratique de marché" (article 631-1 Réglement général de l'AMF). La Commission récuse cela, car elle considère que ce texte ne vise que trois hypothèses : contrats de liquidité obligatoires, contrats de liquidité sur actions et acquisitions d'actions.... pour les opérations de croissance externe". C'est donc tout à fait une conception très restrictive que la Commission adopte pour ce qui vient en restriction des textes répressifs....
Quand à "l'intention manipulatoire", les choses sont encore plus claire. Pour sanctionner un manquement, il n'est besoin d'aucune démonstration d'une intention puisque les textes sur les abus de marché "ne font référence pas à un quelconque élément intentionnel"...
Pour se protéger, la Commission estime que l'intention découle de toutes les façons du manquement...
QU'EN PENSER ?
Il est probable que cette décision fera l'objet d'un recours.
L'on comprend bien le raisonnement du Régulateur.
Il fait prévaloir l'efficacité, la sanction n'étant qu'un moyen de préservation l'intégrité du système financier dans son coeur même à savoir le caractère adéquat des prix des instruments qui y sont offerts. En cela la sanction n'est qu'un instrument au service du marché, n'est qu'un instrument de Compliance.
Il est assez savoureux, et amer, de lire comment la "conformité à une pratique de marché" est balayée d'un revers de main, le caractère général, de principe et téléologique n'étant tout à coup plus un raisonnement recevable....
Il est vrai que le Conseil d'Etat conçoit la sanction de la même façon. A propos du mécanisme de gel des avoirs, autre instrument du Droit de la Compliance, la sanction infligée à une banque par l'ACPR est maniée de la même façon.
Mais que reste-t-il du Droit pénal, qui devait innerver dans son esprit et ses principes fondamentaux, repris dans la "matière pénale" le Droit administratif répressif ?
Comment ne pas être inquiet quand il est désormais affirmé que d'élément intentionnel, il n'en est plus besoin ?
L'on peut effectivement penser que le Droit retient la sanction, et l'accroît, mais met de côté la matière pénale : de la répression sans droit pénal... N'est-ce pas un oxymore ? Ne faut-il pas chercher au moins à le résoudre ?
Dec. 11, 2019
This working document serves as the basis for the conference given in the symposium made under the direction of Lucien Rapp, Les incitations, outils de la Compliance,
Référence : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance et Incitations : un couple à propulser, in Faculté de droit de l'Université Toulouse-Capitole, et Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRc),Les incitations, outils de la Compliance, 12 décembre 2019, Toulouse.
The so-called incentive theory targets mechanisms that do not directly use coercion but nevertheless obtain the desired behaviors for those who set up the devices. The working document procedure in three stages.
At first, the association seems natural between the incentive mechanisms and the "Compliance Law" defined in a dynamic way. Indeed if we define it as placing its legal normativity in the "monumental goals" that it pursues, such as the disappearance of corruption, the detection of money laundering so that the criminality which is under it disappears underlying, or as the effective protection of nature or the concrete concern of human beings, then what counts is not the means in themselves but to tend effectively towards these "monumental goals. For this, what was previously public policies led by the States, because they are definitely not in a position to do so, the burden is internalized in the companies which are able to strive towards these goals: the "crucial operators", because they have the surface, the technological, informational and financial means.
In this perspective, the internalization of the public will causing a split with the state form linked to a territory which deprives the Politics of its power of constraint, the incentive mechanisms appear as the most effective means to achieve these monumental goals. They appear both negatively and positively. Negatively in that they do not require in Ex Ante clearly identifiable and localized institutional sources and no more in Ex Post of power of sanction. Interest replaces obligation. Positively, the incentives are relayed through the operators' strategies, which was the so often criticized form of public action: the "plan". Duration is thus injected thanks to the Compliance mechanism, as we can see through its development in the interest of the environment ("Climate Plan"), or through the education mechanism, which is only conceived over time.
