Formally, the legal system had constructed the regulatory authorities in the form of Independent Administrative Authorities (AAI).

The stake being to build their independence in an institutional and consubstantial way, the Legislator conferred a new status: that of Independent Public Authority (API). Thus, the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF), the Commission Nationale Informatique et Libertés (CNIL), the Haute Autorité de Santé (HAS) or HADOPI are classified among APIs and not only among IAAs.

We must therefore see two distinct legal categories, AAI on the one hand and APIs on the other.

Thus the two laws of January 20, 2017 relate, to better supervise them, both on AAIs and on APIs, but reading the preparatory work shows that the two categories show that they are treated in a fairly common way. Even more if one consults the sites of certain regulatory authorities themselves, such as HADOPI, for example, it presents itself as an "Independent Public Authority" but defines this legal category as being that which targets the Authorities. Independent Administrative .....

It thus appears that the category of Independent Public Authorities is above all marked by the symbol of a greater dignity than that of the category of "simply" Administrative Independent Authorities. From a technical point of view, the two categories are essentially distinguished from a budgetary point of view, financial autonomy being the nerve of independence. This is how the AMF's budget is based on the size of market operations, through tax mechanisms that are not included in the LOLF. Independence does not extend to autonomy, the API does not negotiate its budget with Parliament, since an Independent Public Authority is not a Constitutional Authority.

► Référence complète : J.-Fr. Bohnert, "Les conditions de réussite de l'enquête interne dans les rapports entre le parquet national financier et l’entreprise mise en cause – l’enquête interne au soutien de la défense de l’entreprise", in M.-A. Frison-Roche et M. Boissavy (dir.), Compliance et droits de la défense. Enquête interne – CJIP – CRPC, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", à paraître.

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📕consulter une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Compliance et droits de la défense - Enquête interne, CIIP, CRPC, dans lequel cet article est publié

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► Résumé de l'article (fait par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC) : Dans une présentation très proche des lignes directrices du Parquet national financier (PNF) de 2023 et du droit souple produit avec l'Agence française anticorruption (AFA), l'auteur expose la façon dont l'entreprise doit dans un climat de confiance et de collaboration. Il s'agit pour l'entreprise de rechercher objectivement ce qui pourrait engager sa responsabilité pénale d'une façon transparente et loyale en gardant à l'esprit la collaboration possible dans la perspective d'une CJIP avec le PNF et la valorisation que celui-ci fait des diligences de l'entreprise dans la menée d'une enquête interne, de la même façon que des attitudes contraires sont logiquement considérés comme des éléments inverses dans le calcul.

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🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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► Full Reference: V. Magnier, "The transformation of governance and due diligence", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, to be published

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📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC): The author develops the tensions caused by Compliance Law and the Duty of Vigilance on corporate governance.

The French "Sapin 2" law targets corruption, while the French "Vigilance" law has a broader scope in terms of risks and the entire value chain. It is logical that this should create tensions in terms of governance, given the monumental goals involved. Companies need to take ownership of the powers delegated to them, which means rethinking their governance and the way in which they exercise their corporate mandates, with the corporate interest, the judge's compass, having to be combined with the adoption of new standards of behaviour formalised voluntarily by ethical charters in line with international standards. On this voluntary and supervised basis, the company must adapt its structure and then contractualise these norms.

This ethical approach has an impact on the role of corporate organs, not only in terms of transparency and risk prioritisation, but also proactively in terms of the adoption of commitments whose sincerity will be verified, as reflected, for example, in corporate governance codes (cf.in France the AFEP-MEDEF Code), the setting up of ad hoc committees and the presence of stakeholders, who will be consulted when the vigilance plan is drawn up.

She stresses that this creates tensions, that dialogue is difficult, that business secrecy must be preserved, but that stakeholders must become Vigilance watchdogs, a role that should not be left to the public authorities alone.

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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In Europe, Community Law prohibits States from providing aid to companies, which are analyzed as means for the benefit of their country which the State cares about (and sometimes wrongly)  having the effect and maybe the object of maintaining or constructing borders between peoples, thus contradicting the first European political project of a common area of peace and exchanges between the peoples of Europe. That is why this prohibition does not exist in the United States, since Antitrust Law is not intended to build such a space, which is already available to businesses and people.

This essential difference between the two zones changes industrial policies because the US federal Government can help sectors where Member States can not. The European prohibition of State Aid can not be called into question because it is associated with the political project of Europe. This seems to be an aporia since Europe is handicapped against the United States.

In any form it takes, Aid is prohibited because it distorts equality of opportunity in competition between  operators in the markets and constitutes a fundamental obstacle to the construction of a unified European internal market. On the basis of this simple principle, a branch of technical and specific law has developed, because States continue to support their entreprises and sectors, and many rules and cases divide this principe of prohibition into as many exceptions and nuances. Is built over the years a probation system related to it. Thus, the concept of a public enterprise was able to remain despite this principle of prohibition.

But if there is a crisis of such a nature or magnitude that the market does not succeed by its own forces to overcome and / or the European Union itself pursues a-competitive objectives, exogenous Regulation, which can then take the form of legitimate State Aid. Thus a sort of synonymy exists between State Aid and Regulation.

