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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "La formation : contenu et contenant de la Compliance" ("Training: content and container of Compliance"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, pp.. 227-244.

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📝read the article (in French)

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🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks

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📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation and Compliance): Firstly, as Training is a specific Compliance tool, it is supervised by Regulators. It becomes mandatory when it is contained in Compliance programs or sanction decisions. Since effectiveness and efficiency are legal requirements, what is the margin of companies to design them and how to measure the result?

Secondly, as long as each Compliance tool includes, more and more, an educational dimension, we can take each of them to identify this perspective. So even condemnations and prescriptions are so many lessons, lessons given, lessons to be followed. The question is then to know who, in this so pedagogical Compliance Law, are the "teachers"?

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Approche juridique des outils de la Compliance. Construire juridiquement  l'unité des outils de la Compliance à partir de la définition du Droit de la Compliance par ses "buts monumentaux"" ("Legal approach to Compliance Tools. Building by Law the Unicity of Compliance Tools from the definition of Compliance Law by its "Monumental Goals""), in  M.-A. Frison-Roche, (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 27-38.

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📝read the article (in French) 

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🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with more developments, technical references and hypertext links

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📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation and Compliance): The "tools of Compliance" do not stack on top of each other. They form a system, thanks to a unity drawn from the goals that all these multiple and different tools serve: the "Monumental Goals" by which Compliance Law is defined.

All these tools are configured by these goals and for mastering all these techniques, it is essential to put them all in perspective of what Compliance Law is, which is designed teleologically with regard to its goals. Extension of Regulatory Law and like it, Compliance Law is built on a balance between the principle of competition and other concerns that public authorities claim to take care of. Compliance Law has moreover more "pretensions" in this respect, for example in environmental matters. All the means are then good, the violence of the tools marrying without difficulty with the voluntary commitments since it is the goals which govern this branch of Law.

As legal solutions adopted show, a common method of interpretation and common levels of constraint for all Compliance Tools result from this definition. Starting from the goals (in which legal normativity is housed), the interpretation of the different tools is thus unified. Moreover, the different degrees of constraint do not operate according to the consideration of sources (traditional legal criterion) but by the goals, according to the legal distinction between obligations of means and obligations of results which result from the articulation between tools, of which the establishment is an obligation of result, and the goal, of which the achievement is only an obligation of means.

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Compliance et incitations: un couple à propulser " ("Compliance and incentives : a promising tandem"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 123-130.

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📝read the article (in French)

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🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with more developments, technical references and hypertext links

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📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation and Compliance): The theory of incentives targets the mechanisms which do not use directly constraint (except to present sanctions themselves as incentives) but which leads nevertheless to expected behaviors. To appreciate the links which must or must not be done between incentives and Compliance, we should proceed in two times. 

First, the association appears natural between incentive mechanisms and "Compliance Law" since the later is defined in a dynamic way. Indeed, if it is defined placing its legal normativity in its "monumental goals", as the end of corruption, the detection of money laundering in order to underlying criminality disappears, or as the effective protection of environment or the concrete care of human beings, then what matters is not the means in themselves but the effective tension towards these "monumental goals". In this perspective, what was related to public policies led by States, because they are definitively not able to do it, the charge is internalized in the firms which are able to tend towards this goals: "crucial operators" because they have the geographical, technological, informational and financial means. 

In this perspective, the internalization of public willingness provoking a split with the concept of State linked to a territory which deprives Politics of its constraint power, incentive mechanisms appear as the most efficient mean to reach these monumental goals. They appear as this "natural" mean both negatively and positively defined. Negatively in which they do not need in Ex Ante institutional localizable sources and sanction power in Ex Post: it is enough to substitute the interest to obligation. Positively, incentives relay through operators' strategies what was the so critical and joked form of public action: the "plan". The duration is thus injected thanks to Compliance mechanisms, as we can see it through the development of it in the care for environment ("plan climat") or through the educational mechanism, which could be conceived only in duration.  

However, the opposition seems radical between Compliance Law and Incentives. And this because of three convictions often developed and that we have to overcome. First, the idea that in a general way, there would be a Law only if there is a mechanism of immediate constraint which is associated to the norm. As long as the incentive is not based on obligation, then it will be nothing... Secondly, and as if that were a kind of consolation ..., Compliance would not be really Law either ... We so often say that it is only about a methodology, a range of processes without sense, procedures to follow without trying to understand, process that algorithms integrate in a mechanic without end and without sense or that on the contrary, Compliance would be full of sense by Ethics and Morality, which are far from Law. While incentives talk to the human spirit which calculate, Compliance would be so a process through which machines will be connected to other machines, so an extra soul, where calculation has no place... Thirdly, solutions would be to be find in Competition Law because it can do without States, submit them and approach what is a-sectorial, especially finance and digital, the world being financialized and digitalized. The violence of Competition Law which comes in Ex Ante thanks to "Compliance sanctions" applying for example to essential infrastructures Law, by continuing to deny the salience of the duration and taking care of the "market power" would be also not compatible with a marriage with incentive mechanisms which rely on duration and power of those to which it is applied, converging towards goals, which are set by what Competition Law ignores: the project. This project which pretends to build the future is the one of politics and of companies, which use their deployed power in time to concretize it. It is without any doubt there that the future of Europe is. 

