Documentary Base : Doctrine
Référence : Beauvais, P., Méthode transactionnelle et justice pénale, in Gaudemet, A. (dir.), La compliance : un nouveau monde? Aspects d'une mutation du droit, coll. "Colloques", éd. Panthéon-Assas, Panthéon-Assas, 2016, pp. 79-90.
Documentary Base : Doctrine
Référence complète : Bossuet, sermon De l’éminente dignité des pauvres, 1659.
Édité par Alain Supiot, 64 p. , Éditions Mille et un nuits, 2015.
Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary
First of all, the Regulation and Compliance Law is difficult to understand in others languages than English, through translation, for example in French. This corpus of rules and institutions suffers from ambiguity and confusion because of its vocabulary of Anglophone origin, in which words or expressions that are similar or identical have not the same meaning in English and, for example, in French..
To every lord all honor, this is the case for the term "Regulation".
In English, "regulation" refers to the phenomenon which the French language expresses by the term "Régulation". But it can also aim at the complete fitting of what will hold a sector reaching a market failure and in which regulation is only one tool among others. The expression "regulatory system" will be used with precision, but also the term "Regulation", the use of the capital letter indicating the difference between the simple administrative power to take texts ("regulation") and the entire system which supports the sector ("Regulation"). It is inevitable that in a quick reading, or even by the play of digital, which overwrites the capital letters, and the automatic translations, this distinction of formulation, which stands for a lower / upper case, disappears. And confusion arises.
The consequences are considerable. It is notably because of this homonymy, that frequently in the French language one puts at the same level the Droit de la Régulation ("regulatory law, Regulation") and the réglementation (regulation). It will be based on such an association, of a tautological nature, to assert that "by nature" the Regulatory Law is "public law", since the author of the reglementation (regulation) is a person of public law, in particular the State or Independent administrative authorities such as Regulators. There remains the current and difficult justification for the considerable presence of contracts, arbitrators, etc. Except to criticize the very idea of Regulatory Law, because it would be the sign of a sort of victory of the private interests, since conceived by instruments of private law.
Thus two major disadvantages appear. First of all, it maintains in the Law of Regulation the summa divisio of Public and Private Law, which is no longer able to account for the evolution of Law in this field and leads observers, notably economists or international Institutions, to assert that the Common Law system would be more adapted today to the world economy notably because if it does indeed place administrative law, constitutional law, etc., it does not conceive them through the distinction Law Public / private law, as the Continental system of Civil Law continues to do.
Secondly, no doubt because this new Law draws on economic and financial theories that are mainly built in the United Kingdom and the United States, the habit is taken to no longer translate. In other languages, for example, texts written in French are phrases such as "le Régulateur doit être accountable".
It is inaccurate that the idea of accountability is reducible to the idea of "responsibility". The authors do not translate it, they do not recopy and insert it in texts written in French.
One passes from the "translation-treason" to the absence of translation, that is to say to the domination of the system of thought whose word is native, here the U.K. and the U.S.A.
One of the current major issues of this phenomenon is in the very term of "Compliance". The French term "conformité" does not translate it. To respect what compliance is, it is appropriate for the moment to recopy the word itself, so as not to denature the concept by a translation. The challenge is to find a francophone word that expresses this new idea, particularly with regard to legal systems that are not common law, so that their general framework remains.
Documentary Base : Doctrine
Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary
The Independent Administrative Authority (IAA) is the legal form that the legislator has most often chosen to build regulatory authorities. The IAA is only its legal form, but French law has attached great importance to it, following the often formalistic tradition of public law. They are thus independent administrative authorities, especially in the legal systems of continental law like France, Germany or Italy.
The essential element is in the last adjective: the "independent" character of the organism. This means that this organ, which is only administrative so has a vocation to be placed in the executive hierarchy, does not obey the Government. In this, regulators have often been presented as free electrons, which posed the problem of their legitimacy, since they could no longer draw upstream in the legitimacy of the Government. This independence also poses the difficulty of their responsibility, the responsibility of the State for their actions, and the accountability of their use of their powers. Moreover, the independence of regulators is sometimes questioned if it is the government that retains the power to appoint the leaders of the regulatory authority. Finally, the budgetary autonomy of the regulator is crucial to ensure its independence, although the authorities having the privilege of benefiting from a budget - which is not included in the LOLF - are very few in number. They are no longer referred to as "independent administrative authorities" but as "Independent Public Authorities", the legislator making a distinction between the two (French Law of 20 January 2017).
The second point concerns the second adjective: that it is an "administrative" body. This corresponds to the traditional idea that regulation is the mechanism by which the State intervenes in the economy, in the image of a kind of deconcentration of ministries, in the Scandinavian model of the agency. If we allow ourselves to be enclosed in this vocabulary, we conclude that this administrative body makes an administrative decision which is the subject of an appeal before a judge. Thus, in the first place, this would be a first instance appeal and not a judgment since the administrative authority is not a court. Secondly, the natural judge of the appeal should be the administrative judge since it is an administrative decision issued by an administrative authority. But in France the Ordinance of 1 December 1986 sur la concurrence et la libéralisation des prix (on competition and price liberalization), because it intended precisely to break the idea of an administered economy in order to impose price freedom on the idea of economic liberalism, required that attacks against the decisions of economic regulators taking the form of IAA are brought before the Court of Appeal of Paris, judicial jurisdiction. Some great authors were even able to conclude that the Paris Court of Appeal had become an administrative court. But today the procedural system has become extremely complex, because according to the IAA and according to the different kinds of decisions adopted, they are subject to an appeal either to the Court of Appeal of Paris or to the Conseil d'État (Council of State) . If one observes the successive laws that modify the system, one finds that after this great position of principle of 1986, the administrative judge gradually takes again its place in the system, in particular in the financial regulation. Is it logical to conclude that we are returning to a spirit of regulation defined as an administrative police and an economy administered by the State?