For this reason, the European institutions have asserted that State Aid becomes lawful when it intervenes either in strategic sectors, such as energy production in which the State must retain its power over assets, or the defense sector. Far from diminishing, this hypothesis is increasing. European Union Law also allows the State to intervene by lending to financial operators threatened with default or already failing, the State whose function is to fight systemic risk, directly or through its Central Bank. The aid can come from the European Central Bank itself helping States in issuing sovereign debt, the Court of Justice having admitted in 2015 the non-conventional monetary policy programs compliance with the treaties. In 2010, the European Commissioner for Competition stressed that public aid is essential tools for States to deal with crises, before regulations come to the fore in 2014 to lay the foundations of the European Banking Union.

► Référence complète : A. Oumedjkane, "Le devoir de vigilance est-il soluble dans le droit des contrats publics ?", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), Compliance et contrat, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", à paraître

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► Résumé de l'article (fair par le Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC) : Il analyse le devoir de vigilance, lequel constitue la pointe avancée du Droit de la Compliance dans la commande publique.

Cela est contrintuitif, puisque le devoir de vigilance est légal et que la loi donne compétence au juge judiciaire. Mais l'auteur souligne que les lois récentes, notamment les lois "résilience et climat" et "finance verte" visent expressément le devoir de vigilance pour constituer des causes d'exclusion de l'entreprise qui manque à son obligation de vigilance des commandes publiques.

L'auteur regrette que les textes à ce propos aient fait l'objet d'une rédaction approximative et variant de texte en texte, alors qu'il s'agit de régir la même situation : celle de l'exclusion d'une entreprise du champ de la commande publique parce qu'elle n'a pas rempli son obligation de vigilance; ce qui suppose des obligations pleinement réalisées, ou de n'avoir pas établi un plan de vigilance, ce qui n'est pas la même chose et manifeste moins d'exigence.

Il souligne également la question du contrôle qualitatif du plan de vigilance, contrôle approfondi ou au contraire obligation purement formelle. Là encore, il pense, comme la majorité de la doctrine, qu'il est raisonnable de se rapporter à une interprétation minimale, même si la loi sur le devoir de vigilance marque plus d'ambition.

Il estime que si le juge administratif était en effet confronté à un contrôle substantiel, en raison de la compétence, qu'il estime exclusive, du Tribunal judiciaire de Paris, il faudrait former des questions préjudicielles...

Dans ces conditions d'interprétation minimale, seule une absence de plan ou un plan formellement défaillant serait sanctionné dans le cadre de la commande publique... Mais cette interprétation est la moins adaptée à l’objectif de la législation elle-même, et que l'on pourrait en arriver que ce qu'une entreprise qui aurait été condamnée par le Tribunal judiciaire pourrait n'être pourtant pas exclue d'un marché public...

L'auteur estime enfin que cette nouvelle démarche incitative montre en réalité l'impuissance du Droit des contrats publics à produire par lui-même les effets recherchés sur les entreprises.

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Sont ici répertoriés les sujets proposés chaque année, soit au titre du travail à faire en parallèle du cours, à remettre à la fin du semestre (le jour de l'examen étant la date limite de remise), soit les sujets à traiter sur table, sans documentation extérieure et sous surveillance le jour de l'examen final. 

A partir de 2019, en raison du règlement administratif de la scolarité, l'examen final ne peut plus se dérouler en dehors du cours.

Les étudiants cessent donc de bénéficier d'une durée de 4 heures pour réaliser l'examen.

Le contrôle final est donc nécessairement réalisé pendant la durée de 2 heures du dernier cours de l'enseignement, supprimé pour être remplacé par ce contrôle sur table. Les sujets sont désormais choisis en considération de ce format. 

Retourner sur la description générale du Cours de Droit commun de la Régulation, comprenant notamment des fiches méthodologiques. 

► Référence complète : A. Pogurschi , "« Souveraineté numérique européenne » Réalité juridique ou expression au service du discours (géo)politique ?" Politique européenne, 83(1), 2024, pp.6-41.

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🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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► Full Reference: M. Séjean, "The Compliance Obligation in the Cybersecurity Field: a web of behavioural requirements to protect the System", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, to be published

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📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC): 

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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The Office of Communications (Ofcom) is the UK's communications regulator.

This independent regulator is competent both for television, radio and television services, but also for the post office.

In addition, there are very diverse missions, such as not only the allocation of licenses but also data protection or public policies of diversity and equality.

We can consider that these are the broadest competences that can be conferred on a regulator with regard to "communication" activities!footnote-767.

► Full Reference: R. Sève, "Compliance Obligation and changes in Sovereignty and Citizenship", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, to be published

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📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC): 

The contribution describes "les changements de philosophie du droit que la notion de compliance peut impliquer par rapport à la représentation moderne de l’Etat assurant l’effectivité des lois issues de la volonté générale, dans le respect des libertés fondamentales qui constituent l’essence du sujet de droit." ("the changes in legal philosophy that the notion of Compliance may imply in relation to the modern representation of the State ensuring the effectiveness of laws resulting from the general will, while respecting the fundamental freedoms that constitute the essence of the subject of law").

The contributor believes that the definition of Compliance is due to authors who « jouer un rôle d’éclairage et de structuration d’un vaste ensemble d’idées et de phénomènes précédemment envisagés de manière disjointe.  Pour ce qui nous occupe, c’est sûrement le cas de la théorie de la compliance, développée en France par Marie-Anne Frison-Roche dans la lignée de grands économistes (Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole) et dont la première forme résidait dans les travaux bien connus de la Professeure sur le droit de la régulation. » ( "play a role in illuminating and structuring a vast set of ideas and phenomena previously considered in a disjointed manner.  For our purposes, this is certainly the case with the theory of Compliance, developed in France by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche in the tradition of great economists (Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole) and whose first form was in her well-known work on Regulatory Law").

Drawing on the Principles of the Law of the American Law Institute, which considers compliance to be a "set of rules, principles, controls, authorities, offices and practices designed to ensure that an organisation conforms to external and internal norms", he stresses that Compliance thus appears to be a neutral mechanism aimed at efficiency through a move towards Ex Ante. But he stresses that the novelty lies in the fact that it is aimed 'only' at future events, by 'refounding' and 'monumentalising' the matter through the notion of 'monumental goals' conceived by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, giving rise to a new jus comune. Thus, "la compliance c’est l’idée permanente du droit appliquée à de nouveaux contextes et défis." ("Compliance is the permanent idea of Law applied to new contexts and challenges"). 

So it's not a question of making budget savings, but rather of continuing to apply the philosophy of the Social Contract to complex issues, particularly environmental issues. 

This renews the place occupied by the Citizen, who appears not only as an individual, as in the classical Greek concept and that of Rousseau, but also through entities such as NGOs, while large companies, because they alone have the means to pursue the Compliance Monumental Goals, would be like "super-citizens", something that the digital space is beginning to experience, at the risk of the individuals themselves disappearing as a result of "surveillance capitalism". But in the same way that thinking about the Social Contract is linked to thinking about capitalism, Compliance is part of a logical historical extension, without any fundamental break: "C’est le développement et la complexité du capitalisme qui forcent à introduire dans les entités privées des mécanismes procéduraux d’essence bureaucratique, pour discipliner les salariés, contenir les critiques internes et externes, soutenir les managers en place" ("It is the development and complexity of capitalism that forces us to introduce procedural mechanisms of a bureaucratic nature into private entities, in order to discipline employees, contain internal and external criticism, and support the managers in place") by forcing them to justify remuneration, benefits, and so on.

Furthermore, in the words of the author, "Avec les buts monumentaux, - la prise en compte des effets lointains, diffus, agrégés par delà les frontières, de l’intérêt des générations futures, de tous les êtres vivants - ,  on passe, pour ainsi dire, à une dimension industrielle de l’éthique, que seuls de vastes systèmes de traitement de l’information permettent d’envisager effectivement." ("With the Monumental Goals - taking into account the distant, diffuse effects, aggregated across borders, the interests of future generations, of all living beings - we move, so to speak, to an industrial dimension of ethics, which only vast information processing systems can effectively envisage").

This is how we can find a division between artificial intelligence and human beings in organisations, particularly companies, or in decision-making processes.

In the same way, individual freedom does not disappear with Compliance, because it is precisely one of its monumental goals to enable individuals to make choices in a complex environment, particularly in the digital space where the democratic system is now at stake, while technical mechanisms such as early warning will revive the right to civil disobedience, invalidating the complaint of "surveillance capitalism".

The author concludes that the stakes are so high that Compliance, which has already overcome the distinctions between Private and Public Law and between national and international law, must also overcome the distinction between Information and secrecy, particularly in view of cyber-risks, which requires the State to develop and implement non-public Compliance strategies to safeguard the future.

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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► Référence complète : B. Lecourt, "Des obligations d'information en matière de droit de l'homme et d'environnement au devoir de vigilance", in B. Lecourt (dir.) Lebvre - Dalloz, coll. "Thèmes et commentaires", 2025, pp

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📗lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Le devoir européen de vigilance, dans lequel cet article est publié

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🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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► Référence complète : J.-Ch. Roda, « Pouvoir économique et concurrence : le cas des Big Techs », in M. Fabre-Magnan et P. Lokiec (dir.), Les limites juridiques au pouvoir économique, Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. « Thèmes et Commentaires – Etudes », 2026, pp.117-141.

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► Full Reference: J.-B. Racine, "Compliance Obligation and Human Rights​", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, to be published

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📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC): The author asks whether human rights can, over and above the many compliance obligations, form the basis of the Compliance Obligation. The consideration of human rights corresponds to the fundamentalisation of Law, crossing both Private and Public Law, and are considered by some as the matrix of many legal mechanisms, including international ones. They prescribe values that can thus be disseminated.

Human rights come into direct contact with Compliance Law as soon as Compliance Law is defined as "the internalisation in certain operators of the obligation to structure themselves in order to achieve goals which are not natural to them, goals which are set by public authorities responsible for the future of social groups, goals which these companies must willingly or by force aim to achieve, simply because they are in a position to achieve them". These "Monumental Goals" converge on human beings, and therefore the protection of their rights by companies. 

In a globalised context, the State can either act through mandatory regulations, or do nothing, or force companies to act through Compliance Law. For this to be effective, tools are needed to enable 'crucial' operators to take responsibility ex ante, as illustrated in particular by the French law on the Vigilance Obligation of 2017.

This obligation takes the form of both a "legal obligation", expression which is quite  imprecise, found for example in the duty of vigilance of the French 2017 law, and in a more technical sense through an obligation that the company establishes, in particular through contracts.

Legal obligations are justified by the fact that the protection of human rights is primarily the responsibility of States, particularly in the international arena. Even if it is only a question of Soft Law, non-binding Law, this tendency can be found in the Ruggie principles, which go beyond the obligation of States not to violate human rights, to a positive obligation to protect them effectively. The question of whether this could apply not only to States but also to companies is hotly debated. If we look at the ICSID Urbaser v. Argentina award of 2016, the arbitrators accepted that a company had an obligation not to violate human rights, but rejected an obligation to protect them effectively. In European Law, the GDPR, DSA and AIA, and in France the so-called Vigilance law, use Compliance Lools, often Compliance by Design, to protect human rights ex ante.

Contracts, particularly through the inclusion of multiple clauses in often international contracts, express the "privatisation" of human rights. Care should be taken to ensure that appropriate sanctions are associated with them and that they do not give rise to situations of contractual imbalance. The relationship of obligation in tort makes it necessary to articulate the Ex Ante logic and the Ex Post logic and to conceive what the judge can order.

The author concludes that "la compliance oblige à remodeler les catégories classiques du droit dans l’optique de les adosser à l’objectif même de la compliance : non pas uniquement un droit tourné vers le passé, mais un droit ancré dans les enjeux du futur ; non pas un droit émanant exclusivement de la contrainte publique, mais un droit s’appuyant sur de la normativité privée ; non pas un droit strictement territorialisé, mais un droit appréhendant l’espace transnational" ("Compliance requires us to reshape the classic categories of Law with a view to bringing them into line with the very objective of Compliance: not just a Law turned towards the past, but a Law anchored in the challenges of the future; not a Law emanating exclusively from public constraint, but a Law based on private normativity; not a strictly territorialised Law, but a law apprehending the transnational space".

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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The procedural guarantees from which the person benefits are mainly the right of action, the rights of defense and the benefit of the adversarial principle.

While the rights of the defense are subjective rights which are advantages given to the person at risk of having his situation affected by the decision that the body which is formally or functionally legally qualified as a "tribunal", may take, the adversarial principle is rather a principle of organization of the procedure, from which the person can benefit.

This principle, as the term indicates, is - as are the rights of the defense - of such a nature as to generate all the technical mechanisms which serve it, including in the silence of the texts, imply a broad interpretation of these.

The adversarial principle implies that the debate between all the arguments, in particular all the possible interpretations, is possible. It is exceptionally and justified, for example because of urgency or a justified requirement of secrecy (professional secrecy, secrecy of private life, industrial secrecy, defense secrecy, etc.) that the adversarial mechanism is ruled out. , sometimes only for a time (technique of deferred litigation by the admission of the procedure on request).

This participation in the debate must be fully possible for the debater, in particular access to the file, knowledge of the existence of the instance, the intelligibility of the terms of the debate, not only the facts, but also the language (translator, lawyer , intelligibility of the subject), but still discussion on the applicable legal rules). So when the court automatically comes under the rules of Law, it must submit them to adversarial debate before possibly applying them.

The application of the adversarial principle often crosses the rights of the defense, but in that it is linked to the notion of debate, it develops all the more as the procedure is of the adversarial type.

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance et Contrat ("Compliance and Contract"), coll."Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Editions Lefebvre-Dalloz, to be published.

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📘 At the same time, a book in English, Compliance and Contracts, is published in the collection copublished by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Editions Lefebre-Bruylant.

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🧮the book follows the cycle of colloquia organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its Universities partners in 2026

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📚this volume is one of a series of books devoted to Compliance in this collection.

► read the presentations of the other books:

• further books:

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Le système probatoire de la Compliance, 2027

• previous books:

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕L'obligation de compliance 2025

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche & M. Boissavy (eds.), 📕Compliance et droits de la défense. Enquête interne - CJIP - CRPC, 2024

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕La juridictionnalisation de Compliance, 2023

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, 2022

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Les outils de la Compliance, 2021

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Pour une Europe de la Compliance, 2019

🕴️N. Borga, 🕴️J.-Cl. Marin and 🕴️J.-Ch. Roda (eds.), 📕Compliance : l'Entreprise, le Régulateur et le Juge, 2018

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Régulation, Supervision, Compliance, 2017

🕴️M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), 📕Internet, espace d'interrégulation, 2016

📚see the global presentation of all the books of the collection.

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► General presentation of this book: The book, published in 2025 int the same series "Regulations & Compliance" series, demonstrates that the Obligation of Compliance—which falls upon crucial operators and those concerned with the future of systems and the present and future individuals involved in them—derives from laws and regulations, and is upheld by these operators themselves, regulators and judges. The role played by contracts is discussed therein. This book specifically examines the role that contracts play and will play in the conception, development and implementation of Compliance Law.  