To overcome this triple difficulty, it is thus necessary, in a second time, to modify our conception of Law, especially thanks to Compliance Law, in which this new branch is autonomous from Competition Law, and even sometimes opposed to it, in order to the insertion of incentive mechanisms permit to unknown or against Competition Law organizations to reach "monumental goals" which are imperative to take into consideration. For example, the taking into consideration of climate challenges or the building of a sovereign identity of the data. This is expressly set by European Commission which supervises such initiatives, supervision being what is articulated with Compliance, in a couple that go beyond Regulation, and replaces in Ex Ante Competition Law, salient branch for Ex Post. All the texts which are in the process of expressing it are based on this reformed couple: Compliance and Incentive.

This couple supposes that we recognize as such the existence of companies as project carriers, project which is the creation of marketed wealth circulating on a market, which could be an industrial project specific to a geographical zone both economical and political. Regulation is deployed to go away from the notion of sector and to transform itself in supervision of crucial firms in the correspondance between the project and the action, what refers to the notion of "plan". In this, banking supervision is just the advanced bastion of all thematic, energetic, climatic and health plans, or more broadly industrial and technological that could by incentive be implemented, this conception of Compliance permitting to build zones which are not reduced to immediate market exchange. The incentive corresponds to the fact that Compliance Law relies on the power of the firm to reach its own political goals, for example fighting against disinformation in the digital space or obtaining a healthy environnement. This supposes that Compliance stops to be only conceived as a model of rules effectivity, for example of Competition Law, to be recognized as a substantial branch of Law. A branch which expresses political goals. A branch which is anchored in crucial firms whose it recognizes the autonomy with regards to markets. This makes it possible, in particular through the coupling with incentive mechanisms leading to long-term collaborative operations supervised by public authorities, not to be governed by simple Competition Law, inapt to bring projects to fruition.

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Résoudre la contradiction entre "sanction" et "incitation" sous le feu du Droit de la Compliance" ("Resolving the contradiction between "sanction" and "incentive" under the fire of Compliance Law"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 89-98

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📝read the article (in French)

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🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with more developments, technical references and hyperlinks 

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📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation and Compliance): Compliance and Incentives appear at first glance to be totally opposite. For two major reasons. Firstly, because sanctions have a central place in Compliance Law and that the incentives suppose an absence of constraint on the operators. Secondly, because the incentives are linked to self-regulation and that Compliance Law assumes a strong presence of public authorities. Thus, one should choose: either Compliance or Incentives! Either the effectiveness of one or the effectiveness of the others; either the techniques of one, or the techniques of others; either the philosophy of one or the philosophy of the other. Resign oneself to the waste that such a necessary choice would imply. But to put the terms in this way amounts to thinking poorly about the situations and reducing the fields of the solutions they call for. If we take a rich definition of Compliance Law, we can on the contrary articulate Compliance and Incentives. From this perspective, sanctions can no longer become what blocks the use of incentives but, on the contrary, what constitutes them. Even more, the coupling between the Incentives and the requirements of Compliance Law must be strongly encouraged, as soon as the public authorities supervise in Ex Ante all the initiatives taken by the "crucial operators".

This article deals with the first issue. Indeed, the so-called incentive theory targets mechanisms which do not directly resort to constraint. They would therefore have little place in Compliance Law. But it seems saturated with sanction procedures. We can even say that it seems to put them at the center, the public authorities presenting the number of sanctions as a sign of success, while the companies seem obsessed with their prospects, the two concerns ending in such a strange convergence that are the Convention Judiciaire d'Intérêt Public (non-prosecution agreement).

The honest observer cannot help but be immediately uneasy. Indeed, it can only raise the definition of the sanction as a "constraint" triggered Ex Post, at the very heart of a Compliance Law which is presented as a set of Ex Ante mechanisms. Based on this contradiction in terms, should we give up the association and think that it would be wrong against the spirit to think of the sanction as an incentive?

It is undoubtedly in this connection that one perceives most clearly the clash of two cultures, which do not communicate, while technically they apply to the same situations. Indeed, because Compliance was designed by Finance, everything is a tool for it. Therefore, the tendency to think of the sanction only as an incentive is very strong in Compliance Law, manifests itself continuously and will not stop (I). But whatever the reasons for conceiving it this way, the principles of the rule of law cannot disappear and if we do not want them to be erased, then they must be articulated (II). This is an essential game (II).

