🌐 follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn

🌐 subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) & Dalloz, 2021, 323 p.

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📘In parallel, the English version of this book, Compliance Tools, is published in the collection co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC)  and Bruylant. 

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📅This book comes after a cycle of colloquia organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its Academic Partners. 

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This volume is the continuation of the books dedicated to Compliance in this collection.

📚Read the other books ' presentations of the collection about Compliance:

📕 M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, 2023

📕 M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, 2022

📕 M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Pour une Europe de la Compliance, 2019

📕 N. Borga, J.-Cl. Marin, J.-Ch. Roda (ed.), Compliance : l'Entreprise, le Régulateur et le Juge, 2018

📕 M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Régulation, Supervision, Compliance, 2017

📕 M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Internet, espace d'interrégulation, 2016

📚Read the presentations of the other titles of the collection.

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► General presentation of the book: The political dimension of Compliance Law resides in the monumental goals that it aims for and which define it. These goals are internalized in "crucial operators", who willingly or by force must structure themselves and act to achieve "monumental goals", as set by public authorities and which may coincide with the interests of the enterprise. This one designs and controls the Ex Ante reorganization that this implies, under the public authorities supervision. Enterprises, even if their activities are not regulated, thus become transparent and must show the Compliance Tools effectively deployed to effectively achieve these goals. It is a major transformation of economic life in all countries because the Compliance Tools are adopted everywhere and have a global effect.

These appear to be very diverse but their unity is profound and bringing it out has the practical benefit of producing a legal regime that is as unified as possible, while allowing their adaptation country by country, sector by sector, enterprise by enterprise. 

This book aims to understand these Compliance Tools to better anticipate the assessment that will be made by Regulators, Supervisors and Courts, as well as the new conceptions of the authors of legal texts which impose new ones every day, while companies must also imagine the most appropriate Compliance Tools.

This collective work specifically apprehends those on which we have few studies when we handle them on a daily basis, such as risk mapping or training or rights, letting more familiar tools shine through more transversal contributions, such as compliance programs, sanctions, whistleblowing or many sorts of settlements, agreements of public interest.

A first chapter takes a legal and economic approach. A second chapter emphasizes the role of risk mapping. A third chapter draws the game of incentives. A fourth chapter identifies the expertise required. A fifth chapter insists on geographic significance. A sixth chapter details the measurement of effectiveness. A seventh chapter explores training. The eighth chapter examines technological tools. The concluding article leads to rights.

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► Read the general introduction of the book (in French).

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► Understand the book through the Table of Contents and the summaries of each article:

INTRODUCTION 

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Décrire, concevoir et corréler les outils de la compliance, pour en faire un usage adéquat

I. APPROCHES JURIDIQUE ET ÉCONOMIQUE DES OUTILS DE LA COMPLIANCE (LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO COMPLIANCE TOOLS)

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Approche juridique des outils de la compliance. Construire juridiquement l'unité des outils de la compliance à partir de la définition du Droit de la compliance par ses "buts monumentaux"

🕴️L. Benzoni et 🕴️B. Deffains, 📝Approche économique des outils de la compliance : finalité, mesure, effectivité de la compliance "subie" et "choisie"

II. LA CARTOGRAPHIE DES RISQUES, OUTIL CENTRAL DE LA COMPLIANCE (RISK MAPPING, CENTRAL COMPLIANCE TOOL)

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Dresser des cartographies des risques comme obligation et le paradoxe des "risques de conformité"

🕴️N. Guillaume, 📝Cartographie des risques de compliance. Premiers aperçus des enjeux, des limites et des bonnes pratiques

III. PLACE ET MANIEMENT DES INCITATIONS DANS LES SYSTÈMES DE COMPLIANCE (PLACE AND USE OF INCENTIVES IN COMPLIANCE SYSTEMS)

🕴️L. Rapp, 📝Théorie des incitations et gouvernance des activités spatiales

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Résoudre la contradiction entre "sanction" et "incitation" sous le feu du Droit de la compliance

🕴️M. Larouer, 📝La manifestation des mécanismes incitatifs dans le droit français de la compliance

🕴️H. Tardieu, 📝Souveraineté des données et compliance

🕴️L. Calandri, 📝Incitation(s) et autorégulation(s) : quelle place pour le droit de la compliance dans le secteur audiovisuel?