Finally, the third term is the name itself: "authority". It means in the first place an entity whose power holds before in its "authority". But it marks that it is not a jurisdiction, that it takes unilateral decisions. It was without counting the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the judicial judge! Indeed, Article 6§1 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that everyone has the right to an impartial tribunal in civil and criminal matters. The notion of "criminal matter" does not coincide with the formal traditional concept of criminal law but refers to the broad and concrete factual concept of repression. Thus, by a reasoning which goes backwards, an organization, whatever the qualification that a State has formally conferred on it, which has an activity of repression, acts "in criminal matters". From this alone, in the European sense, it is a "tribunal". This automatically triggers a series of fundamental procedural guarantees for the benefit of the person who is likely to be the subject of a decision on his part. In France, a series of jurisprudence, both of the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation), the Conseil d'État (Council of State) or the Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) has confirmed this juridictionnalization of the AAI.
Documentary Base : Doctrine
Documentary Base : Doctrine
Teachings : Grandes Questions du Droit, Semestre d'Automne 2014
Documentary Base : Doctrine
Référence complète : Archives de Philosophie du Droit (APD), Le droit et l'immatériel, tome 43, ed. Sirey, 1999, 521 p.
Lire la présentation de l'article de Hélène Ruiz Fabri, Immatériel, territorialité et État.
Voir la présentation d'autres tomes des Archives de Philosophie du Droit.
Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary
The distinction between "Public Law" and "Private Law" is important. In the systems of Continental Law, or still called under Roman-Germanic Law, or even called Civil Law systems, it is even around it that legal systems are built: it can be a basic distinction, a summa divisio, as it it in the Civil Law systems. In the so-called Common Law or Anglo-American systems, the distinction is less fundamental, but it remains, justifying in particular that the rules and disputes concerning the administration call for special rules and are apprehended by special tribunals.
In principle, this distinction is based on the nature of the persons whose legal situation is examined. Under"Public Law" a legal situation involving a person who is itself a public-law entity: the State, a local authority, a public undertaking, etc. That is why, for example, the contract which may be concluded will be of public law, and the judge who may be seized of it will be an administrative court. If the situation does not involve a person governed by public law, then it will be governed by "Private Law". There are a thousand exceptions, but this is the starting and basic and fondamental principle.
Two essential remarks, bearing a system of values, explaining that the systems of Civil Law and Common Law are in fact confronting each other.
The two bodies of rules and institutions are not of equal strength because one of the categories is "closed", corresponding to one criterion (the "public person"), while the other is open: Public Law is a closed category; on the contrary, Private law becomes "active" as soon as there is no public person (a "private person" who or which must define himself or itself as a "non-public person").
One can consider this articulation between Public Law and Private Law in two ways, radically opposed. It may express a mark of inferiority in disfavour of private law: we are all "ordinary" persons in "ordinary" situations with "ordinary" activities (this will be the French conception ....). On the contrary, Public Law is the mark of the State, of Public Order, of Sovereignty, of public power, of the general will, in the interstices of which individuals slip in to act and satisfy their small particular interests
On the contrary, Private Law can be considered as the expression of the "common law": people are free and do what they want, through ownership and contract. As an exception and because they have elected people to do so, the rulers (whom they control), by exception, enact norms that constrain them. But this is an exception, since repression - public law and criminal law, which has the same status in this respect - is only a tribute to the freedom of persons, since this freedom remains wholly in the form of the private enterprise on the market.
It is then measured that the articulation between Public and Private Law profoundly reflects a philosophy and a political position. If it is considered that Regulation is the underlying order by which the Sovereign allows the deployment of his subjects who also benefit from a long-term policy constructed by the autonomous and measured political will, then Public Law in Is the master, the Regulation Law expressing a renewed search for efficiency, this but only this. If we believe that Regulation is whereby economic rationality manages to protect persons and companies from risks and to compensate for market failures, a market whose liberal principle remains the ideal, then Private Law is the core, whith contract and private property as basis tools.
France and the Latin countries adhere rather to this metaphysics of values which entrusts to the Public Authorities and the State the legitimacy and the power to express the general interest by Public Law, Regulators and Constitutional Courts, expressing it on a technical form renewed by the Regulatory tools: incitations, soft law, etc. The legal systems whose history draws on British history put more trust in the person of the entrepreneur and conceive of Regulation Law as an efficient outsourcing of functions to administrations that are efficient, informed and impartial.
Certainly, in the technical daily of the Law of Regulation and following the different sectors, Public and Private Law mix up: public companies take the form of publicly traded companies under private law or private companies will be entrusted with missions of public service, instituting them as second-level regulators as are the infrastructure network operators.
But the fundamental conception of systems (rooted in the history of the people) and practice marry. In the silence of regulations (and the more they are gossiping and the more the judge must interpret them, which amounts to a "silence"), what sense to give to the system?
To take only a few questions, frequent in practice:
The absence of a firm and shared definition of what is the Law of Regulation does not facilitate practice. Hesitations in translations from one language to another increase confusion.
For the time being, there is a tendency to refer to Public Law in the sectors where whe take precedence over public operators' monopolies, such as telecommunications, energy, railways, air and postal services, and to refer to Private Law in the sectors which have long been the subject of competition between operators, namely banking, finance and insurance.
It should be recognized that the criterion of distinction has little economic rationale. The notion of risk would be a clearer and more manageable criterion. But it would then lead to a greater challenge to the distinction between Public and Private Law. Because the Law of Regulation, impregnated with Economy and Economic Analysis of Law, has sometimes little basis of legal tradition, it put in question of this summa divisio. If this were to be the case, it would be the totality of the legal systems which would be upset, especially in its judicial organization, since the judicial civil and commercial system is so distinctly distinguished (that of "ordinary" persons, that of "common law ) and the administrative judge (the "natural judge" of the State). It is then realized that the Law of Regulation challenges the whole Law, especially in the Latin countries and the Civil Law systems.
