Food for thoughts

► Full Reference: J.-B. Blanc, "La loi, source de l’Obligation de Compliance" ("The Law, source of the Compliance Obligation"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, "Régulations & Compliance" Serie, to be published

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📕lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, L'Obligation de Compliance, dans lequel cet article est publié

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► Summary of this contribution  (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance) :

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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► Full Reference: L. Rapp, "Compliance, Chaines de valeur et Économie servicielle",  ", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2024, forthcoming

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📕read the general contribution of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this contribution is published

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► English summary of this contribution  (done par its author) :  Based on an analysis of the value chains of companies in the space sector and their recent evolution, this contribution examine the role, place and current transformations of compliance policies and strategies in the context of an industrial transformation that has become essential: the transition from an industrial economy to a service economy.

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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Complete reference : Archives de Philosophie du Droit (APD), Droit et économie, tome 37, ed. Sirey, 1992, 426 p. 

 

Read the table of contents.

Read the summaries of the articles in english. 

 

See the presentation of others volumes of Archives de Philosophie du Droit.

The economic theory of incentives implicitly assumes that an operator can not be compelled to act against his will, or at least that it is more efficient to offer him advantages in such a way that he does what he wants . In this, this conception is opposed to the traditional conception of Law, which posits, on the contrary, that subjects obey the order dictated by the legal norm.

But in globalized markets, operators have the tools to disobey and the asymmetry of information diminishes the power of control of the Regulators, which raises doubts as to the effectiveness of the legal constraint: it is not enough that the Law orders. In these circumstances, texts, regulators and judges must produce conditions that encourage agents to adopt behaviors that are consistent with the aims sought by the Regulators because the operators themselves have an interest in them.

Thus, whilst regulatory systems in any sector become increasingly repressive, even in liberal economies, it is not so much to punish the perpetrator but to incite others who are tempted to commit crimes, To abandon them. It is the system of exemplarity. This thought prior to Beccaria participates in the re-feoadization of the Law, demonstrated by Pierre Legendre, associated with the decline of the State and to which the Regulation fully participates. Judgeshave little inclination to handle repression in this way, which creates a clash between Criminal Law and Regulatory Law, which nevertheless puts repression at its center.

In the same way, Regulatory Systems must inject positive incentives, for example rewards for communication of information, which encourages delation, or incentives done by the regulator for the network manager make investments in the maintenance of it, against the immediate interest of its shareholder. Finally, all patent law and economics are now thought of as an incentive to inn/en/article/innovation/ovate. But, some incentives have proven perverse such as stock-options or bonuses. As a result, new texts seek to regulate these.

► Référence complète : B. Lecourt, "Des obligations d'information en matière de droit de l'homme et d'environnement au devoir de vigilance", in B. Lecourt (dir.) Lebvre - Dalloz, coll. "Thèmes et commentaires", 2025, pp

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📗lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage, Le devoir européen de vigilance, dans lequel cet article est publié

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🦉Cet article est accessible en texte intégral pour les personnes inscrites aux enseignements de la Professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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► Full reference : M.-A. Frison-Roche, Scientific coprdination and co-hosting of the colloquia series Compliance and Contract, organised on the initiative of the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its academic partners

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► The Symposium Series in a nutshell : As a direct continuation of the previous symposium series co-organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance and its partner universities on "Compliance Obligation", which served as the basis for the publication of the book 📘Compliance Obligation,  The series, some elements of which began in 2024 and others are already present in this book, explored in depth the specific theme of the links between compliance law and contracts. Indeed, compliance law is often analysed as the construction of laws and regulations to achieve "📘 Monumental Goals " of a political nature desired by States and public authorities, to the achievement of which systemic economic operations contribute through 📘Compliance Tools that are now well documented. Contracts are still relatively little studied, or even developed, in compliance systems that are often perceived through the orders issued, the technologies put in place and the 📘sanctions to be avoided or endured. On the contrary, the future of compliance law, particularly in its European conception, which places human beings at the centre of concerns for the sustainability of systems and the use of contracts, is the new conception that we must adopt. Contracts then appear to be both the means by which the subject company fulfils its legal obligations, forges relationships with other actors and deploys the necessary innovations. Contract law is both used and renewed as a result. The series of symposiums will examine various aspects of this general issue. It will result in the publication of a 📘book Compliance and Contrat.

