Paradoxically, the notion of conflict of interest seems to be at the center of Economic Law only recently in Economic Law, in both Corporate and Public Law. This is due to the philosophy which animates these two branches of Law, very different for each, and which has changed in each.

In fact, and in the first place in Public Law, in the Continental legal systems and especially in French legal tradition, on the side of the State, the one who serves it, by a sort of natural effect,, makes the general interest incarnated by the State pass before its personal interest. There is an opposition of interests, namely the personal interest of this public official who would like to work less and earn more, and the common interest of the population, who would like to pay less taxes and for example benefit trains that always arrive on time and the general interest which would be for example the construction of a European rail network.

But this conflict would be resolved "naturally" because the public official, having "a sense of the general interest" and being animated by the "sense of public service", sacrifices himself to serve the general interes. He stays late at his office and gets the trains on time. This theory of public service was the inheritance of royalty, a system in which the King is at the service of the People, like the aristocracy is in the "service of the King." There could therefore be no conflict of interest, neither in the administration nor in the public enterprises, nor to observe, manage or dissolve. The question does not arise ...

Let us now take the side of the companies, seen by the Company Law. In the classical conception of corporate governance, corporate officers are necessarily shareholders of the company and the profits are mandatorily distributed among all partners: the partnership agreement is a "contract of common interest". Thus, the corporate officer works in the knowledge that the fruits of his efforts will come back to him through the profits he will receive as a partner. Whatever its egoism - and even the agent must be, this mechanism produces the satisfaction of all the other partners who mechanically will also receive the profits. Selfishness is indeed the motor of the system, as in the classical theory of Market and Competition. Thus, in the corporate mechanism, there is never a conflict of interest since the corporate officer is obligatorily associated: he will always work in the interest of the partners since in this he works for himself. As Company Law posits that the loss of the company will also be incurred and suffered by all partners, he will also avoid this prospect. Again, there is no need for any control. The question of a conflict of interest between the mandatary and those who conferred this function does not structurally arise...

These two representations both proved inaccurate. They were based on quite different philosophies - the public official being supposed to have exceeded his own interest, the corporate officer being supposed to serve the common interest or the social interest by concern for his own interest - but this was by  a unique reasoning that these two representations were defeated.

Let us take the first on Public Law: the "sense of the State" is not so common in the administration and the public enterprises, that the people who work there sacrifice themselves for the social group. They are human beings like the others. Researchers in economics and finance, through this elementary reflection of suspicion, have shattered these political and legal representations. In particular, it has been observed that the institutional lifestyle of public enterprises, very close to the government and their leaders, is often not very justified, whereas it is paid by the taxpayer, that is, by the social group which they claimed to serve. Europe, by affirming in the Treaty of Rome the principle of "neutrality of the capital of enterprises", that is to say, indifference to the fact that the enterprise has as its shareholder a private person or a public person, validated this absence of exceeding of his particular interest by the servant of the State, become simple economic agent. This made it possible to reach the conclusion made for Company Law.

Disillusionment was of the same magnitude. It has been observed that the corporate officer, ordinary human being, is not devoted to the company and does not have the only benefit of the profits he will later receive as a partner. He sometimes gets very little, so he can receive very many advantages (financial, pecuniary or in kind, direct or indirect). The other shareholders see their profits decrease accordingly. They are thus in a conflict of interest. Moreover, the corporate officer was elected by the shareholders' meeting, that is to say, in practice, the majority shareholder or the "controlling" shareholder (controlling shareholder) and not by all. He may not even be associated (but a "senior officer").

The very fact that the situation is no longer qualified by lawyers, through the qualifications of classical Company Law, still borrowing from the Civil Contract Law, the qualifications coming more from financial theories, borrowing from the theory of the agency, adically changed the perspective. The assumptions have been reversed: by the same "nature effect", the conflict of interest has been disclosed as structurally existing between the manager and the minority shareholder. Since the minority shareholder does not have the de facto power to dismiss the corporate officer since he does not have the majority of the voting rights, the question does not even arise whether the manager has or has not a corporate status: the minority shareholder has only the power to sell his securities, if the management of the manager is unfavorable (right of exit) or the power to say, protest and make known. This presupposes that he is informed, which will put at the center of a new Company Law information, even transparency.

Thus, this conflict of interests finds a solution in the actual transfer of securities, beyond the legal principle of negotiability. For this reason, if the company is listed, the conflict of interest is translated dialectically into a relationship between the corporate officer and the financial market which, by its liquidity, allows the agent to be sanctioned, and also provides information, Financial market and the minority shareholder becoming identical. The manager could certainly have a "sense of social interest", a sort of equivalent of the state's sense for a civil servant, if he had an ethics, which would feed a self-regulation. Few people believe in the reality of this hypothesis. By pragmatism, it is more readily accepted that the manager will prefer his interest to that of the minority shareholder. Indeed, he can serve his personal interest rather than the interest for which a power has been given to him through the informational rent he has, and the asymmetry of information he enjoys. All the regulation will intervene to reduce this asymmetry of information and to equip the minority shareholder thanks to the regulator who defends the interests of the market against the corporate officers, if necessary through the criminal law. But the belief in managerial volunteerism has recently taken on a new dimension with corporate social responsability, the social responsibility of the company where managers express their concern for others.

The identification of conflicts of interests, their prevention and their management are transforming Financial Regulatory Law and then the Common Law of Regulation, because today it is no longer believed a priori that people exceed their personal interest to serve the interest of others. It is perhaps to regain trust and even sympathy that companies have invested in social responsibility. The latter is elaborated by rules which are at first very flexible but which can also express a concern for the general interest. In this, it can meet Compliance Law and express on behalf of the companies a concern for the general interest, if the companies provide proof of this concern.

To take an example of a conflict of interest that resulted in substantial legal changes, the potentially dangerous situation of credit rating agencies has been pointed out when they are both paid by banks, advising them and designing products, While being the source of the ratings, the main indices from which the investments are made. Banks being the first financial intermediaries, these conflicts of interest are therefore systematically dangerous. That is why in Europe ESMA exercises control over these rating agencies.