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance et incitations : un couple à propulser

IV. LES EXPERTISES REQUISES EN MATIÈRE DE COMPLIANCE (THE REQUIRED EXPERTISES IN TERMS OF COMPLIANCE)

🕴️A. Gutierrez-Crespin, 📝L’audit du dispositif de compliance : un outil clé pour en vérifier la robustesse

🕴️S. Koenigsberg et 🕴️Fr. Barrière, 📝La construction de l'expertise de l'avocat en matière de compliance

🕴️Th. Amico, 📝La Compliance ou le passage de l'ex post à l'ex ante. Une révolution copernicienne pour l'avocat pénaliste ?

V. LA PRÉGNANCE GÉOGRAPHIQUE DES OUTILS DE LA COMPLIANCE (THE GEOGRAPHICAL DOMINANCE OF COMPLIANCE TOOLS)

🕴️J.-B. Racine, 📝Propos introductifs. La prégnance géographique dans le choix et l'usage des outils de la compliance

🕴️M. M. Salah, 📝Conception et application de la compliance en Afrique

🕴️R. Burlingame, 🕴️K. Coppens, N. Power et 🕴️D.H. Lee, 📝Compliance : lutte internationale contre la corruption et gestion des risques

VI. LA MESURE DE L'EFFECTIVITÉ DES OUTILS DE LA COMPLIANCE (THE MEASURE OF COMPLIANCE TOOLS EFFECTIVITY)

🕴️M. Galland, 📝Le contrôle par le régulateur de l'effectivité des instruments de compliance mis en place par l'entreprise

🕴️A. Banck, 📝La maturité de l’utilisateur d'un outil de compliance, premier critère du choix de l’outil adéquat

VII. LA FORMATION, ALPHA ET OMÉGA DE LA COMPLIANCE (TRAINING, ALPHA AND OMEGA OF COMPLIANCE)

🕴️H. Causse, 📝La compliance : par et au-delà de la formation juridique classique

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝La formation : contenu et contenant de la compliance

🕴️Th. Thouret, 📝Formation et compliance : deux outils corrélés de transmission d'information

VIII. LES OUTILS TECHNOLOGIQUES ET LA COMPLIANCE BY DESIGN (TECHNOLOGICAL TOOLS AND COMPLIANCE BY DESIGN)

🕴️J.-Ch. ​Roda, 📝La compliance by design en antitrust : entre innovation et illusion

🕴️C. Granier, 📝L'originalité normative de la compliance by design

🕴️L. Pailler, 📝Les outils technologiques, la compliance by design et le RGPD : la protection des données dès la conception

🕴️S. Merabet, 📝La morale by design

CONCLUSION

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Les droits subjectifs, outils premiers et naturels du Droit de la compliance

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Full reference: Fasterling, B., "Criminal Compliance - Les risques d'un droit pénal du risque", Revue internationale de droit économique, 2016/2 (t.XXX), p. 217-237

Read the article.

L'ouvrage de Christophe André, Droit pénal spécial, vient de paraître dans sa 5ième édition, dans la collection Cours Dalloz - série Droit privé.

Il fût un temps où l'on ne faisait pas plus "spécial" que le Droit pénal spécial.

Déjà le Droit pénal, que l'on disait "autonome" était spécial (et merci à l'auteur d'en rappeler les bases en début d'ouvrage), mais en son sein l'on ressemblait l'ensemble de chacune des infractions. Un peu comme le Droit du contrat et les contrats spéciaux. 

Mais le Droit pénal spécial l'implique plus encore, parce que le Droit pénal général est lui-même spécial, puisqu'il est une exception au principe de liberté et que ce principe d'exception implique un isolement de chaque infraction close sur elle-même.  L'effet de catalogue serait de la nature même de ce Droit si "spécial". 

Comme l'écrit parfaitement Christophe André lorsqu'on arrive au Droit pénal spécial, alors on aborde un "droit très spécial". Il est d'ailleurs usuel de lui consacrer un ouvrage autonome....

