Food for thoughts

Ce cours constitue la première partie d'un triptyque permettant de mieux comprendre les rapports que l'Etat entretient via le Droit avec les marchés.  

Ce cours pose donc les base d'un Droit commun de la Régulation, enseignement qui a vocation à être enrichi au semestre suivant par la perspective des Droits sectoriels de la Régulation, voire au semestre ultérieur par une approche du nouveau Droit de la Compliance. Ce dernier cours est commun avec l'Ecole du Management et de l'Innovation car la Régulation est alors internalisée dans les entreprises elles-mêmes. 

Le livret de cours du Droit commun de la Régulation  décrit le contenu et les objectifs du cours. Il détaille en outre la façon dont les étudiants, qui suivent cet enseignement situé dans l'École d'affaires publiques de Science po, sont évalués afin de valider cet enseignement. Il précise la charge du travail qui est demandé.

Les thèmes des leçons qui composent successivement le cours sont énumérés.

Les lectures conseillés sont précisées.

Les étudiants inscrits au Cours ont été connectés au dossier documentaire "MAFR - Régulation & Compliance", présent sur le drive de Science po, où sont disponibles documents cités dans le Cours. 

A partir de ce livret, chaque document support de chaque leçon est accessible.

Voir ci-dessous plus de détails sur chacun de ces points, ainsi que la liste des leçons.

Full reference: Bounie, D. and Maxwell, W., L'explicabilité des algorithmes est-elle un droit fondamental?, Column in Le Monde, 1st of September 2019 

Read the column (in French)

Référence complète : Dufour, O., L'avocat en entreprise enfin pour demain ?, in Les Petites affiches, n°173-174, août 2019, 4 p.

Résumé par l'auteur : Le rapport du député Raphaël Gauvain intitulé "Rétablir la souveraineté de la France et de l'Europe et protéger nos entreprises des lois et mesures à portée extraterritoriale" recommande de créer un statut d'avocat en entreprise. Quelles sont les chances de trouver une solution à ce problème de confidentialité qui dure depuis 40 ans ?

Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent consulter l'article via le Drive, dossier "MAFR - "Regulation & Compliance"

L'ouvrage de Christophe André, Droit pénal spécial, vient de paraître dans sa 5ième édition, dans la collection Cours Dalloz - série Droit privé.

Il fût un temps où l'on ne faisait pas plus "spécial" que le Droit pénal spécial.

Déjà le Droit pénal, que l'on disait "autonome" était spécial (et merci à l'auteur d'en rappeler les bases en début d'ouvrage), mais en son sein l'on ressemblait l'ensemble de chacune des infractions. Un peu comme le Droit du contrat et les contrats spéciaux. 

Mais le Droit pénal spécial l'implique plus encore, parce que le Droit pénal général est lui-même spécial, puisqu'il est une exception au principe de liberté et que ce principe d'exception implique un isolement de chaque infraction close sur elle-même.  L'effet de catalogue serait de la nature même de ce Droit si "spécial". 

Comme l'écrit parfaitement Christophe André lorsqu'on arrive au Droit pénal spécial, alors on aborde un "droit très spécial". Il est d'ailleurs usuel de lui consacrer un ouvrage autonome....

Celui qui non seulement fait du Droit des affaires mais même travaille dans un entreprise sans faire particulièrement de Droit fera du Droit pénal des affaires dès l'instant par exemple qu'il s'occupe de gouvernance ou de relations avec les investisseurs. Les mécanismes de Compliance sont visés comme mettant en place un Droit qui n'a plus rien à voir avec le Droit pénal classique, construit même à l'inverse de celui-ci. 

C'est d'une façon liée que l'auteur s'inquiète en affirmant que toute cette pluie particulière de crimes et délits spéciaux, soustrait à un Droit pénal qui semble disparaître ferait naître un "droit d'exception". 

C'est vrai et c'est bien l'enjeu du "Droit de la Compliance" dans son rapport avec le Droit pénal. Qui ne fait que mettre encore plus nettement en valeur la question que ne l'avait déjà fait les rapports entre Droit de la Régulation et Droit pénal.

En effet, lorsqu'on affirme que la "répression" est l'arme principale du Régulateur, que le nombre de sanctions est la mesure de son succès, que les sanctions ne sont que l'outil nécessaire et naturel de l'efficacité de la règle ordinaire, tournant généralement autour de l'information et de la liberté d'aller et de venir (dont la liberté de la concurrence est dérivée), on ôte à la répression son caractère "spécial" pour la rendre ordinaire. Et par un oxymore dont les entreprises sentent chaque jour la pointe c'est en la rendant ordinaire que la répression devient un "droit d'exception", puisqu'il s'est affranchi d'un "principe d'exception" que posait le Droit pénal général.

C'est le principe d'efficacité qui continue à cela. 

Il paraît premier aux économistes.

Il paraît secondaire aux juristes.

Ce n'est pas une question théorique, c'est une question pratique.

Ainsi la décision de la Commission des sanctions de l'Agence Française Anticorruption, dans sa décision du 4 juillet 2019 est une parfaite illustration de cette tension. L'autorité de poursuite que constitue le président de l'AFA avait estimé que l'efficacité du système objectif et structurel de compliance justifiait une sanction sans avoir à prouver un comportement. La Commission des sanctions s'y refuse, dès l'instant que l'entreprise a suivi les recommandations émise par l'AFA, sauf au directeur de celle-ci a démontré un manquement malgré cela.

Comme quoi en matière de droit pénal tout est question de technique probatoire, cette articulation entre le droit pénal substantiel et la procédurale pénale, celle par laquelle ce Droit sort du sommeil dans lequel pourtant sa réussite voudrait qu'il demeure.

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En matière de Compliance, il y a deux sujets à la fois très importants et très incertains : celui de l'admission ou non des technologies de reconnaissance faciale ; celui de la forme et et de la place du "consentement" quelque soit la technique de captation, conservation et utilisation de l'information. 

Le cas soumis à l'Autorité suédoise de protection des données (Datainspecktionen) et rapporté par la presse, croise les deux. 

I. LE CAS

Une école suédoise doit en application de la loi nationale faire l'appel de chaque élève à chaque cours. Une Ecole supérieur a calculé que cette tâche, qui incombe donc à chaque enseignant en début de cours, représente un nombre d'heures important, qui pourrait être mieux utilisées par ceux-ci. Elle demande donc à une entreprise de technologie, Tieto, de développer pour elle des technologies qui redonnent aux enseignants leur temps. 

L'entreprise Tieto conçoit un programme pilote, comprenant un procédé de reconnaissance faciale par la pupille de l'oeil, comptant ainsi les élèves présents. Les 21 élèves qui suivent le programme pilote apportent leur consentement express pour l'ensemble des technologies utilisées, notamment celle-ci.

Mais en février 2019 l'Autorité suédoise de surveillance, d'inspection et de protection des données poursuit l'entreprise qui a fourni cette technologie et l'école qui en a bénéficié pour violation du Réglement européen dit "RGPD".

L'école se prévaut du consentement libre et éclairé qui lui a été apporté par les élèves, tandis que le fournisseur de la technologie justifie l'usage de celle-ci par le fait qu'ainsi l'équivalent de 10 emplois à plein temps sont annuellement économisés pour des tâches mécaniques. 

II. LA SOLUTION

Ces moyens n'ont pas convaincu l'Autorité.

Sur la question de l'efficacité du procédé, il ne semble pas même y être répondu, car tous ces mécanismes sont à l'évidence performants, car la protection des personnes est sans conteste coûteuse.

Mais sur la question du consentement, il est mentionné que le moyen tiré du consentement des élèves n'est pas retenu en raison du fait qu'ils n'étaient pas autonomes de l'établissemnt bénéficiaire de la technique de reconnaissance et qu'à ce titre le consentement n'avait donc pas de portée.

L'usage de cette technique est donc interdicte. 

Mais l'Autorité ne se contente pas d'une interdiction. Elle indique qu'il convient, puisque les opérateurs en sont encore au stade d'un programme pilote d'ensemble de trouver ce que l'Autorité appelle un mode de contrôle des présences "moins intrusifs", car c'est en tant que l'ensemble prenait les élèves dans leur environnement toute la journée que cela n'était pas admissible. 

III. LA PORTEE

Ce n'est pas donc une décision de principe.

C'est plutôt une décision d'espèce, en raison des circonstances qui vont que d'une part le consentement ne traduisait pas une volonté libre. Si les élèves n'avaient pas été ce que l'Autorité appelle la "dépendance" de l'établissement, alors sans doute leur acceptation de ces contrôles aurait eu de la portée.

S'il faut trouver un principe, il est par déduction celui-ci : le "consentement" n'est pas une notion autonome, suffisant à elle-seule à valider les technologies au regard du RGPD. Ce n'est qu'en tant qu'elle traduit une "volonté libre" que le "consentement" a pour effet de soumettre la personne qui l'émet à une technologie qui pourtant la menace autant qu'elle la sert. 

C'est bien ce lien entre "consentement" et "volonté" que le RGPD veut garantir. C'est bien ce lien - de nature probatoire -, le consentement devant être la preuve d'une volonté libre, que le dispositif de Droit de la Compliance veut protéger. 

Dès lors, si l'émetteur du consentement est dans une situation de dépendance par rapport à l'entité qui bénéficie de la technologie (par exemple et en l'espèce l'école qui fait des économies grâce à la technologie, sans que cela n'apporte rien à l'élève), la présomption comme quoi son consentement est la preuve d'une volonté libre est brisé : c'est pourquoi le consentement ne peut plus valider l'usage de la technologie. 

Sur la question du rapport entre le "consentement" et la "volonté" : v. Frison-Roche, M.-A., Oui au principe de la volonté, manifestation de la liberté, non aux consentements mécaniques, 2019.

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Digital technology is not only a new world: it has transformed the world (see a demonstration in this sense, Frison-Roche, MA, The contribution of Compliance Law in Internet governance, report to the French Government, July 2019 ) ..

Thus, one should not always put in the same basket even if the expression is euphonic "GAFAM". While some companies offer only intangible services, such as Facebook or Google, namely putting in contact, others have material activities. Amazon ensures the delivery of material objects, of which it provides storage for example, while Uber takes care of the transport of people. Admittedly, this company denies this meeting and ensures that it deals only with the connection, but Law has requalified its activity, which is indeed of a material nature.

It is therefore difficult to find a unity in these companies, apart from the fact that they are American, that their power seems as sudden as it is unmatched, their global deployment and that they appear "indispensable" to billions of individuals. .

Because many sellers consider that they can only reach potential buyers digitally, that the main market maker is Amazon, that the latter has enacted terms of sale that deprive these sellers numerous protections, the Germain Competition Authority, the Bundeskartellamt,  opened on November 28, 2018 an abuse of a dominant position against Amazon.

The act taken by the Bundeskartellamt on July 17, 2019 with regard to Amazon and with the "Amazon agreement", in exchange for which the procedure initiated for a possible sanction of a possible abuse of a dominant position has stopped .

Ex Post competition law is exchanged for a Compliance program that goes beyond the powers of a competition authority and the territorial scope of the latter. This does not pose a problem, since it is the “acceptance” that the company makes of it that gives rise to the binding effect and no longer the law which mandated the Competition Authority.

This is an example of the remarkable transformation of Competition Law, which goes far beyond the digital issue. In 6 months, the lawsuit turns into an agreement. Which appears as a diktat of the Authority, bearing on the future, obliging in particular a different procedural behavior.

Read the analysis below.

This working document serves as a basis for a contribution to the Grands Arrêts de la Propriété intellectuelle (major cases in Intellectual Property), published under the direction of Michel Vivant, in the new section devoted to Regulatory perspective.

Summary:

Intellectual property, derived from the State and inserted in a public policy, can be conceived, not to reward a posteriori the creator but to incite others to innovate. It is then an Ex Ante tool of Regulation, alternative to subsidies. If private copying is an exception, it is not in relation to the principle of competition but in an insertion in a system of incentives, starting from the costs borne by the author of the first innovation: the owner of the rights is then protected , not only according to a balance of interests, but in order not to discourage innovative potentials and the sector itself. (1st decision).

The sectoral policy then pervades the intellectual property used to regulate a sector, for example that of the drug. While it is true that a laboratory wishing to market a generic medicine did not wait for the patent expiry of the original medicine to do so, it is not relevant to sanction this anticipation of a few days because investments made by the holder of the intellectual property right have been made profitable by it and because the public authorities favor generics for the sake of public health (2nd decision).

The systemic interest provides and that is why Internet service providers have to bear the costs of access blocking while they are irresponsible because of the texts. This obligation to pay is internalized by Compliance because they are in the digital system best able to put an end to the violation of intellectual property rights that the ecosystem requires to be effective. (3rd decision).

It is necessary to underline the paradox represented by the infatuation of the theoreticians of Regulation with intellectual property, whose legal nature it transforms by an exogenous reasoning(I). Influenced, the case law uses reasoning based on incentives, investments, returns and costs, so that the State obtains the operators expected behaviors (II). As a natural result, there is a sectoral segmentation, for example  in telecommunications or pharmacy, which ends up calling into question the uniqueness of intellectual property, according to the technologies and public policies that affect them  (III). There are still imputations of new obligations on operators just because they are in the technical position of implementing intellectual property rights: the transition from Regulation to Compliance is thus taking place (IV).

Référence complète : interview à propos du rapport reçu par le Gouvernement le 15 juillet 2019  : Frison-Roche, M.-A., "Gouvernance d'Internet : nous sommes face à un enjeu de civilisation", Petites affiches, 18 juillet 2019, entretien mené avec Olivia Dufour. 

Résumé de l'interview : 

"Dans le rapport qu’elle a remis au secrétaire d’État au numérique en juillet, Marie-Anne Frison-Roche émet 55 propositions visant à élaborer une gouvernance d’internet fondée sur la compliance. Il s’agit en pratique pour le politique de définir des buts monumentaux : par exemple la lutte contre le réchauffement climatique et de les internaliser dans les acteurs cruciaux, par exemple Facebook ou Google sous le contrôle d’un superviseur. Ainsi Facebook serait-il appelé à surveiller les échanges numériques de la même façon qu’aujourd’hui Euronext surveille les échanges financiers. Au-delà de la question cruciale de la régulation du numérique, l’ambition consiste pour l’Europe à être fidèle à sa tradition humaniste en imposant par le droit la protection de la personne.".

Lire l'interview.

Se reporter au Rapport de Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, L'apport du Droit de la Compliance dans la Gouvernance d'Internet, à propos duquel l'interview a été donné. 

Full reference: Roda, J.-C., La crise du droit antitrust in Mélanges en l'honneur de Jacques Mestre, coll. Mélanges, LGDJ-Lextenso, 2019, p. 839-854

Sciences Po's students can read the article via MAFR Sciences Po's Drive Regulation & Compliance 

►Référence complète : Krouti M., Dufourq P., Décryptage des nouvelles lignes directrices sur la mise en œuvre de la convention judiciaire d'intérêt public, in Dalloz actualité, 12 juillet 2019. 

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►  Complete reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Having a good behavior in the digital space, working paper, April 2019.

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📝  This working document serves as a basis for a contribution to the collective book dedicated to Professor Michel Vivant, article written en French.

Summary: The jurist sees the world through the way he learns to speak!footnote-1536, legal vocabulary build by Law itself, whether in common law or in civil law. Thus, we think we are dealing with the human being who does not move, taken by the legal notion expressed by the term "person", their body and their biological development in time, from the birth to the death, holding entirely in this hollow of that word "person", while the behavior of the human being with regard to the world, others and things, are grouped in other branches of Law: the Contract and Tort Law and the Property Law, which are only what people do with and about things.

The Law of the Environment has already come to blur this distinction, so finally so strange because this classical conception refers to a person taken firstly in his immobility (Law of individuals), and then in his only actions (Contrats and Tort Law, Property Law). Indeed, the very notion of "environment" implies that the person is not isolated, that he/she is "surrounded", that he/she is what he/she is and will become because of what surrounds him/her ; in return the world is permanently affected by his/her personal action. On second thought, when once "Law of Individuals" was not distinguished from Family Law, the human being was more fully restored by this division in the legal system that not only followed him/her from birth to death but also in him/her most valuable interactions: parents, siblings, couples, children. Thus Family Law was finer and more faithful to what is the life of a human being.

To have instituted Law of Individuals, it is thus to have promoted of the human being a vision certainly more concrete, because it is above all of their identity and their body about what Law speaks, astonishing that we have not noticed before that women are not men like the others. To have instituted the Law of the people, it is thus to have promoted of the human being a vision certainly more concrete, because it is above all of his identity and his body that one speaks to us, astonishing that the we have not noticed before that women are not men like the others!footnote-1537 without however remembering that abstraction is sometimes the best of protections!footnote-1538.  But it is also to have isolated human beings, split from what they do, what they touch, what they say to others. It is by taking legally a static perception of a "man without relationship". We have gone from the legal individualism of the Law of the sole man.

From this concrete vision, we have all the benefits but Law, much more than in the eighteenth century, perceives the human being as an isolated subject, whose corporeality ceases to be veiled by Law!footnote-1570, but for whom the relation to others or to things does not define him or her. Which brings the human being a lot closer to things. An human being who is a legal subject who does what they wants, as they can, limited by the force of things. But in fact things are so powerful and the human being, in fact, so weak. For example, the marks people leave are erased by time. Their grip on the world stops at the extent of their knowledge, the time and money they have, building to use better their own time and to reach projects that they designed, In this conception, Person and Liberty are one, returning the subject to their solitude.

This freedom will come into conflict with the need for order, expressed by society, social contract, state, law, which imposes limits on freedom of one to preserve freedom of the other, as recalled by the French Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme  of 1789. Thus, it is not possible de jure to transform every desire in action,, even though the means would be within reach of the person in question, because certain behaviors are prohibited in that they would cause too much disorder and if they are nevertheless committed, they are punished for order to return. Thus, what could be called "law of behavior", obligations to do and not to be put in criminal, civil and administrative Law, national and international Law, substantial Law and procedural Law :they will protect the human being in movment pushed by the principle of freedom forward others and thing, movement inherent in their status as a Person. 

The human being is therefore limited in what they want to do. In the first place by the fact: their exhausting forces, their death that will come, the time counted, the money that is lacking, the knowledge that they does not even know not holding, all that is to say by their very humanity; Secondly, by the Law which forbids so many actions ...: not to kill, not to steal, not to take the spouse of others, not to pass as true what is false, etc. For the human being on the move, full of life and projects, Law has always had a "rabat-joy" side. It is for that reason often ridiculous and criticized because of all its restraining regulations, even hated or feared in that it would prevent to live according to our desire, which is always my "good pleasure", good since it is mine. Isolated and all-powerful, the human being alone not wanting to consider other than its desire alone.

Psychoanalysis, however, has shown that Law, in that it sets limits, assigns to the human being a place and a way of being held with respect to things and other persons. If one no longer stands themselves by the prohibition of the satisfaction of all desire (the first of which is the death of the other), social life is no longer possible!footnote-1571. Thank to the Law, everyone follows the same Rule at the table, from which a discussion can take place between guests and without which it can not!footnote-1539. You stand straight in your chair, you do not eat with your fingers, you do not speak with your mouth full, you do not interrupt the speaker. Admittedly, one often learns at the beginning of the learning of the Law that one should not confuse "politeness" and Law. That these rules are politeness and that this is not Law ...

But this presentation aims to make it possible to admit that the criterion of Law would be in the effectiveness of a sanction by the public power: the fine, the prison, the confiscation of a good, which the rudeness does not trigger whereas Law would imply it: by this way we are thus persuaded of the intimacy between the public power (the State) and Law... But later, after this first lesson learned, the doubt comes from the consubstansuality between Law and State. Is it not rather appropriate to consider that Law is what must lead everyone to "behave well" with regard to things and people around them? The question of punishment is important, but it is second, it is not the very definition of Law. The French author Carbonnier pointed out that the gendarme's "kepi" is the "Law sign", that is to say what it is recognized without hesitation, but it is not its definition.

The first issue dealt with by Law is then not so much the freedom of the person as the presence of others. How to use one's freedom and the associated deployment of forces in the presence of others? How could I not using it when I would like to harm them, or if the nuisance created for them by the use of my free strength is indifferent to me!footnote-1540 How can Law lead me to use my means for their benefit while our interests do not converge? 

We do not use our force against others because we have interest or desire, we do not give him the support of our strength while he indifferent us, because Law holds us. If the superego was not enough. If Law and the "parental function of the States" did not make alliance. We do it because we hold ourselves

Or rather we were holding ourselves.

Because today a new world has appeared: the digital world that allows everyone not to "hold" himself, that is to say to constantly abuse others, never to take them into consideration, to attack massively. It's a new experience. It is not a pathological phenomenon, as is delinquency (which simply leads to punishment), nor a structural failure in a principle otherwise admitted (which leads to regulatory remedies) but rather a new use, which would be a new rule: in the digital space, one can do anything to everyone, one is not held by anything or anyone, one can "let go" (I). This lack of "good behavior" is incompatible with the idea of ​​Law, in that Law is made for human beings and protect those who can not afford to protect themselves; that is why this general situation must be remedied  (II).

Référence complète : Cartographie AMF des marchés et des risques, in Bulletin Joly Bourse, Lextenso, n°04, 2019, p.7

Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent lire l'article via le Drive dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation & Compliance"

 It is often observed, even theorized, even advised and touted, that Compliance is a mechanism by which public authorities internalize political (eg environmental) concerns in big companies, which accept them, in Ex Ante, because they are rather in agreement with these "monumental goals" (eg saving the planet) and that this shared virtue is beneficial to their reputation. It is observed that this could be the most successful way in new configurations, such as digital.

But, and the Compliance Mechanism has often been brought closer to the contractual mechanism, this is only relevant if both parties are willing to do so. This is technically true, for example for the Deferred Prosecution, which requires explicit consent. This is true in a more general sense that the company wants to choose itself how to structure its organization to achieve the goals politically pursued by the State. Conversely, the compliance mechanisms work if the State is willing to admit the economic logic of the global private players and / or, if there are possible breaches, not to pursue its investigations and close the file it has opened, at a price more or less high.

But just say No.

As in contractual matters, the first freedom is negative and depends on the ability to say No.

The State can do it. But the company can do it too.

And Daimler just said No.

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Publicly, including through an article in the Wall Street Journal of June 28, 2019.

The company sets out in a warning to the market that it is the object of a requirement on the part of the German Motor Authority (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt)  of an allegation of fraud, by the installation of a software, aimed at misleading instruments for measuring emissions of greenhouse gases on cars using diesel.

It is therefore an environmental compliance mechanism that would have been intentionally countered.

On this allegation, the Regulator both warns the company of what it considers to be a fact, ie compliance fraud, and attaches it to an immediate measure, namely the removal of the circulation of 42,000 vehicles sold or proposed by Daimler with such a device.

And the firm answers : "No".

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Which is probably only beginning, since a No ends the dialogue of Ex Ante to project in the Ex Post sanction procedures, calls 6 observations:

• 1. No doubt Daimler, a German car manufacturing company, has it in mind in this allegation of fraud calculating pollution of its diesel cars what happened to his competitor Volkswagen: namely a multi-billion dollar fine, for lack of compliance in a similar hypothesis (so-called dieselgate). The strategic choice that is then made depends on education through the experience of the company, which benefits as such from a previous case that has had a very significant cost. Thus educated, the question is to measure the risk taken to refuse any cooperation, when the company can anticipate that it will still result in such an amount ....

• 2. In addition, we find the difficulty of the distinction of Ex Ante and Ex Post. Indeed, saying No will involve for the company a cost of confrontation with the Regulator, then the peripheral jurisdictions or review courts. But in Germany, the Government itself, concerning a bank threatened with compliance proceedings and almost summoned by the US regulator to pay "of its own free will" a transactional fine, felt that this was not normal, because it must be the judges who punish, after a contradictory procedure with due process and after established facts. 

• 3.  However, this is only an allegation, of probable assertions, of what legally allows to continue, but which does not allow to condemn. The confusion between the burden of proof, which presupposes the obligation to prove the facts before being able to sanction, and the burden of the allegation, which only supposes to articulate plausibility before being able to prosecute, is very damaging, particularly if we are committed to the principles of Repressive Law, such as the presumption of innocence and the due process. This distinction between these two probationary charges is at the heart of the probatory system in the Compliance Law. Because Compliance Law always looks for more efficiency, tends to go from the first to the second, to give the Regulator more power, since businesses are so powerful ....

• 4. But the first question then arises: what is the nature no so much of the future measure to be feared, namely a sanction that could be taken later, against Daimler, if the breach is proven, or which will not be applied to the firm if the breach is not established; but what is the nature of the measure immediately taken, namely the return of 42,000 vehicles?

• This may seem like an Ex Ante measurement. Indeed, the Compliance assumes non-polluting cars. The Regulator may have indications that these cars are polluting and that the manufacturer has not made the necessary arrangements for them to be less polluting (Compliance) or even organized so that this failure is not detected ( Compliance fraud).

• This allegation suggests that there is a risk that thiese cars will polluting. They must immediately be removed from circulation for the quality of the environment. Here and now. The question of sanctions will arise after that, having its procedural apparatus of guarantees for the company that will be pursued. But see the situation on the side of the company: having to withdraw 42,000 vehicles from the market is a great damage and what is often called in Repressive Law a "security measure" taken while the evidence is not yet met could deserve a requalification in sanction. Jurisprudence is both abundant and nuanced on this issue of qualification.

• 5. So to withdraw these cars, it is for the company to admit that it is guilty, to increase itself the punishment. And if at this game, taken from the "cost-benefit", as much for the company immediately assert to the market that this requirement of Regulation is unfounded in Law, that the alleged facts are not exacts, and that all this the judges will decide. It is sure at all whether these statements by the company are true or false, but before a Tribunal no one thinks they are true prima facie, they are only allegations.
•  And before a Court, a Regulator appears to have to bear a burden of proof in so far as he has to defend the order he has issued, to prove the breach which he asserts exists, which justifies the exercise he made of his powers. The fact that he exercises his power for the general interest and impartially does not diminish this burden of proof.

• 6. By saying "No", Daimler wants to recover this classic Law, often set aside by Compliance Law, classic Law based on burden of proof, means of proof, and prohibition of punitive measures - except imminent and future imminente and very serious damages  - before 'behavior could be sanctioned following a sanction procedure.
• Admittedly, one would be tempted to make an analogy with the current situation of Boeing whose aircraft are grounded by the Regulator in that he considers that they do not meet the conditions of safety, which the aircraft manufacturer denies , Ex Ante measurement that resembles the retraction measure of the market that constitutes the recall request of cars here operated.
• But the analogy does not work on two points. Firstly, flight activity is a regulated activity that can only be exercised with the Ex Ante authorization of several Regulators, which is not the case for offering to sell cars or to drive with. This is where Regulatory Law and Compliance Law, which often come together, here stand out.Secundly, the very possibility that planes of which it is not excluded that they are not sure is enough, as a precaution, to prohibit their shift. Here (about the cars and the measure of the pollution by them), it is not the safety of the person that is at stake, and probably not even the overall goal of the environment, but the fraud with respect to the obligation to obey Compliance. Why force the withdrawal of 42,000 vehicles? If not to punish? In an exemplary way, to remind in advance and all that it costs not to obey the Compliance? And there, the company says: "I want a judge".

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Rapport de la CNIL, Le corps, nouvel objet connecté,

Lire le rapport. 

Référence complète : Gauvain, R., Rétablir la souveraineté de la France et de l'Europe et protéger nos entreprises des lois et mesures à portée extraterritoriale, Rapport à la demande du Premier Ministre Monsieur Edouard Philippe, Assemblée nationale, juin 2019, 102 p.

Lire le Rapport.

La Chambre commerciale de la Cour de cassation a rendu un arrêt le 17 avril 2019, à propos de la société Créatis. 

Le cas est le suivant : par des emprunts divers, un couple se retrouve endetté à hauteur de 66.000 euros. Ne pouvant sans doute faire face à ce que cela représente comme charge mensuelle cumulée, ils recourent à une société qui propose un "prêt de restructuration". Lorsque celui-ci a été conçu, la situation professionnelle familiale, professionnelle et financière du couple lui laisse en disponibilités mensuelles environ 1.800 euros par mois. Un prêt de restructuration consiste à regrouper la totalité des crédits et à allonger dans le temps des remboursements, puisque le remboursement doit s'opérer désormais sur 144 mensualités, c'est-à-dire 12 ans.... Certes, la charge mensuelle tombe ainsi d'environ 2.000 euros pour le couple à environ 780 euros. Ce qui devait arriver arriva : le couple ne fît pas face aux échéances et fût poursuivi. 

Pour sa défense, les débiteurs font valeur que leur situation était caractéristique d'un "endettement excessif", puis qu’avec une mensualité de 780 euros et 3 enfants à charge, ils ne pouvaient pas rembourser et que le prêteur devait les mettre en garde sur l'inadéquation entre le prêt de restructuration proposé et leur situation, puisque la mensualité excédait le tiers de leur disponibilité et qu'ils étaient non-avertis. Or, cette mise en garde n'avait pas été faite. 

Les juges de première instance donnent raison à l'établissement de crédit qui a agi en exécution forcée mais le jugement est infirmé par la Cour d'appel de Grenoble,qui  par un arrêt du 19 septembre 2017, considère à l'inverse qu'il y a eu manquement à l'obligation de conseil, déboute l'établissement de crédit de sa demande en exécution du contrat.

La Cour de cassation casse l'arrêt des juges du fond. 

La solution est la suivante : La Chambre commerciale relève qu'un "crédit de restructuration, qui permet la reprise du passif et son rééchelonnement à des conditions moins onéreuses, sans aggraver la situation économique de l'emprunteur, ne crée pas de risque d'endettement nouveau". En conséquence de quoi, la Cour d'appel ne pouvait pas statuer ainsi. 

Les enseignements que l'on peut en tirer :  

• Cet arrêt très bref n'explicite pas davantage le motif de la cassation. 

• Est-ce à dire que toutes ces techniques proposées par des sociétés qui diffusent via tous les médias des offres quasiment miraculeuses et promettant à des personnes non-averties qu'elles sortiront ainsi de leur situation quasiment désespérée par cette solution quasiment magique qu'est le regroupement de crédit ? A lire l'arrêt de la Cour de cassation, c'est ce qu'il faut comprendre.... Le raisonnement est de nature arithmétique : puisque par nature les "conditions sont moins onéreuses", la situation du débiteur n'est pas "aggravée" et il ne peut donc pas y avoir de "risque d'endettement nouveau". Ainsi, s'il n'y a pas d'obligation de mise en garde, c'est parce qu'il n'y a pas de sujet.

• Mais est-ce à dire que la Cour d'appel avait entièrement tort ? Sans doute car s'il est vrai qu'il n'y a pas de risque "d'endettement nouveau", il y a un risque de persistance d'incapacité à rembourser. Les chiffres et la situation des débiteurs qui persisteront à l'avenir (charges familiales, loyer, alimentation requise des enfants, situation de handicap d'un parent) fait que le prêteur sait qu'ils ne pourront pas faire face à ces échéances, même diminués. De cela, ne devaient-ils pas les mettre en garde ?

• S'il l'avait fait, alors les débiteurs, conseillés par les travailleurs sociaux, n'auraient sans doute pas persisté dans une voie présentée comme une solution à leurs problèmes, alors qu'elle demeurait structurellement une impasse. Cela ne vaut pas pour tous les prêts de restructuration, mais dans le cas présent, si. Ils auraient recouru à une commission de surendettement, structure publique mise en place par la Loi et non par le marché pour ce type de situation.

• Il aurait été bénéfique que la Cour de cassation rende un arrêt d'espèce et s'exprime ainsi. Car un esprit de justice va sans doute dans ce sens-là : un principe de validité de ces pratiques de marché, car en principe cela est bénéfique pour le débiteur, sauf si dans certaines situations il passe simplement d'une incapacité de payer les échéances à une autre incapacité de payer les échéances. Et dans ce cas-là, le préteur très particulier que sont les établissements spécialisés dans le regroupement de crédit doit le mettre en garde, n'est-ce pas ? 

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In what it presents as a set of guidelines designed by a risk-driven approach, the FATF published on 21 June 2019 recommendating to fight the use of crypto-assets and cryptocurrency platforms for launderind money and financing terrorism.

This fight against money laundering is (with the fight against corruption) often presented as the core of the Compliance Law. The FATF takes a large part of it. Even if this new branch of Law aims to crystallize other ambitions, such as the fight against tax fraud or climate change, or even the promotion of diversity or education and the preservation of democratie, the legislation of Compliance Law are mature in the matter of money laundering and the terrorism financing, as they are in the fight against corruption.

The news comes then not from the new legal mechanisms but rather from the new technological tools that could allow the realization of the behaviors against which these obligations of compliance have been inserted in the legal system. It is then to these technologies that the law must adapt. This is the case with crypto-assets and cryptocurrency platforms. Because these are rapidly evolving technologies, with the exercise of written guidelines in 2019 to inform the meaning of the provisions adopted in 2018, the FATF is taking the opportunity to change the definition it provides of crypto-assets and cryptocurrencies. So that a too narrow definition by the texts does not allow the operators to escape the supervision (phenomenon of "hole in the racket" - loophole)..  

___

In fact, in October 2018, the FATC (Financial Action Task Force) developed 15 principles applying to these platforms, to allow this intergovernmental organization to carry out its general mission to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. These June 2019 recommendations are to interpret them.

In this very important document, where it is expressly stated that it is a matter of fixing the obligations of those who propose crypto-assets and crypto-currencies, the notion of self-regulation is rejected. Il est writter : "Regarding VASP (virtual assets services providers) supervision, the Guidance makes clear that only competent authorities can act as VASP supervisory or monitoring bodies!footnote-1628, and not self-regulatory bodies. They should conduct risk-based supervision or monitoring, with adequate powers, including the power to conduct inspections, compel the production of information and impose sanctions. There is a specific focus on the importance of international co-operation between supervisors, given the cross-border nature of VASPs’ activities and provision of services."

On the contrary, it is a matter of elaborating the control obligations that these service providers must exercise over products and their customers (Due Diligences), which must be supervised by public authorities. 

In order to exercise this supervision and monitoring, the national authorities themselves must ensure that they work together : "As the Virtual Assets Services Providers (VASP) sector evolves, countries should consider examining the relationship between AML/CF (Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financint) measures for covered VA activities and other regulatory and supervisory measures (e.g., consumer protection, prudential safety and soundness, network IT security, tax, etc.), as the measures taken in other fields may affect the ML/TF risks. In this regard, countries should consider undertaking short- and longer-term policy work to develop comprehensive regulatory and supervisory frameworks for covered VA activities and VASPs (as well as other obliged entities operating in the VA space) as widespread adoption of VAs continues".

After particularly interesting comparative law information on Italy, the Scandinavian countries and the United States, the report concludes: "International Co-operation is Key", because of the global nature of this activity.

Since the issue is not the global Regulation of these platforms and types of products, but only the possible modes of money laundering and terrorist financing to which they may give rise, the FATF recalls that neither crypto-products nor product suppliers are not referred to as such. As the guidance's title recalls, common to the 2018 document adopting the 15 principles and this interpretive document, these are "risk-based" rules. Thus, it is according to the situations that these - products and suppliers - that they may or may not present risks of laundering and financing of terrorism: depending on the type of transaction, the type of client, the type of country, etc. For example, from the moment that the transaction is anonymous, that is impossible to know the "beneficiary", or that it is transnational and instantaneous, which makes it difficult to supervise because of the heterogeneity of national supervisions little articulated between them.

In reports that public supervisors must have with crypto-product suppliers, they must adjust according to the level of risk presented by them, higher or lower: "Adjusting the type of AML/CFT supervision or monitoring: supervisors should employ both offsite and onsite access to all relevant risk and compliance information.However, to the extent permitted by their regime, supervisors can determine the correct mix of offsite and onsite supervision or monitoring of Virtual Assets Services Providers (VASPs). Offsite supervision alone may not be appropriate in higher risk situations. However, where supervisory findings in previous examinations (either offsite or onsite) suggest a low risk for ML/TF, resources can be allocated to focus on higher risk VASPs. In that case, lower risk VASPs could be supervised offsite, for example through transaction analysis and questionnaires".

This "adjustment" required does not prevent a very broad conception of the power of supervision. So, for nothing escapes the recommendations (and in particular the obligations that ensue for the suppliers of these products), the definition of the crypo-assets and crypo-currencies is this one: “Virtual asset” as a digital representation of value that can be digitally traded or transferred and can be used for payment or investment purposes. Virtual assets do not include digital representations of fiat currencies, securities, and other financial assets that are already covered elsewhere in the FATF Recommendations."

And for the same reason of effectiveness is posited the principle of technological neutrality: "Whether a natural or legal person engaged in Virtual Assets (VA) activities is a Virtual Asset Services Provider (VASP) depends on how the person uses the VA and for whose benefit. As emphasized above, ...  then they are a VASP, regardless of what technology they use to conduct the covered VA activities. Moreover, they are a VASP, whether they use a decentralized or centralized platform, smart contract, or some other mechanism.".

The interpretative guidelines then formulate the obligations that these platforms have with regard to the supervisors they obey(question of the "jurisdiction", ratione loci ; ratione materiae): " The Guidance explains how these obligations should be fulfilled in a VA context and provides clarifications regarding the specific requirements applicable regarding the USD/EUR 1 000 threshold for virtual assets occasional transactions, above which VASPs must conduct customer due diligence (Recommendation 10); and the obligation to obtain, hold, and transmit required originator and beneficiary information, immediately and securely, when conducting VA transfers (Recommendation 16). As the guidance makes clear, relevant authorities should co-ordinate to ensure this can be done in a way that is compatible with national data protection and privacy rules. ".

These platforms are not uniformly defined due to the diversity of their activities. Because it is their activity that makes them responsible for this or that regulator. For example from the Central Bank or the Financial Regulator: "For example, a number of online platforms that provide a mechanism for trading assets, including VAs offered and sold in ICOs, may meet the definition of an exchange and/or a security-related entity dealing in VAs that are “securities” under various jurisdictions’ national legal frameworks. Other jurisdictions may have a different approach which may include payment tokens. The relevant competent authorities in jurisdictions should therefore strive to apply a functional approach that takes into account the relevant facts and circumstances of the platform, assets, and activity involved, among other factors, in determining whether the entity meets the definition of an “exchange”!footnote-1626 or other obliged entity (such as a securities-related entity) under their national legal framework and whether an entity falls within a particular definition. In reaching a determination, countries and competent authorities should consider the activities and functions that the entity in question performs, regardless of the technology associated with the activity or used by the entity".

____

Reading this very important document, it is possible to make 6 observations: 

1. Interpretative documents are often more important than rules interpretated themselves. En these guidances, first and foremost, these are major obligations that are stated, not only for platforms but also for national laws, and well beyond the issue of money laundering. So, it is laid: "Countries should designate one or more authorities that have responsibility for licensing and/or registering VASPs. ...  at a minimum, VASPs should be required to be licensed or registered in the jurisdiction(s) where they are created. ".This is a general prescription, involving a general regulation of these platform, which registered in a general way, will probably be supervised in a general way.

Secondly, it is a series of binding measures that is required of the National legal systems, for example the possibility of seizing crypto-values.

It shows that the soft Law illustrates the continuum of the texts, and allows their evolution. Here the evolution of the definition of the object itself: the definition of crypto-assets and crypto-currencies is widened, so that the techniques of money laundering and terrorist financing are always countered, without it being necessary to adopt new binding rules. We are beyond mere interpretation. And even more of the principle of restrictive interpretation, classically attached to the Repressive Law ...

2. Fort the effectiveness of the Compliance Law, definition become extremely broad. Thus, to follow the FATF, the definititon off a financial institution is as follows: "“Financial institution” as any natural or legal person who conducts as a business one or more of several specified activities or operations for or on behalf of a customer". This is more the definition of a company in Competition Law!footnote-1627....Why ? Because otherwise, an operator finds a status allowing him to escape the category and obligations listed. The principle of efficiency implies it. The principle of "legality", derived from criminal law, has hardly any existence. But this also corresponds to the general evolution of the financial world, in which one no longer stars from the organ (for example to be a"bank") but of activity, but from an activity or a fonction whose metamorphoses are so rapid that it is almost impossible to define them ....

3. In the same way, the definition of crypto-assets or crypto-currencies: "“Virtual asset” as a digital representation of value that can be digitally traded or transferred and can be used for payment or investment purposes. Virtual assets do not include digital representations of fiat currencies, securities, and other financial assets that are already covered elsewhere in the FATF Recommendations". This definition is purely operational because nothing can escape the FATF: all that is financial or monetary, whatever its form or support, its traditional form or a form that will be invented tomorrow, is within its competence and, through a such definition, is under national supervisors. In Compliance Law, and since everything is based on risk analysis, the idea is simple: nothing must escape obligations and supervision.

4. Platform apprehension is done by the criterion of activity, according to the "functional" method. Thus, its supervision, or even its regulation, and its obligations of compliance, will apply, depending on what it does, to the Financial Regulator (if it does ICO) or to others if it only uses tokens as an instrument of exchange. If it makes several uses, then it would fall under several Regulators (criterion ratione materiae).

5. The principle of "technological neutrality" is a classic principle in Telecommunications Law. Here we measure the interference between the principles of Telecommunications Law and Financial Law, which is logical because crypto-financial objects are born of digital technology. This neutrality allows both technological innovation to develop and supervision to be unhindered for not having foreseen an innovative technology appearing after the adoption of the legal text. Here again, the effectiveness of Compliance and risk management are served, without the innovation being thwarted, which is often opposed.

6. What is expected of national public authorities is a very wide "interregulation". This is both "positive". Indeed, this includes financial matters but also the security of networks, or the protection of consumers. It can be called equilibrium interregulation in that all goals converge. But this is also an "interregulation" that can be described as balance. Indeed, the FATF is concerned about the protection of personal data. However, it emphasizes that the effectiveness of the Compliance system must stop. But the protection of personal data is also a part of Compliance Law.... This is one of the major challenges in the future: the balance between security and the fight against global evils(here the fight against money laundering and terrorism) and the protection of the privacy of individuals, as both fall under Compliance, but both have opposite legal effects: one the transmission of information, and the other the secret of the information. 

____

The European Banking Union is based on supervision as much as on regulation: it concerns the operators as much as the structures of the sector, because the operators "hold" the sector.

This is why the "regulator - supervisor" holds the operators by the supervision and is close to them.

He meets them officially and in "soft law" relations. This is all the more necessary since the distinction between the Ex Ante and the Ex Post must be nuanced, in that its application is too rigid, in that it involves a long time (first of all the rules, then to apply them, then to notice a gap between rules and behaviors, then to repair it) is not appropriate if the system aims at the prevention of systemic crises, whose source is inside the operators.

This is why the body in charge of solving the difficulties of the systemic banks for the salvation of the systeme meets the banking sector itself, to ensure that they are permanently "resolvable", so that the hypothesis of their resolution never arises. This is the challenge of this system: that it is always ready, for never be applying.

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In the European Banking Union, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) is in charge of "resolve" the difficulties of European systemic banks in difficulty. It is the public body of the second pillar of the Banking Union. The first pillar is the prevention of these difficulties and the third is the guarantee of deposits. The resolution is therefore more like an Ex Post mechanism.

But in this continuum through these three pillars between the Ex Ante and the Ex Post, the SRB does not wait passively - as would a traditional judge do - that the file of the troubled bank reaches it. Like a supervisor - which brings it closer to the first public in the system (Single Supervisory Board -SSB), which supervises all the banks, it is in direct contact with all the banks, and it approaches the hypothesis of a bank in trouble by a systemic perspective: it is therefore to the entire banking system that the SRB addresses itself.

As such, it organizes meetings, where he is located: in Brussels.

Thus, on June 18, 2019, all banks came to discuss with the Single Resolution Board to know what it wants from the banks and for the banks, in what is called a "dialogue meeting".

To resolve in Ex Post the difficulties of a bank, it has to present a quality (a little known concept in Bankruptcy Law): "resolvability". How build it? Who build it ? In its very design and in its application, bank by bank.

For the resolution body vis-à-vis all players in the banking and financial sector, it's clear: "Working together" is crucial in building resolvability ".

In the projection that is made, it is affirmed that there can be a successful resolution only if the operator in difficulty is not deprived of access to what makes to stay it alive, that is to say the banking and financial system itself, and more specifically the "Financial Market Infrastructures", for example payment services.

Does the Single Resolution Board expect spontaneous commitments from the FMIs for such a "right of access"? In this case, as the Single Resolution Board says, this right of access corresponds to "critical functions" for a bank, the resolution situation can not justify the closure of the service.

By nature, these crucial operators are entities that report to regulators who oversee them. Who enforces - and immediately - this right of access? When one can think that it is everyone, it risks being nobody .... That is why the resolution body, relaying in this a concern of the Financial Stability Board, underlines that it is necessary to articulate the supervisors, regulators and "resolvers" between them.

_____

To read this program, since it is a proposed program of work for the banking sector, four observations can be made:

1. We are moving more and more towards a general "intermaillage" (which will perhaps replace the absence of a global State, but it is an similar nature because it is always to public authorities that it refers and not to self-regulation);

2. But as there is no political authority to keep these guardians, the entities that articulate all these various public structures, with different functions, located in different countries, acting according to different temporalities, these are the companies themselves that internalize the concern that animates those who built the system: here the prevention of systemic risk. This is the definition of Compliance, which brings back to companies, here more clearly those those which manage the Market Infrastructures, the obligations of Compliance (here the management of systemic risk through the obligation of giving access).

3. Even without a  single systemic guard, there is always a recourse. That will be the judge. There are already many, there will probably be more in a system of this type, more and more complex, the articulation of disputes is sometimes called "dialogue". And it is undoubtedly "decisions of principle" that will set the principles common to all of these particular organisms.

4. We then see the emergence of Ex Ante mechanisms for the solidity of the systems, and the solidity of the players in the systems, and then the Ex Post resolution of the difficulties of the actors according to access to the solidity of the infrastructures of these systems, which ultimately depend on judges (throughout the West) facing areas where all of this depends much less on the judge: the rest of the world.

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Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Analyse des blockchains au regard des usages qu'elles peuvent remplir et des fonctions que les officiers ministériels doivent assurer, in Revue Défrenois, Lextenso, n°25, 20 juin 2019, pp. 23-29.

Résumé : La blockchain est une technologie qui n'est pas, en soir, bonne ou mauvaise. Elle est plus ou moins adaptée aux fonctions qu'elle est apte à remplir. Ce qu'il faut ensuite confronter aux fonctions que l'État a dévolues aux officiers ministériels. Or, autant les fonctions de conservation et de duplication des actes gagnent à être transférées et développées dans cette technologie, autant la fonction d'élaboration des instrumentums ne peut être assumée que par des officiers ministériels auxquels l'État demande de vérifier la correspondance entre les mentions des instrumentums et la réalité des négotiums, ce que seuls des êtres humains peuvent mener et ce qu'aucune machine ne peut faire.

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Lire le document de travail ayant servi de base à l'article publié, document de travail bilingue comprenant des notes de bas de page, des références techniques et de liens hypertextes.

As the previous cycles devoted to the general theme of Compliance and aiming to build a "Compliance Law", having the same vocation to be published in the series Regulation & Compliance, co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Editions Dalloz, this cycle takes a particular aspect of this branch of the Law being built and developed, which was applied even before being conceived. Since pragmatism preceded or even prevailed, the theme chosen this year is: Les outils de la Compliance (Compliance Tools).

These conferences will be in French

These tools are very diverse, not only among themselves but according to the sectors in which they are deployed or according to the geographical areas in which they are applied. It is necessary to apprehend them by going beyond the description of the instrument literally shown, as the texts or the promoters show it, without immediately going up to too large  generalities. For this reason, some conferences will focus on specific, well-identified mechanisms, such as risk mapping or alert. They may also consider how Compliance Law uses more general tools to achieve its goals, such as lawsuits, incentives or new technologies. This will make it possible to problematize more clearly perceptible difficulties in Compliance  Law, such as the adequacy or inadequacy of the constraint in relation to the aims, the consideration or not of the legal and political geography, the articulation or not of the tools between them.

These various conferences will take place in several places, according to the part taken by the different university structures that this year contribute to the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) for the realization of the cycle. The result will be two books, one in French: Les outils de la Compliance, the other in English: Compliance Tools.

This cycle of conferences about Compliance tools will begin in November 2019 and will last until June 2020.

• First conference: 28 November 2019, La cartographie des risques (Risk Mapping), Sciences po. This conference will be in French. Its publication will be in French and in English.
• Conditions of inscription (in French). 
• Calendar of the entire conferences.

Le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) works with : 

• The School of Public Affairs of Sciences Po,
• The Department of Economics of Sciences po,
• The  École de Droit of the Panthéon-Sorbonne University (Paris I),
• The École doctorale de Droit privé of Panthéon-Assas University (Paris 2),
• The Centre Perelman of l'Université Libre de Bruxelles,
• The GREDEG of the Sophia-Antipolis University (Nice),
• The Centre Louis Josserand of the Faculté Lyon III.
• The Faculté de Droit of Toulouse,
• TheFaculté de Droit of Clermont-Ferrand.

This cycle of conferences is supported by :

• The Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie de Paris.
• The Ecole de Formation du Barreau de Paris. 

Full reference: Fabre-Magnan, M., La responsabilité du fait du cocontractant. Une figure juridique pour la RSE, in Liber amicorum en hommage à Pierre Rodière. Droit social international et européen en mouvement, Coll. Mélanges, LGDJ-Lextenso, 2019, pp. 79-90

Sciences Po's students can read the article via Sciences Po's Drive in the folder MAFR - Régulation & Compliance

Le 5 juin 2019, Youtube a informé via son "blog officiel" (Official YouTube Blog) le renforcement de sa politique pour atteindre la lutte contre les contenus de haine, en raison de leur responsabilité sociale : we need "to live up to our responsability and protect the YouTube community from harmfum content".

Le slug du billet de blog "officiel" est plus clair encore : our-ongoing-work-to-tackle-hate.html.

On ne peut qu'être favorable à cette politique dans son principe, et ce d'autant plus qu'en ce qui concerne l'Europe ce sont les Autorités publiques, la jurisprudence et bientôt la Loi en ce qui concerne la France, qui exigent des opérateurs numériques cruciaux l'adoption d'une telle politique!footnote-1615. 

Le "billet officiel" prend deux cas et deux exemples : le premier porte sur la déinformation et l'affirmation que la terre est plate, le second porte sur l'incitation à la haine et la promotion du nazisme. Sur celui-ci, le "billet officiel" le fait en ces termes :

"Today, we're taking another step in our hate speech policy by specifically prohibiting videos alleging that a group is superior in order to justify discrimination, segregation or exclusion based on qualities like age, gender, race, caste, religion, sexual orientation or veteran status. This would include, for example, videos that promote or glorify Nazi ideology, which is inherently discriminatory. Finally, we will remove content denying that well-documented violent events, like the Holocaust or the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary, took place.

We recognize some of this content has value to researchers and NGOs looking to understand hate in order to combat it, and we are exploring options to make it available to them in the future. And as always, context matters, so some videos could remain up because they discuss topics like pending legislation, aim to condemn or expose hate, or provide analysis of current events. We will begin enforcing this updated policy today; however, it will take time for our systems to fully ramp up and we’ll be gradually expanding coverage over the next several months.

Le 6 juin, un journaliste s'en inquiète en affirmant qu'avec une telle politique le film Le triomphe de la volonté, en ce qu'elle met en scène le nazisme et constitue un film de propagande de ce mouvement est donc condamné à disparaître de l'espace numérique. 

Il titre son article : "YouTube Pulls ‘Triumph of the Will’ For Violating New Hate Speech Policy".

Il proteste en disant que dans toutes les universités le film a été montré pour souligner à quel point le cinéma peut être un médium en politique : "Riefensahl's harrowing depiction of the Nuremberg Rallies remains an essential loof at the ideological power of the moving image, and how it can be co-opted on a mass scale" ; "the movie also illuminates how a nation can filter its own realities through recorded media". 

Il soutient qu'à ce compte les films d'Eistenstein, Potemkin, devrait être retiré, ce qu'il n'est pas, et soutient que cela devrait aussi le cas pour Naissance d'une Nation de Griffith, qui ne l'est pas davantage. 

Découvrant dans une chaine que Youtube diffuse au titre des "archives historiques", une prise de position est prise sur le caractère inadmissible du "Triomphe de volonté", il estime que le retrait de ce film-là est donc le reflet d'une prise de position qui n'est pas neutre.

Il conclut son article de la façon suivante : "It raises major issues surrounding the platform's capacity as a historical archive, and how much viewers can be trusted to do some of the legwork on their own. These are the challenges that no algorithmes can solve.".

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Pourtant effectivement, le film est désormais indisponible sur Youtube, l'internaute ne trouvant que le message suivant (dans la langue que son adresse IP suppose être la suivante : "Cette vidéo a été supprimée, car elle ne respectait pas le règlement de YouTube concernant les contenus incitant à la haine. Découvrez comment lutter contre l'incitation à la haine dans votre pays.". Il est possible en cliquant sur "En savoir plus".

En cliquant, l'on arrive à un document de "Règles concernant l'incitation à la haine".  Il s'adresse aux personnes qui mettent des contenus, les prévient de ce qui sera supprimé par Youtube et pourquoi, donne des exemple. Signale que cela résulte des mesures supplémentaires adoptées par YouTube le 5 juin. Renvoie par click  à ce document. L'internaute arrive au document précité en anglais du "blog officiel".

Qu'en penser en Droit ?

Lire ci-dessous.

Référence complète : Thierache, C., RGPD vs Cloud Act : le nouveau cadre légal américain est-il anti-RGPD ?, in La Revue juridique Dalloz IP/IT,  n°6, 2019, p.367

Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent lire l'article via le Drive dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation & Compliance"