The identification of conflicts of interest, which most often involves changing the way we look at a situation - which seemed normal until the point of view changes - the moral and legal perspective being different, Trust one has in this person or another one modifying this look, is today what moves the most in Regulation Law.
This is true of Public and Corporate Law, which are extended by the Regulation Law, here itself transformed by Compliance Law, notably by the launchers of alerts. But this is also true that all political institutions and elected officials.

For a rule emerges: the more central the notion of conflict of interest becomes, the more it must be realized that Trust is no longer given a priori, either to a person, to a function, to a mechanism, to a system. Trust is no longer given only a posteriori in procedures that burden the action, where one must give to see continuously that one has deserved this trust.

►Référence complète : Galli, M., Une justice pénale propre aux personnes morales : Réflexions sur la convention judiciaire d'intérêt public , Revue de Sciences Criminelle, 2018, pp. 359-385.

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The Independent Administrative Authority (IAA) is the legal form that the legislator has most often chosen to build regulatory authorities. The IAA is only its legal form, but French law has attached great importance to it, following the often formalistic tradition of public law. They are thus independent administrative authorities, especially in the legal systems of continental law like France, Germany or Italy.

The essential element is in the last adjective: the "independent" character of the organism. This means that this organ, which is only administrative so has a vocation to be placed in the executive hierarchy, does not obey the Government. In this, regulators have often been presented as free electrons, which posed the problem of their legitimacy, since they could no longer draw upstream in the legitimacy of the Government. This independence also poses the difficulty of their responsibility, the responsibility of the State for their actions, and the accountability of their use of their powers. Moreover, the independence of regulators is sometimes questioned if it is the government that retains the power to appoint the leaders of the regulatory authority. Finally, the budgetary autonomy of the regulator is crucial to ensure its independence, although the authorities having the privilege of benefiting from a budget - which is not included in the LOLF - are very few in number. They are no longer referred to as "independent administrative authorities" but as "Independent Public Authorities", the legislator making a distinction between the two (French Law of 20 January 2017).

The second point concerns the second adjective: that it is an "administrative" body. This corresponds to the traditional idea that regulation is the mechanism by which the State intervenes in the economy, in the image of a kind of deconcentration of ministries, in the Scandinavian model of the agency. If we allow ourselves to be enclosed in this vocabulary, we conclude that this administrative body makes an administrative decision which is the subject of an appeal before a judge. Thus, in the first place, this would be a first instance appeal and not a judgment since the administrative authority is not a court. Secondly, the natural judge of the appeal should be the administrative judge since it is an administrative decision issued by an administrative authority. But in France the Ordinance of 1 December 1986 sur la concurrence et la libéralisation des prix (on competition and price liberalization), because it intended precisely to break the idea of ​​an administered economy in order to impose price freedom on the idea of ​​economic liberalism, required that attacks against the decisions of economic regulators taking the form of IAA are brought before the Court of Appeal of Paris, judicial jurisdiction. Some great authors were even able to conclude that the Paris Court of Appeal had become an administrative court. But today the procedural system has become extremely complex, because according to the IAA and according to the different kinds of decisions adopted, they are subject to an appeal either to the Court of Appeal of Paris or to the Conseil d'État (Council of State) . If one observes the successive laws that modify the system, one finds that after this great position of principle of 1986, the administrative judge gradually takes again its place in the system, in particular in the financial regulation. Is it logical to conclude that we are returning to a spirit of regulation defined as an administrative police and an economy administered by the State?

Finally, the third term is the name itself: "authority". It means in the first place an entity whose power holds before in its "authority". But it marks that it is not a jurisdiction, that it takes unilateral decisions. It was without counting the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the judicial judge! Indeed, Article 6§1 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that everyone has the right to an impartial tribunal in civil and criminal matters. The notion of "criminal matter" does not coincide with the formal traditional concept of criminal law but refers to the broad and concrete factual concept of repression. Thus, by a reasoning which goes backwards, an organization, whatever the qualification that a State has formally conferred on it, which has an activity of repression, acts "in criminal matters". From this alone, in the European sense, it is a "tribunal". This automatically triggers a series of fundamental procedural guarantees for the benefit of the person who is likely to be the subject of a decision on his part. In France, a series of jurisprudence, both of the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation), the Conseil d'État (Council of State) or the Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) has confirmed this juridictionnalization of the AAI.

Impartiality is the quality, maybe the virtue, that is demanded of the judge, not only the one who is called like that but also the one who has the function to judge the others (maybe without this name).

It can not be defined as the absolute positive aptitude, namely the total absence of prejudice, the heroic aptitude for a person to totally ignore his or her personal opinions and personal history. This heroic virtue is nonsense because not only is it inaccurate, impossible but it is also not desirable because a person is not a machine. It must not be so because good justice is human justice. In this respect, impartiality refers to a philosophical conception of what is justice and what is Regulation, not machines, but systems that must keep the human person in their center (Sunstein).

Thus Impartiality is articulated with the subjective nature of the assessment not only inevitable but also desirable that the judge makes of situations. Because Law is reasonable, Impartiality is defined only negatively: the absence of bias.

Impartiality is defined first and foremost as a subjective and individual quality, namely, the prohibition on the person who makes a decision affecting the situation of others (as is the case of a judge) to a a personal interest in this situation. The constitutional prohibition of being "judge and party" is thus the expression of the principle of impartiality. This definition is in line with the otherwise general requirement of no conflict of interests.

Impartiality is defined secondly as an objective and individual quality, namely the prohibition for a person who has already known of the case to know again (because he or she has already had an opinion about it, this having constituted an objective pre-judgment).

Impartiality is defined thirdly as an objective and structural quality, which obliges the organ which takes judgments to "give to see" a structure that makes it fit for this impartiality, objective impartiality that third parties can see and which generates confidence in its ability to judge without bias. This theory of English origin has been taken up by European law in the interpretation given to the European Convention on Human Rights. The expression "apparent impartiality" has sometimes given rise to misunderstandings. Indeed, far from being less demanding (in that it is "only" to be satisfied with an appearance of impartiality and not of a true impartiality), it is rather a matter of demanding more, not only of a true impartiality, but also of an impartiality which can be seen by all. This leads in particular to the obligation of transparency, to which the institutions, notably the State, were not necessarily bound by the law.