This aspect is underestimated because Compliance Law is often analysed through the prism of laws and regulations designed to achieve Monumental Goals set by states and public authorities, to the realisation of which systemic economic operations contribute through compliance tools, rather than through the actors themselves. When they do act, this is referred to outside the realm of Law, generally to Ethics. However, the Contract, the binding legal instrument par excellence, will play an increasingly significant role within global and interconnected compliance systems.

In the European construction of Compliance Law, which places human beings at the heart of efforts to ensure the sustainability of systems, the Contract serves not only as the means by which the entity fulfils its legal obligations, forges relationships with stakeholders and implements the necessary innovations, but also as the means by which it exercises its autonomy to contribute to the realisation of the systemic ambitions in question. 

To describe and anticipate the practice and rules that link Compliance Law and Contracts, the book first examines how this new branch of Law, insofar as it draws on the political ideas of the Social Contract, renews Contract Law by embedding it within the strategy of economic operators, a task made all the easier for them as they have built value chains through contracts. These are ‘regulatory contracts’. This demonstrates that Public Law Contracts exemplify the incorporation by General Contract Law of the overarching perspective of compliance, normatively anchored in the Monumental Goals (Title I).

That explained, the book examines how General Contract Law interfaces with the techniques and objectives of Compliance Law. Whether through mandatory requirements, incentives or support, Compliance Law plays a role in contracts, helping to shape them in part, whether they relate to regulated or unregulated activities, with the points of contact with the principle of liberalism – and the limits to it – being determined by the courts. Conversely, however, General Contract Law contributes to Compliance Law and will do so increasingly. This applies equally to the stages of formation, execution, and sanctions, which may take the form of consolidations (Title II). 

In practical terms, the Contract itself serves as a Compliance Tol. As such, the company may choose to outsource the compliance function, which it is free to do provided it remains accountable for its performance to the legislator and the persons concerned: this is the concept of the ‘Compliance Contract’, which appears as a specific contract.  Furthermore, compliance can be incorporated into multiple contracts—contractual arrangements through which the contracting parties establish one or more obligations that will facilitate or enhance their legal obligations. In doing so, legal entities exercise their freedom, as permitted by general law, and this is also recognised by the Regulator, Supervisor and/or Judge in light of the normative Monumental Goals of Compliance Law (Title III). 

Precisely, a new field of ‘contractual compliance litigation’ is emerging. The primary topic here is to examine contractual judicial disputes in which an element of Compliance Law features in the proceedings. Indeed, a dispute concerning a claim for mandatory execution, termination or contractual liability may involve, in the claim itself or in an procedural exception or defence raised, an element of compliance law, ranging from an allegation of lack of jurisdiction to a request for the court to take into account a systemic teological norm that the contract judge should consider. Secondly, in certain emerging systemic compliance litigation, because the role of the judge is transformed and the procedure must be adapted, the contract appears as a particularly suitable tool, either as a ‘procedural framework’ through the contractualisation of the whole, or as a technique used in the strict sense, its ex ante nature allowing, in disputes concerning the future, the development of new adequate techniques (Title IV). 

► First presentation of the Table of Content  : 

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TABLE OF CONTENT 

REPORTING ON CONTRACTUAL PRACTICES WITHIN THE COMPLIANCE SYSTEM AND ENHANCING ITS EFFECTIVENESS AND HUMANITY COMPTE DES PRATIQUES CONTRACTUELLES DANS LE SYSTEME DE COMPLIANCE ET ACCROITRE L'EFFICACITE ET L'HUMANISME DE CELUI-CI  

(REPORTING ON CONTRACTUAL PRACTICES WITHIN THE COMPLIANCE SYSTEM AND ENHANCING ITS EFFECTIVENESS AND HUMANITY) 

 ♦️ sss, par 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

TITRE I.

CONTRAT SOCIAL, DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE ET STRATEGIE DES OPERATEURS ECONOMIQUES 

CHAPITRE I : CONTRAT SOCIAL ET DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE 

Section 1 ♦️ Les Buts Monumentaux de la Compliance, guide d'action pour des opérateurs économiques au service d'une politique globale, par 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 2 ♦️ sss, par 🕴️René Sève

CHAPITRE II : AMBITIONS POITIQUES ET STRATEGIES D'ENTREPRISE DANS L'ORGANISATION CONTRACTUELLE DES CHAINES DE VALEUR

Section 1 ♦️ sss

Section 2 ♦️ sss, par 

CHAPITRE III : LES CONTRATS PUBLICS, PARANGONS DE L'ACCUEILS DES AMBITIONS POLITIQUES DANS LES STRATEGIES ET L'ALLIANCE DES INSTITUTIONS

Section 1 ♦️ sss

Section 2 ♦️ sss, par 

TITRE II.

LE DROIT COMMUN DES CONTRATS CONFRONTE AU DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE

CHAPITRE I : DISTINGUER LE CONTRACTUEL DE CE QUI S'EN RAPPROCHE DANS LE SYSTEM DE COMPLIANCE 

Section 1 ♦️ La ronde des engagements et des contrats dans le droit de la compliance e, par 🕴️Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

Section 2 ♦️ sss,

CHAPITRE II : L'EMPRISE DU DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE SUR LE DROIT COMMUN DE DES CONTRATS 

Section 1 ♦️ sss

Section 2 ♦️ sss,

CHAPITRE III : L'APPORT DU DROIT COMMUN DES CONTRATS AU DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE

Section 1 ♦️ sss

Section 2 ♦️ sss, par 

TITRE III.

CONTRAT DE COMPLIANCE, CLAUSES DE COMPLIANCE

CHAPITRE I : LE "CONTRAT DE COMPLIANCE"

Section 1 ♦️ sss

Section 2 ♦️ sss,

CHAPITRE II : LES CLAUSES DE COMPLIANCE

Section 1 ♦️ sss

Section 2 ♦️ sss, par 

TITRE IV.

LE CONTENTIEUX CONTRACTUEL IMPLIQUANT LE DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE 

CHAPITRE I : CE 

Section 1 ♦️ sss

Section 2 ♦️ sss,

CHAPITRE II : CE 

Section 1 ♦️ sss

Section 2 ♦️ sss, par 

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► Full reference: M.A. Frison-Roche, “Considérer la géographie juridique africaine pour y réussi l'obligation de vigilance" (Taking into account the legal landscape in Africa to fulfil the Vigilance Obligation), in E. Da Allada (ed.), Devoir de vigilance, quelles perspectives africaines ? (The Vigilance Duty: what African perspectives?), Lefebvre-Dalloz, “Thèmes et Commentaires” series, 2026, pp. 235–235.

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📝Read the article (in French)

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🚧read the bilingual working document on which this article is based

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🎤read the presentation of the conference  which summarised this topic

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► Summary of the article: The French ‘Vigilance’ Act of 2017 incorporated the technical provisions and the spirit of the ‘Sapin 2’ Act of 2016. They share a common ambition. They have been, and remain, a source of both controversy and fervour. At their heart lies the establishment of a “compliance obligation”, for which vigilance techniques form the “vanguard” in serving a grand ambition: to protect systems from present and future risks in order to safeguard the people involved in them.

The passion that continues to surround the Vigilance Act – which gave rise to the CS3D Directive – is not a good thing, because the law and passion are never allies. Some are passionately committed to the triumph of vigilance by forcing companies to perform miracles, whilst others are passionately committed to the destruction of all the legislation that has established the very concept of this compliance law, built upon these monumental humanist goals.

But let us recognise that in these debates on the Duty of Care, which is being legally implemented across value chains,  Africa is often cited as an example in a general discussion. It is not often considered as a distinct case in its own right. No account is taken of its strengths or its own legal mechanisms, even though value chains – particularly industrial ones – so often lead to it, both now and in the future. Through analyses of the duty of care, Africa is perceived as a place of retribution or of a new form of paternalism, and when its future is considered, prospects seem to be lacking, even though the very purpose of compliance – and therefore of due diligence – is the future. 

If we take a less confrontational view and focus more on the ‘legal geography’ of African countries and their social and inter-state structures  social and inter-state structures, we can see that concern for others – both present and future – which ultimately constitutes the Monumental Aim of Compliance Law and thus of the Duty of Vigilance – is more prevalent in Africa than it is in Europe, which is now built upon legal individualism. This concern for others is reflected in legal mechanisms akin to mediation and various legal structures that our own institutions would do well to take on board – our legislators before adopting legislation, and our judges, who could listen to them as amici curiae before always reaching a decision.

If we turn our attention to the African continent, where a segment of the value chains operates, and to the way work is organised, it becomes clear that here too, legislation and sanctions are not the whole story. Compliance techniques that make use of soft law and the contractual arrangements underpinning the chains themselves can remove the element of abstraction that is, by its very nature, inherent in general legislation. Making progress through contracts, under the scrutiny and with the support of the courts, is an approach that could prove more fruitful than well-intentioned legislation – which served as a catalyst – given the prominent role of Contract Law within OHADA.

This serves to enhance the judge’s importance. The judicialisation of compliance is also linked to the growing connection between compliance and contracts. However, it appears that not only can European judges specialising in due diligence thus rule on matters concerning Africa – a continent they can only know from a distance (though it is the lot of every judge to be an outsider) – but African and inter-state courts, notably through OHADA, can address the duty of care because value chains are constituted by contracts. By developing it not as a foreign concept to be assimilated, but as something that expresses the very heart of the law in Africa: concern for others, solidarity, and the search for compromises and solutions to ensure that the social and environmental – that is to say, human – system continues to thrive tomorrow.

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► Full Reference: M.A. Frison-Roche, "La part du gracieux dans le traitement juridictionnel de la compliance (The role of Discretionary Jurisdictio in the judicial treatment of Compliance cases)", in Mélanges Dominique d'Ambra, Liber Amicorum, Lefebvre-Dalloz, 2026, pp.175-196.

