May 15, 2021
Publications
Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A. Place and Role of Companies in the Creation and Effectiveness of Compliance Law in Crisis, Working Paper, May 2021.
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This Working Paper has been elaborated as basis for a conference in the colloquium of Mai 17, 2021 (done in French: Normes publiques et Compliance en temps de crise : les buts monumentaux à l'épreuve.
This video is made with English substitutes.
It is also the basis for an article in the book Compliance Monumental Goals, the English version of which is co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant.
Summary: This article has a very topic: the place of private Companies, with regard to the chapter's issue: "the ordeal of a crisis". The crisis constitutes a "test", that is to say, it brings evidence. Let us take it as such.
Indeed, during the health crisis, it appears that Companies have helped the Public Authorities to resist the shock, to endure and to get out of the Crisis. They did so by force, but they also took initiatives in this direction. From this too, we must learn lessons for the next crisis that will come. It is possible that this has already started in the form of another global and systemic crisis: the environmental crisis. In view of what we have been able to observe and the evolution of the Law, of the standards adopted by the Authorities but also by the new case law, what can we expect from Companies in the face of this next Crisis, willingly and strength
Lire ci-dessous les développements.
April 27, 2021
Law by Illustrations
Academics did a study on how people who work in investment banks kill themselves on the job.
The death of a 21-year-old intern, having worked three days without sleeping, in the Goldman Sachs bank, the testimonies of young people explaining that they work non-stop, undoubtedly contributed to testimonies, relayed in the press, specialized or generalist, but also university studies.
Indeed, two academics published a research no longer on the rules applicable within investment banks, which took measures to force their employees and their interns (since the victim was an intern) to rest on Sundays but on journeys based on data accessible by taxi companies.
As a result, the reaction of the people was not to rest: it was to increase the daily working time, to leave even later after dark.
Research shows that this phenomenon increases during the summer, that is to say precisely when the people who work are more trainees, that is to say those who want to "prove themselves": As the authors say: "Cette analyse, menée avec mon ex-collègue de doctorat de la Aalto University School of Business (Finlande), montre que, lorsque les banques ont mis en place des politiques de travail sans samedi, cela a incité les employés à travailler tard le soir en semaine pour compenser. Ces résultats sont plus marqués pendant les semaines de stages d’été, lorsque les banques d’investissement emploient un grand nombre d’étudiants désireux de faire leurs preuves en travaillant dur." (“This analysis, conducted with my ex-doctoral colleague from Aalto University School of Business (Finland), shows that when banks implemented work policies without Saturday, it prompted employees to work late nights on weekdays to compensate. These results are most marked during the summer internship weeks, when investment banks employ large numbers of students eager to prove themselves by working hard. ")
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Let's go back to the Industry series.
An expert has shown all the points on which it does not correspond to "reality", on such and such a point.
The cinema is reality — not even in the reconstitution of such or such a point, it reproduces it by throwing on the screen what is the idea which moves in the facts.
This series begins with the death of a trader, who died of work.
It tells exactly the life, how to qualify it ..., let's say "the crazy life" of those who work there.
It is hardly bearable to watch.
In any case, it is exactly the image of what these two academics are saying.
April 21, 2021
Publications
► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Résoudre la contradiction entre "sanction" et "incitation" sous le feu du Droit de la Compliance" ("Resolving the contradiction between "sanction" and "incentive" under the fire of Compliance Law"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 89-98
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📝read the article (in French)
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🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with more developments, technical references and hyperlinks
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📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published
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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation and Compliance): Compliance and Incentives appear at first glance to be totally opposite. For two major reasons. Firstly, because sanctions have a central place in Compliance Law and that the incentives suppose an absence of constraint on the operators. Secondly, because the incentives are linked to self-regulation and that Compliance Law assumes a strong presence of public authorities. Thus, one should choose: either Compliance or Incentives! Either the effectiveness of one or the effectiveness of the others; either the techniques of one, or the techniques of others; either the philosophy of one or the philosophy of the other. Resign oneself to the waste that such a necessary choice would imply. But to put the terms in this way amounts to thinking poorly about the situations and reducing the fields of the solutions they call for. If we take a rich definition of Compliance Law, we can on the contrary articulate Compliance and Incentives. From this perspective, sanctions can no longer become what blocks the use of incentives but, on the contrary, what constitutes them. Even more, the coupling between the Incentives and the requirements of Compliance Law must be strongly encouraged, as soon as the public authorities supervise in Ex Ante all the initiatives taken by the "crucial operators".
This article deals with the first issue. Indeed, the so-called incentive theory targets mechanisms which do not directly resort to constraint. They would therefore have little place in Compliance Law. But it seems saturated with sanction procedures. We can even say that it seems to put them at the center, the public authorities presenting the number of sanctions as a sign of success, while the companies seem obsessed with their prospects, the two concerns ending in such a strange convergence that are the Convention Judiciaire d'Intérêt Public (non-prosecution agreement).
The honest observer cannot help but be immediately uneasy. Indeed, it can only raise the definition of the sanction as a "constraint" triggered Ex Post, at the very heart of a Compliance Law which is presented as a set of Ex Ante mechanisms. Based on this contradiction in terms, should we give up the association and think that it would be wrong against the spirit to think of the sanction as an incentive?
It is undoubtedly in this connection that one perceives most clearly the clash of two cultures, which do not communicate, while technically they apply to the same situations. Indeed, because Compliance was designed by Finance, everything is a tool for it. Therefore, the tendency to think of the sanction only as an incentive is very strong in Compliance Law, manifests itself continuously and will not stop (I). But whatever the reasons for conceiving it this way, the principles of the rule of law cannot disappear and if we do not want them to be erased, then they must be articulated (II). This is an essential game (II).
This is why we can literally say that Compliance has set Criminal Law on fire by its conception, logical but closed in on itself, of sanctions as simple incentives. In order for Law to remain, however, we must hold a very firm definition of Compliance Law centered on its Monumental Goal, which is the protection of the person.
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April 21, 2021
Publications
► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Décrire, concevoir et corréler les outils de la Compliance, pour en faire un usage adéquat" ("Describing, conceiving and correlating Compliance Tools, in order to use them adequately"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. Régulations & Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 3-24.
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📝read the article (in French)
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📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published
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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The article is the general introduction to the book on Compliance tools. In its first part it develops the overall problematic. In its second part, it presents each of the contributions, placed in the overall construction of the work.
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April 21, 2021
Publications
► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Dresser des cartographies des risques comme obligation et le paradoxe des "risques de conformité"" ("Drawing up risk maps as an obligation and the paradoxe of the "compliance risks""), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 53-62.
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📝read the article (in French)
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🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks
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📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published
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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): There are few synthetic or theoretical studies on Risk Mapping even though it is in fact the Compliance central tool, perhaps because it is more a management tool than a legal one. Risk Mapping is often described but does not receive any other legal qualifications than being a "modality", suffering in this respect from an evil which affects the whole of Compliance, still little understood by Law, attention often so focused on the Ex Post (sanctions) while Compliance is by nature in the Ex Ante. Going from disarray to incomprehension, everyone can note the existence of "compliance risks" among the mapped risks, because if as so many affirm that it would be necessary to speak only of simple conformity as obedience, demonstrated in Ex Ante, to Law, how a sub-set of a tool would therefore have the same object as the set of Law that this tool serves ... This aporia can only be resolved if Compliance Law is defined substantially by its "monumental goals" which exceed obedience to regulations.
Consequently, Law taking up Risk Mapping, this mechanism may first appear as an ancillary obligation to the main obligation consisting in achieving "monumental goals". The ancillary obligation to draw up the maps is an obligation of result, while the main obligation to achieve the monumental goals is an obligation of means. These cartographies being very diverse and being only occasionally targeted by specific laws, it can also constitute only a legal fact or, through the play of various charters, a unilateral legal commitment. But it isnbecoming the basis of an autonomous legal obligation incumbent on enterprises in position to know certain risks, obligation referring to the existence of a subjective right tof knowing and measuring them ("right to be worried") which the third parties who are going to run them would hold, thus allowing them to choose to run them, or not.
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April 21, 2021
Publications
► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Compliance et incitations: un couple à propulser " ("Compliance and incentives : a promising tandem"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 123-130.
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📝read the article (in French)
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🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with more developments, technical references and hypertext links
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📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published
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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation and Compliance): The theory of incentives targets the mechanisms which do not use directly constraint (except to present sanctions themselves as incentives) but which leads nevertheless to expected behaviors. To appreciate the links which must or must not be done between incentives and Compliance, we should proceed in two times.
First, the association appears natural between incentive mechanisms and "Compliance Law" since the later is defined in a dynamic way. Indeed, if it is defined placing its legal normativity in its "monumental goals", as the end of corruption, the detection of money laundering in order to underlying criminality disappears, or as the effective protection of environment or the concrete care of human beings, then what matters is not the means in themselves but the effective tension towards these "monumental goals". In this perspective, what was related to public policies led by States, because they are definitively not able to do it, the charge is internalized in the firms which are able to tend towards this goals: "crucial operators" because they have the geographical, technological, informational and financial means.
In this perspective, the internalization of public willingness provoking a split with the concept of State linked to a territory which deprives Politics of its constraint power, incentive mechanisms appear as the most efficient mean to reach these monumental goals. They appear as this "natural" mean both negatively and positively defined. Negatively in which they do not need in Ex Ante institutional localizable sources and sanction power in Ex Post: it is enough to substitute the interest to obligation. Positively, incentives relay through operators' strategies what was the so critical and joked form of public action: the "plan". The duration is thus injected thanks to Compliance mechanisms, as we can see it through the development of it in the care for environment ("plan climat") or through the educational mechanism, which could be conceived only in duration.
However, the opposition seems radical between Compliance Law and Incentives. And this because of three convictions often developed and that we have to overcome. First, the idea that in a general way, there would be a Law only if there is a mechanism of immediate constraint which is associated to the norm. As long as the incentive is not based on obligation, then it will be nothing... Secondly, and as if that were a kind of consolation ..., Compliance would not be really Law either ... We so often say that it is only about a methodology, a range of processes without sense, procedures to follow without trying to understand, process that algorithms integrate in a mechanic without end and without sense or that on the contrary, Compliance would be full of sense by Ethics and Morality, which are far from Law. While incentives talk to the human spirit which calculate, Compliance would be so a process through which machines will be connected to other machines, so an extra soul, where calculation has no place... Thirdly, solutions would be to be find in Competition Law because it can do without States, submit them and approach what is a-sectorial, especially finance and digital, the world being financialized and digitalized. The violence of Competition Law which comes in Ex Ante thanks to "Compliance sanctions" applying for example to essential infrastructures Law, by continuing to deny the salience of the duration and taking care of the "market power" would be also not compatible with a marriage with incentive mechanisms which rely on duration and power of those to which it is applied, converging towards goals, which are set by what Competition Law ignores: the project. This project which pretends to build the future is the one of politics and of companies, which use their deployed power in time to concretize it. It is without any doubt there that the future of Europe is.
To overcome this triple difficulty, it is thus necessary, in a second time, to modify our conception of Law, especially thanks to Compliance Law, in which this new branch is autonomous from Competition Law, and even sometimes opposed to it, in order to the insertion of incentive mechanisms permit to unknown or against Competition Law organizations to reach "monumental goals" which are imperative to take into consideration. For example, the taking into consideration of climate challenges or the building of a sovereign identity of the data. This is expressly set by European Commission which supervises such initiatives, supervision being what is articulated with Compliance, in a couple that go beyond Regulation, and replaces in Ex Ante Competition Law, salient branch for Ex Post. All the texts which are in the process of expressing it are based on this reformed couple: Compliance and Incentive.
This couple supposes that we recognize as such the existence of companies as project carriers, project which is the creation of marketed wealth circulating on a market, which could be an industrial project specific to a geographical zone both economical and political. Regulation is deployed to go away from the notion of sector and to transform itself in supervision of crucial firms in the correspondance between the project and the action, what refers to the notion of "plan". In this, banking supervision is just the advanced bastion of all thematic, energetic, climatic and health plans, or more broadly industrial and technological that could by incentive be implemented, this conception of Compliance permitting to build zones which are not reduced to immediate market exchange. The incentive corresponds to the fact that Compliance Law relies on the power of the firm to reach its own political goals, for example fighting against disinformation in the digital space or obtaining a healthy environnement. This supposes that Compliance stops to be only conceived as a model of rules effectivity, for example of Competition Law, to be recognized as a substantial branch of Law. A branch which expresses political goals. A branch which is anchored in crucial firms whose it recognizes the autonomy with regards to markets. This makes it possible, in particular through the coupling with incentive mechanisms leading to long-term collaborative operations supervised by public authorities, not to be governed by simple Competition Law, inapt to bring projects to fruition.
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April 21, 2021
Publications
► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Les droits subjectifs, outils premiers et naturels du Droit de la Compliance" ("Rights, primary and natural Compliance Tools"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 301-323.
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📝read the article (in French)
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🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks
____
📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published
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► Summary of this article (done by the Journal of Regulation and Compliance): In the traditional conception of the architecture of the sectors regulated by Law, and in Compliance Law which extends the regulatory techniques, rights have little place. But this configuration no longer takes place; on the contrary, rights are at the center of Regulatory and Compliance systems, and will be more and more so. They are and will be the primary tools of Compliance Law because they constitute a very effective "tool" to ensure the entire functioning of a system whose goals are so difficult to achieve. Because every effort must be done to achieve these goals, the public authorities not only rely on the power of crucial operators, but also distribute prerogatives to people and organizations who, thus encouraged, activate the Compliance system and participate in the achievement of the "monumental goal". Rights can prove to be the most effective tools for actually achieving the goals set, so much so that they can be seen as "primary tools".
But it is pertinent to have more pretension and to conceive rights as the most "natural" tools of Compliance Law. Indeed because all the Monumental Goals by which Compliance Law is defined can be expressed by the protection of persons, that is to say to the effectiveness of their prerogatives, by a mirror effect between rights. given as tools by Law by to persons and rights which constitute the very goal of all Compliance Law, in particular the protection of all human beings, even if they are in a situation of great weakness, rights becoming a "natural tool" of Compliance Law.
We are only at the beginning of their deployment and it is undoubtedly on them that Digital space in which we now live would be regulated, so that we will not suffocated there and that it will constitute for people a civilized space.
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April 21, 2021
Publications
General reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, series "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) & Dalloz, 2021.
In parallel, the book is published in an English version Compliance Tools, co-edited by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant.
This book follows a cycle of conferences organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance and by its partner universities.
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See the collection Regulation & Compliance in which the book has been published.
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General presentation of the book : The political dimension of Compliance Law resides in the monumental goals that it aims for and which define it. These goals are internalized in "crucial operators", who willingly or by force must structure themselves and act to achieve "monumental goals", as set by public authorities and which may coincide with the interests of the enterprise. This one designs and controls the Ex Ante reorganization that this implies, under the public authorities supervision. Enterprises, even if their activities are not regulated, thus become transparent and must show the Compliance Tools effectively deployed to effectively achieve these goals. It is a major transformation of economic life in all countries because the Compliance Tools are adopted everywhere and have a global effect.
These appear to be very diverse but their unity is profound and bringing it out has the practical benefit of producing a legal regime that is as unified as possible, while allowing their adaptation country by country, sector by sector, enterprise by enterprise.
This book aims to understand these Compliance Tools to better anticipate the assessment that will be made by Regulators, Supervisors and Courts, as well as the new conceptions of the authors of legal texts which impose new ones every day, while companies must also imagine the most appropriate Compliance Tools.
This collective work specifically apprehends those on which we have few studies when we handle them on a daily basis, such as risk mapping or training or rights, letting more familiar tools shine through more transversal contributions, such as compliance programs, sanctions, whistleblowing or many sorts of settlements, agreements of public interest.
A first chapter takes a legal and economic approach. A second chapter emphasizes the role of risk mapping. A third chapter draws the game of incentives. A fourth chapter identifies the expertise required. A fifth chapter insists on geographic significance. A sixth chapter details the measurement of effectiveness. A seventh chapter explores training. The eighth chapter examines technological tools. The concluding article leads to rights.
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Read the presentations of the articles of the book :
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