This is why we can literally say that Compliance has set Criminal Law on fire by its conception, logical but closed in on itself, of sanctions as simple incentives. In order for Law to remain, however, we must hold a very firm definition of Compliance Law centered on its Monumental Goal, which is the protection of the person.

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Décrire, concevoir et corréler les outils de la Compliance, pour en faire un usage adéquat" ("Describing, conceiving and correlating Compliance Tools, in order to use them adequately"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. Régulations & Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 3-24.

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📝read the article (in French)

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📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The article is the general introduction to the book on Compliance tools. In its first part it develops the overall problematic. In its second part, it presents each of the contributions, placed in the overall construction of the work.

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General reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Les outils  de la Compliance, series "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) & Dalloz, 2021.

In parallel, the book is published in an English version Compliance Tools, co-edited by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant. 

This book follows a cycle of conferences organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance and by its partner universities. 

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See the collection Regulation & Compliance in which the book has been published. 

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General presentation of the book : The political dimension of Compliance Law resides in the monumental goals that it aims for and which define it. These goals are internalized in "crucial operators", who willingly or by force must structure themselves and act to achieve "monumental goals", as set by public authorities and which may coincide with the interests of the enterprise. This one designs and controls the Ex Ante reorganization that this implies, under the public authorities supervision. Enterprises, even if their activities are not regulated, thus become transparent and must show the Compliance Tools effectively deployed to effectively achieve these goals. It is a major transformation of economic life in all countries because the Compliance Tools are adopted everywhere and have a global effect.

These appear to be very diverse but their unity is profound and bringing it out has the practical benefit of producing a legal regime that is as unified as possible, while allowing their adaptation country by country, sector by sector, enterprise by enterprise. 

This book aims to understand these Compliance Tools to better anticipate the assessment that will be made by Regulators, Supervisors and Courts, as well as the new conceptions of the authors of legal texts which impose new ones every day, while companies must also imagine the most appropriate Compliance Tools.

This collective work specifically apprehends those on which we have few studies when we handle them on a daily basis, such as risk mapping or training or rights, letting more familiar tools shine through more transversal contributions, such as compliance programs, sanctions, whistleblowing or many sorts of settlements, agreements of public interest.

A first chapter takes a legal and economic approach. A second chapter emphasizes the role of risk mapping. A third chapter draws the game of incentives. A fourth chapter identifies the expertise required. A fifth chapter insists on geographic significance. A sixth chapter details the measurement of effectiveness. A seventh chapter explores training. The eighth chapter examines technological tools. The concluding article leads to rights.

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Read the general presentation of the book, including the table of contents and the introduction (in French).

Read the presentations of the articles of the book :

• Amico, Th., La Compliance ou le passage de l'ex post à l'ex ante: une révision copernicienne pour l'avocat pénaliste ?

• Banck, A., La maturité de l’usager de l’outil de la Compliance, premier critère du choix de l’outil adéquat

• Benzoni, L., and Deffains, B., Approche économique des outils de la Compliance: finalités, effectivité et mesure de la Compliance "subie" et "choisie"

• Burlingame, R., Coppens, KK, Power, N. & Lee, D.H., Compliance : lutte internationale contre la corruption et gestion du risque

• Calandri, L., Incitation(s) et autorégulation(s): quelle place pour le Droit de la Compliance dans le secteur audiovisuel?

• Causse, H., La formation en Compliance, par et au-delà de la formation classique

• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Décrire, concevoir et corréler les outils de la Compliance, pour en faire un usage adéquat

• Frison-Roche, Construire juridiquement l'unité des outils de la Compliance à partir de la définition du droit de la Compliance par ses "buts monumentaux"

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• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance et incitations, un couple à propulser

• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Résoudre la contradiction entre incitations et sanctions sous le feu du Droit de la Compliance

• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Dresser des cartographie des risques comme obligation et le paradoxe des "risques de conformité"

• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance : contenu et contenant du Droit de la Compliance 

• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Les droits subjectifs, outils premiers et naturels du Droit de la Compliance

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• Galland, M., Le contrôle par le Régulation de l'effectivité des instruments de compliance

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• ​Granier, C., L'originalité normative de la Compliance by design

• Guillaume, N., Cartographie des risques de compliance : premiers aperçus des enjeux,des limites et des bonnes pratiques

• Gutierriez-Crespin, A., L’audit du dispositif de compliance : un outil clé pour en vérifier la robustesse

• Koenigsberg, S. et Barrière, Fr, La construction de l'expertise de l'avocat en matière de compliance

• Larouer, M., Les manifestations des mécanismes incitatifs dans le Droit français de la Compliance

• Merabet, S., La morale by design

• Pailler, L., Les outils technologiques, la Compliance by Design et le RGPD: la protection des données personnelles dès la conception

• Racine, J.-B., La prégnance géographique dans le choix et l'usage des outils de la Compliance

• Rapp, L., Théorie des incitations et gouvernance des activités spatiales

• ​Roda, J.-C., Compliance by Design en antitrust: entre innovation et illusion

• Salah, M., Conception et application de la Compliance en Afrique

• Tardieu, H., Souveraineté des données et Compliance

• Thouret, T., Formation et Compliance, deux outils corrélés de transmission d'information

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Référence complète: Frison-Roche, M.-A.,Compliance et Arbitrage : un adossement,  rapport de synthèse in Frison-Roche, M.-A. & Racine, J.-B. (dir.) Compliance et Arbitrage, Colloque coorganisé par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et le Centre de recherches sur la Justice et le Règlement des Conflits (CRJ) de l'Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris II), avec le soutien de la Cour Internationale d'Arbitrage, Paris, 31 mars 2021.

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🗓️ Lire le programme de ce colloque

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✏️Le rapport de synthèse a été réalisé au fur et à mesure que se déroulait le colloque : se reporter aux notes prises durant le colloque. 

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Voir le rapport de synthèse en vidéo

Voir l'intégralité du colloque en vidéo. 

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📅 Ce colloque s'insère dans le cycle de colloques 2021 organisé par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et ses partenaires autour de la Juridictionnalisation de la Compliance.

📕 Les interventions ont servi de première base à la réalisation d'un titre  dans l'ouvrage dirigé par Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, dont la version française,  La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance, est co-édité par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz.

📘 Elles ont été de la même façon la première base pour la version anglaise de l'ouvrage, Compliance Juridictionalisation, co-édité par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant. 

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This scientific event is placed under the scientific responsibility of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Baptiste Racine. It is organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and by the Centre de recherche sur la Justice et le Règlement des Conflits (CRJ)  of the  Panthéon-Assas (Paris II) University, with the active support of the International Chamber of Commerce ICC.

This event is the third colloquium of the 2021 colloquia cycle around the general theme of Compliance Juridictionnalization.

The different interventions will be then transformed into contributions in the books La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance  and Compliance Juridictionnalization  which will be published in the Regulation & Compliance serie, jointly published by the JoRC and Dalloz for the book in French and by JoRC and Bruylant for the book in English. 

This colloquium will take place the 31st of March 2021.

The manifestation will be live broadcasted on Zoom.

To register: https://u-paris2-fr.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_sPSB4aUUQTWDWDnNcYt3sA

Presentation of the theme: 

The arbitrator is the ordinary judge of international trade. It was natural that he or she encountered Compliance: by definition Compliance Law takes hold of the whole world and follows the paths of international trade while it can only be deployed with the help of institutions which, by nature are spreading around the world and need authorities like the Courts.

The conference is based on the already perceptible connection points between Compliance and Arbitration to better identify what is emerging for tomorrow: contradiction or convergence between the two; weakening or consolidation. We are already seeing the impact that Compliance can have on the arbitrator's treatment of corruption or the consideration of money laundering. More generally, where do we stand with the arbitrator's knowledge of the many technical issues related to compliance? Beyond these, will the courts and arbitrators be able to achieve the goals, themselves new, sometimes monumental, pursued by Compliance Law?

Through this joint exploration of these avenues, the fate of compliance clauses inserted in contracts, the relevance in the matter of private codes of conduct, etc. will be examined.

Tomorrow, as of today, is the arbitrator a full and complete judge of Compliance Law?

How, with what specificities and what controls?

Notably will speak:

• Mathias Audit, professeur à l'Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I (full professor at Sorbonne - University - Paris)

• Dominique Bourrinet, General Counsel of Société générale group 

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• Cécile Chainais, director of the Centre de Recherche sur la Justice et le Règlement des Conflits (CRJ) and professeur à l'Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris II) (Full professor at Panthéon-Assas (Paris II) University) 

• Claire Debourg, professeure à l'Université Paris X- Nanterre (Full professor at Paris X - Nanterre) 

• Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, professeur à Sciences Po - Paris (Full Professor at Sciences Po - Paris)) and Director of the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC)

• Catherine Kessedjian, professeur émérite de l'Université Panthéon-Assas (professor emeritus of Panthéon-Assas - Paris II University)

• Elie Kleiman, partner, Jones Day Law Firm

• Alexis Mourre, president of the ICC International Court of Arbitration

• Jean-Baptiste Racine, professeur à l'Université Panthéon-Assas - Paris II (Full Professor at Panthéon-Assas - Paris II University)

• François-Xavier Train, professeur à l'Université Paris X-Nanterre (Full Professor at Paris X-Nanterre University)

• Eduardo Silva-Romero, Dechert Law Firm 

Read a detailed presentation of the colloquium below: