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Watch the video that presents, analyzes and measures the scope of the Commission des sanctions de l'Autorité des marchés financiers - AMF (French Financial Markets Authority Sanctions Committee) of December 4, 2019, Morgan Stanley International.

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The bank, through its British subsidiary, had to answer before the Sanctions Committee of the Authority of the financial markets where it contested a notification of price manipulation grievances on financial instruments based on specific securities (OAT) issued by the Public Treasury French and put on  the regulated market, these first various financial instruments being themselves built elsewhere and offered on various national financial markets, for example for France FOAT, which are futures on these OAT not traded on a regulated market.

The sentencing decision of 4 December 2019 is instructive. On the very principle of the competence of the administrative sanctioning authority (I) and on the evidentiary mechanism of the facts (II). This corresponded to the "3 elements of the infringement", which should in principle be found in the repressive administrative law, which is a "criminal matter." But as expressly stated in the decision, the intentional element is not required for market abuse.

There remains therefore the legal element, which requires that the behavior be precisely targeted by a text, and the material element.

Let's see their fate.

I. LE PRINCIPE DE LEGALITE DES DELITS ET DES PEINES N'ENTRAVE PAS L'EFFET NATUREL DE LA DEFINITION "NATURELLE" DU COURS DU TITRE SOUS-JACENT AFFECTE PAR LA MANIPULATION

En premier lieu la Banque contestait la compétence même du Régulateur à en connaître car ce n'est que postérieurement aux faits reprochés que les textes applicables ont dit qu'étaient sanctionnables les agissement sur des instruments financiers "liés" aux instruments financiers émis sur un marché réglementé. Au nom du principe d'analyse restrictive et de la non-rétroactivité des textes d'incrimination qui gouvernent la matière pénale, la Banque soutenait n'être pas apte à être poursuivie.

La Commission des sanction écarte le moyen en affirmant qu'elle respecte ces principes inhérents à la matière pénale, mais qu'il faut regarder la finalité des textes. Or la manipulation de cours, manquement ici en cause, est un manquement parce que l'agissement a pour objet ou pour effet de perturber le cours du titre qui est sur le marché réglementé. En agissant sur un instrument financier, même situé sur un marché non-réglementé, dont le sous-jacent est sur un marché réglement, le cours de celui-ci est perturbé, alors la manipulation du premier ayant pour effet de perturbé le cours du second justifie la pourrsuite et la sanction. Sans qu'il y ait rétroactivité des textes. 

II. LES PRESOMPTIONS SIMPLES D'AGISSEMENTS LEGITIMES OU ILLEGITIMES SUR LES TITRES ET LE "FAIT JUSTIFICATIF DE COMPLIANCE"

En second lieu, la Banque soutient que son action sur les différents instruments financiers sur les différents marchés a été justifiée par son intérêt légitime démontré en raison de l'absence de liquidité du titre et pour dénouer une position déficitaire appelant une intervention massive dans un temps très court de sa part sur plusieurs marchés en même temps et que si le cours en a été modifié, il n'en est pas devenu pour autant "anormal", ce qui est un élément matériel du manquement. 

La Commission des sanctions pose tout d'abord que l'opérateur peut à la fois avoir des motifs légitimes démontrés d'agir sur un titre et néanmoins opérer sur celui-ci une manipulation de cours. 

Revenant sur la définition de la manipulation de cours, la Commission ne reprend pas la notion d'"anormalité" dans le sens où il faudrait que le cours ne soit pas conforme aux attentes, il faut mais il suffit qu'il soit inattendu : le "normal" est donc dans le sens de l'inhabituel. Si la Banque parvient à justifier son action, comme elle arrive à le faire pour un titre (le FGBL et FGBX), alors il n'y a pas de sanction (n°90 de la décision) mais dans les autres cas la Commission estime que les agissements ont eu pour effet de faire varier le cours des sous-jacents émis par le Trésor public français (OAT), ne s'expliquent pas autrement, les autres opérateurs agissant comme si la hause de la valeur des OAT avait une autre origine. Or, la Banque avant cet effet a revendu immédiatement les OAT. L'ensemble des agissements ayant duré moins d'un quart d'heure, la Commission considère que l'élément matériel de la manipulation de cours est constitué. 

Pourtant la Banque se prévalait d'une sorte de fait justificatif : elle avait agi en "conformité" avec "une pratique de marché" (article 631-1 Réglement général de l'AMF).  La Commission récuse cela, car elle considère que ce texte ne vise que trois hypothèses : contrats de liquidité obligatoires, contrats de liquidité sur actions et acquisitions d'actions.... pour les opérations de croissance externe". C'est donc tout à fait une conception très restrictive que la Commission adopte pour ce qui vient en restriction des textes répressifs....

Quand à "l'intention manipulatoire", les choses sont encore plus claire. Pour sanctionner un manquement, il n'est besoin d'aucune démonstration d'une intention puisque les textes sur les abus de marché "ne font référence pas à un quelconque élément intentionnel"...

Pour se protéger, la Commission estime que l'intention découle de toutes les façons du manquement...

QU'EN PENSER ?

Il est probable que cette décision fera l'objet d'un recours. 

L'on comprend bien le raisonnement du Régulateur.

Il fait prévaloir l'efficacité, la sanction n'étant qu'un moyen de préservation l'intégrité du système financier dans son coeur même à savoir le caractère adéquat des prix des instruments qui y sont offerts. En cela la sanction n'est qu'un instrument au service du marché, n'est qu'un instrument de Compliance. 

Il est assez savoureux, et amer, de lire comment la "conformité à une pratique de marché" est balayée d'un revers de main, le caractère général, de principe et téléologique n'étant tout à coup plus un raisonnement recevable....

Il est vrai que le Conseil d'Etat conçoit la sanction de la même façon. A propos du mécanisme de gel des avoirs, autre instrument du Droit de la Compliance, la sanction infligée à une banque par l'ACPR est maniée de la même façon.

Mais que reste-t-il du Droit pénal, qui devait innerver dans son esprit et ses principes fondamentaux, repris dans la "matière pénale" le Droit administratif répressif ?

Comment ne pas être inquiet quand il est désormais affirmé que d'élément intentionnel, il n'en est plus besoin ?

L'on peut effectivement penser que le Droit retient la sanction, et l'accroît, mais met de côté la matière pénale : de la répression sans droit pénal... N'est-ce pas un oxymore ? Ne faut-il pas chercher au moins à le résoudre ? 

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► Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Articuler les principes gouvernant les sanctions et les principes animant le Droit de la Compliance, décembre 2019.

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► Ce document de travail a servi de base à la première des conférences faites dans le colloque qui s'est tenu sous la direction scientifique de Marie-Anne Frison-Roche et de Lucien Rapp, Les incitations, outils de la Compliance,  le 12 décembre 2019,  à Toulouse,

🚧 voir le document de travail, sous-jacent au thème général:  Incitations et Droit de la Compliance, ayant conclu le colloque

Il a ensuite servi de base à un article dans l'ouvrage Les outils de la Compliance, dans la collection Régulations & Compliance.

Lire une présentation générale de cet ouvrage.  

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Résumé du document de travail : 

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Lire ci-dessous les développements.

Watch the video explaining the content, meaning and scope of the decision made by the Conseil d'Etat (French Council of State) on November 15, 2019, La Banque Postale v. Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR).

The Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution - ACPR (French Authority of prudential control and resolution) pronounced a very high sanction, representing 7% of La Banque Postale's net annual result. The breach is constituted by the fact of not having prevented the use of the banking technique of the "money order" which was used to escape the freezing of the assets.

The Conseil d'Etat recalls that by nature if the assets are frozen, it is not possible that anyone is able to dispose of these assets. However, by the use of "money orders", persons targeted by asset freezing decisions, tools used in connection with the fight against money laundering and the fight against terrorism, had been able to circulate money to from accounts managed by La Banque Postale, of which they were not customers.

This case was not foreseen at the time when the Bank Postale was sanctioned by the ACPR for not having prevented such a use, the texts forcing it under its obligations of "conformity" to prevent this behavior of violation background gels on the part of his customers, but only that.

This case of a use of a means by a person who is not a customer of the bank was not foreseen at the time when the alleged facts took place and the Bank claims not to be able to be punished since in the repressive matter it is necessary to respect the principle of non-retroactivity of the texts, - in this case texts later supplemented to aim at such an assumption -, the non-retroactivity being a major principle itself related to the principle of the legality of the offenses and the penalties.

We are therefore in the hypothesis of a silence of the texts.

What to decide? Can the Bank be condemned and so heavily or not by the ACPR?

The Bank does not think so. 

It acted against this sanction decision firstly because those who used these money orders were not its clients. It has strong reasons to avail itself of this fact, since subsequently the texts needed to be modified to aim not only the use of this technique of money order by those who have a count in the bank and also by those who act with cash through the bank without a count, that is to say without an account holder to look at. Because we are in criminal matters, the restrictive interpretation and non-retroactivity of the text should lead to follow the reasoning of the Bank. But the Conseil d'Etat does not because it considers that implicitly but necessarily even with this subsequent modification of the text, it had aimed that use before.

By this way, the Conseil d'Etatuncil develops a very broad concept of the obligations of banks in their role in the fight against money laundering, and therefore a very repressive point of view, which permeates their "obligation of Compliance". Thus, when the bank also argues that it can not be sanctioned since for it this activity of money order is  deficit and that it did not cause harm to its customers even by assuming badly its obligations, theConseil d'Etat stresses that this is not a pertinent perspective since the Compliance obligations falls within the "overriding general interest of protection of public order and public security, to which the freezing of assets legislation responds".

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Read the  judgment of the Conseil d'Etat ( in French). 

Regarder le film de 5 minutes sur le contenu, le sens et la portée de l'arrêt rendu par la première chambre civile de la Cour de cassation du 27 novembre 2019, M.X.A. c/ Google.

Cet arrêt casse l'arrêt de la Cour d'appel de Paris qui valide le non-déférencement, après que la CNIL a demandé l'interprétation des textes, notamment du RGPD, parce que le droit à l'oubli doit limiter l'exception ici invoquée, à savoir le droit à l'information, même s'il s'agit d'une décision pénale concernant un commissaire-aux-comptes, car il s'agit d'une affaire privée et non pas ce qui concerne l'exercice de sa profession réglementée coeur du système financier. 

Lire la décision de la Première Chambre civile de la Cour de cassation du 27 novembre 2019, M.X.A. c/ Google. 

Reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., General presentation of the cycle of conferences on Les outils de la Compliance  (Compliance Tools) and  "Théorie générale de la cartographie des risques" (Legal Theory of Risk Mapping), conference made in French, in Département d'Economie de Sciences Po & Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC),  La cartographie des risques, outil de la Compliance (Risk Mapping, as Compliance Tool), November 28th, 2019, Sciences Po, Paris. 

• Read the  General Presentation ot the cycle of conferences about the Compliance Tools

• Read the General Presentation of the book written in English to be published

• Read the General Presentation of the serie Régulations & Compliance in which the book will be published

Summary of the conference

Risk mapping is both central to the obligations or practices of companies and little apprehended by the legal systems. It is not expressly referred to by the French legal system, except for the special national laws known as "Sapin 2" and "Vigilance". But if we are out of this field, because there is only a description and not a legal definition, even less a legal notion, we do not know what legal regime to apply to the action of mapping risks. It is therefore useful, indeed compelling, to define the legal concept of risk mapping. Starting from what is still the safest ground, namely these two special laws, to go towards less secure legal grounds, such as the doctrine of the authorities or the commitments of the companies, even the ISO certifications obtained in this matter. Through a few judicial decisions and legal reasoning, a legal notion of the action of mapping risks emerges.

It is advisable to proceed in 5 steps (the working document follows another approach).
The first, based directly on the two available laws, apprehends the action of mapping when it comes into execution of a special legal obligation. The decision rendered in 2019 by the French Commission des sanctions of the Agence Française Anticorruption (French Corruption Agency's Sanctions Commission) draws probate games as to the demonstration of the execution of the obligation and the probationary system can be extended. In the same way the decision of the French Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) in 2017 on the "Vigilance Act" shows that a mechanism referred to as a "modality" is legitimate with regard to the goal, which is, concerning this tool, the establishment of a responsibility for others. It is therefore the concern for the situation of others that can be targeted by the Law thanks to Compliance Tool, especially Risk Mapping.

The second theme aims to map risks as a fact of good management for a company, while the enterprise is not constrained by a legal obligation. This fact is a paradox because the Regulatory Authority and the Judge may, where the conduct that was to be prevented occurs, for example a market abuse or an anti-competitive behavior, either qualify as an aggravating circumstance or as an attenuating circumstance. Consideration of the theory of incentives should lead to the adoption of the American solution, that is to say the qualification of an effective cartography as a mitigating fact. European case law is not yet fixed, especially in terms of Competition Law's compliance.

The third theme is the mapping action carried out by an entity which, in doing so, exercises power over a third party. Because cartography is as much an obligation as a power, possibly on a third party. The Conseil d'Etat (French Council of State) in 2017 qualified risk mapping as an act of grievance, but doing so legitimately, since it was to prevent forest fires efficiently. This solution based on the teleology attached to Compliance Law can be transposed to other areas.

Going further, one may consider transforming this action from de facto status to legal status on the part of the company, if it thus identifies risks for third parties. It would thus give third-party creditors the right to be in a position to measure the risks that weigh on them. Risk mapping would thus be part of a broader unilateral commitment by powerful companies, recognizing the existence of risks for third parties to enable them to know their nature and extent. If this responsibility Ex Ante (characteristic of Compliance Law) is fulfilled, then the Ex Post liability of the company could no longer be retained. This is the ongoing issue of the Johnson & Johnson trial (2019 American judgment), in terms of medical compliance. Because if one can argue that there exists through this kind of risk mapping that the posology a "subjective right to be worried about the risks related to the taking of the drug", the patient remains free in the use of it. The question of whether third-party education is included in the mapping, since the alert is already included in it, is an open question. For now, the answer is negative.

Indeed and in a fifth time, appears the liberal definition of Compliance Law through the apprehension that the Law must make of the cartography of the risks. Beyond the rational act that any person has to control their risks for their own interest, by preventing the damaging effects of that from the crystallization of risk has in fact proved, it is a question of preserving an external interest for the preservation of which the Law must intervene because the subject of law, in particular the company will be less likely to be concerned.

By the imprint of the law, risk mapping expresses the concern for an external interest, either of a system or of a third party. But this support in Ex Ante implies force (Sapin 2, Vigilance, financial market information obligation) or will (social responsibility, ethical commitment, adoption of non-financial standards) relates only to information, its constitution, its intelligibility and its hierarchy. Then it is the actors exposed to the risks, able to understand in Ex Ante the extent as far as they are concerned, either the entity itself, or the thirds, to choose to run them to no.

• Consult the two sets of slides as basis of the conference: 

• Slides served as basis for the General Presentation of the cycle of conference on the Compliance Tools (in French) 
• Slides served as basis for the specific contribution "Théorie générale de la cartographie des risques / Legal Theory of Risk Mapping" (in French).

