► Référence complète : B. Lecourt, "Des obligations d'information en matière de droit de l'homme et d'environnement au devoir de vigilance", in B. Lecourt (dir.) Lebvre - Dalloz, coll. "Thèmes et commentaires", 2025, pp

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📗lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Le devoir européen de vigilance, dans lequel cet article est publié

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🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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Complete reference : Archives de Philosophie du Droit (APD), Le procès, tome 39, ed. Sirey, 1995, 545 p. 

 

Read the forth of cover.

Read the table of contents.

Read the summaries of the articles in English. 

 

See the presentation of other volumes of Archives de Philosophie du Droit.

Référence complète : Lebovici, S., C'est pas juste, in Baranès, W. et Frison-Roche, M.-A., La justice. L'obligation impossible, coll. " Nos valeurs", Éditions Autrement, 1994, p. 16-27.

 

Consulter la présentation générale de l'ouvrage.

Consulter une analyse dans laquelle cet article est cité.

 

« Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent lire l’article via le Drive de Sciences po en allant dans le dossier « MAFR – Régulation ».

The Independent Administrative Authority (IAA) is the legal form that the legislator has most often chosen to build regulatory authorities. The IAA is only its legal form, but French law has attached great importance to it, following the often formalistic tradition of public law. They are thus independent administrative authorities, especially in the legal systems of continental law like France, Germany or Italy.

The essential element is in the last adjective: the "independent" character of the organism. This means that this organ, which is only administrative so has a vocation to be placed in the executive hierarchy, does not obey the Government. In this, regulators have often been presented as free electrons, which posed the problem of their legitimacy, since they could no longer draw upstream in the legitimacy of the Government. This independence also poses the difficulty of their responsibility, the responsibility of the State for their actions, and the accountability of their use of their powers. Moreover, the independence of regulators is sometimes questioned if it is the government that retains the power to appoint the leaders of the regulatory authority. Finally, the budgetary autonomy of the regulator is crucial to ensure its independence, although the authorities having the privilege of benefiting from a budget - which is not included in the LOLF - are very few in number. They are no longer referred to as "independent administrative authorities" but as "Independent Public Authorities", the legislator making a distinction between the two (French Law of 20 January 2017).

The second point concerns the second adjective: that it is an "administrative" body. This corresponds to the traditional idea that regulation is the mechanism by which the State intervenes in the economy, in the image of a kind of deconcentration of ministries, in the Scandinavian model of the agency. If we allow ourselves to be enclosed in this vocabulary, we conclude that this administrative body makes an administrative decision which is the subject of an appeal before a judge. Thus, in the first place, this would be a first instance appeal and not a judgment since the administrative authority is not a court. Secondly, the natural judge of the appeal should be the administrative judge since it is an administrative decision issued by an administrative authority. But in France the Ordinance of 1 December 1986 sur la concurrence et la libéralisation des prix (on competition and price liberalization), because it intended precisely to break the idea of ​​an administered economy in order to impose price freedom on the idea of ​​economic liberalism, required that attacks against the decisions of economic regulators taking the form of IAA are brought before the Court of Appeal of Paris, judicial jurisdiction. Some great authors were even able to conclude that the Paris Court of Appeal had become an administrative court. But today the procedural system has become extremely complex, because according to the IAA and according to the different kinds of decisions adopted, they are subject to an appeal either to the Court of Appeal of Paris or to the Conseil d'État (Council of State) . If one observes the successive laws that modify the system, one finds that after this great position of principle of 1986, the administrative judge gradually takes again its place in the system, in particular in the financial regulation. Is it logical to conclude that we are returning to a spirit of regulation defined as an administrative police and an economy administered by the State?

Finally, the third term is the name itself: "authority". It means in the first place an entity whose power holds before in its "authority". But it marks that it is not a jurisdiction, that it takes unilateral decisions. It was without counting the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the judicial judge! Indeed, Article 6§1 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that everyone has the right to an impartial tribunal in civil and criminal matters. The notion of "criminal matter" does not coincide with the formal traditional concept of criminal law but refers to the broad and concrete factual concept of repression. Thus, by a reasoning which goes backwards, an organization, whatever the qualification that a State has formally conferred on it, which has an activity of repression, acts "in criminal matters". From this alone, in the European sense, it is a "tribunal". This automatically triggers a series of fundamental procedural guarantees for the benefit of the person who is likely to be the subject of a decision on his part. In France, a series of jurisprudence, both of the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation), the Conseil d'État (Council of State) or the Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) has confirmed this juridictionnalization of the AAI.