Documentary Base : Doctrine
Documentary Base : Doctrine
Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary
Legally, the State is a public law subject defined by territory, people and institutions. It acts in the international space and emits norms. Politically, it has the legitimacy required to express the will of the social body and to exercise the violence of which it deprives the other subjects of law. It is often recognizable by its power: its use of public force, its budgetary power, its jurisdictional power. These three powers, declining or being challenged by private, international and more satisfying mechanisms, some predicted the disappearance of the State, to deplore it or to dance on its corpse.
With such a background, in current theories of Regulation, primarily constructed by economic thought and at first sight one might say that the State is above all the enemy. And this for two main reasons. The first is theoretical and of a negative nature. The advocates of the theory of regulation deny the State the political qualities set out above. The State would not be a "person" but rather a group of individuals, civil servants, elected officials and other concrete human beings, expressing nothing but their particular interests, coming into conflict with other interests, and using their powers to serve the former rather than the latter as everyone else. The Regulation theory, adjoining the theory of the agency, is then aimed at controlling public agents and elected representatives in whom there is no reason to trust a priori.
The second reason is practical and positive. The State would not be a "person" but an organization. Here we find the same perspective as for the concept of enterprise, which classical lawyers conceive as a person or a group of people, while economists who conceive of the world through the market represent it as an organization. The state as an organization should be "efficient" or even "optimal". It is then the pragmatic function of the Regulation Law. When it is governed by traditional law, entangled by that it would be an almost religious illusions of the general interest, or even the social contract, it is suboptimal. The Regulation purpose is about making it more effective.
To this end, as an organization, the State is divided into independent regulatory agencies or independent administrative authorities that manage the subjects as close as possible, which is fortunate in reducing the asymmetry of information and in reviving trust in a direct link. The unitary, distant and arrogant State is abandoned for a flexible and pragmatic conception of a strategic state (without capital ...) that would finally have understood that it is an organization like any other ...
Competition law adopts this conception of the State, which it posed from the beginning that it was an economic operator like any other. This is how this conception which would be more "neutral" of the world is often presented.
Successive crises, whether sanitary or financial, have produced a pendulum effect.
Now, the notions of general interest or common goods are credited of an autonomous value, and the necessity of surpassing immediate interests and of finding persons to bear superior interests or to take charge of the interests of others, even a non-immediate one, emerged.
Thus, the State or the public authority, reappears in the globalization. The Compliance Law or the Corporal Social Responsibility of the crucial companies are converging towards a consideration of the State, which can not be reduced to a pure and simple organization receptacle of externalities.
Documentary Base : Doctrine
Référence complète : Salah, M., La mondialisation vue de l'Islam, in Archives de Philosophie du Droit, La mondialisation entre illusion et utopie, tome 47, Dalloz, 2003, 27-54.
La mondialisation apparaît comme une occidentalisation des cultures et du droit. L'Islam qui prend forme juridique devrait se l'approprier sans se dénaturer. La réussite d'un tel processus difficile dépendra de la qualité de la régulation qui sera mise en place.
Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent via le drive lire l'article dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation".
Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary
Paradoxically, the notion of conflict of interest seems to be at the center of Economic Law only recently in Economic Law, in both Corporate and Public Law. This is due to the philosophy which animates these two branches of Law, very different for each, and which has changed in each.
In fact, and in the first place in Public Law, in the Continental legal systems and especially in French legal tradition, on the side of the State, the one who serves it, by a sort of natural effect,, makes the general interest incarnated by the State pass before its personal interest. There is an opposition of interests, namely the personal interest of this public official who would like to work less and earn more, and the common interest of the population, who would like to pay less taxes and for example benefit trains that always arrive on time and the general interest which would be for example the construction of a European rail network.
But this conflict would be resolved "naturally" because the public official, having "a sense of the general interest" and being animated by the "sense of public service", sacrifices himself to serve the general interes. He stays late at his office and gets the trains on time. This theory of public service was the inheritance of royalty, a system in which the King is at the service of the People, like the aristocracy is in the "service of the King." There could therefore be no conflict of interest, neither in the administration nor in the public enterprises, nor to observe, manage or dissolve. The question does not arise ...
Let us now take the side of the companies, seen by the Company Law. In the classical conception of corporate governance, corporate officers are necessarily shareholders of the company and the profits are mandatorily distributed among all partners: the partnership agreement is a "contract of common interest". Thus, the corporate officer works in the knowledge that the fruits of his efforts will come back to him through the profits he will receive as a partner. Whatever its egoism - and even the agent must be, this mechanism produces the satisfaction of all the other partners who mechanically will also receive the profits. Selfishness is indeed the motor of the system, as in the classical theory of Market and Competition. Thus, in the corporate mechanism, there is never a conflict of interest since the corporate officer is obligatorily associated: he will always work in the interest of the partners since in this he works for himself. As Company Law posits that the loss of the company will also be incurred and suffered by all partners, he will also avoid this prospect. Again, there is no need for any control. The question of a conflict of interest between the mandatary and those who conferred this function does not structurally arise...
These two representations both proved inaccurate. They were based on quite different philosophies - the public official being supposed to have exceeded his own interest, the corporate officer being supposed to serve the common interest or the social interest by concern for his own interest - but this was by a unique reasoning that these two representations were defeated.
Let us take the first on Public Law: the "sense of the State" is not so common in the administration and the public enterprises, that the people who work there sacrifice themselves for the social group. They are human beings like the others. Researchers in economics and finance, through this elementary reflection of suspicion, have shattered these political and legal representations. In particular, it has been observed that the institutional lifestyle of public enterprises, very close to the government and their leaders, is often not very justified, whereas it is paid by the taxpayer, that is, by the social group which they claimed to serve. Europe, by affirming in the Treaty of Rome the principle of "neutrality of the capital of enterprises", that is to say, indifference to the fact that the enterprise has as its shareholder a private person or a public person, validated this absence of exceeding of his particular interest by the servant of the State, become simple economic agent. This made it possible to reach the conclusion made for Company Law.
Disillusionment was of the same magnitude. It has been observed that the corporate officer, ordinary human being, is not devoted to the company and does not have the only benefit of the profits he will later receive as a partner. He sometimes gets very little, so he can receive very many advantages (financial, pecuniary or in kind, direct or indirect). The other shareholders see their profits decrease accordingly. They are thus in a conflict of interest. Moreover, the corporate officer was elected by the shareholders' meeting, that is to say, in practice, the majority shareholder or the "controlling" shareholder (controlling shareholder) and not by all. He may not even be associated (but a "senior officer").
The very fact that the situation is no longer qualified by lawyers, through the qualifications of classical Company Law, still borrowing from the Civil Contract Law, the qualifications coming more from financial theories, borrowing from the theory of the agency, adically changed the perspective. The assumptions have been reversed: by the same "nature effect", the conflict of interest has been disclosed as structurally existing between the manager and the minority shareholder. Since the minority shareholder does not have the de facto power to dismiss the corporate officer since he does not have the majority of the voting rights, the question does not even arise whether the manager has or has not a corporate status: the minority shareholder has only the power to sell his securities, if the management of the manager is unfavorable (right of exit) or the power to say, protest and make known. This presupposes that he is informed, which will put at the center of a new Company Law information, even transparency.
Thus, this conflict of interests finds a solution in the actual transfer of securities, beyond the legal principle of negotiability. For this reason, if the company is listed, the conflict of interest is translated dialectically into a relationship between the corporate officer and the financial market which, by its liquidity, allows the agent to be sanctioned, and also provides information, Financial market and the minority shareholder becoming identical. The manager could certainly have a "sense of social interest", a sort of equivalent of the state's sense for a civil servant, if he had an ethics, which would feed a self-regulation. Few people believe in the reality of this hypothesis. By pragmatism, it is more readily accepted that the manager will prefer his interest to that of the minority shareholder. Indeed, he can serve his personal interest rather than the interest for which a power has been given to him through the informational rent he has, and the asymmetry of information he enjoys. All the regulation will intervene to reduce this asymmetry of information and to equip the minority shareholder thanks to the regulator who defends the interests of the market against the corporate officers, if necessary through the criminal law. But the belief in managerial volunteerism has recently taken on a new dimension with corporate social responsability, the social responsibility of the company where managers express their concern for others.
The identification of conflicts of interests, their prevention and their management are transforming Financial Regulatory Law and then the Common Law of Regulation, because today it is no longer believed a priori that people exceed their personal interest to serve the interest of others. It is perhaps to regain trust and even sympathy that companies have invested in social responsibility. The latter is elaborated by rules which are at first very flexible but which can also express a concern for the general interest. In this, it can meet Compliance Law and express on behalf of the companies a concern for the general interest, if the companies provide proof of this concern.
To take an example of a conflict of interest that resulted in substantial legal changes, the potentially dangerous situation of credit rating agencies has been pointed out when they are both paid by banks, advising them and designing products, While being the source of the ratings, the main indices from which the investments are made. Banks being the first financial intermediaries, these conflicts of interest are therefore systematically dangerous. That is why in Europe ESMA exercises control over these rating agencies.
The identification of conflicts of interest, which most often involves changing the way we look at a situation - which seemed normal until the point of view changes - the moral and legal perspective being different, Trust one has in this person or another one modifying this look, is today what moves the most in Regulation Law.
This is true of Public and Corporate Law, which are extended by the Regulation Law, here itself transformed by Compliance Law, notably by the launchers of alerts. But this is also true that all political institutions and elected officials.
For a rule emerges: the more central the notion of conflict of interest becomes, the more it must be realized that Trust is no longer given a priori, either to a person, to a function, to a mechanism, to a system. Trust is no longer given only a posteriori in procedures that burden the action, where one must give to see continuously that one has deserved this trust.
Updated: Sept. 20, 2019 (Initial publication: Aug. 31, 2019)
This working paper is the basis for an article to be published in French Petites Affiches.
Summary : In August 2019, about the fire devastating the Amazon, the French Minister of Ecology says that this fact "is not just the business of a state" (n'est pas que l'affaire d'un Etat). This assertion denies the postulates of Public International Iaw (I). This supposes a new system, based on the idea that the power of the State on its territory is erased when the object that is there is no longer related to this "part" but to the All that is Universe (II). Let's accept the augur. First question: if it is not only the case of a State, whose business is it? (III). Second question: to anticipate the other cases that fall under this regime, what should be the criteria in the name of which the All will have to prevail over the part and who will then take care of the case of which the "local" State is divested? (IV). Because the perspective goes beyond the environment, beyond Brazil, beyond the States. It leads to Compliance Law animated by "monumental goals" that are the concern for the Universe and humans, in a humanist spirit. Let's go.
On August 27, 2019, on the French radio France Inter, Elisabeth Borne, French Minister of Ecology (Transition écologique) expresses it clearly: "Quand on est sur un enjeu tel que l'Amazonie, ça n'est pas que l'affaire d'un État", that can be translated : "When we are on a stake such as the Amazon, it is not only the business of onr State ".
Starting from one case, "the Amazon", the Minister, thus taking up the position of the French President, associates a general consequence: "it is not only the affair of one State".
A. The postulate of Public (and Private) International Law: parties (States) which, because of common interests, are in contact
The notion of State includes in its very definition the notion of territory (a territory, a population, institutions).
Thus the State governs through its institutions what is happening on its territory. For example, if there is a fire, or a risk of fire, the State makes arrangements through all legal, financial, technical and human instruments available to it. It is accountable for what it does through its political and legal responsibility.