• Read the working paper served as basis for the conference

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The conferences cycle Les outils de la Compliance (The Compliance tools) taking place between November 2019 and June 2020 organized by The Journal of Regulation & Compliance and all the Partner Universities will start this year on the theme of "La cartographie des risques" (Risk Mapping) . 

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Conference - Debate (in French)

 jeudi Thursday, November 28, 2019. 19h15 – 21h15

at the Economics Department of Sciences Po 

28 rue des Saints-Pères 75007 Paris

Amphithéâtre Simone Veil

Under the scientific coordination of Guillaume Sarrat de Tramezaigues, Executive Director fo the  Economics Department of Sciences po.

Risk Mapping is defined as a process of identifying, evaluating and prioritizing risks: it is an integral and fundamental part of an effective global strategy for managing these risks. 

As a central tool for Compliance, this approach may not be radically new, but the Risk Mapping Technique is now renewed and sometimes compromised by the emergence of new Risks, often due to their new mutiform nature. Moreover, the primacy of the new pair of "Political Risks/Compliance Risks" tends to increase the vulnerability of organizations obliged by new legal provisions to draw up these maps, whereas these tools must also protect these organizations. 

Before discussing it with the audience, the speakers will explain through their experience the place of this tool in Compliance, by looking at how Risk Mapping is articulated with the logic of value creation through risk-taking, inherent in entrepreneurial and political action. This good understanding is not only essential for the company, but also for the administrative and judicial authorities which control or sanction firms.

Especially with the interventions of:

- Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, full professor of Regulatory Law and Compliance Law, Sciences Po

- Jean-François Guillemin, former general secretary of the Bouygues Group

- Lamia Liabes, Chief Operating Office, HSBC France

- Guillaume Sarrat de Tramezaigues, executive Director fo the  Economics Department of Sciences po

Inscription : anouk.leguillou@mafr.fr

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This first event is more specifically   organized by the Economics Department of Sciences po.

It opens the cycle of conferences organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) (see the partners of this cycle), whose general theme is Les outils de la Compliance (The Compliance tools).

Read the General Presentation of the Conferences Cycles.

This manifestation will be the basis for a book. 

Read the conditions for inscription, and conditions for access les conditions d'accès (in French).

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This Working Paper served as the basis for an intervention in the conference organized in the conference cycle organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) on the theme: Compliance Tools, in collaboration with many university partners: this first conference is organized in collaboration with the Sciences po Economics Department and is held on November 28, 2019 at Sciences po and deals with the more specific theme of Risk mapping.

It also serves as the basis for the book edited by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Compliance Tools, which will be released in the Regulations & Compliance collection.

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 Is the consideration by Law of the Risk Mapping mechanism so new?

At first glance yes, and one might even be surprised at this novelty, since this rational anticipation of risks should have been recognized for a long time. But this is perhaps due to the more general fact that Risk itself has only recently become an autonomous legal object in Economic Law, in particular because Risk does not have at all the same position in Competition Law and in Regulation Law (I) .. Its position is even opposed in the both, Risk becoming central in Regulation Law. Compliance Law being the extension of Regulatory Law, it is also built on the "concern" of Risk and the internalization of this consideration in enterprises therefore takes the form of mapping.

A closer look maybe not,even  before the specific  French laws, called "Sapin 2" and "Vigilance" and beyond them, case law decisions giving a general scope to maps drawn up by operators, or increasing the obligation that 'they have to do it (II). In this, general and precise technical Law offers points of support for Compliance Law, strengthening it in its tools.

Référence complète : contribution à l'organisation et à la tenue de la conférence de présentation de l'Association Henri Capitant, Faculté de Droit d'Oslo, centre de droit privé, 21 novembre 2019.

Par cette conférence de présentation et la discussion qui s'en est suivie avec les juristes réunis à l'initiative du professeur Mads Andenas, professeur de droit à la Faculté de Droit d'Oslo, les bases ont été posées de la constitution d'un Groupe norvégien de l'Association Henri Capitant.