► Référence complète : D. Esty et M. Hautereau-Boutonnet, "Derrière les procès climatiques français et américains : des systèmes politique, juridique et judiciaire en opposition", D.2022, p.1606 et s.

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Impartiality is the quality, maybe the virtue, that is demanded of the judge, not only the one who is called like that but also the one who has the function to judge the others (maybe without this name).

It can not be defined as the absolute positive aptitude, namely the total absence of prejudice, the heroic aptitude for a person to totally ignore his or her personal opinions and personal history. This heroic virtue is nonsense because not only is it inaccurate, impossible but it is also not desirable because a person is not a machine. It must not be so because good justice is human justice. In this respect, impartiality refers to a philosophical conception of what is justice and what is Regulation, not machines, but systems that must keep the human person in their center (Sunstein).

Thus Impartiality is articulated with the subjective nature of the assessment not only inevitable but also desirable that the judge makes of situations. Because Law is reasonable, Impartiality is defined only negatively: the absence of bias.

Impartiality is defined first and foremost as a subjective and individual quality, namely, the prohibition on the person who makes a decision affecting the situation of others (as is the case of a judge) to a a personal interest in this situation. The constitutional prohibition of being "judge and party" is thus the expression of the principle of impartiality. This definition is in line with the otherwise general requirement of no conflict of interests.

Impartiality is defined secondly as an objective and individual quality, namely the prohibition for a person who has already known of the case to know again (because he or she has already had an opinion about it, this having constituted an objective pre-judgment).

Impartiality is defined thirdly as an objective and structural quality, which obliges the organ which takes judgments to "give to see" a structure that makes it fit for this impartiality, objective impartiality that third parties can see and which generates confidence in its ability to judge without bias. This theory of English origin has been taken up by European law in the interpretation given to the European Convention on Human Rights. The expression "apparent impartiality" has sometimes given rise to misunderstandings. Indeed, far from being less demanding (in that it is "only" to be satisfied with an appearance of impartiality and not of a true impartiality), it is rather a matter of demanding more, not only of a true impartiality, but also of an impartiality which can be seen by all. This leads in particular to the obligation of transparency, to which the institutions, notably the State, were not necessarily bound by the law.

For a long time the Regulator, in that it took the form of an Administrative Authority, was not considered a jurisdiction, it was long considered that it was not directly subject to this requirement. It is clear from the case law that the national courts now consider that the regulatory authorities are courts "in the European sense", which implies a fundamental procedural guarantee for the operators concerned

Legally, the State is a public law subject defined by territory, people and institutions. It acts in the international space and emits norms. Politically, it has the legitimacy required to express the will of the social body and to exercise the violence of which it deprives the other subjects of law. It is often recognizable by its power: its use of public force, its budgetary power, its jurisdictional power. These three powers, declining or being challenged by private, international and more satisfying mechanisms, some predicted the disappearance of the State, to deplore it or to dance on its corpse.

With such a background, in current theories of Regulation, primarily constructed by economic thought and at first sight one might say that the State is above all the enemy. And this for two main reasons. The first is theoretical and of a negative nature. The advocates of the theory of regulation deny the State the political qualities set out above. The State would not be a "person" but rather a group of individuals, civil servants, elected officials and other concrete human beings, expressing nothing but their particular interests, coming into conflict with other interests, and using their powers to serve the former rather than the latter as everyone else. The Regulation theory, adjoining the theory of the agency, is then aimed at controlling public agents and elected representatives in whom there is no reason to trust a priori.

The second reason is practical and positive. The State would not be a "person" but an organization. Here we find the same perspective as for the concept of enterprise, which classical lawyers conceive as a person or a group of people, while economists who conceive of the world through the market represent it as an organization. The state as an organization should be "efficient" or even "optimal". It is then the pragmatic function of the Regulation Law. When it is governed by traditional law, entangled by that it would be an almost religious illusions of the general interest, or even the social contract, it is suboptimal. The Regulation purpose is about making it more effective.

To this end, as an organization, the State is divided into independent regulatory agencies or independent administrative authorities that manage the subjects as close as possible, which is fortunate in reducing the asymmetry of information and in reviving trust in a direct link. The unitary, distant and arrogant State is abandoned for a flexible and pragmatic conception of a strategic state (without capital ...) that would finally have understood that it is an organization like any other ...

Competition law adopts this conception of the State, which it posed from the beginning that it was an economic operator like any other. This is how this conception which would be  more "neutral" of the world is often presented.

Successive crises, whether sanitary or financial, have produced a pendulum effect.