► Presentation of symposiums in development : 

• March 2026: COMPLIANCE AND SOCIAL CONTRACT: read the presentation

 

• 24 April 2026🧮COMPLIANCE: CLAUSE BY CLAUSE: read the presentation

 

• 29 May 2026🧮THE JUDGE CONFRONTED WITH CONTRACTS OF COMPLIANCE AND COMPLIANCE CLAUSES: read the presentation

 

• June 2026🧮COMPLIANCE AND COMMON CONTRACT LAW : read the presentation

 

• June 2026🧮THE "CONTRACT OF COMPLIANCE" : read the presentation

 

• September 2026🧮COMPLIANCE, VALUE CHAINS AND CONTRACT: read the presentation

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In an ordinary market of goods and services, access to the market is open to everyone, whether it is the one who offers the good or service (potential supplier) or who wants to own it (potential applicant ). Freedom of competition presupposes that these new entrants can, at their will, become effective agents on the market, the potential supplier if its entrepreneurial dynamism drives him there, and the potential applicant if he has the desire and the tools to do it(money, Information and proximity, in particular ; but first of all, money). The absence of barriers to entry is presumed; a barrier resulting from anti-competitive behavior will be penalized ex post by the competition authority.

The barrier is therefore what undermines the principle of access to the market. This is why the World Trade Organization (WTO), in that it fights against barriers to ensure global free trade, can be regarded as a forerunner of a sort of World Competition Authority.

But it may happen that it is necessary to organize by the force of Law the market access in a first situation, when there has been a liberalization decision of a previously monopolistic sector, access can not be exercised solely by the strength of demand and the power of potential new entrants, notably prevented by the de facto power of the formerly monopolistic enterprises. The Regulatory Authority will build access to sectoral markets whose sole principle of Competition has been declared by Law. Secondly this necessity can also result from phenomena that definitely impede this ideal competitive functioning of the sector, such as natural monopolies or asymmetries of information: Law will make this access concrete by distributing rights of access to the interested operators.

This is the case in network industries for operators' access rights to essential infrastructure networks. Even if this act is carried out by contract, this contract merely crystallizes a right of access conferred by the Legislator to the operator in order this one can penetrate the market. This is particularly true in the energy and telecommunications sectors.

In a more political way and not directly related to a desire to set up competition or to compensate for a market failure, this access organization may still be required because there is a political decision to provide everyone with access to common goods. The decision then goes hand in hand with the notion of a "fundamental right", such as the fundamental right of access to the healthcare system or vital medicines, or the fundamental right of access to the digital system, which the Regulator becomes the guardian in Ex Ante but also in Ex Post.

 

Network industries are built on transport infrastructure such as telecommunications waves or data, gas or electricity, which are essential facilities.

These essential infrastructures are monitored by regulators not only for the operators to have a concrete right of access but also for a complete network of these infrastructures to be built in a space, especially in Europe, for example to achieve a European railway system.

These infrastructures also exist in banking, financial and insurance matters, which it would be futile to oppose too easily to Network industries, as financial centers are based on huge computer systems, internalized clearing houses, which are themselves Infrastructure, deserving Regulation.

In this way, the optimal infrastructure solidity, the Regulator having its final responsibility in a permanent control over the manager, whether the State or an operator - whether the operator is an operator Public or a private operator -, and the competitive dynamism of the sector that the system can also entrust to the same regulator.

This is particularly the case in Financial Regulation, which aims to optimize the places, which compete with each other, and their respective security, which itself constitutes a competitive advantage, common to all operators.

► Référence complète : L. Grosclaude, "Financiarisation des professions libérales réglementées : vers un changement du paradigme",  JCP Entreprise, n°49, déc. 2023, étude 1355.

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🦉cet article est accessible aux personnes qui suivent les enseignements du professeure Marie-Anne Frison-Roche

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The United States established regulatory authorities at the end of the 19th century: starting from the principle of the market, they tempered it by setting up regulators, after noting market failures, for example in terms of transport, in the event of economically natural monopolies or essential facilities. The tradition of the European Union is the reverse since the States, in particular the French State, have considered that sectors of general interest, deemed unsuitable for the competitive pattern because not corresponding to the operational pattern of the meeting of supply and demand, and to serve the missions of public services, were to be held by the State, either directly by public establishments, or by public enterprises under the supervision of the ministries.