For a long time the Regulator, in that it took the form of an Administrative Authority, was not considered a jurisdiction, it was long considered that it was not directly subject to this requirement. It is clear from the case law that the national courts now consider that the regulatory authorities are courts "in the European sense", which implies a fundamental procedural guarantee for the operators concerned

Legally, the State is a public law subject defined by territory, people and institutions. It acts in the international space and emits norms. Politically, it has the legitimacy required to express the will of the social body and to exercise the violence of which it deprives the other subjects of law. It is often recognizable by its power: its use of public force, its budgetary power, its jurisdictional power. These three powers, declining or being challenged by private, international and more satisfying mechanisms, some predicted the disappearance of the State, to deplore it or to dance on its corpse.

With such a background, in current theories of Regulation, primarily constructed by economic thought and at first sight one might say that the State is above all the enemy. And this for two main reasons. The first is theoretical and of a negative nature. The advocates of the theory of regulation deny the State the political qualities set out above. The State would not be a "person" but rather a group of individuals, civil servants, elected officials and other concrete human beings, expressing nothing but their particular interests, coming into conflict with other interests, and using their powers to serve the former rather than the latter as everyone else. The Regulation theory, adjoining the theory of the agency, is then aimed at controlling public agents and elected representatives in whom there is no reason to trust a priori.

The second reason is practical and positive. The State would not be a "person" but an organization. Here we find the same perspective as for the concept of enterprise, which classical lawyers conceive as a person or a group of people, while economists who conceive of the world through the market represent it as an organization. The state as an organization should be "efficient" or even "optimal". It is then the pragmatic function of the Regulation Law. When it is governed by traditional law, entangled by that it would be an almost religious illusions of the general interest, or even the social contract, it is suboptimal. The Regulation purpose is about making it more effective.

To this end, as an organization, the State is divided into independent regulatory agencies or independent administrative authorities that manage the subjects as close as possible, which is fortunate in reducing the asymmetry of information and in reviving trust in a direct link. The unitary, distant and arrogant State is abandoned for a flexible and pragmatic conception of a strategic state (without capital ...) that would finally have understood that it is an organization like any other ...

Competition law adopts this conception of the State, which it posed from the beginning that it was an economic operator like any other. This is how this conception which would be  more "neutral" of the world is often presented.

Successive crises, whether sanitary or financial, have produced a pendulum effect.

Now, the notions of general interest or common goods are credited of an autonomous value, and the necessity of surpassing immediate interests and of finding persons to bear superior interests or to take charge of the interests of others, even a non-immediate one, emerged.

Thus, the State or the public authority, reappears in the globalization. The Compliance Law or the Corporal Social Responsibility of the crucial companies are converging towards a consideration of the State, which can not be reduced to a pure and simple organization receptacle of externalities.

 

La présomption est une dispense de preuve lorsqu'elle est établie par la loi. Elle est un raisonnement probatoire lorsqu'elle est présentée devant un juge, raisonnement qui permet d'établir un fait pertinent à partir d'une preuve indirecte. Il constitue en cela un déplacement d'objet de preuve.

On distingue les présomptions légales, lorsque c'est le législateur qui a posé comme établi un fait, ce qui engendre alors non plus un déplacement d'objet de preuve, mais une dispense de preuve pour celui qui doit supporter normalement la charge de preuve.

Lorsque l'adversaire à l'allégation n'est pas autorisé à rapporter la preuve contraire à l'allégation, la présomption est irréfragable. Parce que la présomption irréfragable est une dispense définitive de preuve, elle soustrait la réalité d'un fait à l'obligation d'être prouvé. La présomption équivaut alors à une fiction. Parce qu'il s'agit d'un artefact, on affirme généralement que seul le législateur a le droit de poser des présomptions irréfragables. Ainsi, la présomption de vérité qui s'attache à la chose définitivement jugée est une présomption légale irréfragable. Celle-ci est alors une pure règle de fond, ici l'incontestabilité des décisions de justice contre lesquelles il n'existe plus de voies de recours d'annulation disponible.

A côté des présomptions légales, existent les "présomptions du fait de l'homme", expression traditionnelle pour désigner les raisonnements probatoires précités que les parties présentent au juge. Comme il s'agit de preuves véritables, ayant donc pour objet de reconstituer la vérité, elles ne peuvent pas être irréfragables, et ne peuvent entraîner qu'une alternance des charges de preuve, au détriment du défendeur à l'allégation. La présomption du fait de l'homme est toujours simple.

Si la jurisprudence établit pourtant des présomptions qu'elle pose comme incontestables, cela signifie simplement qu'elle a établie comme une règle de fond, comme la responsabilité des parents du fait des enfants, antérieurement une responsabilité pour faute présumée aujourd'hui une responsabilité aujourd'hui. Cela n'est que l'expression de la jurisprudence source de droit, c'est-à-dire de la jurisprudence au même niveau que le législateur.

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Exemple concret

Une personne, A,  est retrouvée blessée sur la chaussée. Elle prétend que l'auteur du dommage est le propriétaire d'un vélo qui a freiné brutalement et l'a renversée avant de prendre la fuite. Il n'y a pas de témoin. Elle soutient qu'il s'agit de son voisin, B, dont le vélo, est endommagé. Elle démontre qu'il existe sur le bitume des traces de peinture et de pneus, qui correspondent aux entailles du vélo de B., observation faite qu'il a changé ses pneus le lendemain même de l'accident.

A soutient le raisonnement suivant au juge : je dois démontrer que B m'a renversée (objet direct de preuve), ce que je ne peux faire directement. Mais je peux prouver que son vélo est endommagé, qu'il a changé les pneus, que les entailles du vélo correspondent aux traces relevées sur le sol où a eu lieu l'accident, que B a changé ses pneus le lendemain même de l'accident : on peut, par ces preuves indirectes, présume un lien de causalité. Ainsi, la preuve est apportée non directement, mais par raisonnement.

Si le juge admet le raisonnement, comme la présomption n'est pas irréfragable, la question probatoire ne sera pas réglée, il opérera simplement un renversement de charge de preuve. B, défendeur à l'allégation, sera recevable à démontrer que ces éléments, le changement des pneus, l'endommagement de l'ossature du vélo, ont d'autre chose. S'il apporte ces preuves, alors il aura brisé la présomption simple, et le demandeur, qui supporte le risque de preuve, aura perdu le procès. S'il ne les apporte pas, alors le demandeur, grâce à la présomption, aura gagné son procès.

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► Référence complète : A.-M. Ilcheva, "Condamnation de Shell aux Pays-Bas : la responsabilité climatique des entreprises pétrolières se dessine", D. 2021, pp. 1968-1970

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► Résumé de l'article : Après une brève description de l'affaire en cause au principal, l'auteure explicite dans un premier les fondements du jugement dit "Shell". Elle explique que l'action engagée était fondée sur le droit de la responsabilité civile délictuelle néerlandais, plus précisément le "duty of care" de l'article 6:162 du code civil néerlandais, lequel amène le juge, afin d'établir le fait générateur, à apprécier le comportement de l'entreprise défenderesse au regard du standard de comportement de la personne prudente et raisonnable. Sont également mobilisés par le juge des travaux scientifiques (rapport du GIEC), des normes de droit international (CEDH) et des normes de droit souple (Principes directeurs de l'ONU), afin de caractériser tant le fait générateur que le dommage (notamment futur). Dans un second temps, l'auteure envisage la portée de ce jugement, frappé d'appel au moment de la rédaction de son article. Elle souligne que le juge s'est appuyé sur la notion d'entreprise, permettant ainsi de contourner l'obstacle traditionnel lié à la personnalité morale, et qu'il a retenu ici une responsabilité préventive, tournée vers le futur. Elle termine en mettant en avant les conditions nécessaires pour que ce jugement soit effectif et constate que l'effort demandé à l'entreprise est plus important que celui préconisé par les rapports d'experts.

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🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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Référence complète : Lebovici, S., C'est pas juste, in Baranès, W. et Frison-Roche, M.-A., La justice. L'obligation impossible, coll. " Nos valeurs", Éditions Autrement, 1994, p. 16-27.

 

Consulter la présentation générale de l'ouvrage.

Consulter une analyse dans laquelle cet article est cité.

 

« Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent lire l’article via le Drive de Sciences po en allant dans le dossier « MAFR – Régulation ».

The procedural guarantees from which the person benefits are mainly the right of action, the rights of defense and the benefit of the adversarial principle.

While the rights of the defense are subjective rights which are advantages given to the person at risk of having his situation affected by the decision that the body which is formally or functionally legally qualified as a "tribunal", may take, the adversarial principle is rather a principle of organization of the procedure, from which the person can benefit.

This principle, as the term indicates, is - as are the rights of the defense - of such a nature as to generate all the technical mechanisms which serve it, including in the silence of the texts, imply a broad interpretation of these.

The adversarial principle implies that the debate between all the arguments, in particular all the possible interpretations, is possible. It is exceptionally and justified, for example because of urgency or a justified requirement of secrecy (professional secrecy, secrecy of private life, industrial secrecy, defense secrecy, etc.) that the adversarial mechanism is ruled out. , sometimes only for a time (technique of deferred litigation by the admission of the procedure on request).

This participation in the debate must be fully possible for the debater, in particular access to the file, knowledge of the existence of the instance, the intelligibility of the terms of the debate, not only the facts, but also the language (translator, lawyer , intelligibility of the subject), but still discussion on the applicable legal rules). So when the court automatically comes under the rules of Law, it must submit them to adversarial debate before possibly applying them.

The application of the adversarial principle often crosses the rights of the defense, but in that it is linked to the notion of debate, it develops all the more as the procedure is of the adversarial type.

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► Full reference: M.A. Frison-Roche, “Si l'heureux stratagème probatoire du Roi Salomon n'avait pas fonctionné (If King Solomon's probationary strategy hadn't worked)”, in Collective Book dedicated to Professor Pierre Crocq, Liber Amicorum, LGDJ-Lextenso, 2026, pp. 713–723.

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📝Read the article (in French)

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► Introduction to the article:

As renowned and significant in biblical scholarship as it is in legal culture and imagination, Solomon’s Judgement is a procedural measure, an evidential stratagem (I). But even a King cannot be certain of the success of an investigative measure that his authority allows him to impose; nothing guarantees the success of the evidential stratagem he has devised, that is to say, the discovery of the truth. The investigative measure he devised presupposes a maternal love that leads the woman—who might prefer to continue disputing—to choose instead not to keep the child and to leave him in a state of death, a mere inert prey to the claim of appropriation made by the plaintiff. It is the woman’s virtue that enables the Judge’s wisdom. The evidence stratagem might not have worked (II). This is scarcely considered, as King Solomon is always portrayed as wise and the mother as preferring the child to herself. But if we step outside the Book of Kings, where virtue reigns—that of the mother as well as that of the judge—to confront the passion of the woman who smothered her newborn in the night and now seeks the force of justice to seize the second, one might reflect, whilst wandering through the lobby of a courthouse, that it is all too often the case that adults put themselves before children. What if the second mother had put herself before the child? What would have happened if the judge’s order, already being carried out, had not been halted by the virtue of the defendant?  (III). What would the King then have done to exercise his office as Judge justly, since the truth would not have been accessible to him? (IV). If one changes an element of the narrative, because justice is human, because passions drive the parties, because children are often the silent victims on both sides, is justice still possible?

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► Full reference: M.A. Frison-Roche, “Considérer la géographie juridique africaine pour y réussi l'obligation de vigilance" (Taking into account the legal landscape in Africa to fulfil the Vigilance Obligation), in E. Da Allada (ed.), Devoir de vigilance, quelles perspectives africaines ? (The Vigilance Duty: what African perspectives?), Lefebvre-Dalloz, “Thèmes et Commentaires” series, 2026, pp. 235–235.

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📝Read the article (in French)

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🚧read the bilingual working document on which this article is based

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🎤read the presentation of the conference  which summarised this topic

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► Summary of the article: The French ‘Vigilance’ Act of 2017 incorporated the technical provisions and the spirit of the ‘Sapin 2’ Act of 2016. They share a common ambition. They have been, and remain, a source of both controversy and fervour. At their heart lies the establishment of a “compliance obligation”, for which vigilance techniques form the “vanguard” in serving a grand ambition: to protect systems from present and future risks in order to safeguard the people involved in them.