Celui qui non seulement fait du Droit des affaires mais même travaille dans un entreprise sans faire particulièrement de Droit fera du Droit pénal des affaires dès l'instant par exemple qu'il s'occupe de gouvernance ou de relations avec les investisseurs. Les mécanismes de Compliance sont visés comme mettant en place un Droit qui n'a plus rien à voir avec le Droit pénal classique, construit même à l'inverse de celui-ci. 

C'est d'une façon liée que l'auteur s'inquiète en affirmant que toute cette pluie particulière de crimes et délits spéciaux, soustrait à un Droit pénal qui semble disparaître ferait naître un "droit d'exception". 

C'est vrai et c'est bien l'enjeu du "Droit de la Compliance" dans son rapport avec le Droit pénal. Qui ne fait que mettre encore plus nettement en valeur la question que ne l'avait déjà fait les rapports entre Droit de la Régulation et Droit pénal.

En effet, lorsqu'on affirme que la "répression" est l'arme principale du Régulateur, que le nombre de sanctions est la mesure de son succès, que les sanctions ne sont que l'outil nécessaire et naturel de l'efficacité de la règle ordinaire, tournant généralement autour de l'information et de la liberté d'aller et de venir (dont la liberté de la concurrence est dérivée), on ôte à la répression son caractère "spécial" pour la rendre ordinaire. Et par un oxymore dont les entreprises sentent chaque jour la pointe c'est en la rendant ordinaire que la répression devient un "droit d'exception", puisqu'il s'est affranchi d'un "principe d'exception" que posait le Droit pénal général.

C'est le principe d'efficacité qui continue à cela. 

Il paraît premier aux économistes.

Il paraît secondaire aux juristes.

Ce n'est pas une question théorique, c'est une question pratique.

Ainsi la décision de la Commission des sanctions de l'Agence Française Anticorruption, dans sa décision du 4 juillet 2019 est une parfaite illustration de cette tension. L'autorité de poursuite que constitue le président de l'AFA avait estimé que l'efficacité du système objectif et structurel de compliance justifiait une sanction sans avoir à prouver un comportement. La Commission des sanctions s'y refuse, dès l'instant que l'entreprise a suivi les recommandations émise par l'AFA, sauf au directeur de celle-ci a démontré un manquement malgré cela.

Comme quoi en matière de droit pénal tout est question de technique probatoire, cette articulation entre le droit pénal substantiel et la procédurale pénale, celle par laquelle ce Droit sort du sommeil dans lequel pourtant sa réussite voudrait qu'il demeure.

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 It is often observed, even theorized, even advised and touted, that Compliance is a mechanism by which public authorities internalize political (eg environmental) concerns in big companies, which accept them, in Ex Ante, because they are rather in agreement with these "monumental goals" (eg saving the planet) and that this shared virtue is beneficial to their reputation. It is observed that this could be the most successful way in new configurations, such as digital.

But, and the Compliance Mechanism has often been brought closer to the contractual mechanism, this is only relevant if both parties are willing to do so. This is technically true, for example for the Deferred Prosecution, which requires explicit consent. This is true in a more general sense that the company wants to choose itself how to structure its organization to achieve the goals politically pursued by the State. Conversely, the compliance mechanisms work if the State is willing to admit the economic logic of the global private players and / or, if there are possible breaches, not to pursue its investigations and close the file it has opened, at a price more or less high.

But just say No.

As in contractual matters, the first freedom is negative and depends on the ability to say No.

The State can do it. But the company can do it too.

And Daimler just said No.

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Publicly, including through an article in the Wall Street Journal of June 28, 2019.

The company sets out in a warning to the market that it is the object of a requirement on the part of the German Motor Authority (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt)  of an allegation of fraud, by the installation of a software, aimed at misleading instruments for measuring emissions of greenhouse gases on cars using diesel.

It is therefore an environmental compliance mechanism that would have been intentionally countered.

On this allegation, the Regulator both warns the company of what it considers to be a fact, ie compliance fraud, and attaches it to an immediate measure, namely the removal of the circulation of 42,000 vehicles sold or proposed by Daimler with such a device.

And the firm answers : "No".