When what is happening on its territory exceeds this one, in fact (epidemic, catastrophe with the consequences exceeding the borders, migrations, etc.) either according to its own opinion or according to that of the other States, the States, being sovereign subjects of Law in the international system, act together on a pre-built legal basis: bilateral or/and multilateral treaties, having created legal integrated zones (like the European Union or the United States) or international institutions (like the IMF).
A particular technique has been developed for several millennia - but here again the seniority is not sufficient to keep the system: diplomacy, anchored in each state in a particular ministry: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which each national government has. If one State totally excludes one phenomenon in the territory of another, the progressive procedure of ceasing diplomatic ties begins.
This can result in wars.
In the "case of the Amazon" both the President of Brazil and the President of the United States stick to the classical construction of Law.
Indeed, the former asserted that the Amazon is in the territory of Brazil, thus falls under the jurisdiction of the power of the Brazilian State and the Brazilian Law, from which it follows that another State does not have to come to interfere. However, the French President takes the floor not as this forest extends also on a French territory but as it is the business of the World. On the contrary, the President of Brazil claims the closing effect, which excludes a third State from taking over directly something - even a difficulty - that takes place in the territory of another.
The President of the US federal State has said that these are joint decisions between the President of Brazil and other heads of State, sovereign subjects of Law, who must agree to organize a solution to solve a local problem . Because in the same way that States can declare war, they can help each other.
The whole Public (and Private) International Law is therefore based on this assumption: "parts" of the world, on which sovereign parties (States) have taken contact, because circumstances make something that falls within one of them or several others.
This is precisely what is called into question. The notion of the "right of interference", whose evocation we hardly hear any more, had already done so. But on another basis.
B. The "right of interference": idea that somebody can directly interfere with what happens in a country , an idea that does not question the postulate of the International Maw, an idea that rests on something else: a " right for the other "
The "right of interference" is the idea that in certain territories, things happen that are inadmissible.
In memory of the jus cogens, a kind of "Natural Law" of Public International Law, Another, that could be another state, can come to meddle with what is happening in a territory that is closed, without declaring war. to the state that keeps its borders.
It is the need of others, for example those who die in mass on this territory, or the nature that is devastated in the indifference of the State on whose soil the disaster is happening, which founds this "right" of another state to come and take charge.
The foundation of this "right" is therefore a "duty".
C. The new idea: a territory is only part of the Globe, whose fate is everyone's concern
The idea is new because it is not based on altruism. And no more about self-interest. Yet, de facto and de jure , the Amazon is not on the sole territory of Brazil.
France is particularly well placed to say something about it since part of the Amazon is on French territory.
Thus the inaction of the main concerned Brazil directly affects the interest of France, a "forest" being a block that can not be divided. If we were in Property Law, we would say that we are in indivision with Brazil and that in this respect, with the other States on whose territories this forest extends, a solution must be found.
Because of the indivisibility of this particular object which is this particular fores
But this is not the argument put forward by France, particularly by the President of the Republic.
It is said that the whole world is concerned about the fate of the Amazon. It could be said that, in this respect, when what could be described as a "global forest" is well treated, its management does indeed fall within the power of Brazil, Brazilian companies and the Brazilian State, but when it is abused to the point of seeing its future compromised, when fires may make it disappear, then this forest appears not to be localized in Brazil but being located in the World, of which Brazil is only a part
This reasoning, which then gives voice to everyone, for in the world every state is included in it, is a new reasoning.
The economic-political theory of the "commons" does not account for it because it is not a very legal theory legal
II. THE NEW REASONING THAT COVERS THE CLASSIC REASONING OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
The new reasoning adopted by the Minister consists in saying that the Amazon does not concern only Brazil. This forest should therefore be directly related to the World (A). This is a welcome change in the system but based on a paradox (B).
A. When the Amazon is in danger of death, then it should no longer be attached to this part of the World that is Brazil, but directly to the World
This forest is presented as the "lung" of the planet, it is the "future" of humanity. In this, it can concern only one State, not even the one on whose territory this "Humanity good" is located
As such, without the need to declare war to Brazil, another State may speak, for example the French State through the one that represents it in the international order, that is to say its President, to say what to do, since according to him the President of Brazil does not say or do what it is absolutely necessary to do for the whole planet and for the future of Humanity.
This induces a complete renewal of international institutions.
Indeed a direct attachment to the World and no longer to Brazil gives the forest object a special status because of a goal that exceeds Brazil: save the Amazon would impose because it would save the world. Therefore, it can no longer be the subject of Brazil, which would be like "dispossessed" by a goal that is imposed on it: to save the Amazon rainforest, even though it is mainly on its territory, while other States become legitimate to dispose of this object, even if the forest would not be in part in their territory, even if they would not be affected in their own interests.
This contradicts all Public International Law
Such an upheaval justifies that such an affirmation is accepted with difficulty. One understands better than first consequence, which is not so innocuous, one of the first rules of diplomacy which is the politeness, between the heads of state, with regard to the spouses of these , have be broken
B. A welcome but paradoxical change in the system
Why not change the system?
This is difficult to admit, not only because it is brutal, but because it is paradoxical.
The paradox is the following. It is recognized that the theme of the disappearance of borders by "globalization"
The paradox is therefore, on the one hand, the rejection of the allegation of a de facto disappearance of borders by an economic interdependence, technology having denied "globalization" as a fact
This paradox leads to two questions.
The first question is: if "it's not juste one State affair", who's concerned?
The second question is: after the "case of the Amazon", what are the other cases? And how are we going to provide solutions, if we no longer have the solutions of Public International Law, that is to say, the agreement of the country whose territory is concerned and which we do not want not go to war?
If we have clear ideas on the answers to be given to these two sets of questions, then because indeed when the future of all is in progress it can not be the affair of a single State, it is necessary to question Public International Law. But do we have clear ideas on these two questions? And what are the possibilities for possible solutions?
See the text following below.
Sur la question du particularisme du cas et de la possibilité ou non d'étendre le raisonnement à d'autre cas, voir le IV.
C'est exactement comme cela que raisonne le Droit de l'Union européenne dont le Droit peut intervenir même dans une affaire qui ne concerne "que" le territoire français, parce que la Cour de justice de l'Union européenne a affirmé que la France constitue une "partie" du territoire de l'Union. Ainsi le Tout a compétence pour la partie, même si une autre partie du Tout n'est pas concernée.
Ici le raisonnement va plus loin, puisqu'une partie pourrait intervenir sur une autre partie, en tant qu'elles appartiennent au même Tout (le Monde, présent et futur).
S, for ex., and for takin only this example, Tirole, J., Economics for the Common Good, 2017.
Sur cette notion de "bien d'humanité", à laquelle correspond ce cas particulier de l'Amazonie, v. Frison-Roche, M.-A.
V. l'explicitation des postulats du Droit international public dans le I.
Private International Law was built in the Middle Ages on the idea of a state being kind enough to apply foreign law to it as the person greets the foreign host in an affable manner.
Ruiz-Fabri, H., ....
Debray, R., Pour les frontières...
S. for example in this sense, O'Sullivan, M., The Levelling. What's next after Globalization ?, 2019.
Association Henri Capitant, Le Droit et la Mondialisation,
Sept. 9, 2019
Editorial responsibilities : Direction de la collection "Cours-Série Droit privé", Editions Dalloz (33)
Référence complète : Cayrol, N., Procédure civile, (À jour de la loi de programmation 2018-2022 et de réforme pour la justice), Coll. "Cours Dalloz-Série Droit privé", Dalloz, 2nde éd. (1ière édition en 2017)., 2019, 574 p.
L'étude de la procédure civile est indispensable à tous les étudiants désireux d'embrasser une « carrière judiciaire » : magistrat, avocat, huissier, etc. Par nombre d'aspects, la procédure civile est bien, en effet, un droit professionnel, un droit à l'usage des professionnels du procès. La matière figure d'ailleurs aux épreuves des concours et examens d'accès à ces professions.
Mais la procédure civile n'est pas seulement un droit professionnel : elle traite de problèmes qui intéressent tous les juristes, quels qu'ils soient, qu'ils pratiquent ou non la procédure. La connaissance des notions procédurales de base est nécessaire pour la bonne compréhension de nombreuses questions de droit.
Voir l'ensemble de la collection "Cours Dalloz-Série Droit privé"
Sept. 8, 2019
BY BASIC TECHNOLOGY, MANY SITES BLOCKTHE INTERNET USERS THE POSSIBILITY TO SAY "NO":THEY "CONSENT" TO TRANSFER THEIR PERSONAL DATA, WITHOUT OTHER TECHNOLGICAL CHOICES THAN THAT OF "ALL ACCEPT". THE LINK BETWEEN "CONSENT" AND "FREE WILL" IS THEREFORE BROKEN
Sept. 7, 2019
Lisant sur mon écran d'ordinateur un article en accès libre dans une revue en partie librement accessible numériquement, une mention attire mon attention.
Elle a de quoi laisser perplexe toute personne qui écrit des articles et ouvrage qui requiert des lectures, lectures dont on indique au lecteur la trace pour l'inviter à son tour à y procéder dans ses propres recherches. Dans des travaux de recherche, de découverte et d'interrogation, donc.
Voilà le texte de la mention. :
Des DOI (Digital Object Identifier) sont automatiquement ajoutés aux références par Bilbo, l'outil d'annotation bibliographique d'OpenEdition.
Les utilisateurs des institutions abonnées à l'un des programmes freemium d'OpenEdition peuvent télécharger les références bibliographiques pour lesquelles Bilbo a trouvé un DOI.
"sont automatiquement ajoutés" ?
Il s'agit littéralement d'un "outil d'annotation bibliographique" ?
Si l'on s'abonne (le prix n'est pas indiqué, mais quand on écrit "-ium", c'est pour dire que l'on sort du gratuit...; comme le fait l'entreprise américaine Academia qui propose rapidement de "upgrapder" par un service payant pour accéder ), automatiquement les références seront téléchargées dès l'instant que l'algorithme, répondant au nom de "Bilbo" (n'est-ce pas le nom d'un personnage dans Le seigneur des anneaux ?), mais qui dans le civil a un nom qui reproduit sa fonction (Digital Object Identifier) fonction exprimée en langue anglaise va "automatiquement ajouter" une référence aux autres références qui auront été tacquées par l'algorithme.
Est-ce raisonnable ? Est-ce efficace ? Est-ce sans danger ?
C'est mécaniquement efficace, dès l'instant que l'on conçoit la référence bibliographique comme un "entassement mécanique" (I). Mais la référence bibliographique est et doit être tout autre chose, ce que les machines ne peuvent en rien restituer : être le reflet du parcours intellectuel que l'être humain qui écrivit l'article ou l'ouvrage fit pour écrit ce texte-là, une invitation à la lecture (et les machines ne lisent pas, on en arrive aujourd'hui à devoir le rappeler). Cette définition qui fut partagée de la bibliographie, qui ne mesure pas l'ampleur de l'empilement mais dessine ce vers quoi l'auteur s'est tourné pour chercher, pour trouver des réponses aux questions qu'il s'est posées, cela seul une personne peut le faire. En rien "Bilbo" (II). Or, si l'on se repose sur celui-ci, contre un abonnement, pour faire cette tâche-là, qui n'est reflet de rien, non seulement la bibliographie ne sera plus rien, mais des effets pervers, comme ceux observés comme celui des "citations", vont s'accroître (III).
Ensuite, si Bilbo écrit les bibliographie, tandis que Sophia fait les conférences, pourquoi un autre algorithme, que l'on pourrait appeler Thesarus ne pourrait pas écrire thèse, livre, essai, article, en ayant compilé toutes les règles formelles à respecter. Pourquoi non ? On se souviendra alors que les machines et les suites de chiffres ne lisent pas, n'écrivent pas, ne conçoivent pas, n'apprennent pas (l'expression Learning machine est un oximore), ne mémorisent pas (la "mémoire" d'un ordinaire n'est qu'une image), ne traduisent pas, n'ont pas d'émotion, n'aiment pas. Seuls les êtres humains le peuvent. Le sait-on encore ?
Lire ci-dessous une analyse plus détaillée.
Updated: Sept. 5, 2019 (Initial publication: April 30, 2019)
Reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., L'apport du Droit de la Compliance dans la Gouvernance d'Internet (The contribution of Compliance Law to the Internet Governance), Report asked by the French Government, published the 15th July 2019, 139 pages ; report fully translated in English later.
Report Summary. Governing the Internet? Compliance Law can help.
Compliance Law is for the Policy Maker to aim for global goals that they requires to be achieved by companies in a position to do so. In the digital space built on the sole principle of Liberty, the Politics must insert a second principle: the Person. The respect of this One, in balance with the Freedom, can be required by the Policy Maker via Compliance Law, which internalises this specific pretention in the digital companies. Liberalism and Humanism become the two pillars of Internet Governance.
The humanism of European Compliance Law then enriches US Compliance law. The crucial digital operators thus forced, like Facebook, YouTube, Google, etc., must then exercise powers only to better achieve these goals to protect persons (against hatred, inadequate exploitation of data, terrorism, violation of intellectual property, etc.). They must guarantee the rights of individuals, including intellectual property rights. To do this, they must be recognized as "second level regulators", supervised by Public Authorities.
This governance of the Internet by Compliance Law is ongoing. By the European Banking Union. By green finance. By the GDPR. We must force the line and give unity and simplicity that are still lacking, by infusing a political dimension to Compliance: the Person. The European Court of Justice has always done it. The European Commission through its DG Connect is ready.
Plan of the Report (4 chapters): an ascertainement of the digitization of the world (1), the challenge of civilization that this constitutes (2), the relations of Compliance mechanisms as it should be conceived between Europe and the United States, not to mention that the world is not limited to them, with the concrete solutions that result from this (3) and concrete practical solutions to better organize an effective digital governance, inspired by what is particularly in the banking sector, and continuing what has already been done in Europe in the digital field, which has already made it exemplary and what it must continue, France can be force of proposal by the example (4).
Read below the 54 propositions that conclude the Report.
Sept. 2, 2019
Editorial responsibilities : Direction de la collection "Cours-Série Droit privé", Editions Dalloz (33)
Référence complète : ANDRÉ, Ch., Droit pénal spécial, Coll. "Cours Dalloz - Série Droit privé", Dalloz, 1ière éd., 2010, 5ième éd., 2019, 486 p.
La 5ième édition de ce Cours est à jour des réformes qui continuellement modifient les infractions pénales, notamment en matière économique et financière, montrant avant tout la constante de la crise d'un droit pénal déliquescent et désormais éclaté en droits répressifs spéciaux. Aujourd'hui c'est non seulement un droit pénal général mais encore voire avant tout un droit pénal d'exceptions qu'il faut apprendre, étudiants comme praticiens.
Ce Cours est construit en trois parties.
La première traite des infractions contre les personnes ; la deuxième des infractions contre les biens ; la troisième contres la Nation, l'État et la paix publique.
Les éléments de procédure pénale, indissociables du droit pénal, sont expliqués à chaque infraction explicitée.
Voir l'ensemble des ouvrages de la même collection "Cours Dalloz -Série Droit privé"
Updated: July 4, 2019 (Initial publication: April 30, 2019)
Complete reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Have a good behavior in the digital space, working paper2019.
This working document serves as a basis for a contribution to the collective book dedicated to Professor Michel Vivant, article written en French.
The jurist sees the world through the way he learns to speak
The Law of the Environment has already come to blur this distinction, so finally so strange because this classical conception refers to a person taken firstly in his immobility (Law of individuals), and then in his only actions (Contrats and Tort Law, Property Law). Indeed, the very notion of "environment" implies that the person is not isolated, that he/she is "surrounded", that he/she is what he/she is and will become because of what surrounds him/her ; in return the world is permanently affected by his/her personal action. On second thought, when once "Law of Individuals" was not distinguished from Family Law, the human being was more fully restored by this division in the legal system that not only followed him/her from birth to death but also in him/her most valuable interactions: parents, siblings, couples, children. Thus Family Law was finer and more faithful to what is the life of a human being.
To have instituted Law of Individuals, it is thus to have promoted of the human being a vision certainly more concrete, because it is above all of their identity and their body about what Law speaks, astonishing that the we have not noticed before that women are not men like the othersTo have instituted the Law of the people, it is thus to have promoted of the human being a vision certainly more concrete, because it is above all of his identity and his body that one speaks to us, astonishing that the we have not noticed before that women are not men like the others
From this concrete vision, we have all the benefits but Law, much more than in the eighteenth century, perceives the human being as an isolated subject, whose corporeality ceases to be veiled by Law
This freedom will come into conflict with the need for order, expressed by society, social contract, state, law, which imposes limits on freedom of one to preserve freedom of the other, as recalled by the French Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme of 1789. Thus, it is not possible de jure to transform every desire in action,, even though the means would be within reach of the person in question, because certain behaviors are prohibited in that they would cause too much disorder and if they are nevertheless committed, they are punished for order to return. Thus, what could be called "law of behavior", obligations to do and not to be put in criminal, civil and administrative Law, national and international Law, substantial Law and procedural Law :they will protect the human being in movment pushed by the principle of freedom forward others and thing, movement inherent in their status as a Person.
