April 21, 2021
Publications
► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Dresser des cartographies des risques comme obligation et le paradoxe des "risques de conformité"" ("Drawing up risk maps as an obligation and the paradoxe of the "compliance risks""), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 53-62.
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📝read the article (in French)
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🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks
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📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published
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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): There are few synthetic or theoretical studies on Risk Mapping even though it is in fact the Compliance central tool, perhaps because it is more a management tool than a legal one. Risk Mapping is often described but does not receive any other legal qualifications than being a "modality", suffering in this respect from an evil which affects the whole of Compliance, still little understood by Law, attention often so focused on the Ex Post (sanctions) while Compliance is by nature in the Ex Ante. Going from disarray to incomprehension, everyone can note the existence of "compliance risks" among the mapped risks, because if as so many affirm that it would be necessary to speak only of simple conformity as obedience, demonstrated in Ex Ante, to Law, how a sub-set of a tool would therefore have the same object as the set of Law that this tool serves ... This aporia can only be resolved if Compliance Law is defined substantially by its "monumental goals" which exceed obedience to regulations.
Consequently, Law taking up Risk Mapping, this mechanism may first appear as an ancillary obligation to the main obligation consisting in achieving "monumental goals". The ancillary obligation to draw up the maps is an obligation of result, while the main obligation to achieve the monumental goals is an obligation of means. These cartographies being very diverse and being only occasionally targeted by specific laws, it can also constitute only a legal fact or, through the play of various charters, a unilateral legal commitment. But it isnbecoming the basis of an autonomous legal obligation incumbent on enterprises in position to know certain risks, obligation referring to the existence of a subjective right tof knowing and measuring them ("right to be worried") which the third parties who are going to run them would hold, thus allowing them to choose to run them, or not.
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April 21, 2021
Publications
► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Compliance et incitations: un couple à propulser " ("Compliance and incentives : a promising tandem"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 123-130.
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📝read the article (in French)
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🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with more developments, technical references and hypertext links
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📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published
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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation and Compliance): The theory of incentives targets the mechanisms which do not use directly constraint (except to present sanctions themselves as incentives) but which leads nevertheless to expected behaviors. To appreciate the links which must or must not be done between incentives and Compliance, we should proceed in two times.
First, the association appears natural between incentive mechanisms and "Compliance Law" since the later is defined in a dynamic way. Indeed, if it is defined placing its legal normativity in its "monumental goals", as the end of corruption, the detection of money laundering in order to underlying criminality disappears, or as the effective protection of environment or the concrete care of human beings, then what matters is not the means in themselves but the effective tension towards these "monumental goals". In this perspective, what was related to public policies led by States, because they are definitively not able to do it, the charge is internalized in the firms which are able to tend towards this goals: "crucial operators" because they have the geographical, technological, informational and financial means.
In this perspective, the internalization of public willingness provoking a split with the concept of State linked to a territory which deprives Politics of its constraint power, incentive mechanisms appear as the most efficient mean to reach these monumental goals. They appear as this "natural" mean both negatively and positively defined. Negatively in which they do not need in Ex Ante institutional localizable sources and sanction power in Ex Post: it is enough to substitute the interest to obligation. Positively, incentives relay through operators' strategies what was the so critical and joked form of public action: the "plan". The duration is thus injected thanks to Compliance mechanisms, as we can see it through the development of it in the care for environment ("plan climat") or through the educational mechanism, which could be conceived only in duration.
However, the opposition seems radical between Compliance Law and Incentives. And this because of three convictions often developed and that we have to overcome. First, the idea that in a general way, there would be a Law only if there is a mechanism of immediate constraint which is associated to the norm. As long as the incentive is not based on obligation, then it will be nothing... Secondly, and as if that were a kind of consolation ..., Compliance would not be really Law either ... We so often say that it is only about a methodology, a range of processes without sense, procedures to follow without trying to understand, process that algorithms integrate in a mechanic without end and without sense or that on the contrary, Compliance would be full of sense by Ethics and Morality, which are far from Law. While incentives talk to the human spirit which calculate, Compliance would be so a process through which machines will be connected to other machines, so an extra soul, where calculation has no place... Thirdly, solutions would be to be find in Competition Law because it can do without States, submit them and approach what is a-sectorial, especially finance and digital, the world being financialized and digitalized. The violence of Competition Law which comes in Ex Ante thanks to "Compliance sanctions" applying for example to essential infrastructures Law, by continuing to deny the salience of the duration and taking care of the "market power" would be also not compatible with a marriage with incentive mechanisms which rely on duration and power of those to which it is applied, converging towards goals, which are set by what Competition Law ignores: the project. This project which pretends to build the future is the one of politics and of companies, which use their deployed power in time to concretize it. It is without any doubt there that the future of Europe is.
To overcome this triple difficulty, it is thus necessary, in a second time, to modify our conception of Law, especially thanks to Compliance Law, in which this new branch is autonomous from Competition Law, and even sometimes opposed to it, in order to the insertion of incentive mechanisms permit to unknown or against Competition Law organizations to reach "monumental goals" which are imperative to take into consideration. For example, the taking into consideration of climate challenges or the building of a sovereign identity of the data. This is expressly set by European Commission which supervises such initiatives, supervision being what is articulated with Compliance, in a couple that go beyond Regulation, and replaces in Ex Ante Competition Law, salient branch for Ex Post. All the texts which are in the process of expressing it are based on this reformed couple: Compliance and Incentive.
This couple supposes that we recognize as such the existence of companies as project carriers, project which is the creation of marketed wealth circulating on a market, which could be an industrial project specific to a geographical zone both economical and political. Regulation is deployed to go away from the notion of sector and to transform itself in supervision of crucial firms in the correspondance between the project and the action, what refers to the notion of "plan". In this, banking supervision is just the advanced bastion of all thematic, energetic, climatic and health plans, or more broadly industrial and technological that could by incentive be implemented, this conception of Compliance permitting to build zones which are not reduced to immediate market exchange. The incentive corresponds to the fact that Compliance Law relies on the power of the firm to reach its own political goals, for example fighting against disinformation in the digital space or obtaining a healthy environnement. This supposes that Compliance stops to be only conceived as a model of rules effectivity, for example of Competition Law, to be recognized as a substantial branch of Law. A branch which expresses political goals. A branch which is anchored in crucial firms whose it recognizes the autonomy with regards to markets. This makes it possible, in particular through the coupling with incentive mechanisms leading to long-term collaborative operations supervised by public authorities, not to be governed by simple Competition Law, inapt to bring projects to fruition.
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April 21, 2021
Publications
► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Résoudre la contradiction entre "sanction" et "incitation" sous le feu du Droit de la Compliance" ("Resolving the contradiction between "sanction" and "incentive" under the fire of Compliance Law"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 89-98
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📝read the article (in French)
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🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with more developments, technical references and hyperlinks
____
📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published
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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation and Compliance): Compliance and Incentives appear at first glance to be totally opposite. For two major reasons. Firstly, because sanctions have a central place in Compliance Law and that the incentives suppose an absence of constraint on the operators. Secondly, because the incentives are linked to self-regulation and that Compliance Law assumes a strong presence of public authorities. Thus, one should choose: either Compliance or Incentives! Either the effectiveness of one or the effectiveness of the others; either the techniques of one, or the techniques of others; either the philosophy of one or the philosophy of the other. Resign oneself to the waste that such a necessary choice would imply. But to put the terms in this way amounts to thinking poorly about the situations and reducing the fields of the solutions they call for. If we take a rich definition of Compliance Law, we can on the contrary articulate Compliance and Incentives. From this perspective, sanctions can no longer become what blocks the use of incentives but, on the contrary, what constitutes them. Even more, the coupling between the Incentives and the requirements of Compliance Law must be strongly encouraged, as soon as the public authorities supervise in Ex Ante all the initiatives taken by the "crucial operators".
This article deals with the first issue. Indeed, the so-called incentive theory targets mechanisms which do not directly resort to constraint. They would therefore have little place in Compliance Law. But it seems saturated with sanction procedures. We can even say that it seems to put them at the center, the public authorities presenting the number of sanctions as a sign of success, while the companies seem obsessed with their prospects, the two concerns ending in such a strange convergence that are the Convention Judiciaire d'Intérêt Public (non-prosecution agreement).
The honest observer cannot help but be immediately uneasy. Indeed, it can only raise the definition of the sanction as a "constraint" triggered Ex Post, at the very heart of a Compliance Law which is presented as a set of Ex Ante mechanisms. Based on this contradiction in terms, should we give up the association and think that it would be wrong against the spirit to think of the sanction as an incentive?
It is undoubtedly in this connection that one perceives most clearly the clash of two cultures, which do not communicate, while technically they apply to the same situations. Indeed, because Compliance was designed by Finance, everything is a tool for it. Therefore, the tendency to think of the sanction only as an incentive is very strong in Compliance Law, manifests itself continuously and will not stop (I). But whatever the reasons for conceiving it this way, the principles of the rule of law cannot disappear and if we do not want them to be erased, then they must be articulated (II). This is an essential game (II).
This is why we can literally say that Compliance has set Criminal Law on fire by its conception, logical but closed in on itself, of sanctions as simple incentives. In order for Law to remain, however, we must hold a very firm definition of Compliance Law centered on its Monumental Goal, which is the protection of the person.
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March 31, 2021
Conferences
► Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.A., Ex Ante Compliance, in Gaia-X, Towards Automated Compliance in the Data Economy, en ligne, 31 mars 2021
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► Présentation générale de l'intervention : Cette courte intervention vise à expliquer l'apport essentiel du Droit de la Compliance pour la construction et la durabilité d'une structure comme GAIA-X.
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March 31, 2021
Organization of scientific events
This scientific event is placed under the scientific responsibility of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Baptiste Racine. It is organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and by the Centre de recherche sur la Justice et le Règlement des Conflits (CRJ) of the Panthéon-Assas (Paris II) University, with the active support of the International Chamber of Commerce ICC.
This event is the third colloquium of the 2021 colloquia cycle around the general theme of Compliance Juridictionnalization.
The different interventions will be then transformed into contributions in the books La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance and Compliance Juridictionnalization which will be published in the Regulation & Compliance serie, jointly published by the JoRC and Dalloz for the book in French and by JoRC and Bruylant for the book in English.
This colloquium will take place the 31st of March 2021.
The manifestation will be live broadcasted on Zoom.
To register: https://u-paris2-fr.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_sPSB4aUUQTWDWDnNcYt3sA
Presentation of the theme:
The arbitrator is the ordinary judge of international trade. It was natural that he or she encountered Compliance: by definition Compliance Law takes hold of the whole world and follows the paths of international trade while it can only be deployed with the help of institutions which, by nature are spreading around the world and need authorities like the Courts.
The conference is based on the already perceptible connection points between Compliance and Arbitration to better identify what is emerging for tomorrow: contradiction or convergence between the two; weakening or consolidation. We are already seeing the impact that Compliance can have on the arbitrator's treatment of corruption or the consideration of money laundering. More generally, where do we stand with the arbitrator's knowledge of the many technical issues related to compliance? Beyond these, will the courts and arbitrators be able to achieve the goals, themselves new, sometimes monumental, pursued by Compliance Law?
Through this joint exploration of these avenues, the fate of compliance clauses inserted in contracts, the relevance in the matter of private codes of conduct, etc. will be examined.
Tomorrow, as of today, is the arbitrator a full and complete judge of Compliance Law?
How, with what specificities and what controls?
Notably will speak:
Read a detailed presentation of the colloquium below:
March 31, 2021
Conferences
Référence complète: Frison-Roche, M.-A.,Compliance et Arbitrage : un adossement, rapport de synthèse in Frison-Roche, M.-A. & Racine, J.-B. (dir.) Compliance et Arbitrage, Colloque coorganisé par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et le Centre de recherches sur la Justice et le Règlement des Conflits (CRJ) de l'Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris II), avec le soutien de la Cour Internationale d'Arbitrage, Paris, 31 mars 2021.
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🗓️ Lire le programme de ce colloque
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✏️Le rapport de synthèse a été réalisé au fur et à mesure que se déroulait le colloque : se reporter aux notes prises durant le colloque.
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Voir le rapport de synthèse en vidéo
Voir l'intégralité du colloque en vidéo.
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📅 Ce colloque s'insère dans le cycle de colloques 2021 organisé par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et ses partenaires autour de la Juridictionnalisation de la Compliance.
📕 Les interventions ont servi de première base à la réalisation d'un titre dans l'ouvrage dirigé par Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, dont la version française, La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, est co-édité par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz.
📘 Elles ont été de la même façon la première base pour la version anglaise de l'ouvrage, Compliance Juridictionalisation, co-édité par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant.
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Updated: March 22, 2021 (Initial publication: Jan. 25, 2021)
Teachings : Sectorial Regulatory Law - 2021
Cet enseignement se déroule au semestre de printemps 2021, à la suite du cours semestriel qui a porté sur le "Droit commun de la Régulation".
Comme pour celui-ci, il est entièrement assuré par Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, professeur d'Université, titulaire à Sciences po.
Comme de nombreux étudiants qui suivent ce présent cours-séminaire n'ont pas suivi ce cours, il est important de se reporter au matériau du cours de Droit commun de la Régulation. Dans la mesure où ce présent séminaire est le prolongement de ce cours qui, en raison des nombreux retours des principes de droit commun dans diverses matières juridiques, s'est souvent éloigné du Droit de la Régulation, cette consultation peut demeurer utile même pour les étudiants ayant suivi ce premier cours.
La crise sanitaire actuelle rendant plus difficile l'apprentissage, il apparaît nécessaire ne pas débuter directement le cours-séminaire sur les problématiques spécifiquement sectorielles : les trois premières séances seront donc consacrées à des bases de Régulation dès l'instant qu'elles se retrouvent dans chacun des secteurs et que si certains sont classiques (comme l'existence et le fonctionnement des "Autorités de Régulation" ou des "Autorités de Supervision", certaines problématiques sont naissantes et déterminantes pour l'avenir : comme le renouvellement de la pertinence de la référence au secteur, ou l'internalisation de la Régulation dans les Entreprises, ou les buts communs ou spécifiques de la Régulation ce qui conduit à reclasser les secteurs.
Cela opéré et ayant donné lieu à discussion, le Cours de Droit sectoriel de la Régulation vise à montrer la persistance de la spécificité de tel et tel secteurs. Il ne peut les examiner tous mais il s'agit de mesurer à quel point les spécificités sectorielles imprègnent les règles. Ainsi chaque secteur est à la fois gouverné par des règles communes à tous (ce "droit commun" qui donna lieu à un cours complet précédent et dont la perspective aura été reprise dans la perspective sectorielle) et par ce qui lui est propre, sans doute avant tout ce qui est afférent à l'objet technique lui-même (le rail, le téléphone, la monnaie, etc.). Le Cours fait place également à la "régulation du numérique", bien que l'espace digital ne puisse plus guère être analysé comme un "secteur", ni en conséquence sa régulation comme une "régulation sectorielle". Cette question sera reprise dans le semestre 3 d'automne dans le cours-séminaire de Droit de la Compliance .
En raison de l'hétérogénéité des étudiants inscrits, il est concevable que le choix des secteurs étudiés plutôt que d'être arrêté par avance puissent être arrêtés directement avec les étudiants lors de la première séance.
Ce livret détaille la façon dont les étudiants, qui suivent cet enseignement situé dans l'École d'affaires publiques de Science po, sont évalués afin de valider cet enseignement. Il précise la charge du travail qui est demandé.
Les thèmes des leçons qui composent successivement le cours sont énumérés. Comme il s'agit d'une perspective thématique les bibliographies sont insérées dans les leçons et non plus dans une bibliographie générale, laquelle allait de soi pour la présentation du "Droit commun de la Régulation" et peut continuer un intérêt dans une perspective sectorielle..
A partir de ce livret, chaque document propre à chaque leçon est accessible.
Voir ci-dessous plus de détails sur chacun de ces points, ainsi que la liste des leçons et les annales des sujets d'examen.
March 22, 2021
Conferences
General reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., The Future of legal uncertainty notion with regards with the treatment of extraordinary situations: economic crisis (L'avenir de la notion d'insécurité juridique au regard du traitement des situations extraordinaires: crise économique), in "Insécurité juridique : émergence d'une notion ?", Cour de cassation, 22nd of March 2021.
Read the general program of the colloquium (in French)
See the first part of the colloquium (in French)
See the second part of the colloquium in which Marie-Anne Frison-Roche speaks (in French)