Evolution in Europe came from community Law. Indeed, after the Second World War, the idea was to build a market which was to be "common" to European countries so that they could no longer wage war on each other in the future. To achieve this goal, the borders between them were lifted thanks to the principles of free movement of people, goods and capital. In the same way, the defense by each of the States of its own national companies by State aid has been prohibited so that any company, even foreign, can enter its territory, so that a common internal market can be established. Finally, a competition Law was necessary to prohibit companies and States from hindering the free functioning of the market, which would have slowed down or even stopped the construction of this internal market, which was an essentially political goal of the Treaty of Rome.

To carry out this political goal, the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU, previously called the Court of Justice of the European Communities - CJEC - until the Treaty of Lisbon) have prohibited any behavior of agreement or of abuse of a dominant position, even on the part of public enterprises, as well as any state support (except in the event of a crisis). Likewise, in perfect political logic, but also in perfect contradiction with European national traditions, European texts, regulations or directives have liberalized previously monopolistic sectors, first of all telecommunications and then energy. This was the case for telecommunications with the 1993 directive, the 1996 directive for electricity and the 1998 directive for gas.

Because of the hierarchy of standards, the States, except to be sued before the Court of Justice by the European Commission in action for failure, were obliged to transpose by national laws these European texts. Thus, by force, community law, both through general competition Law, but above all to achieve its political goal of building a single and initially peaceful internal market, has triggered in Europe a system of economic regulation in all network industry sectors, a system which was nonetheless foreign to the culture of the Member States. This was not the case with banking and insurance regulations, sectors which have always been threatened by systemic risk, and as such have been regulated and supervised by national central banks for a very long time.

Community Law has for 30 years plunged into national Law while ignoring them, which could also be profitable, and on the basis of competition Law, the political dimension of the European project having been forgotten, no doubt over time as the War itself faded from people's minds.

The effects of globalization and the financial crisis have constituted a new turning point in Community Law which, since 2010, has been built no longer to modify national Laws - and destroy them in part - but to build a new Community Law which should neither to Competition Law nor to National Law: Community Regulation Law, which makes room for individual rights and attempts to build over time a system that is robust to crises. Thus, by texts of the European Union of 2014, both a Banking Union and a new Law on Market Abuse is being built, which aims to establish a common law for the integrity of financial markets.

One of the challenges is what could or should be reconciliation between the two Europe, an economic and still not very social Europe on the one hand and the Europe of Human Rights, which is based on the European Convention on Rights of Man. This is not on the agenda.

Référence complète : Response to the Study on Directors’ Duties and Sustainable Corporate Governance by Nordic Company Law Scholars, octobre 2020.

Lire le rapport

Cette bibliographie indicative vise des :

• ouvrages généraux

 

• ouvrages abordant la Régulation et la Compliance bancaire et financière à l'occasion d'un autre sujet principalement traité

 

• sites pertinents pour l'étude du Droit de la Régulation bancaire et financière

 

• ouvrages et articles portant spécifiquement sur la Régulation et la Compliance bancaire et financière

 

The Independent Administrative Authority (IAA) is the legal form that the legislator has most often chosen to build regulatory authorities. The IAA is only its legal form, but French law has attached great importance to it, following the often formalistic tradition of public law. They are thus independent administrative authorities, especially in the legal systems of continental law like France, Germany or Italy.

The essential element is in the last adjective: the "independent" character of the organism. This means that this organ, which is only administrative so has a vocation to be placed in the executive hierarchy, does not obey the Government. In this, regulators have often been presented as free electrons, which posed the problem of their legitimacy, since they could no longer draw upstream in the legitimacy of the Government. This independence also poses the difficulty of their responsibility, the responsibility of the State for their actions, and the accountability of their use of their powers. Moreover, the independence of regulators is sometimes questioned if it is the government that retains the power to appoint the leaders of the regulatory authority. Finally, the budgetary autonomy of the regulator is crucial to ensure its independence, although the authorities having the privilege of benefiting from a budget - which is not included in the LOLF - are very few in number. They are no longer referred to as "independent administrative authorities" but as "Independent Public Authorities", the legislator making a distinction between the two (French Law of 20 January 2017).

The second point concerns the second adjective: that it is an "administrative" body. This corresponds to the traditional idea that regulation is the mechanism by which the State intervenes in the economy, in the image of a kind of deconcentration of ministries, in the Scandinavian model of the agency. If we allow ourselves to be enclosed in this vocabulary, we conclude that this administrative body makes an administrative decision which is the subject of an appeal before a judge. Thus, in the first place, this would be a first instance appeal and not a judgment since the administrative authority is not a court. Secondly, the natural judge of the appeal should be the administrative judge since it is an administrative decision issued by an administrative authority. But in France the Ordinance of 1 December 1986 sur la concurrence et la libéralisation des prix (on competition and price liberalization), because it intended precisely to break the idea of ​​an administered economy in order to impose price freedom on the idea of ​​economic liberalism, required that attacks against the decisions of economic regulators taking the form of IAA are brought before the Court of Appeal of Paris, judicial jurisdiction. Some great authors were even able to conclude that the Paris Court of Appeal had become an administrative court. But today the procedural system has become extremely complex, because according to the IAA and according to the different kinds of decisions adopted, they are subject to an appeal either to the Court of Appeal of Paris or to the Conseil d'État (Council of State) . If one observes the successive laws that modify the system, one finds that after this great position of principle of 1986, the administrative judge gradually takes again its place in the system, in particular in the financial regulation. Is it logical to conclude that we are returning to a spirit of regulation defined as an administrative police and an economy administered by the State?

Finally, the third term is the name itself: "authority". It means in the first place an entity whose power holds before in its "authority". But it marks that it is not a jurisdiction, that it takes unilateral decisions. It was without counting the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the judicial judge! Indeed, Article 6§1 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that everyone has the right to an impartial tribunal in civil and criminal matters. The notion of "criminal matter" does not coincide with the formal traditional concept of criminal law but refers to the broad and concrete factual concept of repression. Thus, by a reasoning which goes backwards, an organization, whatever the qualification that a State has formally conferred on it, which has an activity of repression, acts "in criminal matters". From this alone, in the European sense, it is a "tribunal". This automatically triggers a series of fundamental procedural guarantees for the benefit of the person who is likely to be the subject of a decision on his part. In France, a series of jurisprudence, both of the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation), the Conseil d'État (Council of State) or the Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) has confirmed this juridictionnalization of the AAI.

Référence complète : Y. Quintin, Aux frontières du droit : les embargos américains et l'affaire BNP Paribas, RD banc. fin., étude 21, 2014.

La présomption est une dispense de preuve lorsqu'elle est établie par la loi. Elle est un raisonnement probatoire lorsqu'elle est présentée devant un juge, raisonnement qui permet d'établir un fait pertinent à partir d'une preuve indirecte. Il constitue en cela un déplacement d'objet de preuve.

On distingue les présomptions légales, lorsque c'est le législateur qui a posé comme établi un fait, ce qui engendre alors non plus un déplacement d'objet de preuve, mais une dispense de preuve pour celui qui doit supporter normalement la charge de preuve.

Lorsque l'adversaire à l'allégation n'est pas autorisé à rapporter la preuve contraire à l'allégation, la présomption est irréfragable. Parce que la présomption irréfragable est une dispense définitive de preuve, elle soustrait la réalité d'un fait à l'obligation d'être prouvé. La présomption équivaut alors à une fiction. Parce qu'il s'agit d'un artefact, on affirme généralement que seul le législateur a le droit de poser des présomptions irréfragables. Ainsi, la présomption de vérité qui s'attache à la chose définitivement jugée est une présomption légale irréfragable. Celle-ci est alors une pure règle de fond, ici l'incontestabilité des décisions de justice contre lesquelles il n'existe plus de voies de recours d'annulation disponible.

A côté des présomptions légales, existent les "présomptions du fait de l'homme", expression traditionnelle pour désigner les raisonnements probatoires précités que les parties présentent au juge. Comme il s'agit de preuves véritables, ayant donc pour objet de reconstituer la vérité, elles ne peuvent pas être irréfragables, et ne peuvent entraîner qu'une alternance des charges de preuve, au détriment du défendeur à l'allégation. La présomption du fait de l'homme est toujours simple.

Si la jurisprudence établit pourtant des présomptions qu'elle pose comme incontestables, cela signifie simplement qu'elle a établie comme une règle de fond, comme la responsabilité des parents du fait des enfants, antérieurement une responsabilité pour faute présumée aujourd'hui une responsabilité aujourd'hui. Cela n'est que l'expression de la jurisprudence source de droit, c'est-à-dire de la jurisprudence au même niveau que le législateur.

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Exemple concret

Une personne, A,  est retrouvée blessée sur la chaussée. Elle prétend que l'auteur du dommage est le propriétaire d'un vélo qui a freiné brutalement et l'a renversée avant de prendre la fuite. Il n'y a pas de témoin. Elle soutient qu'il s'agit de son voisin, B, dont le vélo, est endommagé. Elle démontre qu'il existe sur le bitume des traces de peinture et de pneus, qui correspondent aux entailles du vélo de B., observation faite qu'il a changé ses pneus le lendemain même de l'accident.

A soutient le raisonnement suivant au juge : je dois démontrer que B m'a renversée (objet direct de preuve), ce que je ne peux faire directement. Mais je peux prouver que son vélo est endommagé, qu'il a changé les pneus, que les entailles du vélo correspondent aux traces relevées sur le sol où a eu lieu l'accident, que B a changé ses pneus le lendemain même de l'accident : on peut, par ces preuves indirectes, présume un lien de causalité. Ainsi, la preuve est apportée non directement, mais par raisonnement.

Si le juge admet le raisonnement, comme la présomption n'est pas irréfragable, la question probatoire ne sera pas réglée, il opérera simplement un renversement de charge de preuve. B, défendeur à l'allégation, sera recevable à démontrer que ces éléments, le changement des pneus, l'endommagement de l'ossature du vélo, ont d'autre chose. S'il apporte ces preuves, alors il aura brisé la présomption simple, et le demandeur, qui supporte le risque de preuve, aura perdu le procès. S'il ne les apporte pas, alors le demandeur, grâce à la présomption, aura gagné son procès.

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Référence générale, Cohendet, M.-A. et Fleury, M., Droit constitutionnel et droit international de l'environnement, Revue française de droit constitutionnel , PUF, » 2020/2, n°122, p.271-297. 

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Résumé de l'article : 

► Full Reference: E. Maclouf, "Entités industrielles et Obligation de compliance" ("Industrial Entities and Compliance Obligation"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'Obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, "Régulations & Compliance" Serie, 2025, to be published

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📕read a general presentation of the book, L'Obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published

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► Summary of this article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance - JoRC) : This article looks at the topic Industrial Entities and Compliance Obligation from the perspective of Management Science and sets out to resolve the paradox of industrial organisations expressing the ambition of progress for the benefit of people, a humanist ambition that is contradicted by the effects produced by this industrialisation itself, which are harmful to that same humanity. The Compliance Obligation, insofar as it is based on the Monumental Goals and is anchored in Industrial Organisations, aims to resolve this paradox.

The science of human organisations aims to allocate nature's scarce resources as efficiently as possible by getting individuals to cooperate, this engineering producing natural, industrial and social disasters, which are themselves more or less anticipated. The Compliance Obligation holds out the hope of better preventing them (Negative Monumental Goal) and managing them, or even improving people's lives (Positive Monumental Goal) by going beyond traditional disciplines and developing Ex Ante. However, Industrial Organisations may also reject the weight of the constraints that this creates for them, calling for deregulation instead. The debate is currently open.

Furthermore, by moving from the mechanical logic of conformity to the dynamic logic of the Compliance Obligation, companies find themselves in a situation of systemic uncertainty and must decide on the strategy to be implemented, resulting in a managerialisation of the Law  and implying many new decisions to be taken. The notion of "project" is therefore back at the heart of Industrial Organisations, and more specifically that of "Humanist Project", as embodied by the Compliance Obligation, in a new Organisation where everyone plays their part in the Value Chain.

The author draws on the work of Raymond Aron and the Rueff-Armand report to show that the dynamism and strength of Industrial Organisation can support a Humanist Project that is politically developed and fits in with the Economic Rationality of Industrial Organisations. This is all the more necessary as this Regulatory Framework cannot come from the sum of individual actions alone (employees, consumers, investors), as the interests of the company, of the sector, of society, of nature cannot be served by this addition alone, and the claim that the whole is self-regulated by the expression of a single one of these players (who are themselves both inside and outside the industrial organisation) is unsustainable.

The Author shows that new entities are therefore being created to regulate Industrial Entities in the public interest through the Compliance Obligation, which inserts an Obligation into the Industrial Organisation modifying its project: the French so-called "Sapin 2" law is a perfect example of this, encouraging appropriate strategic responses from Industrial Organisations, which have modified their managerial procedures to integrate new strategic projects and involve stakeholders.

Finally, because the Compliance Obligation is anchored in Monumental Goals, it can be the basis of the Company's Project and the Players' Project of the players, which leads us to return to the basis of the Organisations Theory, which entrusts to the corporate bodies the power and the mission of defining such a project through corporate deliberations which will then be, in the aforementioned approach of Industrial Rationality, broken down into Objectives and Plans. This is a reminder that Profit is not a Company's Goal: it is the sine qua non of its survival, which is different. A Rational Organisation determines its Project and for ensuring it,  to achieve it, it must not run the risk of going bankrupt. The Compliance Obligation is developing  between this difference and the link between the Project and this necessity to have some profit which is just a Condition. Furthermore, in order to establish this project, the organisation must resolve oppositions (conflictuality) through the complex interplay of players (Jean-Pierre Dupuy).

Industrial organisations must respond to the Compliance Obligation. In particular, they do this by developing norms, or by contributing to the development of public norms, and by themselves expressly aiming Goals such as the fight against suffering in the workplace or equality between men and women as falling within the scope of the Compliance Obligation. This framing work is an essential part of the organisation's strategy, and environmental concerns can thus be integrated to a greater or lesser extent into this or that perspective. All this goes beyond the mere logic of conformity.

The Compliance Obligation thus enables the production of what the Author calls "adaptive responses by individuals in the face of Systemic Crises and their causes", countering the Anomie which is also a monumental problem in today's society, which has lost its bearings and is suffering from Uncertainty. This Compliance Obligation enables Industrial Entities to integrate into Society, if necessary by coercion, by becoming the vectors of human rights and social and environmental expectations. But the success of this Compliance Obligation presupposes a certain appropriation of the Goals by the scales companies, which taints the Compliance Obligation itself with Uncertainty.

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🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses

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► Full Reference : E. Netter, "Les technologies de conformité pour satisfaire les exigences du droit de la compliance. Exemple du numérique" (Conformity technologies to meet the requirements of Compliance Caw. Digital example), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (dir.), L'obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", 2024, forthcoming.

 

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📕read the general presentation of the book, L'obligation de Compliance, in which this contribution is published.

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► English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance) :The author distinguishes between Compliance, which refers to Monumental Goals, and conformity, which are the concrete means that the company uses to tend towards them, through processes, check-lists in the monitoring of which the operator is accountable (art. 5.2. GRPD). Technology enables the operator to meet this requirement, as the changing nature of technology fits in well with the very general nature of the goals pursued, which leave plenty of room for businesses and public authorities to produce soft law.

The contribution focuses firstly on existing technologies. Through Compliance, Law can prohibit a technology or restrict its use because it runs counter to the goal pursued, for example the technology of fully automated decisions producing legal effects on individuals. Because it is a perilous exercise to dictate by law what is good and what is bad in this area, the method is rather one of explicability, i.e. control through knowledge by others.

Regulators are nevertheless developing numerous requirements stemming from the Monumental Goals of Compliance. Operators must update their technology or abandon obsolete technology in the light of new risks or to enable effective competition that does not lock users into a closed system. But technological power must not become too intrusive, as the privacy and freedom of the individuals concerned must be respected, which leads to the principles of necessity and proportionality.

The author stresses that operators must comply with the regulations by using certain technologies if these technologies are available, or even to counteract them if they are contrary to the goals of the regulations, but this obligation of conformity is applied only if these technologies are available. The notion of "available technology" therefore becomes the criterion of the obligation, which means that its content varies with circumstances and time, particularly in the area of cybersecurity.

In the second part of this contribution, the author examines technologies that are only potential, those that Law, and in particular the courts, might require companies to invent in order to fulfill their conformity obligation. This is quite understandable when we are talking about technologies that are in the making, but which will come to fruition, for example in the area of personal data transfer to satisfy the right to portability (GRPD), or where companies must be encouraged to develop technologies that are of less immediate benefit to them, or in the area of secure payment to ensure strong authentication (SPD 2).

This is more difficult for technologies whose feasibility is not even certain, such as online age verification or the interoperability of secure messaging systems, two requirements which appear to be technologically contradictory in their terms, and which therefore still come under the heading of "imaginary technology". But Compliance is putting so much pressure on companies, particularly digital technology companies, that considerable investment is required to achieve it.

The author concludes that this is the very ambition of Compliance and that the future will show how successful it will be. 

 

 

 

 

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🦉This article is available in full texte for persons following Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche teaching.

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Référence complète : Salah, M., La mondialisation vue de l'Islam, in Archives de Philosophie du Droit, La mondialisation entre illusion et utopie, tome 47, Dalloz, 2003, 27-54.

 

La mondialisation apparaît comme une occidentalisation des cultures et du droit. L'Islam qui prend forme juridique devrait se l'approprier sans se dénaturer. La réussite d'un tel processus difficile dépendra de la qualité de la régulation qui sera mise en place.

 

Lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage dans lequel l'article a été publié.

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Control is a concept so central in Regulation that, in the difficult exercise of translation, the English term of "Regulation" or the expression "Regulatory system" are often translated, for example in French,, by the French word "control" (contrôle). Indeed, the Regulator controls the sector for which he  is responsible. This control is carried out ex ante by the adoption of standards of behavior, whether the Regulator prohibits behavior or obliges the operators to do so. In addition, the Regulators exercises his control powers through the power to approve companies entering the sector or the power to certify certain types of products sold on the markets for which he is responsible. In addition, he continuously monitors the sectors for which he is responsible since his function is either to construct them to bring them to maturity or to remain in balance between the principle of competition and another concern, for example to ensure that they do not fall into a systemic crisis.

These ex ante controls radically distinguish the regulatory authority from the competition authority, which intervenes only ex post. Finally, the regulatory authority controls the sector in ex post: in this he works on a temporal continuum, sanctioning the failings he finds on the part of the operators to the prescriptions he has adopted himself. he often has the power to settle disputes if two operators compete in a dispute between them and bring it before him.

This control function specific of the regulatory authority, which it often shares with the traditional administration and which opposes it to the activity of the competition authority and the courts, is made difficult by its possible lack of independence. Indeed, because the Regulator is a State boddy, if the regulator has to control a public operator, it may risk being captured by the government, since the whole organization of the regulatory system must therefore ensure its independence not only statutory but also budgetary in relation to it. This risk of capture is permanent not only because of the government but also because of the sector. Secondly, control can be inefficient if the regulator lacks adequate, reliable and timely information, risk generated by information asymmetry.

To fight against this, according to the childish image of the stick and the carrot, we must at the same time give the regulator powers to extirpate information that the operators do not want to provide, the texts never ceasing to give regulators new powers, such as perquisitions power ou sanction ou settlemeent. Symmetrically, operators are encouraged to provide information to the market and the regulator, for example through leniency programs or the multiplication of information to be inserted in company documents. Finally, there is a difficult balance between the need to combat the capture of the regulator and the need to reduce the asymmetry of information since the best way for the latter to obtain information from the sector is by frequent attendance by operators: , This exchange that they accept very willingly is the open voice to the capture. It is therefore an art for the regulator to keep operators at a distance while obtaining from them information that only untended relationships allow him to obtain.

Moreover, the Compliance Law which is in the process of being put in place is intended to resolve this major difficulty, since the operator becomes the primary agent for the implementation of the Regulation Law, whose aims are internalized in the " crucial " and global operators perator, operator crucial and global, the Regulator ensuring the effective structural change of the operator to realize these goals of this Global Regulation Law.

 

 

► Référence complète : D. Esty et M. Hautereau-Boutonnet, "Derrière les procès climatiques français et américains : des systèmes politique, juridique et judiciaire en opposition", D.2022, p.1606 et s.

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►Full Reference: Delalieu, G., La loi sur le devoir de vigilance des sociétés multinationales : parcours d’une loi improbable, Droit et Société, 2020/3, n°106, p.649-665.

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►English Summary of the Article (done by the Author): (Corporate Duty of Vigilance in France: The Path of an Improbable Statute). This article offers an analysis of the resistance encountered by defenders (NGOs and trade unions) of the French Law on Corporate Duty of Vigilance. These actors sought to behave as institutional entrepreneurs deploying intense advocacy and lobbying efforts to successfully have this bill tabled, examined, and ultimately passed by the French government. Considering this case, the concept of “institutional entrepreneurship” is discussed and then relativized using Machiavelli’s notion of “Fortuna,” to describe the “improbable” adoption of this statute. The results tend to put into perspective the importance that individual actors, including collective ones, can have in the explanation of institutional change, in favor of a multilevel analysis of change (micro, meso, macro).

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► Full Reference: Segonds, M., Compliance, Proportionality and Sanction. The example of the sanctions taken by the French Anticorruption Agency, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.),Compliance Monumental Goals, series "Compliance & Regulation", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, to be published.

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► Article Summary:  Before devoting the developments of his article to the sole perspective of sanctions imposed under "Anti-corruption Compliance", the author recalls in a more general way that, as is the sanction, Compliance is in essence proportional: Proportionality is inherent to Compliance as it conditions any sanction, including a sanction imposed under Compliance.

This link between Proportionality and Compliance has been underlined by the French Anti-Corruption Agency (Agence française anticorruption - AFA) with regard to risk mapping, which must measure risks to arrive at effective and proportional measures. This same spirit of proportionality animates the recommendations of the AFA which are intended to apply according to the size of the company and its concrete organisation. It governs sanctions even more, in that punitive sanctions refer on one hand to Criminal Law, centered on the requirement of proportionality. Punitive sanctions It governs sanctions even more, in that punitive sanctions refer on the other hand to the disciplinary power of the manager who, from other sources of law, must integrate the legal requirement of proportionality when he/she applies external and internal compliance norms.

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📘see the general presentation of the book, Compliance Monumental Goals, in which this article is published

 

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The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is the independent regulatory authority in the United States that regulates at the federal level both the container and the content of telecommunications.

In this, the United States differs from the European Union, a legal space in which most often the regulatory institutions of the container and the content are distinct (for example in France ARCEP / CSA / CNIL) and in which the regulations of communications remain substantially at the level of the Member States of the Union.

Like other audiovisual regulators, it ensures pluralism of information by limiting the concentration of capital - and therefore of power - in the television and radio sector. We can thus see that the American system is not in principle different from the European system.

In addition, the FCC is characterized first of all by a very great power, imposing at the same time substantial principles on the operators, like that of the "decency", going in the name of this principle until sanctioning television channels which had let show a bare breast of a woman. The control is therefore more substantial than in Europe, this control weighing against the constitutional freedom of expression which is more powerful in the United States than in Europe. It is true that today the leading digital companies tend to formulate for us what is beautiful, good and decent, in place of public authorities.

The FCC continued to develop the major principles of the public communication system, as in 2015 that of the Open Internet (Open Internet) or to formulate the principle of "digital neutrality", adopted by a federal law, this principle having considerable economic and political implications.

But at the same time, a general mark of American law, the judge moderates this power, according to the principle of Check and Balance. Thus the Supreme Court of the United States in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation in 1978 this power of direct control of the content but also operates the control of the control.

The election in 2016 of a new president who is, among other things, totally hostile to the very idea of ​​Regulation is a test in the probative sense of the term. In January 2017, he appointed a new president of the FCC, hostile to any regulation and in particular to the principle of neutrality. The question which arises is to know if technically a regulation already established on these principles can resist, how and for how long, a political will violently and expressly contrary. And what will the judges do.