The human being is therefore limited in what they wants to do. In the first place by the fact: their exhausting forces, their death that will come, the time counted, the money that is lacking, the knowledge that they does not even know not to hold, all that is to say by their very humanity; Secondly, by the Law which forbids so many actions ...: not to kill, not to steal, not to take the spouse of others, not to pass as true what is false, etc. For the human being on the move, full of life and projects, Law has always had a side "rabat-joy". It is for that reason often ridiculed and criticized because of all its restraining regulations, even hated or feared in that it would prevent to live according to our desire, which is always my "good pleasure", good since it is mine. Isolated and all-powerful, the human being alone not wanting to consider other than his desire alone.
Psychoanalysis, however, has shown that Law, in that it sets limits, assigns to the human being a place and a way of being held with respect to things and other persons. If one no longer stands themselves by the prohibition of the satisfaction of all desire (the first of which is the death of the other), social life is no longer possible
But this presentation aims to make it possible to admit that the criterion of Law would be in the effectiveness of a sanction by the public power: the fine, the prison, the confiscation of a good, which the rudeness does not trigger whereas Law would imply it: by this way we are thus persuaded of the intimacy between the public power (the State) and Law... But later, after this first lesson learned, the doubt comes from the consubstansuality between Law and State. Is it not rather appropriate to consider that Law is what must lead everyone to "behave well" with regard to things and people around them? The question of punishment is important, but it is second, it is not the very definition of Law. The French author Carbonnier pointed out that the gendarme's "kepi" is the "Law sign", that is to say what it is recognized without hesitation, but it is not its definition.
The first issue dealt with by Law is then not so much the freedom of the person as the presence of others. How to use one's freedom and the associated deployment of forces in the presence of others? How could I not use it when I would like to harm them, or if the nuisance created for them by the use of my free strength is indifferent to me
We do not use our force against others because we have interest or desire, we do not give him the support of our strength while he indifferent us, because Law holds us. If the superego was not enough. If Law and the "parental function of the States" did not make alliance. We do it because we hold ourselves
Or rather we were holding ourselves.
Because today a new world has appeared: the digital world that allows everyone not to "hold" himself, that is to say to constantly abuse others, never to take them into consideration, to attack massively. It's a new experience. It is not a pathological phenomenon, as is delinquency (which simply leads to punishment), nor a structural failure in a principle otherwise admitted (which leads to regulatory remedies) but rather a new use, which would be a new rule: in the digital space, one can do anything to everyone, one is not held by anything or anyone, one can "let go" (I). This lack of "good behavior" is incompatible with the idea of Law, in that Law is made for human beings and protect those who can not afford to protect themselves; that is why this general situation must be remedied (II).
Cornu, G., Linguistique juridique, 2005.
Frison-Roche, M.-A. & Sève, R., Le Droit au féminin (ed.), 2003.
Under this "mask" of the "subject of Law", we are all equal. S. Archives de Philosophie du Droit, Le sujet de droit, 1989.
Baud, J.P., L'affaire de la main volée. Histoire juridique du corps humain, 1993.
Read the article of Alain Supiot about the idée of Rule common of all, under the discussion between all, presented by this author through the artwork of Kafka : "Kafka, artiste de la loi", 2019; Kafka is very present in the work of Alain Supiot, for example in his First Lesson in the Collège de France, 2012, or in an Introduction of La Gouvernance par les nombres ; This latter book is now available in English : Governance by numbers. The making a legal model of allegiance, 2017 (translated by S. Brown).
That's why splitting Persons Law and Family Law masks another reality: the family is not made up of third parties. The links are there. They pre-exist. Starting from the only Persons Law pushes to think one can "build" his/her family by links drawn on white paper: the contracting of the families made up of individuals becomes thinkable, even natural.
June 1, 2019
Et fêter le nazisme à travers la beauté féminime, le Droit l'interdit.
Le 31 mai 2019, un réseau social russe a supprimé l'information de son support.
Il convient que tous les opérateurs numériques cruciaux numériques le fassent également.
A travers cet exemple particulier, simple et net, donc "exemplaire", l'on mesure que ces "entreprises numériques cruciales" (ici les entreprises qui tiennent les réseaux sociaux) sont à même de rendre effective les lois, ici l'interdiction de l'incitation à la haine raciale.
Plus techniquement, cela s'appelle : le Droit de la Compliance.
Sur ce point et d'une façon très développée, v. Frison-Roche, M.-A., L'apport du Droit de la Compliance à la gouvernance d'Internet, rapport remis au Gouvernement, 2019.
May 28, 2019
Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Participation à la journée d'étude: « J’ai toujours été pour tout être » : Guillaume Dustan ou l’infinité des possibles in Laboratoire du Changement Social et Politique, Paris-Diderot, Paris, 28 mai 2019.
May 16, 2019
Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Game of Thrones : un droit si classique. Pour l'instant, in Le Pluard, Q., et Plouhinec, P., (dir.), Du droit dans GAME OF THRONES, 2019, pp. 19-34.
Résumé. Dans cette série emplie de surprises grandioses, de personnages épiques, de retournements, et ce d’autant plus qu’elle se mit à courir plus vite que le livre dont elle naquit, on semble ne trouver que ce que l'on connaît déjà du Droit : il suffirait de soulever les déguisements, comme on le fait dans une fable. On y retrouve alors les règles juridiques classiques (I), la reproduction en décalque de l'organisation juridique féodale (II), parfois contestée au nom de principes exogènes (III). Mais il est remarquable que la série ne soit pas encore finie. Or, ce qui va arriver ne renvoie-t-il pas à des problématiques juridiques que nous ne maîtrisons pas nous-mêmes ? Saison inconnue au sens plein du terme, terrain juridique glacé et sol incertain d’un Droit qui prendrait la forme des "sans-visages" et des "morts qui marchent" ? (IV).
Consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage.