Dec. 8, 2014

Publications

I propose to reflect on how the legal system requires companies to take into account the interests of those who aren't shareholders, for example the interests of employees and even the interests of those who don't yet exist, for example the interests of future generations, or interests that are traceable to group interests, for example the interests of "minorities" or interest that can't be attached to anyone in particular, such as interest of the Planet.

It's like in the fairy tales. Dream or nightmare. The future will tell. The evolution of the law can be presented in three parts as souvenirs or wishes Christmas, which remain under each other like so many open roads choices and decisions for legislators and judges.

Let slip into the clothes of the legendary usurer and talk about the first ghost of the three Christmas that made him famous: "Christmas past." At a time when the company built on the partnership agreement served the interests of the shareholders, the French judicial courts had  taken into account the interests of employees and the interest of the environment by Tort Law. The generality of this branch of law has allowed such judicial policy. It was much easier to build than Procedural Law opened the doors of the courthouse, for example by allowing works commitees to access the court for an expert analyse, to make their voices heard in moments of transformation of the company. The evolution of Law in favor of stakeholders has therefore taken form Ex post but in an imperative way.

The "Christmas Present" comes from Financial Law. Influenced by economic thinking. A French author could say he prefers no translate "skateholders" because French Corporate Law is influenced directly be this economic theory now!footnote-112

Laws require listed companies they and they alone to inform the market about what they have done and will do spontaneously in favor of employees, "minorities", diversity policy or the environment, and probably more generally in favor of the social group and the planet.

These recent laws aren't prescriptive : they oblige to inform. By an feedback effect, they are an incentive for responsible investors, responsible shareholders, Legislator hoping that the company is rationally selfishness for "well" performing towards stakeholders at the end of the day. There are no legal sanctions, the European Commission referring to self-regulation. Calculation or ethical share the causal role, an issue to which the law doesn't lend relevance.
 
The "Christmas yet to come" is already showing its premises. An author writes Corporate Social Responsibity is "irresistible"!footnote-106... It will be to turn these legal standards of information into legal norms with binding effect: laws require companies, not just listed companies but everyone to take into account the interests of employees, "minorities", environmental issues and future generations. Not only to inform what is done, but to oblige to do.This is the challenge, for example, the composition of the boards, or more radically the rewriting of Article 1833 of the Code civil (French Civil Code). Like any future, such rewriting promises possible changes, which converge to an increased power of the judge The question for the future is: "who will decide the consistency of these interests and will make the balance?". At less, it might be a "coregulation!footnote-94" between State and companies. At the end, it might be a transformation of companies into new legislators through soft law.
Fairy tale or nightmare ?
 
1

Trebulle, F.-G., Stakeholders Theory et droit des sociétés, 2006. He wrote that the French translation of "stakeholders" by "parties prenantes" is not convincing and prefers to keep the original term.

2

Malecki, C., L'irrésistible montée en puissance de la RSE : les impulsions européennes et françaises de l'année 2013,  2013.This article begins by : "Toujours plus ! (Always more!)".

3

Berns, T., Docquir, P.-F., Frydman, B., Hennebel, L and Lewkowicz, G., Responsabilités des entreprises et corégulation, 2007.

March 18, 2014

Publications

Ce working paper est la base d'une contribution parue ultérieurement dans un numéro spécial de la Revue Concurrences.

Le fil conducteur est que la concurrence n'est pas le principe d'organisation du secteur énergétique, dont le secteur électrique dont partie. Par principe, il s'agit d'un secteur régulé.

Si la concurrence peut y trouver sa place, car elle n'est pas pour autant exclue, c'est d'une façon "adjacente".

En effet, parce que la concurrence produit de l'émulation, de l'innovation, de la réduction des coûts, elle est bienvenue lorsque rien ne s'y oppose. Plus encore, lorsque ces effets convergent vers les buts servis par la régulation, elle est doublement bienvenue.

Mais elle ne saurait être le principe du secteur de l'énergie, et cela d'une façon définitive car c'est d'une façon structurelle que ce secteur a par principe régulé.

 

Feb. 1, 2012

Documentary Base : Doctrine

Référence complète : Murphy, J., How DG Competition and U.S. DOJ Antitrust Division Hurt Compliance Efforts, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, février 2012, n°1.

Les étudiants Sciences Po peuvent consulter l'article via le drive, dossier "MAFR - Régulation & Compliance"