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Which is probably only beginning, since a No ends the dialogue of Ex Ante to project in the Ex Post sanction procedures, calls 6 observations:

• 1. No doubt Daimler, a German car manufacturing company, has it in mind in this allegation of fraud calculating pollution of its diesel cars what happened to his competitor Volkswagen: namely a multi-billion dollar fine, for lack of compliance in a similar hypothesis (so-called dieselgate). The strategic choice that is then made depends on education through the experience of the company, which benefits as such from a previous case that has had a very significant cost. Thus educated, the question is to measure the risk taken to refuse any cooperation, when the company can anticipate that it will still result in such an amount ....

• 2. In addition, we find the difficulty of the distinction of Ex Ante and Ex Post. Indeed, saying No will involve for the company a cost of confrontation with the Regulator, then the peripheral jurisdictions or review courts. But in Germany, the Government itself, concerning a bank threatened with compliance proceedings and almost summoned by the US regulator to pay "of its own free will" a transactional fine, felt that this was not normal, because it must be the judges who punish, after a contradictory procedure with due process and after established facts. 

• 3.  However, this is only an allegation, of probable assertions, of what legally allows to continue, but which does not allow to condemn. The confusion between the burden of proof, which presupposes the obligation to prove the facts before being able to sanction, and the burden of the allegation, which only supposes to articulate plausibility before being able to prosecute, is very damaging, particularly if we are committed to the principles of Repressive Law, such as the presumption of innocence and the due process. This distinction between these two probationary charges is at the heart of the probatory system in the Compliance Law. Because Compliance Law always looks for more efficiency, tends to go from the first to the second, to give the Regulator more power, since businesses are so powerful ....

• 4. But the first question then arises: what is the nature no so much of the future measure to be feared, namely a sanction that could be taken later, against Daimler, if the breach is proven, or which will not be applied to the firm if the breach is not established; but what is the nature of the measure immediately taken, namely the return of 42,000 vehicles?

• This may seem like an Ex Ante measurement. Indeed, the Compliance assumes non-polluting cars. The Regulator may have indications that these cars are polluting and that the manufacturer has not made the necessary arrangements for them to be less polluting (Compliance) or even organized so that this failure is not detected ( Compliance fraud).

• This allegation suggests that there is a risk that thiese cars will polluting. They must immediately be removed from circulation for the quality of the environment. Here and now. The question of sanctions will arise after that, having its procedural apparatus of guarantees for the company that will be pursued. But see the situation on the side of the company: having to withdraw 42,000 vehicles from the market is a great damage and what is often called in Repressive Law a "security measure" taken while the evidence is not yet met could deserve a requalification in sanction. Jurisprudence is both abundant and nuanced on this issue of qualification.

• 5. So to withdraw these cars, it is for the company to admit that it is guilty, to increase itself the punishment. And if at this game, taken from the "cost-benefit", as much for the company immediately assert to the market that this requirement of Regulation is unfounded in Law, that the alleged facts are not exacts, and that all this the judges will decide. It is sure at all whether these statements by the company are true or false, but before a Tribunal no one thinks they are true prima facie, they are only allegations.
•  And before a Court, a Regulator appears to have to bear a burden of proof in so far as he has to defend the order he has issued, to prove the breach which he asserts exists, which justifies the exercise he made of his powers. The fact that he exercises his power for the general interest and impartially does not diminish this burden of proof.

• 6. By saying "No", Daimler wants to recover this classic Law, often set aside by Compliance Law, classic Law based on burden of proof, means of proof, and prohibition of punitive measures - except imminent and future imminente and very serious damages  - before 'behavior could be sanctioned following a sanction procedure.
• Admittedly, one would be tempted to make an analogy with the current situation of Boeing whose aircraft are grounded by the Regulator in that he considers that they do not meet the conditions of safety, which the aircraft manufacturer denies , Ex Ante measurement that resembles the retraction measure of the market that constitutes the recall request of cars here operated.
• But the analogy does not work on two points. Firstly, flight activity is a regulated activity that can only be exercised with the Ex Ante authorization of several Regulators, which is not the case for offering to sell cars or to drive with. This is where Regulatory Law and Compliance Law, which often come together, here stand out.Secundly, the very possibility that planes of which it is not excluded that they are not sure is enough, as a precaution, to prohibit their shift. Here (about the cars and the measure of the pollution by them), it is not the safety of the person that is at stake, and probably not even the overall goal of the environment, but the fraud with respect to the obligation to obey Compliance. Why force the withdrawal of 42,000 vehicles? If not to punish? In an exemplary way, to remind in advance and all that it costs not to obey the Compliance? And there, the company says: "I want a judge".

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The European Banking Union is based on supervision as much as on regulation: it concerns the operators as much as the structures of the sector, because the operators "hold" the sector.

This is why the "regulator - supervisor" holds the operators by the supervision and is close to them.

He meets them officially and in "soft law" relations. This is all the more necessary since the distinction between the Ex Ante and the Ex Post must be nuanced, in that its application is too rigid, in that it involves a long time (first of all the rules, then to apply them, then to notice a gap between rules and behaviors, then to repair it) is not appropriate if the system aims at the prevention of systemic crises, whose source is inside the operators.

This is why the body in charge of solving the difficulties of the systemic banks for the salvation of the systeme meets the banking sector itself, to ensure that they are permanently "resolvable", so that the hypothesis of their resolution never arises. This is the challenge of this system: that it is always ready, for never be applying.

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In the European Banking Union, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) is in charge of "resolve" the difficulties of European systemic banks in difficulty. It is the public body of the second pillar of the Banking Union. The first pillar is the prevention of these difficulties and the third is the guarantee of deposits. The resolution is therefore more like an Ex Post mechanism.

But in this continuum through these three pillars between the Ex Ante and the Ex Post, the SRB does not wait passively - as would a traditional judge do - that the file of the troubled bank reaches it. Like a supervisor - which brings it closer to the first public in the system (Single Supervisory Board -SSB), which supervises all the banks, it is in direct contact with all the banks, and it approaches the hypothesis of a bank in trouble by a systemic perspective: it is therefore to the entire banking system that the SRB addresses itself.

As such, it organizes meetings, where he is located: in Brussels.

Thus, on June 18, 2019, all banks came to discuss with the Single Resolution Board to know what it wants from the banks and for the banks, in what is called a "dialogue meeting".

To resolve in Ex Post the difficulties of a bank, it has to present a quality (a little known concept in Bankruptcy Law): "resolvability". How build it? Who build it ? In its very design and in its application, bank by bank.

For the resolution body vis-à-vis all players in the banking and financial sector, it's clear: "Working together" is crucial in building resolvability ".

In the projection that is made, it is affirmed that there can be a successful resolution only if the operator in difficulty is not deprived of access to what makes to stay it alive, that is to say the banking and financial system itself, and more specifically the "Financial Market Infrastructures", for example payment services.

Does the Single Resolution Board expect spontaneous commitments from the FMIs for such a "right of access"? In this case, as the Single Resolution Board says, this right of access corresponds to "critical functions" for a bank, the resolution situation can not justify the closure of the service.

By nature, these crucial operators are entities that report to regulators who oversee them. Who enforces - and immediately - this right of access? When one can think that it is everyone, it risks being nobody .... That is why the resolution body, relaying in this a concern of the Financial Stability Board, underlines that it is necessary to articulate the supervisors, regulators and "resolvers" between them.

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To read this program, since it is a proposed program of work for the banking sector, four observations can be made:

1. We are moving more and more towards a general "intermaillage" (which will perhaps replace the absence of a global State, but it is an similar nature because it is always to public authorities that it refers and not to self-regulation);

2. But as there is no political authority to keep these guardians, the entities that articulate all these various public structures, with different functions, located in different countries, acting according to different temporalities, these are the companies themselves that internalize the concern that animates those who built the system: here the prevention of systemic risk. This is the definition of Compliance, which brings back to companies, here more clearly those those which manage the Market Infrastructures, the obligations of Compliance (here the management of systemic risk through the obligation of giving access).

3. Even without a  single systemic guard, there is always a recourse. That will be the judge. There are already many, there will probably be more in a system of this type, more and more complex, the articulation of disputes is sometimes called "dialogue". And it is undoubtedly "decisions of principle" that will set the principles common to all of these particular organisms.

4. We then see the emergence of Ex Ante mechanisms for the solidity of the systems, and the solidity of the players in the systems, and then the Ex Post resolution of the difficulties of the actors according to access to the solidity of the infrastructures of these systems, which ultimately depend on judges (throughout the West) facing areas where all of this depends much less on the judge: the rest of the world.

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♾️ follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn

♾️ subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law

____

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Pour une Europe de la Compliance (For the Europe of the Compliance), series "Régulations & Compliance", Dalloz, 2019, 124 p. 

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This volume is the continuation of the books dedicated to Compliance in this collection.

📚Read the other books' presentations of the collection about Compliance:

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, 2023

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, 2022

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Les outils de la Compliance, 2021

🕴️N. Borga, 🕴️J.-Cl. Marin &🕴️J.-Ch. Roda (ed.), 📕Compliance : l'Entreprise, le Régulateur et le Juge, 2018

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Régulation, Supervision, Compliance, 2017

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.),📕 Internet, espace d'interrégulation, 2016

📚Read the presentations of the other titles of the collection.

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► General presentation of the book: This book is written in French. The topic is : "For the Europe of the Compliance".

See below its general presentation in English. 

The political dimension is intrinsic to the Compliance Law. Indeed, compliance mechanisms consist of internalizing in certains companies the obligation to implement goals of general interest set by Public Authorities. These public bodies control the Ex Ante reorganization that implies for these companies and punish Ex Post the possible structural inadequacy of these compagnies, becoming transparent for this purpose. 

This new mode of governance establishes a continuum between Regulation, Supervision, Compliance (book published in 2017) and renew the links between Companies, Regulators and Judges!footnote-1600. 

This political dimension must be increased: the Compliance Law of Compliance must today be used to build Europe.

One can observe not only the construction of the  European Compliance Law, object-by-object, sector-by-sector, purpose-by-purpose, but also the construction of the European Compliance Law that transcends and unifies them. Becoming independent of American Law and ceasing to be in reaction, even on the defensive, the Compliance Law contributes to the European project, offering it a higher ambition, that Europe can carry and, by this way, can carry the Europe itself, not only to preserve the European economy from corruption or money laundering, but by claiming the protection of nature and human beings.

This is why the book describes the "reasons and objectives" of the Europe of the Compliance, which makes it possible to describe, detect and even predict the ways and means.

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► Understand the book through the Table of Contents and the summaries of each article: 

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Avant propos 

🕴️K. Lenaerts, 📝Le juge de l'Union européenne dans une Europe de la compliance

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Un droit substantiel de la compliance, appuyé sur la tradition européenne humaniste

I. LES RAISONS ET LES OBJECTIFS D'UNE EUROPE DE LA COMPLIANCE (THE REASONS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE EUROPE OF THE COMPLIANCE) 

🕴️X. Musca, 📝Construire une Europe de la compliance en donnant une meilleure place aux entreprises

🕴️P. Vimont, 📝La place de la diplomatie dans l'avancée d'une Europe de la compliance

🕴️P. Sellal, 📝Les vertus de la compliance : une réponse possible aux faiblesses de l'Union européenne ?

🕴️J.-J. Daigre, 📝Compliance, entreprise et Europe

II. LES VOIES ET MOYENS D'UNE EUROPE DE LA COMPLIANCE  (THE WAYS AND MEANS OF THE EUROPE OF THE COMPLIANCE)

🕴️J.-Cl. Marin, 📝Quels outils pour la construction du droit de la compliance en Europe ?

🕴️M. Canto-Sperber, 📝La compliance et les définitions traditionnelles de la vertu

🕴️T. Bonneau, 📝Compliance et secteur bancaire et financier en Europe

🕴️C. Duchaine, 📝L'Agence française anticorruption, à l'appui de l'Europe de la compliance

🕴️D. Martin, 📝Les contraintes et les vertus de la compliance

🕴️A. de La Cotardière, 📝Construire une Europe de la compliance lisible pour les entreprises

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Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Interview à propos de l'ouvrage Pour une Europe de la Compliance, entretien avec Ondine Delaunay in La Lettre des Juristes d'Affaires, n° 1397, 20 mai 2019, p 4.

Présentation par La Lettre des Juristes d'Affaires:

"Les Éditions Dalloz et le Journal of Regulation & Compliance viennent de publier un ouvrage intitulé Pour une Europe de la compliance.

Placé sous la direction du professeur Marie-Anne Frison Roche, il tend à prouver que la compliance pourrait constituer le droit de demain, un droit sans frontière qui servirait à construire l’Europe.

Explications."

Lire l'entretien.

Consulter la présentation de l'ouvrage.