However, in a second step, the opposition seems radical between Compliance Law and Incentives. This stems from three convictions, as strong as they are probably inaccurate. In the first place the idea that in general there is a Law only if there is a mechanism of immediate constraint which is attached to the norm. A law currently in the course of adoption shows it with envi ... As soon as the incentive would not rest on the obligation, then it would be nothing ... In the second place, and as if that were a kind of consolation ..., Compliance either would not be Law either ... It is so often said that it is only a process, without meaning, procedures to follow without trying to understand, that algorithms integrate into endless and meaningless mechanics. While the incentives are addressed to the human mind, Compliance would be a process by which machines would connect to other machines ... Third, the alpha and omega of Digital Law would be in the Competition law, because it can do without States, subject them and apprehend what is a-sectoral, in particular finance and digital, because the world is now financialized and digitalized. The violence of Competition Law which goes back in Ex Ante thanks to "compliance sanctions" by applying in particular the essential facilities while continuing to deny the relevance of the duration and taking as concern "market power" is incompatible with a coupling with incentive mechanisms that are based on duration and power, converging towards goals determined by what the Competition Law aims to ignore: the project, that of the Politics and that of the company , who use their power deployed over time to make it happen.
It is therefore necessary, in a third step, to modify our conception of the Law, in particular thanks to the Law of Compliance, in that it is autonomous from the Law of Competition, so that the insertion of the incentive mechanisms allow organizations little known by it. ci to achieve monumental goals which it is imperative today to claim. For example the Climate. This is expressly stated by the European Commission. All the texts that are expressing it are based on this reformed couple: Compliance and Incentive. This couple supposes that we recognize as such the existence of companies as they carry a project, which is other than the creation of market wealth circulating on a market, which can be an industrial project specific to an area. both economic and political. The Regulation then detaches itself from the concept of sector and is transformed into supervision of the crucial companies in the correspondence between the project and the action, which returns to the concept of "plan". In this the banking supervision is only the advanced bastion of all the energy plans or more generally industrial and technological being able by incentive to be set up, this conception of the Compliance making it possible to build zones which are not reduced to the exchange instant merchant. The incentive corresponds to the fact that Compliance Law relies on the power of the company to achieve its own political goals, for example combating disinformation in the digital space or obtaining a healthy environment. This supposes that Compliance ceases to be conceived only as a mode of effectiveness of the rules, for example of Competition Law, to be recognized as a substantial branch of Law. A branch that expresses political goals. A branch that is anchored in crucial companies whose autonomy it recognizes in relation to the markets. This allows, in particular by the culprit with the incentive mechanisms leading to long-term collaborative operations supervised by public authorities, not to be governed by simple competition law, unfit to materialize projects.
See the intervention plan below.
Dec. 10, 2019
Teachings : Banking and Financial Regulatory Law, spring semester 2020
Ce livret de cours décrit le contenu, la méthodologie et les objectifs du cours magistral de Droit de la Régulation bancaire et financière., tel qu'il se déroule au semestre de printemps 2020
Le cours magistral est assuré par Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, agrégée des Facultés de Droit et professeur des Universités, titulaire à Sciences Po.
Par ailleurs sont assurées des conférences par des maîtres de conférence.
Pour faciliter l'assimilation des techniques juridiques articulées à des techniques économiques et financières, est disponible un Dictionnaire bilingue de Droit de la Régulation et de la Compliance, en permanence disponible et actualisé.
Le livret détaille la façon dont les étudiants, qui suivent cet enseignement, situé dans le semestre de printemps de la première année du Master Finance et Stratégie de Science Po, sont évalués afin de valider ce module. Il précise la charge du travail requis.
Les thèmes des 6 leçons qui composent le cours d'amphi sont énumérés.
Les lectures demandées sont précisées, appuyées sur une bibliographie générale, de la même façon que les sites pertinents sont indiqués.
Lire une présentation détaillée de l'enseignement ci-dessous.
Dec. 5, 2019
MAFR TV : MAFR TV - case
The French Council of State (Conseil d'Etat) confirms the wide and therefore severe application of the sanctions mechanism in the Compliance Law concerning the freezing of assets, by its decision of November 15, 2019, La Banque Postale v. ACPR
Watch the video explaining the content, meaning and scope of the decision made by the Conseil d'Etat (French Council of State) on November 15, 2019, La Banque Postale v. Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR).
The Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution - ACPR (French Authority of prudential control and resolution) pronounced a very high sanction, representing 7% of La Banque Postale's net annual result. The breach is constituted by the fact of not having prevented the use of the banking technique of the "money order" which was used to escape the freezing of the assets.
The Conseil d'Etat recalls that by nature if the assets are frozen, it is not possible that anyone is able to dispose of these assets. However, by the use of "money orders", persons targeted by asset freezing decisions, tools used in connection with the fight against money laundering and the fight against terrorism, had been able to circulate money to from accounts managed by La Banque Postale, of which they were not customers.
This case was not foreseen at the time when the Bank Postale was sanctioned by the ACPR for not having prevented such a use, the texts forcing it under its obligations of "conformity" to prevent this behavior of violation background gels on the part of his customers, but only that.
This case of a use of a means by a person who is not a customer of the bank was not foreseen at the time when the alleged facts took place and the Bank claims not to be able to be punished since in the repressive matter it is necessary to respect the principle of non-retroactivity of the texts, - in this case texts later supplemented to aim at such an assumption -, the non-retroactivity being a major principle itself related to the principle of the legality of the offenses and the penalties.
We are therefore in the hypothesis of a silence of the texts.
What to decide? Can the Bank be condemned and so heavily or not by the ACPR?
The Bank does not think so.
It acted against this sanction decision firstly because those who used these money orders were not its clients. It has strong reasons to avail itself of this fact, since subsequently the texts needed to be modified to aim not only the use of this technique of money order by those who have a count in the bank and also by those who act with cash through the bank without a count, that is to say without an account holder to look at. Because we are in criminal matters, the restrictive interpretation and non-retroactivity of the text should lead to follow the reasoning of the Bank. But the Conseil d'Etat does not because it considers that implicitly but necessarily even with this subsequent modification of the text, it had aimed that use before.
By this way, the Conseil d'Etatuncil develops a very broad concept of the obligations of banks in their role in the fight against money laundering, and therefore a very repressive point of view, which permeates their "obligation of Compliance". Thus, when the bank also argues that it can not be sanctioned since for it this activity of money order is deficit and that it did not cause harm to its customers even by assuming badly its obligations, theConseil d'Etat stresses that this is not a pertinent perspective since the Compliance obligations falls within the "overriding general interest of protection of public order and public security, to which the freezing of assets legislation responds".
Read the judgment of the Conseil d'Etat ( in French).
Dec. 4, 2019
MAFR TV : MAFR TV - case
Regarder le film de 5 minutes sur le contenu, le sens et la portée de l'arrêt rendu par la première chambre civile de la Cour de cassation du 27 novembre 2019, M.X.A. c/ Google.
Cet arrêt casse l'arrêt de la Cour d'appel de Paris qui valide le non-déférencement, après que la CNIL a demandé l'interprétation des textes, notamment du RGPD, parce que le droit à l'oubli doit limiter l'exception ici invoquée, à savoir le droit à l'information, même s'il s'agit d'une décision pénale concernant un commissaire-aux-comptes, car il s'agit d'une affaire privée et non pas ce qui concerne l'exercice de sa profession réglementée coeur du système financier.
Nov. 28, 2019
Reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., General presentation of the cycle of conferences on Les outils de la Compliance (Compliance Tools) and "Théorie générale de la cartographie des risques" (Legal Theory of Risk Mapping), conference made in French, in Département d'Economie de Sciences Po & Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC), La cartographie des risques, outil de la Compliance (Risk Mapping, as Compliance Tool), November 28th, 2019, Sciences Po, Paris.
Summary of the conference
Risk mapping is both central to the obligations or practices of companies and little apprehended by the legal systems. It is not expressly referred to by the French legal system, except for the special national laws known as "Sapin 2" and "Vigilance". But if we are out of this field, because there is only a description and not a legal definition, even less a legal notion, we do not know what legal regime to apply to the action of mapping risks. It is therefore useful, indeed compelling, to define the legal concept of risk mapping. Starting from what is still the safest ground, namely these two special laws, to go towards less secure legal grounds, such as the doctrine of the authorities or the commitments of the companies, even the ISO certifications obtained in this matter. Through a few judicial decisions and legal reasoning, a legal notion of the action of mapping risks emerges.
It is advisable to proceed in 5 steps (the working document follows another approach).
The first, based directly on the two available laws, apprehends the action of mapping when it comes into execution of a special legal obligation. The decision rendered in 2019 by the French Commission des sanctions of the Agence Française Anticorruption (French Corruption Agency's Sanctions Commission) draws probate games as to the demonstration of the execution of the obligation and the probationary system can be extended. In the same way the decision of the French Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) in 2017 on the "Vigilance Act" shows that a mechanism referred to as a "modality" is legitimate with regard to the goal, which is, concerning this tool, the establishment of a responsibility for others. It is therefore the concern for the situation of others that can be targeted by the Law thanks to Compliance Tool, especially Risk Mapping.
The second theme aims to map risks as a fact of good management for a company, while the enterprise is not constrained by a legal obligation. This fact is a paradox because the Regulatory Authority and the Judge may, where the conduct that was to be prevented occurs, for example a market abuse or an anti-competitive behavior, either qualify as an aggravating circumstance or as an attenuating circumstance. Consideration of the theory of incentives should lead to the adoption of the American solution, that is to say the qualification of an effective cartography as a mitigating fact. European case law is not yet fixed, especially in terms of Competition Law's compliance.
The third theme is the mapping action carried out by an entity which, in doing so, exercises power over a third party. Because cartography is as much an obligation as a power, possibly on a third party. The Conseil d'Etat (French Council of State) in 2017 qualified risk mapping as an act of grievance, but doing so legitimately, since it was to prevent forest fires efficiently. This solution based on the teleology attached to Compliance Law can be transposed to other areas.
Going further, one may consider transforming this action from de facto status to legal status on the part of the company, if it thus identifies risks for third parties. It would thus give third-party creditors the right to be in a position to measure the risks that weigh on them. Risk mapping would thus be part of a broader unilateral commitment by powerful companies, recognizing the existence of risks for third parties to enable them to know their nature and extent. If this responsibility Ex Ante (characteristic of Compliance Law) is fulfilled, then the Ex Post liability of the company could no longer be retained. This is the ongoing issue of the Johnson & Johnson trial (2019 American judgment), in terms of medical compliance. Because if one can argue that there exists through this kind of risk mapping that the posology a "subjective right to be worried about the risks related to the taking of the drug", the patient remains free in the use of it. The question of whether third-party education is included in the mapping, since the alert is already included in it, is an open question. For now, the answer is negative.
Indeed and in a fifth time, appears the liberal definition of Compliance Law through the apprehension that the Law must make of the cartography of the risks. Beyond the rational act that any person has to control their risks for their own interest, by preventing the damaging effects of that from the crystallization of risk has in fact proved, it is a question of preserving an external interest for the preservation of which the Law must intervene because the subject of law, in particular the company will be less likely to be concerned.
By the imprint of the law, risk mapping expresses the concern for an external interest, either of a system or of a third party. But this support in Ex Ante implies force (Sapin 2, Vigilance, financial market information obligation) or will (social responsibility, ethical commitment, adoption of non-financial standards) relates only to information, its constitution, its intelligibility and its hierarchy. Then it is the actors exposed to the risks, able to understand in Ex Ante the extent as far as they are concerned, either the entity itself, or the thirds, to choose to run them to no.
Nov. 27, 2019
This Working Paper served as the basis for an intervention in the conference organized in the conference cycle organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) on the theme: Compliance Tools, in collaboration with many university partners: this first conference is organized in collaboration with the Sciences po Economics Department and is held on November 28, 2019 at Sciences po and deals with the more specific theme of Risk mapping.
Introduction and Summary.
Most often we only describe the risk mapping mechanism, without qualifying it legally. The legislator does not do more. Thus, in the French legal system, in the law adopted in 2016 for fighting againt corruption, the so-called "Sapin 2 law", the article 17 describes cartography as "la forme d'une documentation régulièrement actualisée et destinée à identifier, analyser et hiérarchiser les risques d'exposition de la société à des sollicitations externes aux fins de corruption, en fonction notamment des secteurs d'activité et des zones géographies dans lesquelles la société exerce son activité" " ("the form of documentation regularly updated and intended to identify, analyze and prioritize the risks of exposure of the company to external solicitations at the end of corruption, depending in particular on the sectors of activity and the geographic areas in which the company operates.").
In the law adopted in 2017 for obliging big companies to be "vigilant", the article 1 of this so-called "Vigilance law" of March 27, 2017 aims to do a "cartographie des risques destinée à leur identification, leur analyse et leur hiérarchisation ("map the risks intended for their identification, analysis and prioritization").
This is a description, not a definition, with the text only targeting the "form" that this piece of information takes, without saying more. The letter of the descriptive text inserted in the second part of article 17 referring to the first part thereof, which expressly covers it as a "modality" of "the obligation" to take "measures intended to prevent and prevent detect the commission, in France or abroad, of acts of corruption or trading in influence ". In the same way when consulting the documents by which the regulatory authorities, for example the Financial Market Authority, presents the way to properly identify the risks, including the risks of "non-compliance"!footnote-1734, there is a description of the ways of doing things, no definition, often no rights. We find this same tendency in Compliance itself, so often reduced in its presentation to a mechanical process, often not very legal, or only becoming so in its bad light: that of the sanction. This mechanical conception of Compliance as a process leads to proposing that machines and not human beings establish the tools, notably the risk mapping.
Because it is understood that cartography is only a "tool", the law designated it as a "modality". It is therefore a given that we must look for what the tool is made for. Either it is done so that the law is not ignored, mapping identifying for example the increased risk that it is not: it is usually referred to by the strange name of "risk of compliance". The mapping then allows the company to execute its "compliance obligation", that is to say to ensure in Ex Ante that the law is respected by eliminating in advance the risk that it will not be . Thus, in 2008, the OECD defined risk mapping by its objectives, namely to put in place efficient means to reduce the risk of fraud and corruption and to set up efficient investigations by focusing efforts on effective procedures "!footnote-1739.
Then there are the risks which do not concern the Law, and which the company manages as so many considerations for its action, such as economic, natural or political risks, as well as "market risks", about which the Authorities markets, as the Financial Market Authority regularly draws up a "risk map"!footnote-1740. But this mapping does not seem to concern Law, even though it is no longer the sole responsibility of the company's internal management. The more we read cards, the more we observe their diversity, without knowing whether they constitute a "modality" of an obligation, therefore constituting a legal object, or if it constitutes a good way of doing things, which is neutral. for the Law. But what does law today not mix with? Especially of a fact as important and significant and expensive as this one ...
However, we observe to what extent "risk mapping" has so far been little thought in law. Indeed, when it is exposed, and so often, that it includes both "economic risks", "political risks", and "compliance risks", when however as a whole it is not instrument of a Compliance Law, which organizes all of compliance, the lawyer who constantly orders no longer manages to follow: as "compliance" could be only part of a mechanism that itself is only part of "compliance"? There are very many writings which detail the cartography, which by a kind of mirror effect, draw up cartographies of the requirements country by country, texts by texts, sectors by sectors, law by law, cartography requirements. .. We are faced with a house of cards, always more meticulously described, without ever meeting any legal qualification. For example, does drawing up such a card constitute a legal fact or a legal act? I don't see the question even asked. Yet the consequences of diet are immense. Assuming that this is only a legal fact, can it be justified? The lawyers thought about it and instead found the door closed ... But why should it not be a legal act? The legal category of unilateral legal acts is there to welcome it. In this case, the risk mapping commits the company and we feel that regulators and judges are seeing it more and more. But if the company is engaged, with whom is it? More precisely still, if it becomes debtor of the obligation to map, even if no specific law prescribes it in a precise way, then there is necessarily a creditor beneficiary of this obligation. Who is he ? And why is it?
The essence of this contribution is to ask these questions. They are elementary. They open up avenues, those that the exercise of legal qualification, legal categorization and legal definition, opens up.
If for the moment it has been little practiced, risk mapping being strangely left to algorithms, capable of heaping up data and incapable of defining and qualifying legally, this may be due to the fact more general than Law and risk are rarely directly associated. The mechanism of good management that constitutes risk mapping, especially in organizations that are not companies but are in charge of administering and adopting this good method without constraint!footnote-1735, incites it even less that we can read that it would be for the meticulous entity to identify in advance in particular the "legal risk"!footnote-1731, that is to say the application that could be made of law, uncertain application, annoying application. How many successful seminars on "penal risk" ... As in defense, lawyers explain too generally that the Law is constituted to fight against the risk, which is a fact. In fact, we repeat over and over again that the legal system is there to "secure", sometimes reducing it to this technical performance due to its very nature, by the principle of "legal security", that the State by its permanence , its legitimate violence, its imperium, gives us in exchange the peace, that the contract by the "little law" which it constitutes offers to the parties which enact it a haven of security for this island of stability in a future that never quite knows; beware of us if we get out of the legal order because we fall back into risk ... Thus, either one is in the Law, subject to the Law, and one benefits from its specific security, which economists would readily refer to as "regulation", or one is in the freedom of action, and the 'then we are at risk .... It would be like for the markets, about which we must choose between liquidity and security: if we want freedom of action, then we need less regulation , and therefore less security, more risk .... This traditional opposition, so often relayed in economics, is called into question by the obligation of risk mapping because if these are established, it is not for know in itself but to combat them, beyond the traditional obligation of information on risks, of which there are many anchors in the branches of Law, in particular Company Law, in particular those exposed to the financial markets (I) .
Consequently, since there is under the classic information of the political pretension, of the will to "prevent" the evil, which is quickly transformed into the will to "promote" the good, the new appears. The novelty is first of all institutional (II). In this, the so-called "Sapin 2" law, through the establishment of the French Anticorruption Agency, institutionalized this mechanism by which companies "exposed" to financial markets and / and to international investors, and / and to international trade , present in a clear and orderly manner - that is to say by a map - the risks they have identified in their present and future actions, must more concretely account for their structural organization. Public authorities will supervise the companies exposed to these risks. Certainly banks are legally accustomed to it, but banks are in a sector which is regulated and supervised. What is remarkable is that the Compliance Law applies via the risk mapping requirement the legal technique of supervision to companies which operate in sectors which are not supervised, which are sometimes not even regulated. Thus, they become structurally transparent. The liberal principle according to which a company only reports on its behavior and not on its internal organization is undermined. Thus, by the only technique imposed by law, the transparency method, specific to supervised companies becomes general, as soon as a risk exists. This is a radical innovation, since the risk in question is not a sector risk and a general crisis is no longer to be feared. The rupture is thus effected with the Law of supervision which until now was unbreakable from the Law of Regulation, the obligation of risk mapping applying to any "crucial operator" exposed to the risk of corruption, in that this must be fought in a global manner.
Therefore, risk mapping is a tool which, beyond the simple description, takes its definition in a teleological way. Its aim is to prevent risks which compromise ambitions which are not always of an economic nature but which are of a political nature (III). The fight against corruption is only one example, the so-called "vigilance" law also requiring a "risk mapping" in the area of human rights, while this technique is taken up by more or less binding texts in environmental matter. Certainly companies in a position to carry such political ambitions, by force - because of their position - or willingly - by their reason for being or by their policy of social responsibility - must support it, transforming them into major political actors . They cannot, however, take the place of the Public Authorities, which on the one hand fix the "monumental goals" which it is a question of achieving on the one hand and which on the other hand supervise in Ex Ante and in Ex Post the implementation and operation of these tools within crucial companies.
Nov. 21, 2019
Référence complète : contribution à l'organisation et à la tenue de la conférence de présentation de l'Association Henri Capitant, Faculté de Droit d'Oslo, centre de droit privé, 21 novembre 2019.
Par cette conférence de présentation et la discussion qui s'en est suivie avec les juristes réunis à l'initiative du professeur Mads Andenas, professeur de droit à la Faculté de Droit d'Oslo, les bases ont été posées de la constitution d'un Groupe norvégien de l'Association Henri Capitant.