► Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., « Le parquet européen est un apport considérable au droit de la compliance », entretien avec Olivia Dufour, Actu-Juridique, 11 et 14 juin 2021.

💬 Lire l'entretien. 

❓ Questions posées : 

Référence générale : Frison-Roche, M.-A.., Rights, primary and natural Compliance Tools, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), Compliance Tools, série "Regulation & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, 2021, p. 319-342

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Résumé en français de l'article (publié en anglais)

Dans la conception traditionnelle de l'architecture des secteurs régulés par le Droit et dans le Droit de la Compliance qui prolonge les techniques étatiques de Régulation, les droits subjectifs ont peu de place. Mais cette configuration n'a plus lieu, au contraire les droits subjectifs sont aujourd'hui au cœur, et le seront de plus en plus. Ils sont et seront les outils premiers du Droit de la Compliance parce qu'ils constituent un "outil" d'une grande efficacité pour assurer le fonctionnement entier d'un système dont les buts sont si difficiles à atteindre. Parce qu'il faut faire feu de tout bois pour concrétiser ces buts, les Autorités publiques non seulement s'appuient sur la puissance des opérateurs cruciaux, mais encore distribuent des prérogatives aux personnes qui, ainsi incitées, activent le système de Compliance et participent à la réalisation du "but monumental". Les droits subjectifs peuvent s'avérer les outils les plus efficaces pour atteindre effectivement les buts fixés, à tel point qu'on peut les considérer comme des "outils premiers".

Mais il convient d'avoir plus de prétention et de concevoir les droits subjectifs comme les outils les plus "naturels" du droit de la Compliance. En effet parce que tous les Buts Monumentaux par lesquels le Droit de la Compliance se définit peuvent se ramener à la protection des personnes, c'est-à-dire à l'effectivité de leurs prérogatives, par un effet de miroir entre les droits subjectifs donnés comme moyens par le Droit aux personnes et les droits subjectifs qui constituent le but même de tout le Droit de la Compliance, notamment la protection de tous les êtres humains, même s'ils sont en situation de grande faiblesse, les droits subjectifs devenant un "outil naturel" du Droit de la Compliance. Nous ne sommes qu'à l'orée de leur déploiement et c'est sans doute sur eux que pourra se réguler l'espace digital dans lequel désormais nous vivons, afin que nous n'y soyons pas étouffés et qu'il constitue pour les personnes un espace civilisé. 

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Lire le document de travail bilingue, doté de développements supplémentaires, de références techniques et de liens hypertextes, sur lequel cet article est basé.

Consulter une présentation générale du volume dans lequel l'article a été publié.

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► Référence complète : M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), Compliance Tools, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, coll "Régulations & Compliance", 2021, 357 p.

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📕Parallèlement, un ouvrage en français, Les outils de la Compliance, est publié dans la collection "Régulations & Compliance", co-éditée par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz

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🧮Cet ouvrage vient à la suite d'un cycle de colloques organisés par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et des Universités qui lui sont partenaires

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Cet ouvrage en langue anglaise constitue le 1ier titre de cette collection entièrement consacrée au Droit de la Compliance, en ce que celui-ci est le prolongement du Droit de la Régulation. 

📚Lire la présentation des autres ouvrages de la Collection portant sur la Compliance :

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, 2024

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, 2023

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Monumental Goals, 2023

📚Consulter les autres titres de la collection

📚Cette collection en langue anglaise s'articule avec une collection coéditée entre le Journal of Regulation & Compliance et Dalloz

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► Présentation générale de l'ouvrage : The political dimension of Compliance Law lies in the goals it aims to achieve. To achieve them, the concern for these goals is internalized in "crucial operators", which may be obliged to concretize "monumental goals" set by public authorities. These public bodies control the Ex Ante reorganization that this implies for these companies and sanction Ex Post the possible inadequacy of the companies, which have become transparent to this end. The effectiveness and efficiency of this internalization, without which the statement of these goals is worth nothing, is based on the Compliance tools that are deployed.

These appear to be truly diverse but their substantial unity (topic which will be the subject of a forthcoming book) makes it possible to study the tools put in place from a unique perspective, by not isolating them in a particular branch of Law, Criminal law or International Law for example, but by measuring what is common to them, notably Anticipation, Trust, Commitment, Responsibility, Incentive, and so on. If the Compliance tools vary, it is not only according to the sectors, finance and banking appearing then as the advanced point of the general Compliance Law, for example in environmental matters, but also according to the countries and the cultures. It is in fact about them that legal cultures seem to oppose.

The book aims to understand these "tools" by going beyond the description of each instrument, for which we already have many monographs, for analyzing them through the issues of Risks, required Expertises, Training. Sovereignty claims, Incentives, mechanical aptitude of Technologies. It is through these themes that are analyzed by the authors, experts in the field, what we always want to understand better: Compliance Programs, Whistleblowing, Mapping, Sanctions, Extraterritoriality, etc.

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📘Consulter le sommaire de l'ouvrage. 

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► Appréhender l'ouvrage à travers la table des matières ci-dessous et les résumés de chacun des articles : 

INTRODUCTION

📝Frison-Roche, M.-A., Describing, designing and correlating Compliance Tools to Have a Better Use of It

I. LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO COMPLIANCE TOOLS

📝Frison-Roche, M.-A., Building by Law the Unicity of Compliance Tools from the Definition of Compliance Law by its "Monumental Goals"

🕴️L. Benzoni et B. Deffains, 📝

II. RISK MAPPING, CENTRAL COMPLIANCE TOOL

III. PLACE AND USE OF INCENTIVES IN COMPLIANCE SYSTEMS

IV. THE REQUIRED EXPERTISES IN TERMS OF COMPLIANCE

V. THE GEOGRAPHICAL DOMINANCE OF COMPLIANCE TOOLS

VI. THE MEASURE OF COMPLIANCE TOOLS EFFECTIVITY

VII. TRAINING, ALPHA AND OMEGA OF COMPLIANCE

VIII. TECHNOLOGICAL TOOLS AND COMPLIANCE BY DESIGN

CONCLUSION

📝Amico, Th., Compliance or the passage from ex post to ex ante: A Copernican revolution for the criminal lawyer?

📝Banck, A., The maturity of the Compliance tool’s user, first criterion of the choice of the salient tool

📝Burlingame, R., Coppens, K., Power, N., Lee, D.H., Anti-Corruption Compliance: Global Dimension of Enforcement and Risk Management

📝Calandri, L., Incentive(s) and Self-Regulation(s): which place for Compliance Law in the Audiovisual Sector? 

📝Causse, H., Compliance Training: Through and Beyond Traditional Legal Training

📝Frison-Roche, M.-A., Drawing up Risk Maps as an obligation and the paradox of the "Compliance risks" 

📝Frison-Roche, M.-A., Incentives and Compliance, a couple to propel

📝Frison-Roche, M.-A., Resolving the contradiction between sanctions and incentives under the fire of Compliance Law

📝Frison-Roche, M.-A., Rights, primary and natural Compliance Tools

📝Frison-Roche, M.-A., Training: content and container of Compliance Law​

📝Galland, M., The Regulator's Inspection of the Effectiveness of the Compliance Tools Implemented by the Company

📝Granier, C., The Normative Originality of Compliance by Design

📝Guillaume, N., Compliance risk mapping: first insights of challenges, limits and good practices

📝Guttierez-Crespin, A., Audit of Compliance Systems

📝Koenigsberg, S. and Barrière, F., The Development of Attorney's Compliance Expertise

📝Larouer, M., The Manifestation of Incentives Mechanisms in French Compliance Law

📝Merabet, S., Morality by Design

📝Pailler, L., Technological Tools, Compliance by Design and GDPR: the Protection of Personal Data from Design

📝Racine, J.-B., Geographical dominance in the choice and the use of Compliance Tools. Introductory remarks​

📝Rapp, L., Incentive Theory and Governance of Space Activities

📝Roda, J.-C., Compliance by design in antitrust: between innovation and illusion

📝Salah, M., Conception and Application of Compliance in Africa

📝Tardieu, H., Data Sovereignty and Compliance

📝Thouret, T., Training and Compliance, Two Correlated Information Transmission Tools

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Référence générale : Frison-Roche, M.-A.(dir.), Compliance Tools, série "Régulations & Compliance", coédition Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, 2021.

Cet ouvrage en langue anglaise constitue le 1ier titre de cette collection entièrement consacrée au Droit de la Compliance, en ce que celle-ci est le prolongement du Droit de la Régulation. 

Consulter les titres de cette série en langue anglaise coéditée avec Bruylant.

Cette collection en langue anglaise s'articule avec une collection coéditée entre le Journal of Regulation & Compliance et Dalloz.

Ainsi, parallèlement, un ouvrage en français, Les outils de la Compliance, est publié. 

Consulter les titres de la série en langue française coéditée avec Dalloz.

Cet ouvrage vient à la suite d'un cycle de colloques organisés par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et des Universités qui lui sont partenaires.

___

Présentation générale de l'ouvrage publié en anglais

The political dimension of Compliance Law lies in the goals it aims to achieve. To achieve them, the concern for these goals is internalized in "crucial operators", which may be obliged to concretize "monumental goals" set by public authorities. These public bodies control the Ex Ante reorganization that this implies for these companies and sanction Ex Post the possible inadequacy of the companies, which have become transparent to this end. The effectiveness and efficiency of this internalization, without which the statement of these goals is worth nothing, is based on the Compliance tools that are deployed.

These appear to be very diverse but their substantial unity (topic which will be the subject of a forthcoming book) makes it possible to study the tools put in place from a unique perspective, by not isolating them in a particular branch of Law, Criminal law or International Law for example, but by measuring what is common to them, notably Anticipation, Trust, Commitment, Responsibility, Incentive, and so on. If the Compliance tools vary, it is rather not only according to the sectors, finance and banking appearing then as the advanced point of the general Compliance Law, for example in environmental matters, but also according to the countries and the cultures. It is in fact about them that legal cultures seem to oppose.

The book aims to understand these "tools" by going beyond the description of each instrument, for which we already have many monographs, for analyzing them through the issues of Risks, required Expertises, Training. Sovereignty claims, Incentives, mechanical aptitude of Technologies. It is through these themes that are analyzed by the authors, experts in the field, what we always want to understand better: Compliance Programs, Whistle-blowing, Mapping, Sanctions, Extraterritoriality, etc.

 ____

Consulter le sommaire de l'ouvrage. 

Lire l'avant-projet résumant l'ensemble des contributions de l'ouvrage. 

Présentation des articles composant l'ouvrage :

• Amico, Th., Compliance or the passage from ex post to ex ante: A Copernican revolution for the criminal lawyer?

• Banck, A., The maturity of the Compliance tool’s user, first criterion of the choice of the salient tool

• Burlingame, R., Coppens, K., Power, N., Lee, D.H., Anti-Corruption Compliance: Global Dimension of Enforcement and Risk Management

• Calandri, L., Incentive(s) and Self-Regulation(s): which place for Compliance Law in the Audiovisual Sector? 

• Causse, H., Compliance Training: Through and Beyond Traditional Legal Training

• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Describing, designing and correlating Compliance Tools to Have a Better Use of It

• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Building by Law the Unicity of Compliance Tools from the Definition of Compliance Law by its "Monumental Goals"

• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Drawing up Risk Maps as an obligation and the paradox of the "Compliance risks" 

• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Incentives and Compliance, a couple to propel
• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Resolving the contradiction between sanctions and incentives under the fire of Compliance Law
• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Rights, primary and natural Compliance Tools

• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Training: content and container of Compliance Law​

• Galland, M., The Regulator's Inspection of the Effectiveness of the Compliance Tools Implemented by the Company

• Granier, C., The Normative Originality of Compliance by Design

• Guillaume, N., Compliance risk mapping: first insights of challenges, limits and good practices

• Guttierez-Crespin, A., Audit of Compliance Systems

• Koenigsberg, S. and Barrière, F., The Development of Attorney's Compliance Expertise

• Larouer, M., The Manifestation of Incentives Mechanisms in French Compliance Law

• Merabet, S., Morality by Design

• Pailler, L., Technological Tools, Compliance by Design and GDPR: the Protection of Personal Data from Design

• Racine, J.-B., Geographical dominance in the choice and the use of Compliance Tools. Introductory remarks​

• Rapp, L., Incentive Theory and Governance of Space Activities

• Roda, J.-C., Compliance by design in antitrust: between innovation and illusion

• Salah, M., Conception and Application of Compliance in Africa

• Tardieu, H., Data Sovereignty and Compliance

• Thouret, T., Training and Compliance, Two Correlated Information Transmission Tools

Full reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Incentives and Compliance, a promising couple to increase the Compliance Law utility, , in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, series "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance and Bruylant, 2021, p. 141-148

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Summary of the article: The theory of incentives targets the mechanisms which do not use directly constraint (except to present sanctions themselves as incentives) but which leads nevertheless to expected behaviors. To appreciate the links which must or must not be done between incentives and Compliance, we should proceed in two times. 

First, the association appears natural between incentive mechanisms and "Compliance Law" since the later is defined in a dynamic way. Indeed, if it is defined placing its legal normativity in its "monumental goals", as the end of corruption, the detection of money laundering in order to underlying criminality disappears, or as the effective protection of environment or the concrete care of human beings, then what matters is not the means in themselves but the effective tension towards these "monumental goals". In this perspective, what was related to public policies led by States, because they are definitively not able to do it, the charge is internalized in the firms which are able to tend towards this goals: "crucial operators" because they have the geographical, technological, informational and financial means. 

In this perspective, the internalization of public willingness provoking a split with the concept of State linked to a territory which deprives Politics of its constraint power, incentive mechanisms appear as the most efficient mean to reach these monumental goals. They appear as this "natural" mean both negatively and positively defined. Negatively in which they do not need in Ex Ante institutional localizable sources and sanction power in Ex Post: it is enough to substitute the interest to obligation. Positively, incentives relay through operators' strategies what was the so critical and joked form of public action: the "plan". The duration is thus injected thanks to Compliance mechanisms, as we can see it through the development of it in the care for environment ("plan climat") or through the educational mechanism, which could be conceived only in duration.  

However, the opposition seems radical between Compliance Law and Incentives. And this because of three convictions often developed and that we have to overcome. First, the idea that in a general way, there would be a Law only if there is a mechanism of immediate constraint which is associated to the norm. As long as the incentive is not based on obligation, then it will be nothing... Secondly, and as if that were a kind of consolation ..., Compliance would not be really Law either ... We so often say that it is only about a methodology, a range of processes without sense, procedures to follow without trying to understand, process that algorithms integrate in a mechanic without end and without sense or that on the contrary, Compliance would be full of sense by Ethics and Morality, which are far from Law. While incentives talk to the human spirit which calculate, Compliance would be so a process through which machines will be connected to other machines, so an extra soul, where calculation has no place... Thirdly, solutions would be to be find in Competition Law because it can do without States, submit them and approach what is a-sectorial, especially finance and digital, the world being financialized and digitalized. The violence of Competition Law which comes in Ex Ante thanks to "Compliance sanctions" applying for example to essential infrastructures Law, by continuing to deny the salience of the duration and taking care of the "market power" would be also not compatible with a marriage with incentive mechanisms which rely on duration and power of those to which it is applied, converging towards goals, which are set by what Competition Law ignores: the project. This project which pretends to build the future is the one of politics and of companies, which use their deployed power in time to concretize it. It is without any doubt there that the future of Europe is. 

To overcome this triple difficulty, it is thus necessary, in a second time, to modify our conception of Law, especially thanks to Compliance Law, in which this new branch is autonomous from Competition Law, and even sometimes opposed to it, in order to the insertion of incentive mechanisms permit to unknown or against Competition Law organizations to reach "monumental goals" which are imperative to take into consideration. For example, the taking into consideration of climate challenges or the building of a sovereign identity of the data. This is expressly set by European Commission which supervises such initiatives, supervision being what is articulated with Compliance, in a couple that go beyond Regulation, and replaces in Ex Ante Competition Law, salient branch for Ex Post. All the texts which are in the process of expressing it are based on this reformed couple: Compliance and Incentive.

This couple supposes that we recognize as such the existence of companies as project carriers, project which is the creation of marketed wealth circulating on a market, which could be an industrial project specific to a geographical zone both economical and political. Regulation is deployed to go away from the notion of sector and to transform itself in supervision of crucial firms in the correspondance between the project and the action, what refers to the notion of "plan". In this, banking supervision is just the advanced bastion of all thematic, energetic, climatic and health plans, or more broadly industrial and technological that could by incentive be implemented, this conception of Compliance permitting to build zones which are not reduced to immediate market exchange. The incentive corresponds to the fact that Compliance Law relies on the power of the firm to reach its own political goals, for example fighting against disinformation in the digital space or obtaining a healthy environnement. This supposes that Compliance stops to be only conceived as a model of rules effectivity, for example of Competition Law, to be recognized as a substantial branch of Law. A branch which expresses political goals. A branch which is anchored in crucial firms whose it recognizes the autonomy with regards to markets. This makes it possible, in particular through the coupling with incentive mechanisms leading to long-term collaborative operations supervised by public authorities, not to be governed by simple Competition Law, inapt to bring projects to fruition.

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Read the bilingual work paper, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks on which this article is based

Read a general presentation of the book in which the article has been published.

____

Référence générale : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Training: content and container of Compliance Law, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), Compliance tools, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, 2021, p. 245-264

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Résumé de l'article

Au premier titre, en tant que la formation est un outil spécifique de Compliance, elle est supervisée par les Régulateurs. Elle devient même obligatoire lorsqu'elle est contenue dans des programmes  de Compliance. Puisque l'effectivité et l'efficacité sont des exigences juridiques, quelle est alors la marge des entreprises pour les concevoir et comment en mesure-on le résultat ? 

Au second titre, tant que chaque outil de Compliance comprend, et de plus en plus, une dimension éducative, l'on peut reprendre chacun d'entre eux pour dégager cette perspective. Ainsi même les condamnations et les prescriptions sont autant de leçons, de leçons données, de leçons à suivre. La question est alors de savoir qui, dans ce Droit si pédagogique, sont les "instituteurs" ?

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Cet article prend appui sur un document de travail bilingue, comprenant des développements techniques supplémentaires, des notes en pop-up et des liens hypertextes. 

Consulter une présentation générale du volume dans lequel l'article a été publié. 

____

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Resolving the contradiction between "sanction" and "incentive" under the fire of Compliance Law, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, series "Regulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance and Bruylant, 2021, p. 101-112

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Summary of the article: Compliance and Incentives appear at first glance to be totally opposite. For two major reasons. Firstly, because sanctions have a central place in Compliance Law and that the incentives suppose an absence of constraint on the operators. Secondly, because the incentives are linked to self-regulation and that Compliance Law assumes a strong presence of public authorities. Thus, one should choose: either Compliance or Incentives! Either the effectiveness of one or the effectiveness of the others; either the techniques of one, or the techniques of others; either the philosophy of one or the philosophy of the other. Resign oneself to the waste that such a necessary choice would imply. But to put the terms in this way amounts to thinking poorly about the situations and reducing the fields of the solutions they call for. If we take a rich definition of Compliance Law, we can on the contrary articulate Compliance and Incentives. From this perspective, sanctions can no longer become what blocks the use of incentives but, on the contrary, what constitutes them. Even more, the coupling between the Incentives and the requirements of Compliance Law must be strongly encouraged, as soon as the public authorities supervise in Ex Ante all the initiatives taken by the "crucial operators".

This working document deals with the first issue. Indeed, the so-called incentive theory targets mechanisms which do not directly resort to constraint. They would therefore have little place in Compliance Law. But it seems saturated with sanction procedures. We can even say that it seems to put them at the center, the public authorities presenting the number of sanctions as a sign of success, while the companies seem obsessed with their prospects, the two concerns ending in such a strange convergence that are the Convention Judiciaire d'Intérêt Public (non-prosecution agreement).

The honest observer cannot help but be immediately uneasy. Indeed, it can only raise the definition of the sanction as a "constraint" triggered Ex Post, at the very heart of a Compliance Law which is presented as a set of Ex Ante mechanisms. Based on this contradiction in terms, should we give up the association and think that it would be wrong against the spirit to think of the sanction as an incentive?

It is undoubtedly in this connection that one perceives most clearly the clash of two cultures, which do not communicate, while technically they apply to the same situations. Indeed, because Compliance was designed by Finance, everything is a tool for it. Therefore, the tendency to think of the sanction only as an incentive is very strong in Compliance Law, manifests itself continuously and will not stop (I). But whatever the reasons for conceiving it this way, the principles of the rule of law cannot disappear and if we do not want them to be erased, then they must be articulated (II). This is an essential game (II).

This is why we can literally say that Compliance has set Criminal Law on fire by its conception, logical but closed in on itself, of sanctions as simple incentives. In order for Law to remain, however, we must hold a very firm definition of Compliance Law centered on its Monumental Goal, which is the protection of the person.

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Read the bilingual working paper, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks, on which this article is based.

Read a general presentation of the book in which this article is published.

____

Référence générale : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Drawing up Risk Maps as an Obligation and the paradoxe of the "Compliance Risks", in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), Compliance Tools, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Bruylant, 2021, p. 61-72

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Résumé de l'article :

There are few synthetic or theoretical studies on Risk Mapping even though it is in fact the Compliance central tool, perhaps because it is more a management tool than a legal one. Risk Mapping is often described but does not receive any other legal qualifications than being a "modality", suffering in this respect from an evil which affects the whole of Compliance, still little understood by Law, attention often so focused on the Ex Post (sanctions) while Compliance is by nature in the Ex Ante. Going from disarray to incomprehension, everyone can note the existence of "compliance risks" among the mapped risks, because if as so many affirm that it would be necessary to speak only of simple conformity as obedience, demonstrated in Ex Ante, to Law, how a sub-set of a tool would therefore have the same object as the set of Law that this tool serves ... This aporia can only be resolved if Compliance Law is defined substantially by its "monumental goals" which exceed obedience to regulations.

Consequently, Law taking up Risk Mapping, this mechanism may first appear as an ancillary obligation to the main obligation consisting in achieving "monumental goals". The ancillary obligation to draw up the maps is an obligation of result, while the main obligation to achieve the monumental goals is an obligation of means. These cartographies being very diverse and being only occasionally targeted by specific laws, it can also constitute only a legal fact or, through the play of various charters, a unilateral legal commitment. But it isnbecoming the basis of an autonomous legal obligation incumbent on enterprises in position to know certain risks, obligation referring to the existence of a subjective right tof knowing and measuring them ("right to be worried") which the third parties who are going to run them would hold, thus allowing them to choose to run them, or not.

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Lire le document de travail bilingue, doté de développements supplémentaires, de références techniques et de liens hypertextes, sur lequel cet article est basé

Consulter une présentation générale du volume dans lequel l'article a été publié.

____