The passion that continues to surround the Vigilance Act – which gave rise to the CS3D Directive – is not a good thing, because the law and passion are never allies. Some are passionately committed to the triumph of vigilance by forcing companies to perform miracles, whilst others are passionately committed to the destruction of all the legislation that has established the very concept of this compliance law, built upon these monumental humanist goals.

But let us recognise that in these debates on the Duty of Care, which is being legally implemented across value chains,  Africa is often cited as an example in a general discussion. It is not often considered as a distinct case in its own right. No account is taken of its strengths or its own legal mechanisms, even though value chains – particularly industrial ones – so often lead to it, both now and in the future. Through analyses of the duty of care, Africa is perceived as a place of retribution or of a new form of paternalism, and when its future is considered, prospects seem to be lacking, even though the very purpose of compliance – and therefore of due diligence – is the future. 

If we take a less confrontational view and focus more on the ‘legal geography’ of African countries and their social and inter-state structures  social and inter-state structures, we can see that concern for others – both present and future – which ultimately constitutes the Monumental Aim of Compliance Law and thus of the Duty of Vigilance – is more prevalent in Africa than it is in Europe, which is now built upon legal individualism. This concern for others is reflected in legal mechanisms akin to mediation and various legal structures that our own institutions would do well to take on board – our legislators before adopting legislation, and our judges, who could listen to them as amici curiae before always reaching a decision.

If we turn our attention to the African continent, where a segment of the value chains operates, and to the way work is organised, it becomes clear that here too, legislation and sanctions are not the whole story. Compliance techniques that make use of soft law and the contractual arrangements underpinning the chains themselves can remove the element of abstraction that is, by its very nature, inherent in general legislation. Making progress through contracts, under the scrutiny and with the support of the courts, is an approach that could prove more fruitful than well-intentioned legislation – which served as a catalyst – given the prominent role of Contract Law within OHADA.

This serves to enhance the judge’s importance. The judicialisation of compliance is also linked to the growing connection between compliance and contracts. However, it appears that not only can European judges specialising in due diligence thus rule on matters concerning Africa – a continent they can only know from a distance (though it is the lot of every judge to be an outsider) – but African and inter-state courts, notably through OHADA, can address the duty of care because value chains are constituted by contracts. By developing it not as a foreign concept to be assimilated, but as something that expresses the very heart of the law in Africa: concern for others, solidarity, and the search for compromises and solutions to ensure that the social and environmental – that is to say, human – system continues to thrive tomorrow.

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► Full Reference: M.A. Frison-Roche, "La part du gracieux dans le traitement juridictionnel de la compliance (The role of Discretionary Jurisdictio in the judicial treatment of Compliance cases)", in Mélanges Dominique d'Ambra, Liber Amicorum, Lefebvre-Dalloz, 2026, pp.175-196.

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📝read this article (in French) 

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🚧read the bilingual Working Paper, base of this article

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► English summary of this article: Based on the definition of Judicial Office, the procedural principles that derive from it and the consequent powers that judges exercise, the objet of this study is to measure the degree of discretion that exists in the judicial treatment of compliance, without direct consideration for the dispute between litigants. This part is very ignored, when it should be given top priority. Indeed, because Systems are involved in compliance cases brought before civil or commercial judges, we are seeing a development of this discretionary element in judicial fonction. Discretionary matters differ from unilateral discretionary procedures, and this discretionary element relates to what the judge examines, possibly in the context of a dispute.

The first part of this contribution therefore aims to describe the natural development of the discretionary power of the judge to deal with compliance cases brought before them. This role stems from the fact that, even when triggered by a dispute, what is submitted to the judge is a situation composed of a system, which cannot defend its interests before the civil or commercial judge in this Systemic Litigation arising from the very nature of Compliance Law and the Compliance Obligations it engenders on systemic entites. Moreover, it is the Future whose interests must be considered and protected, which the judge must do directly.

This leads to the second part of the contribution, calling for a rethinking of the procedure and the role of the Compliance Judge, so that ex gratia matters can be dealt with. The judge must therefore verify that there are no conflicts of interest between the litigants, including hidden ones, and must learn about the systems involved. The inquisitorial principle must therefore be strengthened. But at the same time, since the primary aim is not to settle a dispute but to resolve a systemic problematic situation, the judge must facilitate the movements of the parties, and the adversarial principle must also be strengthened. Must be encouraged this activation of a powerful and discretionary approach, not as an exception but as a principle fully articulated with a contentious principle, with the dispute being only a means used by the necessary parties to enable systemic compliance situations to be resolved.

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► Référence complète : E da Allada. (dir.), Devoir de vigilance. Quelles perspectives africaines ?, Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. "Thèmes & Commentaires, 2026, sous presse.

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►Voir notamment la présentation des contributions :

 

► Référence complète  : Conseil constitutionnel, déc.  n°25-1184 QPC, 6 mars 2026, Conseil national des barreaux et autres

[Expérimentation d’une contribution pour la justice économique due pour chaque instance devant le tribunal des activités économiques]

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►lire la décision

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____

► Référence complète : M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Le jugement adéquat dans le contentieux contractuel impliquant la Compliance", in Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Université Jean Moulin - Lyon 3 (,..), Le contentieux contractuel impliquant la Compliance : aspects procéduraux et juridictionnels,  Faculté de droit, Lyon, 29 mai 2026.

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🧮consulter le programme complet de la manifestation

____

📶consulter les slides

____

🚧Lire le document de travail bilingue sur la base duquel cette conférence est bâti

____

Lire la présentation des deux autres interventions dans ce colloque :

🎥L'émergence du contentieux contractuel impliquant la Compliance par la convergence des matières

🎥Le temps  

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📝Cette conférence sera la base d'une contribution dans l'ouvrage, 📕Compliance et Contrat, 

à paraître dans la collection 📚Régulations & Compliance, ouvrage coédité par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Lefebvre-Dalloz.

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► Présentation de cette conférence : 

⛏️Aller plus loin  :

🕴🏻J.-M. Coulon et 🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche (codir.), Le temps dans la procédure ⚙️Compliance et Contrat, 19966

🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, ⚙️Compliance et Contrat,

 

________

 

🌐Follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn

🌐Subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law

🌐Subscribe to the video newsletter MAFR Overhang

🌐Subscribe to the Newsletter MaFR Law & Art

____

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, 2026, to be published

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📕In parallel, a book in French L'Obligation de compliance, is published in the collection "Régulations & Compliance" co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz. 

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📚This book is inserted in this series created by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche for developing Compliance Law.

 read the presentations of the other books of this Compliance Series:

• further books:

🕴️M.A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Evidential System, 2027

🕴️M.A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance and Contract, 2027

 

• previous books:

​🕴️M.A. Frison-Roche (ed), 📘Compliance Juridictionnalisation, 2023

🕴️M.A. Frison-Roche (ed), 📘Compliance Monumental Goals, 2022

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Tools, 2021

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► go to the general presentation of this 📚Series ​Compliance & Regulation, conceived, founded et managed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, co-published par the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant. 

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🧮the book follows the cycle of colloquia organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its Universities partners.

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► general presentation of the book: Compliance is sometimes presented as something that cannot be avoided, which is tantamount to seeing it as the legal obligation par excellence, Criminal Law being its most appropriate mode of expression. However, this is not so evident. Moreover, it is becoming difficult to find a unity to the set of compliance tools, encompassing what refers to a moral representation of the world, or even to the cultures specific to each company, Compliance Law only having to produce incentives or translate this ethical movement. The obligation of compliance is therefore difficult to define.

This difficulty to define affecting the obligation of compliance reflects the uncertainty that still affects Compliance Law in which this obligation develops. Indeed, if we were to limit this branch of law to the obligation to "be conform" with the applicable regulations, the obligation would then be located more in these "regulations", the classical branches of Law which are Contract Law and Tort Law organising "Obligations" paradoxically remaining distant from it. In practice, however, it is on the one hand Liability actions that give life to legal requirements, while companies make themselves responsible through commitments, often unilateral, while contracts multiply, the articulation between legal requirements and corporate and contractual organisations ultimately creating a new way of "governing" not only companies but also what is external to them, so that the Monumental Goals, that Compliance Law substantially aims at, are achieved. 

The various Compliance Tools illustrate this spectrum of the Compliance Obligation which varies in its intensity and takes many forms, either as an extension of the classic legal instruments, as in the field of information, or in a more novel way through specific instruments, such as whistleblowing or vigilance. The contract, in that it is by nature an Ex-Ante instrument and not very constrained by borders, can then appear as a natural instrument in the compliance system, as is the Judge who is the guarantor of the proper execution of Contract and Tort laws. The relationship between companies, stakeholders and political authorities is thus renewed.

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🏗️general construction of the book

The book opens with a substantial Introduction, putting the different sort of obligations of compliance in legal categories for showing that companies must build structures of compliance (obligation of result) and act to contribute with states and stakeholders to reach Monumental Goals (obligation of means). 

The first part is devoted to the definition of the Compliance Obligation. 

The second part presents the articulation of Compliance obligation with the other branchs of Law, because the specific obligation is built by Compliance Law, as new substantial branch of Law but also by many other branchs of Law.

The third part develops the pratical means established to obtained the Compliance Obligation to be effective, efficace and efficient.

The fourth part takes the Obligation  of Vigilance as an illustration of all these considerations and the discussion about the future of this sparehead fo the Compliance Obligation . 

The fifth part refers to the place and the role of the judges, natural characters for any obligation. 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

 

ANCHORING THE SO DIVERSE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATIONS IN THEIR NATURE, REGIMES AND FORCE TO BRING OUT THE VERY UNITY OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION, MAKING IT COMPREHENSIBLE AND PRACTICABLE 

 

🔹 Compliance Obligation: building a compliance structure that produces credible results withe regard to the Monumentals Goals targeted by the Legislator, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

 

TITLE I.

IDENTIFYING THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

 

CHAPTER I: NATURE OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

Section 1 🔹 Will, Heart and Calculation, the three marks surrounding the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 2 🔹 Debt, as the basis of the compliance obligation, by 🕴️Bruno Deffains

Section 3 🔹 Compliance Obligation and Human Rights, by 🕴️Jean-Baptiste Racine

Section 4 🔹 Compliance Obligation and changes in Sovereignty and Citizenship, by 🕴️René Sève

Section 5 🔹 The definition of the Compliance Obligation in Cybersecurity, by 🕴️Michel Séjean

 

CHAPTER II: SPACES OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

Section 1 🔹 Industrial Entities and Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Etienne Maclouf

Section 2 🔹 Compliance, Value Chains and Service Economy, by 🕴️Lucien Rapp

Section 3 🔹 Compliance and conflict of laws. International Law of Vigilance-Conformity, based on applications in Europe, by 🕴️Louis d'Avout 

 

TITLE II.

ARTICULATING THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION WITH OTHER BRANCHES OF LAW

 

Section 1 🔹 Tax Law and Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Daniel Gutmann

Section 2 🔹 General Procedural Law, prototype of the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 3 🔹 Corporate and Financial Markets Law facing the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Anne-Valérie Le Fur

Section 4 🔹 Transformation of Governance and Vigilance Obligation, by 🕴️Véronique Magnier

Section 5 🔹 The Relation between Tort Law and Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Jean-Sébastien Borghetti

Section 6 🔹 Environmental and Climate Compliance, by 🕴️Marta Torre-Schaub

Section 7 🔹 Competition Law and Compliance Law, by 🕴️Jean-Christophe Roda

Section 8 🔹 The Compliance Obligation in Global Law, by 🕴️Benoît Frydman & 🕴️Alice Briegleb

Section 9 🔹 Environmental an Climatic Dimensions of the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Marta Torre-Schaub

Section 10 🔹 Judge of Insolvency Law and Compliance Obligations, by 🕴️Jean-Baptiste Barbièri

 

TITLE III.

COMPLIANCE: GIVE AND TAKE THE MEANS TO OBLIGE

 

CHAPTER I: COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION: THE CONVERGENCE OF SOURCES

Section 1 🔹 Compliance Obligation upon Obligation works, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 2 🔹 Conformity technologies to meet Compliance Law requirements. Some examples in Digital Law, by 🕴️Emmanuel Netter

Section 3 🔹 Legal Constraint and Company Strategies in Compliance matters, by 🕴️Jean-Philippe Denis & 🕴️Nathalie Fabbe-Coste

Section 4 🔹 Opposition and convergence of American and European legal systems in Compliance Rules and Systems, by 🕴️Raphaël Gauvain & 🕴️Blanche Balian

Section 5 🔹 In Compliance Law, the legal consequences for Entreprises of their Commitments and Undertakings, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

 

CHAPTER II: INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN SUPPORT OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

Section 1 🔹 How International Arbitration can reinforce the Compliance Obligation, by  🕴️Laurent Aynès

Section 2 🔹 Arbitration consideration of Compliance Obligation for a Sustainable Arbitration Place, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 3 🔹 The Arbitral Tribunal's Award in Kind, in support of the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Eduardo Silva Romero

Section 4 🔹 The use of International Arbitration to reinforce the Compliance Obligation: the example of the construction sector, by 🕴️Christophe Lapp 

Section 5 🔹 The Arbitrator, Judge, Supervisor, Support, by 🕴️Jean-Baptiste Racine

 

TITLE IV.

VIGILANCE, SPEARHEAD OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

Section 1 🔹 Vigilance Obligation, Spearheard and Total Share of the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

 

CHAPTER I: INTENSITIES OF THE VIGILANCE OBLIGATION, SPEARHEAD OF THE COMPLIANCE SYSTEM

Section 2 🔹 Intensity of the Vigilance Obligation by Sectors: the case of Financial Operators, by 🕴️Anne-Claire Rouaud

Section 3 🔹 Intensity of the Vigilance Obligation by Sectors: the case of Digital Operators, by 🕴️Grégoire Loiseau

Section 4 🔹 Intensity of the Vigilance Obligation by Sectors: the case of Energy Operators, by 🕴️Marie Lamoureux

 

CHAPTER II: GENERAL EVOLUTION OF THE VIGILANCE OBLIGATION

Section 1 🔹 Rethinking the Concept of Civil Liability in the light of the Duty of Vigilance, Spearhead of Compliance, by 🕴️Mustapha Mekki

Section 2 🔹 Contracts and clauses, implementation and modalities of the Vigilance Obligation, by 🕴️Gilles J. Martin

Section 3 🔹 Proof that Vigilance has been properly carried out with regard to the Compliance Evidence System, by 🕴️Jean-Christophe Roda

Section 4 🔹 Compliance, Vigilance and Civil Liability: put in order and keep the Reason, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

 

Title V.

THE JUDGE AND THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

Section 1 🔹 Present and Future Challenges of Articulating Principles of Civil and Commercial Procedure with the Logic of Compliance, by 🕴️Thibault Goujon-Bethan

Section 2 🔹 The Judge required for an Effective Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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CONCLUSION

THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION: A BURDEN BORNE BY SYSTEMIC COMPANIES GIVING LIFE TO COMPLIANCE LAW  

(conclusion and key points of the books, free access)

 

 

 

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____

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, Arbitration consideration of Compliance Obligation for a sustainable Arbitration Place", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, 2026, forthcoming.

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📝read the article

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📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published

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► Summary of this article: The first part of this study assesses the evolving relationship between Arbitration Law and Compliance Law, which depends on the very definition of the Compliance Obligation (I). Indeed, these relations have been negative for as long as Compliance has been seen solely in terms of "conformity", i.e. obeying the rules or being punished. These relationships are undergoing a metamorphosis, because the Compliance Obligation refers to a positive and dynamic definition, anchored in the Monumental Goals that companies anchor in the contracts that structure their value chains.

Based on this development, the second part of the study aims to establish the techniques of Arbitration and the office of the arbitrator to increase the systemic efficiency of the Compliance Obligation, thereby strengthening the attractiveness of the Place (II). First and foremost, it is a question of culture: the culture of Compliance must permeate the world of Arbitration, and vice versa. To achieve this, it is advisable to take advantage of the fact that in Compliance Law the distinction between Public and Private Law is less significant, while the concern for the long term of contractually forged structural relationships is essential.

To encourage such a movement to deploy the Compliance Obligation, promoting the strengthening of a Sustainable Arbitration Place (III), the first tool is the contract. Since contracts structure value chains and enable companies to fulfill their legal Compliance Obligation but also to add their own will to it, stipulations or offers relating to Arbitration should be included in them. In addition, the adoption of non-binding texts can set out a guiding principle to ensure that concern for the Monumental Goals is appropriate in order the Compliance Obligation to be taken into account by Arbitrators.

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🌐Follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn

🌐s'abonner à la Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law

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____

► Full reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Le maniement du temps dans le contentieux contractuel impliquant la Compliance : de l’urgence au temps long (The management of time in contractual litigation involving compliance: from urgency to the long term)", in Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Jean Moulin – Lyon 3 University, Contractual disputes involving compliance: procedural and jurisdictional aspects,  Faculty of Law, Lyon, 29 May 2026.

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🧮view the full programme for the event (in French)

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📶view the slides (in French)

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🚧Read the bilingual working paper on which this conference is based

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Read the présenation of the other two papers presented at this conference:

🎥The emergence of contractual disputes involving compliance due to the convergence of legal areas

🎥Appropriate adjudication in contractual disputes involving compliance and its effective enforcement

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📝This lecture will form the basis of a contribution to the book, 📕Compliance et Contrat  with English summaries) 

To be published in the 📚Regulations & Compliance series, a book co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz.

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► Overview of this conference : 

⛏️Find out more  :

🕴🏻J.-M. Coulon and 🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche (eds.), Le temps dans la procédure (Time in Legal Proceedings), 19966

🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, ⚙️Compliance and Contracts,

 

________

 

🌐Follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn

🌐Subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law

🌐Subscribe to the video newsletter MAFR Overhang

🌐Subscribe to the Newsletter MaFR Law & Art

____

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "General Procedural Law, prototype of the Compliance Obligation", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, 2026, forthcoming.

____

📝read the article

____

🚧read the bilingual Working Paper on the basis this article has been written, with more developments, technical references and hyperlinks

____

📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published

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► Summary of this article: At first glance, General Procedural Law seems to be the area the least concerned by the Compliance Obligation, because if the person is obliged by it, mainly large companies, it is precisely, thanks to this Ex Ante, in order to never to have to deal with proceedings, these path that leads to the Judge, that Ex Post figure that in return for the weight of the compliance obligation they have been promised they will never see: any prospect of proceedings would be seeming to signify the very failure of the Compliance Obligation (I).

But not only are the legal rules attached to the Procedure necessary because the Judge is involved, and increasingly so, in compliance mechanisms, but they are also rules of General Procedural Law and not a juxtaposition of civil procedure, criminal procedure, administrative procedure, etc., because the Compliance Obligation itself is not confined either to civil procedure or to criminal procedure, to administrative procedure, etc., which in practice gives primacy to what brings them all together: General Procedural Law (II).

In addition to what might be called the "negative" presence of General Procedural Law, there is also a positive reason, because General Procedural Law is the prototype for "Systemic Compliance Litigation", and in particular for the most advanced aspect of this, namely the duty of vigilance (III). In particular, it governs the actions that can be brought before the Courts (IV), and the principles around which proceedings are conducted, with an increased opposition between the adversarial principle, which marries the Compliance Obligation, since both reflect the principle of Information, and the rights of the defence, which do not necessarily serve them, a clash that will pose a procedural difficulty in principle (V).

Finally, and this "prototype" status is even more justified, because Compliance Law has given companies jurisdiction over the way in which they implement their legal Compliance Obligations, it is by respecting and relying on the principles of General Procedural Law that this must be done, in particular through not only sanctions but also internal investigations (VI).

________

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____

► Référence complète : M.-A. Frison-Roche, "L'émergence du contentieux contractuel impliquant la Compliance par la convergence des matières", in Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Université Jean Moulin - Lyon 3 (,..), Le contentieux contractuel impliquant la Compliance : aspects procéduraux et juridictionnels,  Faculté de droit, Lyon, 29 mai 2026.

____

🧮consulter le programme complet de la manifestation

____

📶consulter les slides

____

🚧Lire le document de travail bilingue sur la base duquel cette conférence est bâti

____

Lire la présentation des deux autres interventions dans ce colloque :

🎥Le maniement du temps dans le contentieux contractuel impliquant la Compliance : de l’urgence au temps long

🎥Le jugement adéquat dans le contentieux contractuel impliquant la Compliance et son exécution efficace

____

🌐Lire le compte-rendu de la conférence et de la manifestation sur LinkedIn

____

📝Cette conférence sera la base d'une contribution dans l'ouvrage, 📕Compliance et Contrat, 

à paraître dans la collection 📚Régulations & Compliance, ouvrage coédité par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Lefebvre-Dalloz.

____

► Présentation de cette conférence introductive du colloque : S'insérant dans un cycle de colloques sur Compliance et Contrat, ce colloque porte sur une hypothèse procédurale et juridictionnelle précise : celle d'un contentieux contractuel qui est porté devant le "juge du contrat", qu'il soit civil ou commercial, devant lequel est alléguée une obligation de compliance. Quels effets procéduraux et juridictionnels cela produit-il ?

⛏️Aller plus loin  :

🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche (codir.), ⚙️Compliance et Contrat, 2026

🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Obligation de Compliance : construire une structure de compliance produisant des effets crédibles au regard des Buts Monumentaux visés par le Législateur, in 🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📕L'obligation de compliance, 2025

De nature introductive, ce premier développement vise à décrive la façon dont la question systémique de la compliance doit entrer dans un litige contractuel (la question de la transformation de principe que cela entre sur ce litige est traité par Thibault Goujon-Béthan, qui en montre les spécificités que cela produit.

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Après avoir rappelé en premier lieu ce qu'est l'obligation de compliance à laquelle certaines organisations sont assujetties et en second lieu souligné le mouvement de juridictionnalisation de la compliance, la conférence décrit tout d'abord la façon dont cette "obligation systémique de compliance va pénétrer dans le contentieux contractuel et va ensuite analyser comment de ce fait la "matière systémique de la compliance" va s'articuler au litige contractuel.

Cette hypothèse est encore assez peu étudiée car, en restreignant l'obligation de compliance à la "conformité", produit un rapport unilatéral à la "masse réglementaire", le contrat (et le contentieux lié) y aurait peu de place.

Au mieux, le contrat serait un "objet passif", la réglementation écrivant ou effaçant des clauses, ce qui est davantage un contentieux réglementaire qu'un contentieux contractuel.

Le développement des "contrats de compliance" et des "clauses de compliance", issus de l'autonomie de la volonté change cela, transposant leur nature systémique et téléologique dans le contentieux qu'un cocontractant ou un tiers va porter devant le juge ordinaire du contrat.

Ce sont surtout les stratégies d'un contractant qui vont insérer dans les éléments du litige la compliance, impliquant donc celle-ci. L'on trouve des décisions de justice qui l'illustrent. Une partie au contrat évoquera son obligation de compliance pour obtenir l'exécution d'une obligation que le contrat ne prévoit pas, ou pour obtenir l'engagement de la responsabiilité contractuelle du cocontractant, ou pour se soustraire à une demande d'exécution de son obligation contractuelle. Dans une stratégie plus globale, le litigant peut évoque son obligation systémique de compliance pour destituer le juge du contrat, ou au contraire pour conférer à celui des pouvoirs que celui-ci n'a pas d'ordinaire.

Cette pénétration stratégique va faire se rencontrer la "matière contractuelle et la "matière de la compliance", la matière étant aussi ce par quoi le juge est saisi. Alors la matière contractuelle est souvent bilatérale, singulière et belligueuse, alors que la "matière de la compliance" est de nature systèmique (ce dont les contentieux répressif et administratif rendent davantage compte) et comprend un part essentiel de gracieux.

⛏️Aller plus loin  :

🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Contrat de compliance, clauses de compliance, 2022

🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝 La part du gracieux dans le traitement juridictionnel de la compliance ,in  📗Mélanges en l'honneur de Dominique d'Ambra, 2026

🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Contrat de compliance, clauses de compliance, 2022

🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🏛️Mission donnée par le garde des Sceaux, ministre de la Justice, Droit de la Compliance, Travaux en cours, 2025 - 2026.

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