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📝read this article (in French) 

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🚧read the bilingual Working Paper, base of this article

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► English summary of this article: Based on the definition of Judicial Office, the procedural principles that derive from it and the consequent powers that judges exercise, the objet of this study is to measure the degree of discretion that exists in the judicial treatment of compliance, without direct consideration for the dispute between litigants. This part is very ignored, when it should be given top priority. Indeed, because Systems are involved in compliance cases brought before civil or commercial judges, we are seeing a development of this discretionary element in judicial fonction. Discretionary matters differ from unilateral discretionary procedures, and this discretionary element relates to what the judge examines, possibly in the context of a dispute.

The first part of this contribution therefore aims to describe the natural development of the discretionary power of the judge to deal with compliance cases brought before them. This role stems from the fact that, even when triggered by a dispute, what is submitted to the judge is a situation composed of a system, which cannot defend its interests before the civil or commercial judge in this Systemic Litigation arising from the very nature of Compliance Law and the Compliance Obligations it engenders on systemic entites. Moreover, it is the Future whose interests must be considered and protected, which the judge must do directly.

This leads to the second part of the contribution, calling for a rethinking of the procedure and the role of the Compliance Judge, so that ex gratia matters can be dealt with. The judge must therefore verify that there are no conflicts of interest between the litigants, including hidden ones, and must learn about the systems involved. The inquisitorial principle must therefore be strengthened. But at the same time, since the primary aim is not to settle a dispute but to resolve a systemic problematic situation, the judge must facilitate the movements of the parties, and the adversarial principle must also be strengthened. Must be encouraged this activation of a powerful and discretionary approach, not as an exception but as a principle fully articulated with a contentious principle, with the dispute being only a means used by the necessary parties to enable systemic compliance situations to be resolved.

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► Full reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "La définition juridique du Contrat de compliance (The legal definition of the compliance contract)", in Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) published by the Centre for Research on Justice and Conflict Resolution (CRJ) and the Centre for Research in Economics and Law (CRED) at Panthéon-Assas University (Paris II), Le "Contrat de compliance" (The "Compliance Contract"),  Paris II Lecture Theatre -  82 Rue Notre Dame des Champs, Paris, 12 June  2026.

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🧮view the full programme for the event

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📶view the slides (in French)

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🌐read the presentation made on LinkedIn

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🚧Read the bilingual working paper on which this conference is based

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📝This lecture will form the basis of a contribution to the book, 📕Compliance et Contrat (Compliance and Contracts), 

To be published in the 📚Regulations & Compliance series, a book co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz.

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► Overview of this lecture : The lecture is divided into three parts.

In the first part, the aim is to describe the reality of the “Compliance Contract”, which can be defined as the decision taken by an entity subject to a “Compliance Obligation” (most often a company, but it may also be a administrative organisation) to entrust the fulfilment of that obligation to a third party. This does not diminish the entity’s obligation to be accountable for the compliance structure, nor for its ability to produce the expected outcomes, in particular the behaviours that will contribute to achieving the Monumental Systemic Goals for which the compliance frameworks were adopted. This outsourcing is lawful; its contractual form falls under Contract Law and the principle of contractual freedom.

Even if one considers that, since the subject matter of the contract is Compliance itself, it would constitute a ‘Systemic Contract’—just as Compliance Litigation is ‘Systemic Litigation’—its fundamental nature is indeed a bilateral relationship between a client and a professional (who is often subject to professional rules and codes of conduct).

Indeed, there are legal consequences to this practice of “Compliance Contracts”, because it is the Compliance System that is thereby served: on the one hand, “regulatory clauses” will be inserted, whilst others will be removed (“deemed unwritten”). Contractual freedom remains the guiding principle, however.

In Contract Law, it would be appropriate for the contracting parties to refer to this contribution to the Monumental Goals, which constitute the  fundamental legal norm of the Compliance System, if only to guide the contract Judge who may be called upon in the event of a dispute, as the interpretation of the parties’ intentions must be carried out in a teleological manner.

In the second part, the relationship between this "Compliance Contract" and the various "Compliance Clauses" is analysed. The two should certainly not be confused, since, quite apart from these highly specific contracts through which the various compliance techniques are entrusted, in their drafting and management, to third parties, who thus become the experts, there are also clauses inserted into numerous contracts (sales, distribution, manufacturing, service, etc.), clauses which aim, amongst many other clauses serving different purposes, to incorporate compliance considerations into the contract.

But first and foremost, the Compliance Contract contains numerous clauses specific to it, which often derive from compliance system, since Compliance concretisation is the very purpose of this specific contract, et nothing else: it is therefore logical that, by way of a ‘transparency effect’, the legal Compliance Systemic requirements should be incorporated into the isolated contract.

Secondly, and more significantly, many various contracts contain clauses that provide for the triggering of a “Compliance Ccontract”. For example, when an audit clause is linked to a specific event and the provision stipulates that a contract will then be entered into with a particular expertal body or person, this will generate a Compliance Contract in a second time. The link between the two may give one of the contracting parties control over the other, notably if the expert is close to them. If the links between Compliance Contracts and Compliance Clauses are developping, this could lead to a return to vertical integration. Competition Law may be justified in looking into this. 