Now, the notions of general interest or common goods are credited of an autonomous value, and the necessity of surpassing immediate interests and of finding persons to bear superior interests or to take charge of the interests of others, even a non-immediate one, emerged.

Thus, the State or the public authority, reappears in the globalization. The Compliance Law or the Corporal Social Responsibility of the crucial companies are converging towards a consideration of the State, which can not be reduced to a pure and simple organization receptacle of externalities.

 

► Référence complète : B. Frydman, "Comme l'IA transforme le droit et la justice", in Formes de l'intelligence, Collège de France, 16 octobre 2025

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► Voir le colloque Formes de l'intelligence, dans lequel la conférence s'insère.

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► regarder la conférence

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►Résumé par l'auteur : "Les techniques d’IA ont été introduites depuis longtemps dans le domaine du gouvernement et de la régulation, et se déploient désormais à grande vitesse dans toutes les branches du droit en transformant considérablement les outils et la logique de l’action administrative et judiciaire. Ce développement s’inscrit dans le projet formulé déjà par Leibniz au XVIIe siècle d’un droit mathématisé et calculable, mais recourt à des techniques, comme le profilage, qui trouvent leur source première dans l’usage normatif des probabilités au XIXe siècle. Leur déploiement à large échelle, souvent de manière prématurée et sans contrôle adéquat, met au défi les bases de l’État de droit, spécialement le contrôle des pouvoirs, la protection des droits et la motivation des décisions qui les affectent. En dépit de plusieurs catastrophes d’ampleur industrielle déjà causées par les erreurs qu’elles ont provoquées, ces innovations s’inscrivent dans un modèle de régulation qui est là pour durer et qui nécessite la mise en place de contre-feux et de garanties adaptées qui reposent également sur l’innovation technologique."

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►Notes prises : Soulignant que la population est de plus en plus favorable à ce que les I.A.  gouvernent et jugent à la place des êtres humains, l'orateur insiste sur le fait que le modèle auquel on se réfère est le modèle scientifique. Le gouvernement n'est plus adossé sur la légitimité politique mais sur la formalisation "scientifique". L'IA est le prolongement de cela et notamment Grotius demande un Droit laïc reposant sur la force de la Raison euclidienne reprise par le Droit à travers le syllogisme. Domat poursuit en mettant les lois dans leur "ordre naturel".

C'est surtout Leibniz qui revendique le caractère scientifiquement incontestable du droit et de son application, pouvant se passer de l'approximation des juges et des avocat. Cette conception est aujourd'hui reprise. L'analyse économique du droit, concevant celui-ci comme un mode de gestion de la société, reprend l'idée (Coase).

L'histoire de l'IA est construite de la même façon, tout d'abord en matière de "conforme / non-conforme", puis en profilage des personnages (pour détecter notamment les fraudes, avec des cas préoccupants d'erreurs). Or, on ne connait pas les critères de qualification utilisés par l'IA.

L'orateur proteste car l'IA connexionniste qui choisit la décision ne révéle pas la façon de choisir la décision. Or, c'est une autre IA qui motivera la décision. Et c'est encore une autre IA, agentique, qui mettra en oeuvre. 

La Loi a interdit les décisions automatiques : loi 1978, RGPD (mais exceptions possibles et c'est de fait autorisé dans le privé et par des lois spécialtes cela est possible dans l'Etat si justifié),  IA (exceptions pour le crédit social, IA à haut risque sont autorisés mais il faut des garanties).

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►Référence complète : Galli, M., Une justice pénale propre aux personnes morales : Réflexions sur la convention judiciaire d'intérêt public , Revue de Sciences Criminelle, 2018, pp. 359-385.

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► Référence complète : E da Allada. (dir.), Devoir de vigilance. Quelles perspectives africaines ?, Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. "Thèmes & Commentaires, 2026, sous presse.

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►Voir notamment la présentation des contributions :

 

► Référence complète  : Conseil constitutionnel, déc.  n°25-1184 QPC, 6 mars 2026, Conseil national des barreaux et autres

[Expérimentation d’une contribution pour la justice économique due pour chaque instance devant le tribunal des activités économiques]

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►lire la décision

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, 2026, to be published

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📕In parallel, a book in French L'Obligation de compliance, is published in the collection "Régulations & Compliance" co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz. 

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📚This book is inserted in this series created by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche for developing Compliance Law.

 read the presentations of the other books of this Compliance Series:

• further books:

🕴️M.A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Evidential System, 2027

🕴️M.A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance and Contract, 2027

 

• previous books:

​🕴️M.A. Frison-Roche (ed), 📘Compliance Juridictionnalisation, 2023

🕴️M.A. Frison-Roche (ed), 📘Compliance Monumental Goals, 2022

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📘Compliance Tools, 2021

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► go to the general presentation of this 📚Series ​Compliance & Regulation, conceived, founded et managed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, co-published par the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant. 

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🧮the book follows the cycle of colloquia organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its Universities partners.

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► general presentation of the book: Compliance is sometimes presented as something that cannot be avoided, which is tantamount to seeing it as the legal obligation par excellence, Criminal Law being its most appropriate mode of expression. However, this is not so evident. Moreover, it is becoming difficult to find a unity to the set of compliance tools, encompassing what refers to a moral representation of the world, or even to the cultures specific to each company, Compliance Law only having to produce incentives or translate this ethical movement. The obligation of compliance is therefore difficult to define.

This difficulty to define affecting the obligation of compliance reflects the uncertainty that still affects Compliance Law in which this obligation develops. Indeed, if we were to limit this branch of law to the obligation to "be conform" with the applicable regulations, the obligation would then be located more in these "regulations", the classical branches of Law which are Contract Law and Tort Law organising "Obligations" paradoxically remaining distant from it. In practice, however, it is on the one hand Liability actions that give life to legal requirements, while companies make themselves responsible through commitments, often unilateral, while contracts multiply, the articulation between legal requirements and corporate and contractual organisations ultimately creating a new way of "governing" not only companies but also what is external to them, so that the Monumental Goals, that Compliance Law substantially aims at, are achieved. 

The various Compliance Tools illustrate this spectrum of the Compliance Obligation which varies in its intensity and takes many forms, either as an extension of the classic legal instruments, as in the field of information, or in a more novel way through specific instruments, such as whistleblowing or vigilance. The contract, in that it is by nature an Ex-Ante instrument and not very constrained by borders, can then appear as a natural instrument in the compliance system, as is the Judge who is the guarantor of the proper execution of Contract and Tort laws. The relationship between companies, stakeholders and political authorities is thus renewed.

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🏗️general construction of the book

The book opens with a substantial Introduction, putting the different sort of obligations of compliance in legal categories for showing that companies must build structures of compliance (obligation of result) and act to contribute with states and stakeholders to reach Monumental Goals (obligation of means). 

The first part is devoted to the definition of the Compliance Obligation. 

The second part presents the articulation of Compliance obligation with the other branchs of Law, because the specific obligation is built by Compliance Law, as new substantial branch of Law but also by many other branchs of Law.

The third part develops the pratical means established to obtained the Compliance Obligation to be effective, efficace and efficient.

The fourth part takes the Obligation  of Vigilance as an illustration of all these considerations and the discussion about the future of this sparehead fo the Compliance Obligation . 

The fifth part refers to the place and the role of the judges, natural characters for any obligation. 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

 

ANCHORING THE SO DIVERSE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATIONS IN THEIR NATURE, REGIMES AND FORCE TO BRING OUT THE VERY UNITY OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION, MAKING IT COMPREHENSIBLE AND PRACTICABLE 

 

🔹 Compliance Obligation: building a compliance structure that produces credible results withe regard to the Monumentals Goals targeted by the Legislator, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

 

TITLE I.

IDENTIFYING THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

 

CHAPTER I: NATURE OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

Section 1 🔹 Will, Heart and Calculation, the three marks surrounding the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 2 🔹 Debt, as the basis of the compliance obligation, by 🕴️Bruno Deffains

Section 3 🔹 Compliance Obligation and Human Rights, by 🕴️Jean-Baptiste Racine

Section 4 🔹 Compliance Obligation and changes in Sovereignty and Citizenship, by 🕴️René Sève

Section 5 🔹 The definition of the Compliance Obligation in Cybersecurity, by 🕴️Michel Séjean

 

CHAPTER II: SPACES OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

Section 1 🔹 Industrial Entities and Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Etienne Maclouf

Section 2 🔹 Compliance, Value Chains and Service Economy, by 🕴️Lucien Rapp

Section 3 🔹 Compliance and conflict of laws. International Law of Vigilance-Conformity, based on applications in Europe, by 🕴️Louis d'Avout 

 

TITLE II.

ARTICULATING THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION WITH OTHER BRANCHES OF LAW

 

Section 1 🔹 Tax Law and Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Daniel Gutmann

Section 2 🔹 General Procedural Law, prototype of the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 3 🔹 Corporate and Financial Markets Law facing the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Anne-Valérie Le Fur

Section 4 🔹 Transformation of Governance and Vigilance Obligation, by 🕴️Véronique Magnier

Section 5 🔹 The Relation between Tort Law and Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Jean-Sébastien Borghetti

Section 6 🔹 Environmental and Climate Compliance, by 🕴️Marta Torre-Schaub

Section 7 🔹 Competition Law and Compliance Law, by 🕴️Jean-Christophe Roda

Section 8 🔹 The Compliance Obligation in Global Law, by 🕴️Benoît Frydman & 🕴️Alice Briegleb

Section 9 🔹 Environmental an Climatic Dimensions of the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Marta Torre-Schaub

Section 10 🔹 Judge of Insolvency Law and Compliance Obligations, by 🕴️Jean-Baptiste Barbièri

 

TITLE III.

COMPLIANCE: GIVE AND TAKE THE MEANS TO OBLIGE

 

CHAPTER I: COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION: THE CONVERGENCE OF SOURCES

Section 1 🔹 Compliance Obligation upon Obligation works, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 2 🔹 Conformity technologies to meet Compliance Law requirements. Some examples in Digital Law, by 🕴️Emmanuel Netter

Section 3 🔹 Legal Constraint and Company Strategies in Compliance matters, by 🕴️Jean-Philippe Denis & 🕴️Nathalie Fabbe-Coste

Section 4 🔹 Opposition and convergence of American and European legal systems in Compliance Rules and Systems, by 🕴️Raphaël Gauvain & 🕴️Blanche Balian

Section 5 🔹 In Compliance Law, the legal consequences for Entreprises of their Commitments and Undertakings, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

 

CHAPTER II: INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN SUPPORT OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

Section 1 🔹 How International Arbitration can reinforce the Compliance Obligation, by  🕴️Laurent Aynès

Section 2 🔹 Arbitration consideration of Compliance Obligation for a Sustainable Arbitration Place, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 3 🔹 The Arbitral Tribunal's Award in Kind, in support of the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Eduardo Silva Romero

Section 4 🔹 The use of International Arbitration to reinforce the Compliance Obligation: the example of the construction sector, by 🕴️Christophe Lapp 

Section 5 🔹 The Arbitrator, Judge, Supervisor, Support, by 🕴️Jean-Baptiste Racine

 

TITLE IV.

VIGILANCE, SPEARHEAD OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

Section 1 🔹 Vigilance Obligation, Spearheard and Total Share of the Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

 

CHAPTER I: INTENSITIES OF THE VIGILANCE OBLIGATION, SPEARHEAD OF THE COMPLIANCE SYSTEM

Section 2 🔹 Intensity of the Vigilance Obligation by Sectors: the case of Financial Operators, by 🕴️Anne-Claire Rouaud

Section 3 🔹 Intensity of the Vigilance Obligation by Sectors: the case of Digital Operators, by 🕴️Grégoire Loiseau

Section 4 🔹 Intensity of the Vigilance Obligation by Sectors: the case of Energy Operators, by 🕴️Marie Lamoureux

 

CHAPTER II: GENERAL EVOLUTION OF THE VIGILANCE OBLIGATION

Section 1 🔹 Rethinking the Concept of Civil Liability in the light of the Duty of Vigilance, Spearhead of Compliance, by 🕴️Mustapha Mekki

Section 2 🔹 Contracts and clauses, implementation and modalities of the Vigilance Obligation, by 🕴️Gilles J. Martin

Section 3 🔹 Proof that Vigilance has been properly carried out with regard to the Compliance Evidence System, by 🕴️Jean-Christophe Roda

Section 4 🔹 Compliance, Vigilance and Civil Liability: put in order and keep the Reason, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

 

Title V.

THE JUDGE AND THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION

Section 1 🔹 Present and Future Challenges of Articulating Principles of Civil and Commercial Procedure with the Logic of Compliance, by 🕴️Thibault Goujon-Bethan

Section 2 🔹 The Judge required for an Effective Compliance Obligation, by 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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CONCLUSION

THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION: A BURDEN BORNE BY SYSTEMIC COMPANIES GIVING LIFE TO COMPLIANCE LAW  

(conclusion and key points of the books, free access)

 

 

 

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, Arbitration consideration of Compliance Obligation for a sustainable Arbitration Place", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, 2026, forthcoming.

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📝read the article

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📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published

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► Summary of this article: The first part of this study assesses the evolving relationship between Arbitration Law and Compliance Law, which depends on the very definition of the Compliance Obligation (I). Indeed, these relations have been negative for as long as Compliance has been seen solely in terms of "conformity", i.e. obeying the rules or being punished. These relationships are undergoing a metamorphosis, because the Compliance Obligation refers to a positive and dynamic definition, anchored in the Monumental Goals that companies anchor in the contracts that structure their value chains.

Based on this development, the second part of the study aims to establish the techniques of Arbitration and the office of the arbitrator to increase the systemic efficiency of the Compliance Obligation, thereby strengthening the attractiveness of the Place (II). First and foremost, it is a question of culture: the culture of Compliance must permeate the world of Arbitration, and vice versa. To achieve this, it is advisable to take advantage of the fact that in Compliance Law the distinction between Public and Private Law is less significant, while the concern for the long term of contractually forged structural relationships is essential.

To encourage such a movement to deploy the Compliance Obligation, promoting the strengthening of a Sustainable Arbitration Place (III), the first tool is the contract. Since contracts structure value chains and enable companies to fulfill their legal Compliance Obligation but also to add their own will to it, stipulations or offers relating to Arbitration should be included in them. In addition, the adoption of non-binding texts can set out a guiding principle to ensure that concern for the Monumental Goals is appropriate in order the Compliance Obligation to be taken into account by Arbitrators.

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "General Procedural Law, prototype of the Compliance Obligation", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, 2026, forthcoming.

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📝read the article

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🚧read the bilingual Working Paper on the basis this article has been written, with more developments, technical references and hyperlinks

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📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published

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► Summary of this article: At first glance, General Procedural Law seems to be the area the least concerned by the Compliance Obligation, because if the person is obliged by it, mainly large companies, it is precisely, thanks to this Ex Ante, in order to never to have to deal with proceedings, these path that leads to the Judge, that Ex Post figure that in return for the weight of the compliance obligation they have been promised they will never see: any prospect of proceedings would be seeming to signify the very failure of the Compliance Obligation (I).

But not only are the legal rules attached to the Procedure necessary because the Judge is involved, and increasingly so, in compliance mechanisms, but they are also rules of General Procedural Law and not a juxtaposition of civil procedure, criminal procedure, administrative procedure, etc., because the Compliance Obligation itself is not confined either to civil procedure or to criminal procedure, to administrative procedure, etc., which in practice gives primacy to what brings them all together: General Procedural Law (II).

In addition to what might be called the "negative" presence of General Procedural Law, there is also a positive reason, because General Procedural Law is the prototype for "Systemic Compliance Litigation", and in particular for the most advanced aspect of this, namely the duty of vigilance (III). In particular, it governs the actions that can be brought before the Courts (IV), and the principles around which proceedings are conducted, with an increased opposition between the adversarial principle, which marries the Compliance Obligation, since both reflect the principle of Information, and the rights of the defence, which do not necessarily serve them, a clash that will pose a procedural difficulty in principle (V).

Finally, and this "prototype" status is even more justified, because Compliance Law has given companies jurisdiction over the way in which they implement their legal Compliance Obligations, it is by respecting and relying on the principles of General Procedural Law that this must be done, in particular through not only sanctions but also internal investigations (VI).

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► Référence complète : P. Lingibé, "Confidentialité des juristes d’entreprise : le Conseil constitutionnel consacre-t-il une révolution… ou un équilibre précaire ?", Actu-Juridique, 3 février 2026

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► Référence complète : S. Grosbon et S. Robert (dir.), Critique écosystémique des droits humains, éd. DICE, 2026.

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► Accéder à l'ouvrage : cliquer ICI

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► Full reference : M.-A. Frison-Roche, "The Future of Compliance", series Compliance, Centre Perelman, Brussels, 23 February 2026.

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🧮view the full programme for the series Compliance (in French)

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► English presentation of this concluding conference in the series Compliance : The future of Compliance: who knows what it holds? Anyone who practises and studies the texts, litigation, structures and behaviours will have to admit that they do not know what will become of what has emerged as a new branch of law. It is not easily recognised, probably for three reasons. Firstly, because the birth of a new branch of law is an unusual phenomenon, whose disruptive and regenerative waves are felt in all branches of law and other regulatory systems, accompanying and reflecting the new world we have already entered, whether we like it or not. Secondly, because it is unpleasant (especially if you are a professor...) to begin and conclude with the fact that you do not know. Thirdly, because it is not very marketable, and in today's large and growing "compliance market", it is not very smart, if you want to sell compliance products (whether they be algorithms, new services to be linked to the highest level of companies, specialities in law firms, new chairs in various schools), to say that you don't know. So the experts say they know. For my part, I meet many people who are "experts" and who are "knowledgeable". What is surprising is the diversity of their discourse, which casts doubt on the solidity of the projection, particularly on the meaning of words: for example, not only words that could be described as "new" (which we then try to anchor in old words) such as "compliance/conformity" and "governance", but also words that we are undoubtedly more familiar with, such as "commitment" and "responsibility" or "sanction", i.e. the very pillars of the matter.

Why is this a cause for concern, apart from the fact that it is always better to know what we are talking about, rather than everyone talking in their own corner, for their own compliance corpus, for their like-minded friends, with the subject matter becoming increasingly siloed? Because the object of Compliance Law is the future. So, the future of this branch of law which its object is the future is by nature very uncertain.

 

It will therefore be assumed in advance that not knowing the future is a major difficulty when it comes to Compliance Law, in that this branch of law is unified in that it is ex ante and its object is the future. The difficulty is neither of the same nature nor of the same magnitude when it comes to the legislator, the "regulator", the regulated company (calculating or political), or the judge faced with systemic compliance litigation.

That said, in a first part, one can imagine the future possibilities for Compliance (because that is what it boils down to, given the number of candidates eager to seize the instruments of power that are the " Compliance tools"). It is not a foregone conclusion that this future will be governed by Law. The consequences could take care of that. Or the order given by the leader (Trump, for instance), and that would go down all the better as he states that he certainly does not care about human beings but that he wields the power of Compliance to restore the climate balance (through Chinese regulations): except to say that there is no unified Compliance Law. That there would be one for the climate and another for human rights. So what about the future consistency of European Law, which links the two in the CSRD and the CS3D? Particularly in value chains. The question then is: what will be the uniqueness of Compliance Law in the future?

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In a second part, since we do not know how things will turn out, from omnibus to omnibus, from a government hostile to the Law to a government appealing to the Due Process, from case law to case law, from special law to common law, we must weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of the various perspectives. There is never one perspective where everything is good and another where everything is bad, because in that case there would be no choice and no policy: it would be enough to have information, to be "rational" and to go for the right solution rather than the wrong one. Beyond general statements that a combination of compliance and ethics is welcome, which is not in doubt in the superb statements made in this regard, it is necessary to look at the advantages and disadvantages of the direction we may take. Firstly, there is the disappearance of Compliance Law, with the advantage of reducing the regulatory burden on those subject to it and the disadvantage of abandoning altruistic and global ambitions (these two Monumental Goals may overlap). Secundly, it could involve the creation of a global empire, with the advantage of a simplified American empire, whether extraterritorialised by the state or by companies and their governance or technology, with the advantage of a Western model and the disadvantage of the crushing of "mondialisation" by globalisation and the disappearance of the specific ambitions of States. Thirdly, it may be a contribution to a war between powers, particularly through the European DSA and the data war, with the advantage of European maturity in Compliance Law as an extension of Regulatory Law and the disadvantage that we could move from a war in the metaphorical sense (never use metaphors in Law) to a war. Quaterly, it could be a new rule of Law in which systemic companies participate in an alliance to achieve Monumental political Goals decided by States and political authorities, preserving systems for the future ("sustainability") so that human beings are not crushed by them but benefit from them. The disadvantage is that we have to relearn the Law, because although it has nothing to do with conformity, which is only an instrument, Compliance Law changes all branches of Law and requires the integration of other techniques, particularly political and technological ones.

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In third part, in practice, we must strive in advance to reduce the disadvantages associated with the shortcomings of possible future developments in Compliance Law, just as we must strive in advance to increase the advantages associated with the qualities of possible future developments in Compliance Law. The disadvantage lies in the very nature of Compliance Law, namely its great power, because unlike Competition Law, it calls for and increases power. We must therefore counteract the prospect of compliance techniques, particularly those related to Information, being monopolised by those who only want to use them to consolidate or extend their power, laughing at Ethics and Monumental Goals. This means that supervision techniques on the one hand and a renewed role for judges on the other must be considered. The quality attached to possible futures stems from the fact that we could uphold a "Global Law" (reference to the work of Benoît Frydman, among others) and that, faced with the possible disappearance of Public International Law and the imperative preservation of value chains, particularly in the context of possible war, the alliance between supervised systemic companies and the political authorities in charge of the future of the social group that legitimises them may appear to be a legitimate, effective, efficiate and efficient system.

