Food for thoughts

► Full Reference: B. Silliman, "Secret professionnel et coopération : les leçons de procédure tirées de l’expérience américaine pour une application universelle" ("Privilege and cooperation, procedural lessons learned from the U.S for global application"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, p. 231-234.  

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📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► English summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The French legal system is evolving, organizing interaction between lawyers with regulators and prosecutors, especially in investigations about corruption or corporate misconduct, adopting U.S. negotiated resolutions such as the Convention judiciaire d'intérêt public, which encourages "collaboration" between them. 

The author describes the evolution of the U.S. DOJ doctrine and askes French to be inspired by the U.S. procedural experience, U.S. where this mechanism came from. Indeed, the DOJ released memoranda about what the "collaboration" means. At the end (2006 Memorandum), the DOJ has considered that the legal privilege must remain intact when the information is not only factual to maintain trust between prosecutors, regulators, and lawyers.

French authorities do not follow this way. The author regrets it and thinks they should adopt the same reasoning as the American authority on the secret professionnel of the avocat, especially when he intervenes in the company internal investigation.

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🦉This article is available in full text for those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

► Full Reference: J.-M. Coulon, "Le droit de la compliance dans le secteur d'activité de la construction et les contradictions, impossibilités et impasses auxquelles les entreprises sont confrontées" ("Compliance Law in the construction sector and the contradictions, impossibilities and impasses facing companies"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, p. 133-140. 

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📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► The summary below describes an article following the colloquium L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance (The Entreprise instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law) , co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Faculté de Droit Lyon 3. This manifestation was designed under the scientific direction of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Christophe Roda and took place in Lyon on June 23, 2021. During this colloquium, the intervention was shared with Christophe Lapp, who is also a contributor in the book (see the summary of the Jean-Marc Coulon's Article).

In the book, the article will be published in Title I, devoted to:  L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance (The Entreprise instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law ).

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► Summary of the article (done by the author): The construction industry is not a regulated sector. Its market is made up of a superposition of territorial strata which are all relevant markets, to which corresponds a specific microcosm of companies. Finally, the temporary association between companies for the purposes of carrying out a project or a work is consubstantial with this sector.

The penetration of Compliance in this sector is inevitably very heterogeneous and results from both exogenous factors (other partners within temporary associations, influence of economic operators from other sectors of activity, capital providers and lenders, incitations from professional organizations ) the endogenous (submission to a Financial Regulatory Authority because the company is listed ; application of the laws on duty of vigilance, and French Law called "Sapin 2"). For example, subject to all these factors combined, the Bouygues group is particularly sensitive to compliance.

Not only internal "legislator", the Bouygues group finds itself in turn "prosecutor and judge" both of itself and of others. Indeed, leading an investigation, filing a complaint, triggering an ethics alert, making use of the leniency program, this group is, however, no other than a sort of assistant for the Prosecutor. In addition, scrutinizing its stakeholders, sanctioning its employees, resorting to a Convention Judiciaire d'intérêt public (judicial agreement in the public interest) or negotiating its sanction within the framework of a procedure instituted by a multilateral bank, it fulfills the function of a judge. Legislator, prosecutor, judge, the Bouygues group is faced with a paradox, in a way encouraged to exercise “sovereignty”, yet it does not benefit from the attributes attached to it or from the unwavering support of the competent Public Authorities.

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► Full Reference: A. Bruneau, "L'entreprise juge d'elle-même : la fonction compliance dans la banque" ("The company judge of itself: the compliance function inside the bank"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, p. 115-131. 

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📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the author): First of all, it should be remembered that the compliance function was born within finance, and that by being structured, it has evolved to support the transition from regulatory law to compliance law. Through these changes, compliance has gone from an ex-post controlling function to an ex-ante binding function. The LIBOR crisis imperfectly illustrates the primacy of this transition. The evolution of this role is illustrated by concrete examples

Firstly, the management of reputational risk is a fundamental part of the company as prosecutor and judge of itself. Reputational risk is a significant element for a financial institution, because it can have negative consequences on its capitalization, or even culminate in a systemic crisis. Avoiding a large-scale financial crisis is also part of the monumental goals of compliance.

In order to avoid complex and inopportune scenarios, compliance law intervenes as early as possible and identifies issues that may impact reputation. The regulations require the implementation of certain ex ante mechanisms. The French law known as "Sapin 2" requires the implementation of tools that concern all companies (and not just banks). Indeed, beyond the risk of reputation, it is essential to consider the risk of corruption. Consideration of reputational risk may justify refusing to execute certain transactions. From this perspective, compliance must assess the potential consequences of entering into a relationship with a new client upstream, sometimes to decline the provision of services. The compliance function therefore unilaterally judges the relationship with a view to managing the company reputational risk.

Secondly, the internal sanction mechanism established by compliance law is also discussed in this article, in particular the internal sanctions adopted by compliance in a financial institution.

Compliance can act as a prosecutor via management committees set up within the business lines. In addition, compliance can determine and apply sanctions against employees. In this way, there is a dual role of prosecutor and judge for the compliance function within the framework of an extraordinary mechanism of ordinary law.

Finally, the analysis deals with the case of the "judge-judged": following a decision by the bank, the regulator may take an even stricter position by believing that the bank is applying its guidelines incorrectly. Thus, the compliance law, which takes hold within the banking enterprise, finds itself under the judgment of its own regulator. The company finds itself judged and comes to be a prosecutor and judge of itself, but also of its clients.

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► Full Reference: J. Heymann, "La nature juridique de la "Cour suprême" de Facebook" ("The legal nature of Facebook's "Supreme court""), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, p. 151-167. 

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📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► The summary below describes an article following the colloquium L'entreprise instituée Juge et Procureur d'elle-même par le Droit de la Compliance , co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Faculté de Droit Lyon 3. This manifestation was designed under the scientific direction of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Christophe Roda and took place in Lyon on June 23, 2021.

In the book, the article will be published in Title I, devoted to: The Entreprise instituted Judge and Prosecutor of itself by Compliance Law.

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► Summary of the article (done by the author): Taking place in the general theme aiming at making “words and things coincide”, the article offers some thoughts on the “conditions of the discourse” – in the sense in which Foucault understood it in his Archéologie des sciences humaines – relating to the phenomenon of “jurisdictionalization” of Compliance.

            The thoughts are more specifically focusing on the nature of the so-called “Supreme Court” that Facebook instituted to hear appeals of decisions relating to content on the digital social networks that are Facebook and Instagram. Is this really a “Supreme Court”, designed in order to “judge” the Facebook Group?

            A careful examination of the Oversight Board – i.e. the so-called “Supreme Court” created by Facebook – reveals that the latter, in addition to its advisory mission (which consists of issuing policy advisory opinions on Facebook’s content policies), exercises some form of adjudicative function. This is essentially conceived in terms of compliance assessment, of the content published on the social networks Facebook or Instagram with the standards issued by these corporations on the one hand, of content enforcement decisions taken by Facebook with the Law on the other hand. The legal framework of reference is yet rather vague, although its substantial content seems to be per se evolutive, based on the geographical realm where the case to be reviewed is located. An adjudicative function can therefore be characterized, even if the Oversight Board can only claim for a limited one.

            The author can ultimately identify the Oversight Board as a preventive dispute settlement body, in the sense that it seems to aim at avoiding any referral to state courts and ruling before any court’s judgement can be delivered. Some questions are thus to be raised, relating with both legitimacy and authority of such a Board. But whatever the answers will be, the fact remains that the creation of the Oversight Board by a private law company already reveals all the liveliness of contemporary legal pluralism.

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► Full Reference: F. Ancel, "Le principe processuel de compliance, un nouveau principe directeur du procès ?" (The procedural principle of compliance, a new trial leading principle?), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, p. 225-230. 

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📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la compliance, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): Through this article, the author formulates a proposal: elevating the principle of compliance to the rank of leading principle of the trial. To support this, the author firstly emphasizes the convergence of the aims of compliance and the purpose of the trial. Indeed, emphasizing that Compliance Law does not oust either the State or the judge, as soon as compliance means that the person must keep their commitments and that the trial is also based on this principle that the parties must conform to the principles and to their own "speech", compliance thus becomes a trial leading principle.

In a second part of the article, the author illustrates his point in a very concrete way. First, the protocols of procedure which are drawn up by the courts and the bars are commitments which should justify a form of constraint which, if it should not have the same form and nature as that of the law, must all the same even have consequences when a party fails to do so. Secondly, relying on French case law which sanctions a party which had accepted the principle of an arbitration and then systematically hinders its implementation, the author suggests that under the principle of compliance can be grouped the notions for the instant scattered of loyalty, consistency (estoppel) and efficiency.

Thus, this "open practice" echoing the "open way" of a procedural principle of compliance brings out this one.

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► Full Reference: N. Cayrol, "Des principes processuels en droit de la compliance" ("General Procedural Law in Compliance Law"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, p. 213-224. 

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📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): We could be satisfied with examining the reception of the principles of general Procedural Law in compliance litigation and the distortion that compliance techniques justify in procedural mechanisms. But the innovation that constitutes this emerging branch of law that is Compliance Law justifies going to more fundamental.

From this perspective, the pertinent question is the very legitimacy of procedural principles in this branch of law, in that Procedural Law is built on the notion of “Litigation” while Compliance Law deals with situation so enormous, concerning for example the fate of the planet, that this notion of litigation appears inadequate, and consequently the procedural law would be too limited in compliance matters.

If, however, this perspective is maintained of Compliance Law facing, in an almost warlike perspective, the greatest current challenges, general Procedural Law needs to be redesigned, in its very definition. Indeed, compliance trials call into question the future of systems and it is as such that they hold the entities, for instance the enterprises, that are at the heart of these systems. It is in this that liability trials are more “accountability” trials, allowing the judge to demand actions for the future, trials by which commitments are made and the “intentions” of the persons involved are challenged and required.

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► Full Reference: L.-M. Augagneur, "La juridictionnalisation de la réputation par les plateformes" ("The jurisdictionalisation of reputation by platforms"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, p. 97-113. 

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📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published.

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► Summary of the article (done by the author): The large platforms are in the position of arbiter of the reputation economy (referencing, notoriety) in which they themselves act. Although the stakes are usually low on a unit basis, the jurisdiction of reputation represents significant aggregate stakes. Platforms are thus led to detect and assess reputation manipulations (by users: SEO, fake reviews, fake followers; or by the platforms themselves as highlighted by the Google Shopping decision issued by the European Commission in 2017) that are implemented on a large scale with algorithmic tools.

The identification and treatment of manipulations is itself only possible by means of artificial intelligence tools. Google thus proceeds with an automated downgrading mechanism for sites that do not follow its guidelines, with the possibility of requesting a review through a very summary procedure entirely conducted by an algorithm. Tripadvisor, on the other hand, uses an algorithm to detect false reviews based on "fraud modeling to identify electronic patterns that cannot be detected by the human eye". It only conducts a human investigation in limited cases.

This jurisdictionality of reputation has little in common with that defined by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (legal origin, contradictory procedure, independence, application of the Rules of Law). It is characterized, on the one hand, by the absence of transparency of the rules and even of the existence of rules stated in predicative form and applied by deductive reasoning. It is replaced by an inductive probabilistic model by the identification of abnormal behaviors in relation to centroids. This approach of course raises the issue of statistical bias. More fundamentally, it reflects a transition from Rule of Law, not so much to "Code is Law" (Laurence Lessig), but to "Data is Law", that is, to a governance of numbers (rather than "by" numbers). It also comes back to a form of collective jurisdictionality, since the sanction comes from a computational apprehension of the phenomena of the multitude and not from an individual appreciation. Finally, it appears particularly consubstantial with compliance, since it is based on a teleological approach (the search for a finality rather than the application of principles).

On the other hand, this jurisdictionality is characterized by man-machine cooperation, whether in the decision-making process (which poses the problem of automaticity bias) or in the contradictory procedure (which poses, in particular, the problems of discussion with the machine and the explicability of the machine response).

Until now, the supervision of these processes has been based essentially on the mechanisms of transparency, a limited adversarial requirement and the accessibility of appeal channels. The French Law Loi pour une République Numérique ("Law for a Digital Republic"), the European Legislation Platform-to-Business Regulation and the Omnibus Directive, have thus set requirements on the ranking criteria on platforms. The Omnibus Directive also requires that professionals guarantee that reviews come from consumers through reasonable and proportionate measures. As for the European Digital Services Act, it provides for transparency on content moderation rules, procedures and algorithms. But this transparency is often a sham. In the same way and for the moment the requirements of sufficient human intervention and adversarial processes appear very limited in the draft text.

The most efficient forms of this jurisdictionality ultimately emerge from the role played by third parties in a form of participatory dispute resolution. Thus, for example, FakeSpot detects false Tripadvisor reviews, Sistrix establishes a ranking index that helped establish the manipulation of Google's algorithm in the Google Shopping case by detecting artifacts based on algorithm changes. Moreover, the draft Digital Services Act envisages recognizing a specific status for trusted flaggers who identify illegal content on platforms.

This singular jurisdictional configuration (judge and party platform, massive situations, algorithmic systems for handling manipulations) thus leads us to reconsider the grammar of the jurisdictional process and its characteristics. If Law is a language (Alain Sériaux), it offers a new grammatical form that would be that of the middle way (mesotès) described by Benevéniste. Between the active and the passive way, there is a way in which the subject carries out an action in which he includes himself. Now, it is the very nature of this jurisdictionality of compliance to make laws by including oneself in them (nomos tithestai). In this respect, the irruption of artificial intelligence in this jurisdictional treatment undoubtedly bears witness to the renewal of the language of Law.

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, 490 p. 

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► Presentation of this book: Sanctions, controls, appeals, deals: judges and lawyers are everywhere in the Compliance mechanisms, creating unprecedented situations, sometimes without a solution yet available.  Even though Compliance was designed to avoid the judge and produce security by avoiding conflict. This jurisdictionalisation is therefore new. Forcing companies to prosecute and judge, a constrained role, perhaps against their nature. Leading to the adaptation of major procedural principles, with difficulty. Confronting arbitration with new perspectives. Putting the judge at heart, in mechanisms designed so that he is not there. How in practice to organize these opposites and anticipate the solutions? This is the challenge taken up by this book.

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📘 In parallel, the English version of this book, Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, is published in the series co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant. 

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🧮 This book comes after a cycle of colloquia organised in 2021 by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its Academic Partners.

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This volume is the continuation of the books dedicated to Compliance in the collection "Régulations & Compliance", founded and managed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, copublished by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz.

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🏗️ General construction of this book:

The book begins by a double Introduction, the first (in free access) summarizing the book, the second, substantial, relating to the need to reinforce the Judge and the Lawyer to impose the Compliance Law as a characteristic of the Rule of Law. 

The first Part is devoted to what is specific to Compliance Law. of Compliance: the transformation of companies into Prosecutors and Judges of themselves, even of others.

The second Part relates to Compliance general procedural Law, the procedure being the way between the dispute and the judgement. 

The third Part continues this journey to the judge and aims to measure the influence of the reasoning and requirements of Compliance Law in dispute resolution methods where it was not, with some exceptions, present, but where it has a great future: Arbitration.

Because trial and judicial decision are inseparable, because legal techniques and the Rule of Law should not be divided but compliance techniques could paradoxically be the weapon of their dissociation, because the power to judge and the procedures surrounding the latter must not be dissociated, because therefore Compliance mechanisms and the Rule of Law must be thought out and practiced then, the rise in power of one must be the sign of the rise in power of the other, and not the price of the 'weakening of the Rule of Law, the fourth Part relates to the Judges in the Compliance mechanisms and culture. 

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► Read in free access the article: M.A. Frison-Roche, "Lignes de force de l'ouvrage La Juridictionnalisation de la Compliance" (Lines of Forces of the book La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance).

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►Read below the summaries of each contribution of the book⤵️

► Full Reference: A. Bavitot, "Le façonnage de l'entreprise par les accords de justice pénale négociée" ("Shaping the company through negotiated Criminal Justice Agreements"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, p. 187-198.  

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📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the author): Negotiated justice is "the situation in which the criminal conflict is the object of a trade in the etymological sense of the term negotio, i.e. a debate between the parties to reach an agreement".

Thus, the French legislator has succumbed to globalized mimicry by creating the Convention judiciaire d'intérêt public (Public Interest Judicial Agreement), first in matters of probity and then in environmental matters. What is the nature of this deal of justice? Validated by a judge's order, it does not entail any declaration of guilt, has neither the nature nor the effects of a judgment of conviction and is not registered in the judicial record. Possible at the investigation stage as well as at the pre-trial stage, the Public Interest Judicial Agreement is original in that it makes it possible to avoid either the prosecutor's proceedings or the judge's wrath.

A detailed study of the agreements signed shows that in order to negotiate in the best possible way, the company can and must shape itself. The company will shape the facts of its agreement, shape its charge and, finally, shape its sentence. The article offers a concrete analysis of these three dimensions of corporate shaping to better approach understanding the legal nature of negotiated criminal justice agreements.

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► Full Reference: J.-B. Racine, "Compliance et Arbitrage. Essai de problématisation" ("Compliance and Arbitration : Problematisation", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, p. 265-279. 

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📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► The summary below describes an article that follows an intervention in the scientific manifestation Compliance et Arbitrage, co-organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the University Panthéon-Assas (Paris II). This conference was designed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Baptiste Racine, scientific co-directors, and took place in Paris II University on March 31, 2021. 

In the book, the article will be published in Title II, devoted to: Compliance et Arbitrage.

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► Summary of the article (done by the author): Under the consideration of the "Compliance Juridictionalisation", it is necessary to study in the links between Compliance and Arbitration. The arbitrator is a judge, he is even the natural judge of international trade. Arbitration is therefore naturally intended to meet compliance which transforms the action of companies in an international context. However, the links between compliance and arbitration are not obvious. It is not a question of providing firm and definitive answers, but rather, and above all, of asking questions. We are at the start of reflection on this topic, which explains why there is, for the time being, little legal literature on the subject of the relationship between Compliance and Arbitration. It doesn't mean there aren't connections.  Quite simply, these relations may not have come to light, or they are in the making. We should research  the existing or potential bridges between two worlds that have long gravitated separately: Compliance on the one hand, Arbitration on the other. The central question is: is or can the arbitrator be a compliance judge, and, if so, how?

In any event, the Arbitrator is thus in contact with matters requiring the methods, tools and logic of Compliance. In addition to the prevention and suppression of corruption, three examples can be given.

• Arbitration has been facing economic sanctions (notably embargoes) for several years. The link with Compliance is obvious, insofar as texts providing for economic sanctions are often accompanied by compliance mechanisms, as in the United States. The arbitrator is concerned as to the fate he reserves in the treatment of the dispute with the measures of economic sanctions.
• Competition Law is a branch that came into contact with Arbitration from the end of the 1980s. The arbitrability of this type of dispute is now established and arbitrators apply it regularly. At the same time, Compliance has also entered Competition Law, admittedly more strongly in the United States than in France. The existence, absence or insufficiency of a compliance program aimed at preventing violations of the competition rules are thus circumstances which may assist the arbitrator in the assessment of anti-competitive behavior.
• Environmental Law is also concerned. There is environmental Compliance, for example with regard to the French law of March 27, 2017 on the duty of vigilance. Companies are thus responsible for participating in the protection of the environment, by internalizing these concerns in their internal and external operations (in their sphere of influence). As soon as an arbitrator is in charge for settling a dispute relating to Environmental Law, the question of the relationship to Compliance, from this angle, naturally arises.

It is therefore the multiple interactions between Compliance and Arbitration, actual or potential, which are thus open.

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► Full Reference: S. Scemla and D. Paillot, "La difficile appréhension des droits de la défense par les autorités de contrôle en matière de compliance" ("The supervisory authorities face difficulties to apprehend the rights of the defence in Compliance matters"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, p. 241-249.

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📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the authors): Since 2016, French companies subject to the provisions of the so-called “Sapin 2” Law must implement eight stringent anti-corruption measures, such as a risk mapping, a whistleblowing procedure or a third-party due diligence procedure.

To ensure their compliance with these obligations, the Sapin 2 law created the Agence française anticorruption - AFA (French Anti-Corruption Agency), which had been assigned three missions: firstly, to help any person prevent and detect corruption; secondly, to control the quality and effectiveness of the anti-corruption programs deployed by the companies; and thirdly, to sanction any breaches, through its Sanctions Committee.

As pointed out by the French Conseil d’Etat, the powers devolved to the administrations have multiplied and became stratified. While the Conseil d'Etat suggests to improve both the conduct and the effectiveness of administrative controls by harmonising their practices and simplifying their prerogatives, it is urgent to remedy the numerous procedural failures that undermine the rights of defence.

In fact, the AFA exercises various powers when undertaking its controls. Some of these powers are not provided for by the Law, and most of them infringe fundamental rights and freedoms among which the adversarial principle and the freedom not to self-incriminate. For instance, the AFA does not necessarily draft minutes of the interviews it conducts, thus depriving the interviewee of the possibility to challenge the statements reported by the AFA to the Sanctions Committee.

From a more structural point of view, the scope of the AFA's mission is extremely broad. The Law allows the AFA to request the communication of "any professional document or any useful information", without defining the notion of usefulness. Also, the AFA considers that the entity cannot benefit from the legal privilege that would cover their documents, and considers that an entity who voluntarily hands over a document, without expressing any reserves, waives its right to the benefit of its legal privilege.

Apart from the severe consequences that could arise if another proceedings was to be initiated by a foreign authority, the concept of "voluntary handover" does not faithfully reflect the reality. Indeed, the controlled entities only cooperate under the threat of being prosecuted on the basis of an obstruction to the control, which compels them to communicate documents even when facing the risk of contributing to their own incrimination.

These many procedural deficiencies encountered during AFA controls must therefore be reformed, as recommended by the Conseil d’Etat, so as to require the authorities to take into account the rights of the defence.

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► Full Reference: J. Morel-Maroger, "La réception des normes de la compliance par les juges de l'Union européenne" ("Application of compliance standards by EU judges"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, p. 443-452. 

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📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the author): Compliance rules are intended to pursue objectives of public interest – or monumental goals – and thereby in principle modify and guide the behaviour of economic operators. In order to achieve these objectives, the full spectrum of norms are used in compliance matters. What is and what should be the role of the judges of the European Union in the development of compliance rules ? As in domestic law, the legality of compliance standards developed by regulatory authorities has been challenged.

It will first be necessary to analyse what control the judges of the European Union have over these rules. The question arises essentially as regards the rules of soft law, the challenge of which can be considered in two ways : by way of an action for annulment and by exception by way of a preliminary ruling.

But beyond the control of the legality of compliance rules exercised by European judges, they also contribute to their application. The effectiveness of compliance rules depend above all on them being followed by those to whom they are addressed, and economic operators are undoubtedly the first actors of its success. But the judges of the European Union, competent to settle disputes concerning the application of European Union law between the Member States, the European institutions, and individual applicants, may be also be involved in ensuring the effectiveness of European compliance rules and in interpreting them.

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► Full Reference: S. Merabet, "La vigilance, être juge et ne pas juger" ("Vigilance, to be a judge and not judging"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2023, p. 199-209. 

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📕read a general presentation of the book, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the author): Vigilance presents two diametrically opposed dangers. The company is caught in the crossfire. On the one hand, there is a risk that it exercises its role at a minimum, so that the obligations imposed on it are ineffective, thereby risking its own liability.   On the other hand, the danger is that the company oversteps its role and takes the place of the Judge. Does Vigilance always present the same dangers? Does it systematically involve the same role of the company? To be vigilant, is it to judge? The answer to these questions depends on the content of the obligations involved in Vigilance. However, these now seem very diverse.

How to distinguish between the various duties of Vigilance? A first approach could consist in considering a formal identification which leads to distinguish stricto sensu Vigilance, that which is envisaged by the French so-called "Sapin 2" law and identified as such, and the related obligations, such as for example the duty of moderation of companies on social networks, which without being baptized "duty of vigilance", nevertheless come close. The extension of Compliance obligations blurs the line between what exactly falls under Vigilance and what not. A more substantial approach should be taken to consider the degree of control exercised by the company. Understood in this way, it is possible to distinguish two categories: Negative Vigilance, which implies the identification of a risk, and Positive Vigilance, which even more supposes the neutralization of the risk. The first assumes a limited role for the company, while the second encourages it to act positively, even before an Authority has spoken. In this case, the role of the company is closer to that of the judge. That shows that all the obligations of vigilance cannot therefore be understood in a unitary manner.

As soon as the company is led - if not to take the place of the Judge - to act before the Judge even has the opportunity to pronounce himself/herself, then it seems legitimate to supervise the implementation of the company's duty of Vigilance, through a form of proceduralisation of Compliance. The company, as its employees or partners, would benefit from more Vigilance supervision. Insofar as all Vigilance obligations do not call the same role of the company, it is necessary to consider guiding principles of Vigilance, more or less intense depending on whether it is Negative or Positive Vigilance. 

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► Référence complète : J.-Ch. Roda, "Le Digital Markets Act (1re partie). Contrôler les contrôleurs d’accès", Communication - Commerce électronique, n° 2, février 2023, étude 4

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► Résumé de l'article (fait par l'auteur) : "Le règlement (UE) 2022/1925 relatif aux marchés contestables et équitables dans le secteur numérique a été adopté le 14 septembre 2022. Mieux connu sous le nom de « Digital Markets Act », ou DMA, c’est un texte très technique de plus d’une soixantaine de pages. Il est destiné à « mettre au pas » les grandes plateformes américaines et européennes, en ancrant largement la régulation dans l’ex ante. Incontestablement, il s’agit d’un des dispositifs les plus ambitieux adoptés à l’échelon européen, qui doit permettre d’assurer une meilleure contestabilité sur les marchés numériques, et une plus grande loyauté des comportements. Un texte aussi important appelait un commentaire « grand format ». La première partie de celui-ci figure dans le présent numéro de la revue, et s’attache à cerner l’esprit et l’étendue du contrôle prévu par le DMA. La seconde partie, intitulée « Contraindre les contrôleurs d’accès », sera publiée dans le prochain numéro".

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🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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📝consulter une présentation de la première partie de cette étude de Jean-Christophe Roda, "Le Digital Markets Act (2e partie). Contraindre les contrôleurs d'accès"

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► Référence complète : M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Face à des professions régulées, l'Autorité de la concurrence se comporte en Régulateur", Newsletter MAFR Law, Compliance, Regulation, 1ier février 2023.

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L'Autorité de la concurrence publie le 1ier février 2023 deux consultations publiques jumelées, relatives à la Liberté d'installation des notaires et des commissaires de justice.

Chacun a jusqu'au 22 mars 2023 pour y contribuer.

Ce faisant, l'Autorité se place dans une perspective de régulation car elle articule l'usage de ce pouvoir général de consultation - préalable à un avis à propos de l'installation de nouvelles études, en s'appuyant notamment sur les contributions, avec un pouvoir spécifique et direct que lui a donné la Loi : celui de superviser la carte de ces nouvelles ouvertures.

S'il ne s'agissait d'exercer ce dernier pouvoir que dans la perspective concurrentielle, il ne serait pas pertinent d'articuler cela à un avis et une consultation globale sur la politique générale du maillage territorial par lequel notaires et commissaires de justice exercent leurs activités.

La perspective de régulation, qui embrasse davantage et établit des équilibres à long terme entre la concurrence et d'autres soucis, est affirmée par l'Autorité de concurrence.

Cette perspective adoptée par l'Autorité est légitime, dès l'instant que la loi le lui permet, lui offrant tous les instruments pour le faire, et que les entreprises et/ou les activités dont il s'agit sont elles-mêmes régulées. C'est le cas lorsque les entreprises appartiennent à ce que l'on appelle souvent des "professions réglementées", la réglementation étant l'indice le plus certain de la régulation Ex Ante.

C'est même reconnaître leur nature que de le faire, ne pas les briser en ne leur appliquant que la pure et simple "loi de la concurrence".

Le Législateur permet à l'Autorité de le faire puisque, comme elle le rappelle dans son Communiqué, la loi dite Macron de 2015 lui a donné mission de contrôler le maillage d'ouverture sur le territoire concernant les notaires et ceux qui sont aujourd'hui les commissaires de justice. C'est l'Autorité qui formule les propositions d'ouverture, la carte devant être revue tous les 2 ans.

L'on avait à l'époque beaucoup considéré que la seule perspective était celle de la concurrence, qu'il ne s'agissait que de laisser le mécanisme concurrence entrer dans ces activités, quoi qu'il en résulte et que l'Autorité allait être chargée de cela, alors que le texte présentait déjà une perspective de régulation.

🔴 M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Notariat et Régulation font bon ménage, 2015

L'Autorité accroît cette perspective de régulation, c'est-à-dire de construction et de maintien d'équilibres à long terme, rappelant la pratique qu'elle a eue, qu'elle qualifie de "prudente", intégrant notamment les difficultés de la crise sanitaire et le souci du long terme.

Par le biais des consultations pour former des recommandations adéquates, parce que la consultation est un pouvoir général, celle-ci peut dépasser l'objet plutôt restrictif de la loi qui se soucie de l'équilibre territorial. Qu'on en juge, puisque les contributeurs sont invités à réfléchir dans la perspective suivante: "Outre les thèmes récurrents des consultations publiques (l’évaluation de la procédure de nomination, l’impact des créations d’offices sur les différentes parties prenantes ou la cohésion territoriale des prestations), l’Autorité a identifié plusieurs enjeux importants sur lesquels les acteurs intéressés sont invités à formuler des observations, dont notamment :

• les conséquences de la crise sanitaire sur le volume d’activité et l’organisation des offices ;
• les risques pesant sur l’activité des professionnels du fait de la dégradation de la conjoncture économique (ralentissement de la croissance, hausse de l’inflation, durcissement des conditions d’octroi de crédits immobiliers,…) ;
• l’impact de la réforme de la discipline et de la déontologie des professions du droit ;
• les implications de la fusion des professions d'huissier de justice et de commissaire-priseur judiciaire en une profession unique de commissaire de justice depuis juillet 2022".

Ainsi, plutôt que de ne regarder que l'aspect concurrentiel dans ce qui n'est qu'une recommandation, laissant au Gouvernement le soin d'intégrer le reste dans ses propres décisions, notamment parce qu'il mène par ailleurs ses réformes (fusion des professions, réformes de la discipline et déontologie), l'Autorité intègre l'ensemble dès son intervention.

Le président de l'Autorité, Benoît Cœuré, a d'ailleurs développé cette conception lors du premier colloque des Commissaires de justice le 8 décembre 2022.

L'Autorité a raison de le faire, car on connait le poids de ses "recommandations" dont l'encre est déjà le plus souvent celle des arrêtés ministériels en fin de process.

En ouvrant à chacun la possibilité d'exprimer sa conception sur ce qui doit être un maillage territorial adéquat, et au-delà un déploiement adéquat de ces professions, l'Autorité de la concurrence participe plus directement à la régulation de ces professions, qui sont des entreprises dont la mission spécifique implique à la fois des obligations (la discipline et la déontologie, par exemple), une supervision et des règles plus complexes que la libre rencontre de l'offre et de la demande.

Si une Autorité de concurrence n'est pas légitime à se transformer en Autorité de régulation concernant des activités économiques qui sont ordinaires, car la régulation, notamment en ce qu'elle est ex ante et implique des mécanismes de compliance sur les entreprises concernées, en revanche si les entreprises, ici les officiers publics ou les professions libérales, comme les avocats, les médecins ou les pharmaciens, sont elles-mêmes régulées, l'Autorité de concurrence reconnaît leur nature en s'associant à la supervision exercée par les Autorités publiques (dans le cas présent, par le Ministère de la justice).

En outre et en cela, l'Autorité de concurrence s'articule avec les structures professionnelles que sont les Ordres, à travers la notion de "mission".

🔴 M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🎤La compliance dans l'entreprise notariale : aspects théoriques et pratiques, 2022

🔴 M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🎥La compliance, perspective dynamique pour exprimer la raison d'être des commissaires de justice, 2022

🔴 M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🎥Régulation et Compliance, expression des missions d'un Ordre, 2022

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► Référence complète : G. Loiseau, "Le Digital Services Act", Communication - Commerce électronique, n°2, février 2023, étude 3

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Résumé de l'article (fait par l'auteur) : "Le règlement (UE) 2022/2065 du 19 octobre 2022, qui entrera en application dans les États membres début 2024, s'attaque aux effets toxiques de l’activité des plateformes, qu'il s'agisse de la diffusion de contenus illicites ou de certaines pratiques, comme la publicité ciblée ou les interfaces trompeuses. Sans rien changer au régime de semi-responsabilité des hébergeurs voulu par la directive du 8 juin 2000, il table, pour lutter contre les contenus illicites, sur la pratique de modération qu’il rend obligatoire sur l’intervention d’un tiers, comptant aussi sur les initiatives des opérateurs techniques qui ont eux-mêmes intérêt à traiter les éléments les plus nocifs. Prescriptif, il fait porter l'effort de réglementation sur les sanctions que les plateformes peuvent décider, sur la motivation de leurs décisions ainsi que sur le traitement interne des réclamations. En complément de l’action ex-post ciblant les contenus illicites, le règlement appréhende certains risques, liés à des pratiques potentiellement nuisibles ou présentant un caractère systémique, dont il dicte la gestion ex-ante par les plateformes.".

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🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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► Référence complète : Com., 1er février 2023, n° 20-21.844 (publié au Bulletin).

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Lire l'arrêt

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Texte intégral

► Référence complète : V. Catillon, La nature monétaire des cryptomonnaies, préf. L. Thibierge, avant-propos Th. Le Gueut, Presses Universitaires d'Aix-Marseille, Institut de Droit des Affaires, 2023, 340 p.

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📗lire la 4ième de couverture

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📗lire le sommaire de l'ouvrage

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📗lire la table des matières de l'ouvrage

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► Résumé de l'ouvrage (fait par l'éditeur) : "Le Bitcoin et à sa suite, la multitude des cryptomonnaies, révolutionnent les sphères financière, monétaire et juridique. Cette remise en cause de la norme monétaire tient aux procédés mis en œuvre : un fichier informatique, le coin, et un registre distribué, la Blockchain. Leur conjonction réussit à transformer un simple fichier copiable à l’infini, en une unité de monnaie non duplicable. Ces qualités numériques autorisent les transactions sans recourir aux tiers de confiance, les établissements de crédit. Délivrées de toutes contraintes matérielles et de toutes intermédiations, elles circulent librement par-delà les frontières, détachées du joug des États. Se pose dès lors la première problématique : une monnaie peut-elle être juridiquement reconnue en l’absence de tutelle étatique ? Leur forte volatilité complique en outre leur appréhension par le droit. En cela, elles ne pourraient faire fonction d’unité de compte, voire d’unité de paiement. Les cryptomonnaies commandent par conséquent un débat renouvelé de la nature juridique de la monnaie. Les recherches historiques révèlent qu’en tout temps il a circulé des monnaies privées. Cette évidence bouleverse la théorie juridique. La monnaie légale ne forme plus l’épicentre de la pensée dominante. L’autre pan de l’étude a trait à l’analyse fonctionnelle de la monnaie. Son traitement juridique autorise la compréhension des mécanismes monétaires à l’œuvre en droit et permet d’asseoir le caractère monétaire des cryptomonnaies.".

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► Référence complète : Ph. Pétel, Procédures collectives, Coll. "Cours Dalloz-Série Droit privé", Dalloz, 1ière éd., 1996, 11ième éd., 2023, 281 p.

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► Présentation de l'ouvrage : La 11ième édition de ce manuel de référence, dont l'un des nombreux mérites est son volume maîtrisé (281 pages aérées, de lecture aisée), présente cette matière très technique en distinguant tout d'abord l'ouverture de la procédure collective, puis en décrivant le déroulement de la procédure collective.

Jadis infamantes sous le nom de "droit de la faillite", le droit des "procédures collectives" est depuis 1967 un droit de protection de l'entreprise, visant à la prévention de ses difficultés, à sa sauvegarde et à son redressement, sa liquidation et sa cession n'étant que la dernière hypothèse.

Ce souci a été encore accru par l'influence de la théorie économique.

Ce Cours est à jours des ordonnances du 15 septembre 2021 réformant le droit des sûretés et transposant la directive dite Restructuration.

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Dans la même collection, voir les Cours ayant un lien direct :

🕴️V. Magnier, 📕Droit des sociétés

🕴️J.-B. Seube, 📕Droit des sûretés

📚 Consulter l'ensemble de la collection, Cours Dalloz - Droit privé, fondée sur un concept proposé par Marie-Anne Frison-Roche en 1992 et dans laquelle l'ouvrage est publié.

Enregistrer

► Full Reference: Parquet national financier - PNF (National Financial Prosecutor's Office), Lignes directrices sur la mise en oeuvre de la convention judiciaire d'intérêt public (Guidelines on the implementation of the judicial public interest agreement (CJIP)), 16 January 2023.

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► Read the guidelines (in French)

► Read a free translation of the original French document for information purposes

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♾️ suivre Marie-Anne Frison-Roche sur LinkedIn

♾️ s'abonner à la Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 

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► Référence complète : M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Si l'algorithme engendre un risque systémique de fraude, l'entreprise doit trouver le moyen de prévenir et détecter celle-ci : cas d'école", Newsletter MAFR Law, Compliance, Regulation, 15 janvier 2023.

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Le cas agite et inquiète à juste titre. Il est notamment relayé dans Le Parisien et dans Libération.

Il apparait qu'un professeur de master découvre que la moitié de la promotion de ses étudiants avait fait écrire sa copie par un algorithme (ChatGPT), dont on dit que les productions mécaniques se rapprochent, à s'y méprendre, du "langage naturel", c'est-à-dire manié par les êtres humains. Il en a résulté des copies correctes, mais si identiques que l'usage de l'outil par les étudiants avait été ainsi détecté.

La dimension systémique du phénomène mérite qu'on y réfléchisse car il s'agit non seulement de détecter mais encore de prévenir le recours à cet outil, si l'on veut que les travaux rendus par les étudiants permettent d'évaluer leurs niveaux.

L'on peut certes rechercher des solutions très radicales, comme obliger les étudiants à écrire à la main dans des contrôles faits sur table et surveillés..., ou interdire le recours aux algorithmes, interdiction dont l'effectivité va être difficile ; ou rêver d'une Université où l'on leur donnerait des sujets de réflexion à traiter chacun d'une façon originale, ce qui suppose sans doute un nombre d'étudiants moins élevés (d'ailleurs, les lycées et collègues sont aussi concernés).

Mais si l'on regarde le "but" : il s'agit bien de prévenir et détecter un comportement systémiquement dommageable, pour l'Université et pour les étudiants eux-mêmes (qui n'auront rien appris ; ce sont les premières victimes).

Or, la prévention et détection des comportements systémiquement dommageables non pas tant pour les sanctionner mais pour qu'ils ne prospèrent pas à l'avenir, ici garder les avantages des algorithmes comme outils et prévenir leur usage dolosif, c'est la définition du Droit de la Compliance comme mode de prévention et de détection des maux systémique. Cela constitue un "but monumental".

🔴 M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📕Les buts monumentaux de la Compliance, 2022

Pour concrétiser une telle ambition, notamment face à la puissance de ces outils neutres que sont les algorithmes, qui permettent d'ailleurs à des professeurs de rédiger sans difficulté des cours sur l'originalité desquels on ne leur demande pas de compte, le Droit de la Compliance présente un atout majeur : il repose sur les entreprises elles-mêmes, notamment celles par lesquelles le risque est né.

Historiquement, le Droit de la Compliance est né aux Etats-Unis, en imposant aux entreprises ayant contribué par leur comportement interne à la crise de 1929 une série d'obligations de prudence, de gestion des conflits d'intérêts, d'information et de soumission à un superviseur.

🔴 M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance : avant, maintenant, après, 2018

C'est en effet aux entreprises de trouver les solutions pour détecter et prévenir les comportements systémiques dommageables.

L'article publié dans Libération fait état des travaux menés par les entreprises fabriquant les algorithmes pour que soient insérés dans les textes des signaux, indétectables par l'usager (par exemple l'algorithme achevant une phrase sur dix par un mot finissant par la même lettre, ou une phrase sur vingt par un mot commençant par la même lettre), mais qu'un autre algorithme pourrait "détecter" pour que le travail produit soit analysé par le professeur (comme on le fait déjà en matière de plagiat).

Il s'agit ici d'une "compliance consentie, choisie par l'entreprise elle-même ; cela pourrait être leur être également imposé.

🔴 L. Benzoni et B. Deffains, 📝Approche économique des outils de la Compliance: finalité, effectivité et mesure de la Compliance subie et choisie, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), 📕Les outils de la Compliance, 2021

Apparaît ainsi le juste et efficace rapport entre le Droit de la Compliance et ce que l'on appelle "l'intelligence artificielle", dès l'instant que l'on n'a précisément pas une vision mécanique du Droit de la Compliance, ce qui permet de laisser les algorithmes à leur place : des "outils".

🔴 M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🎥Compliance, Intelligence artificielle et gestion des entreprises : la juste mesure, 2022

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► Référence complète : J. Harrison, "Trade Agreement and Sustainability: Exploring the Potential of Global Value Chain (GVC) Obligations", Journal of International Economic Law,  2023

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► Résumé de l'article (fait par l'auteur ) : Après 

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🦉Les étudiants de Marie-Anne Frison-Roche peuvent avoir accès au texte intégral

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► Référence complète : W. Feugère, "Les suites des alertes : observations sur les enquêtes internes", in W. Feugère (dir.), Le nouveau régime des dispositifs d’alerte en France : comment conjuguer conformité et efficacité, Cahiers de droit de l'entreprise (CDE), n° 1, janvier-février 2023, pp. 49-52.

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►Résumé de l'article (fait par l'auteur) : "L’analyse du droit des alertes ne peut se concevoir que dans celle des enquêtes, qui en sont la suite incontournable. L’alerte est une information brute : elle doit être analysée, au-delà de sa seule recevabilité. Quels sont les faits exacts ? Quelle en est l’ampleur ? Quels en sont les enjeux et les impacts, les responsabilités ? Enfin, et surtout, qu’en conclure, que décider ? Une information doit donner lieu à réflexion et à une décision. L’enquête a précisément cet objectif : mettre en mesure les managers de décider.".

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🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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♾️ follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn

♾️ subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 

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► Full reference: M.A. Frison-Roche, Regulatory and Compliance Law, expression of the missions of a professional Order, Working Paper, July 2022.

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🎤 This Working Paper has been done as basis for an intervention in the Annual Congress of the French Professional Order of the Géomètres-Experts, September 15, 2022 (conference given in French) 

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🎥watch the short presentation of this speech (in French) 

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🎥watch the full speech given on 15 September 2022, based on this working paper

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► Summary of the Working Paper: Professional orders should not present themselves as exceptions, however legitimate they may be, in relation to a principle, which would be the competitive system, but as the expression of a principle. This principle is expressed by two branches of Law whose importance is constantly growing in European Law, liberal branches which are based on the conception of economic life and the definition of company, turned towards the future: the Regulatory Law and Compliance Law, two branches of Law at the same time related and distinct.

Indeed, and this is the topic of the first part, Competition Law conceives professional orders as exceptions since these "corporations" constitute structural agreements. French domestic legal system both consolidates the professional orders by backing them up to the State, which would sub-delegate its powers to them, but involves them in the questioning by the European Union of the States and their tools. Most often the temptation is then to recall with a kind of nostalgia the times when the professional orders were the principle but, except to ask for a restoration, the time would be no more.

A more dynamic approach is possible, in accordance with the more general evolution of Economic Law. Indeed, the Professional Order is the expression of a profession, a little-exploited concept in Economic Law, over which the Order exercises the function of "Second-level Regulator", the public authorities exercising the function of "First-level Regulator". The Banking and Financial Regulatory Law is built in this way and operates thank to that, at national, European, and global level. This is what should be linked.

The Professional Orders therefore have the primary function of spreading a "Culture of Compliance" among the professionals they supervise and beyond them (clients and stakeholders). This culture of Compliance is developed regarding the missions which are concretized by the professionals themselves.

Therefore, the second part of the Working Paper deals with the legal evolution of the notion of "Mission" which has become central in Economic and General Law, through the technique of the mission-based company. However, there are multiple points of contact between the raison d'être, the company with a mission and Compliance Law as soon as the latter is defined by the concrete and overly ambitious goals that it pursues. : the Monumental Goals.

Each structure, for example the French Ordre des Géomètres-Experts, is legitimate to set the Monumental Goal that it pursues and that it inculcates, in particular the conception of territory and the living environment, joining what unites all the Monumental Goals of Compliance: concern for others. The French Ordre des Géomètres-Experts, is adequate because it has a more flexible relationship, both tighter and broader, with the territory than the State itself.

By instilling this in professionals, the Professional Order develops in the practitioner an "ex ante responsibility", which is a pillar of Compliance Law, constituting both a charge and a power that the practitioner exercises, and of which the Professional Order must be the supervisor.

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🔓read the Working Paper⤵️

► Référence complète : P. Larouche, "Pluralisme et multivalence en analyse économique du droit", Revue de droit d'Assas, n°24, déc. 2022, p.126-129.

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► Résumé de l'article : L'auteur montre que l'on a parfois une vision déformée de l'Analyse économique du Droit. Après avoir souligné que l'interdisciplinarité débute souvent par une "phase de déception initiative", il rappelle les profits de celle-ci à condition que chaque discipline respecte l'autre.

Or, dans l'analyse économique du droit, chacun s'est souvent bloqué, l'on en reste souvent au premier stade.

Sans doute, parce que ce mouvement né aux Etats-Unis il y a 60 ans, participait alors au mouvement de l'époque visant à faire de l'économie "une science à part entière à l'instar des sciences naturelles", mais ne prétendait pas décrire le monde ni constituer un système de preuves.

Ce n'est que plus tard que la "théorie du coût social" de Coase (1960) a été perçue comme pouvant s'appliquer à tout, ce que l'auteur ne prétendait pas.

Ce n'est qu'en 1970 que Posner y associe ce qui serait une supériorité du Common Law, le courant Law and Economics étant rejeté par les non anglo-américains. 

Mais ce double lien entre la conception très libérale de 1960 et très culturelle de 1970 n'est pas intrinsèque à l'AED.

En outre, pour Coase, les coûts de transactions sont faibles, parce qu'ils sont engendrés par le système juridique lui-même. Aujourd'hui, on admet au contraire qu'ils sont élevés parce qu'ils constituent par l'ensemble du système juridique, l'AED intégrant le pluralisme juridique.

Dès lors, le Droit reprend face à l'Economie à la façon sa spécificité et son ampleur.

L'AED ne peut plus aussi facilement que dans la conception précédente en tirer des conséquences normatives, où la réglementation américaine semblait pouvoir engendrer des solutions applicables partout parce qu'enrichie par l'analyse économique.

Corrélativement, le Droit doit moins rejeter l'analyse économique, dès l'instant que ce qu'est le Droit y est respecté, notamment l'économie de l'information.

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