It appears that, once we have distinguished between Compliance Contracts and Compliance Clauses, and then linked them together, we can arrive at a Contractual Compliance Strategy that is both legitimate and effective, provided that it contributes to the achievement of the Compliance Monumental Goals set by the political and public authorities. 

Indeed, as soon as we distinguish between “conformity” – which is intended solely to compel the operator to obey all applicable regulations blindly and mechanically – and “Compliance Law”, which is legally guided by Monumental Systemic Goals, this contractual strategy becomes essential.

Part Three sets out to clarify the scope of this Compliance Contract.

The first implication concerns the Compliance System itself, of which it forms a part; the Compliance Contract having the welcome effect of increasing the operator’s contribution to the achievement of the Monumental Systemic Goals (ensuring that systems – banking, financial, transport, energy, climate, digital, etc.—do not collapse and do not crush human beings, but rather benefit the human beings who are involved in them, whether willingly or not).

To this end, the contract must enable the operator – where necessary by means of express provisions – to demonstrate its credibility in contributing to the achievement of these Monumental Goals. Reliable pathways and credible structures must be established. In the cas of technical implementation is outsourced by a Compliance Contract, this obligation to provide evidence may be undermined. To compensate for this, the Compliance Contract may itself include provisions relating to portable technical information, support available through the client's accountability mechanism, or even in the event of legal proceedings.

The second aspect concerns the contractors themselves, who adapt their intentions and are bound, above all, by this “little law” which is any contract for the parties. This perspective is surprisingly underdeveloped in practice, no doubt because in Law, when considering Compliance, reference is made to unilateral “regulations” and the vertical relationship of obedience that it engenders in the operator.  This changes with the transformation of "conformity" (which is that) in "Compliance Law" (which is based on Monumental Systemic Goals and justifies contracts).

The third aspect concerns third parties, namely the stakedholders (and competitors...). These third parties benefit from Compliance Contracts because they are integrated into the Compliance System and because of the transparency between this system and the Compliance Contracts. In fact, and more technically speaking, this specific Cgreement provides them not only with a accountable(the company, the public body, the State), but also with a contractual debtor. Stakeholders may assert rights against the latter.

However, because the contracts themselves are also enforceable against third parties, they can anticipate these relationships with third parties – not only the competitors of the entity subject to the Compliance Obligation, but also its own relationship with stakeholders, and even its relationship with public authorities. Indeed, the object (and effect) of the Compliance Contract is to produce and build up Information that is of interest to everyone. The result is a ‘treasure trove of evidence’. A key question is how, and whether, this treasure trove can remain within the circle of the contracting parties or not.

Indeed, the fourth area concerns Public Authorities. As the bodies that “uphold” the compliance system, they consider the Compliance Contract to be legitimate and one of the most effective means of ensuring that regulations are effective, efficient and properly enforced; however, they also wish to benefit from the outcome of the contract’s implementation: to access the systemic information it generates. The contracting parties do not always share this view, but the Compliance Contract is not a means of “obeying” regulations. It is the Judge who will certainly address this question of principle, which relates to the very definition of Compliance Law.

This brings us to the fifth area of application, which concerns the Courts. Indeed, a number of courts are responsible for hearing such cases: the contract courts, the competition courts, the courts overseeing the various systems whose sustainability is thus safeguarded, and the courts specialising in vigilance legal duty  (which is the cutting edge of Compliance Law). 

The issue of the “natural judge” was examined at the symposium held on 29 May 2026 on: Contractual litigation involving compliance: procedural and jurisdictional aspects. The judge hearing the contract case (civil or commercial judge) will tend to refer first and foremost to the contract. This is also why the Compliance Contract conceptor would be well advised to include provisions in its terms regarding its relationship with the Compliance System, so that it is not the authorities of that system who do so in a too much discretionary manner.

In understanding the "Compliance Contract", as Iit was emphasised in 2022, in the judge’s interpretation of the contract, the judge is required to reconcile the parties’ intentions with a teleological approach, that is to say, to establish that the parties intended to serve the purpose of the expertise thus requested and developed (for the operator and ultimately for the stakeholders and for the system itself). 

By establishing this convergence, the judge gives full effect to the Cmpliance Contract. Rather than framing the issue, as is so often done when reasoning in terms of ‘conformity’, as a conflict between contractual freedom and public policy (conformity serving a public policy that would be contrary to the contract, inferior norm in the vertical normative hiercharchy). 

It must be accepted as a fundamental principle that contractual freedom, freedom of contract and a competitive market for compliance expertise are the most effective means of developing a Compliance System that will safeguard interconnected  different systems and protect the people involved in them.

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⛏️Find out more  :

🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance contract, compliance clauses, 2022

🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, ⚙️Compliance and Contracts,

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► Référence complète : E da Allada. (dir.), Devoir de vigilance. Quelles perspectives africaines ?, Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. "Thèmes & Commentaires, 2026, sous presse.

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►Voir notamment la présentation des contributions :

► Référence complète  : Conseil constitutionnel, déc.  n°25-1184 QPC, 6 mars 2026, Conseil national des barreaux et autres

[Expérimentation d’une contribution pour la justice économique due pour chaque instance devant le tribunal des activités économiques]

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►lire la décision

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