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⛏️Go further  :

🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Law, 2016

🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Conceiving Power, 2021

🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📕Compliance Monumental Goals, 2022 

🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝The Birth of a New Branch of Law: Compliance Law, 2024

🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Law and conformity: distinguishing between them to better articulate them, 2024

🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📕Complianceo Obligation, 2025

🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance Law and Systemic Litigation, 2025

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► Full reference : M.-A. Frison-Roche, Taking African legal geography into account to achieve an efficient vigilance system, working paper, August 2025/February 2026

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🎤This working paper follows on from the closing address at the symposium Devoir de vigilance, quelles perspectives africaines ? Regards croisés en droit international, droit comparé et droit OHADA (Vigilance Duty: what are the prospects in Africa? Perspectives from international law, comparative law and OHADA Law, organised by the Faculty of Law of Bordeaux, through its Institut de Recherches en Droit des Affaires et du Patrimoine - IRDAP (Institute for Research in Business and Property Law), held on 15 November 2024. 

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📝This working paper forms the basis of the article "Considérer la géographie juridique africaine pour y réussir l'obligation de vigilance", which concludes the volume edited by Eustache da Allada in 2026 by Éditions Lefebvre-Dalloz, in the “Thèmes & Commentaires” collection,📗Devoir de vigilance, quelles perspectives africaines ? Regards croisés en droit international, droit comparé et droit OHADA (Vigilance Duty: what are the African perspectives? Comparative perspectives in international law, comparative law and OHADA Law).

To this end, following an initial draft in August 2025, it was revised a second time to better incorporate the written contributions that make up the book, since the article on which it is based sets out a personal approach drawing on external research whilst also needing to synthesise these contributions.

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► Summary of the working paper :  The French “Vigilance” Act of 2017 incorporated the technical provisions and the spirit of the “Sapin 2” Act of 2016. They share a common goal. They have been and remain a common source of controversy and passion. At their heart lies the establishment of a “compliance obligation”, for which vigilance techniques form the “edge ” in serving a grand ambition: to protect systems from risks, both now and in the future, in order to protect the people involved in them.

The passion that continues to surround the Vigilance Act, which gave rise to the European CS3D , is misguided, because the law and passion are never allies. Some would passionately want to see vigilance triumph by condemning companies to perform miracles; others would passionately want to see the destruction of all the texts that established the very concept of this Compliance Law, built upon these Humanist Monumental Goals.

But let us acknowledge that in these debates on the Vigilance Obligation, which is being legally implemented across value chains, Africa is often cited as an example in a general discussion. It is not often considered as a distinct case with its own legal landscape. No reliance is placed on its strengths or on its own legal mechanisms, even though value chains – particularly industrial ones – so often lead to it, both now and in the future. Through analyses of the Vigilance Obligation, Africa is perceived as a place of retribution or of a new form of paternalism, and when its future is envisaged, prospects seem to be lacking, even though the very essence of compliance—and therefore of Vigilance—is the future. 

If we take a less confrontational view and focus instead on the ‘legal geography’ of African countries and their social and inter-state structures, we see that the concern for others, both present and future – which ultimately constitutes the Monumental Goal of Compliance Law and thus of the Vigilance Obligation – is more prevalent in Africa than it is in Europe, which is now built upon legal individualism. This concern for others is reflected in legal mechanisms akin to mediation and various legal structures that our own institutions would do well to heed: our legislators before adopting bills, and our judges who might listen to them as amici curiae before reaching a decision.

If we turn our attention to the African continent, which is exploited by certain segments of value chains, and to labour organisations, it becomes clear that here too, legislation and sanctions are not the whole story. Compliance techniques that make use of soft law and the contractual frameworks underpinning the chains themselves can remove the element of abstraction that is, by nature, inherent in general legislation. Moving forward through contracts under the supervision and with the support of the courts is an approach that could prove more fruitful than well-intentioned legislation, which has served as a catalyst, in line with the privileged position of contract law within OHADA.

This serves to enhance the judge’s authority. The Compliance Judicialisation is also linked to the growing connection between Compliance and Contracts. However, it appears that not only can European judges specialising in Compliance Law and Vigilance Obligation thus rule on matters concerning Africa, which they can only know from a distance – though it is the lot of every judge to be an outsider – but African and inter-state Courts, notably through OHADA, can address the Vigilance Obligation because value chains are constituted by contracts. By developing it not as a foreign concept to be assimilated, but as that which expresses the very heart of the Law in Africa: concern for others, solidarity, the search for compromises and solutions so that the social and environmental system – that is to say, the human system – may endure into the Future.

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🔓Read the developments below⤵️

► Référence complète : Com. (sect.), 4 fév. 2026, n°22-22.609, 

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