June 23, 2019
The European Banking Union is based on supervision as much as on regulation: it concerns the operators as much as the structures of the sector, because the operators "hold" the sector.
This is why the "regulator - supervisor" holds the operators by the supervision and is close to them.
He meets them officially and in "soft law" relations. This is all the more necessary since the distinction between the Ex Ante and the Ex Post must be nuanced, in that its application is too rigid, in that it involves a long time (first of all the rules, then to apply them, then to notice a gap between rules and behaviors, then to repair it) is not appropriate if the system aims at the prevention of systemic crises, whose source is inside the operators.
This is why the body in charge of solving the difficulties of the systemic banks for the salvation of the systeme meets the banking sector itself, to ensure that they are permanently "resolvable", so that the hypothesis of their resolution never arises. This is the challenge of this system: that it is always ready, for never be applying.
In the European Banking Union, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) is in charge of "resolve" the difficulties of European systemic banks in difficulty. It is the public body of the second pillar of the Banking Union. The first pillar is the prevention of these difficulties and the third is the guarantee of deposits. The resolution is therefore more like an Ex Post mechanism.
But in this continuum through these three pillars between the Ex Ante and the Ex Post, the SRB does not wait passively - as would a traditional judge do - that the file of the troubled bank reaches it. Like a supervisor - which brings it closer to the first public in the system (Single Supervisory Board -SSB), which supervises all the banks, it is in direct contact with all the banks, and it approaches the hypothesis of a bank in trouble by a systemic perspective: it is therefore to the entire banking system that the SRB addresses itself.
As such, it organizes meetings, where he is located: in Brussels.
To resolve in Ex Post the difficulties of a bank, it has to present a quality (a little known concept in Bankruptcy Law): "resolvability". How build it? Who build it ? In its very design and in its application, bank by bank.
For the resolution body vis-à-vis all players in the banking and financial sector, it's clear: "Working together" is crucial in building resolvability ".
In the projection that is made, it is affirmed that there can be a successful resolution only if the operator in difficulty is not deprived of access to what makes to stay it alive, that is to say the banking and financial system itself, and more specifically the "Financial Market Infrastructures", for example payment services.
Does the Single Resolution Board expect spontaneous commitments from the FMIs for such a "right of access"? In this case, as the Single Resolution Board says, this right of access corresponds to "critical functions" for a bank, the resolution situation can not justify the closure of the service.
By nature, these crucial operators are entities that report to regulators who oversee them. Who enforces - and immediately - this right of access? When one can think that it is everyone, it risks being nobody .... That is why the resolution body, relaying in this a concern of the Financial Stability Board, underlines that it is necessary to articulate the supervisors, regulators and "resolvers" between them.
To read this program, since it is a proposed program of work for the banking sector, four observations can be made:
1. We are moving more and more towards a general "intermaillage" (which will perhaps replace the absence of a global State, but it is an similar nature because it is always to public authorities that it refers and not to self-regulation);
2. But as there is no political authority to keep these guardians, the entities that articulate all these various public structures, with different functions, located in different countries, acting according to different temporalities, these are the companies themselves that internalize the concern that animates those who built the system: here the prevention of systemic risk. This is the definition of Compliance, which brings back to companies, here more clearly those those which manage the Market Infrastructures, the obligations of Compliance (here the management of systemic risk through the obligation of giving access).
3. Even without a single systemic guard, there is always a recourse. That will be the judge. There are already many, there will probably be more in a system of this type, more and more complex, the articulation of disputes is sometimes called "dialogue". And it is undoubtedly "decisions of principle" that will set the principles common to all of these particular organisms.
4. We then see the emergence of Ex Ante mechanisms for the solidity of the systems, and the solidity of the players in the systems, and then the Ex Post resolution of the difficulties of the actors according to access to the solidity of the infrastructures of these systems, which ultimately depend on judges (throughout the West) facing areas where all of this depends much less on the judge: the rest of the world.
Oct. 4, 2017
Editorial responsibilities : Direction of the "Régulations & Compliance" series, Editions Dalloz
General reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Régulation, Supervision, Compliance (english translation: "Regulation, Supervision, Compliance"), Paris, collection "Régulations", Dalloz, 2017, to be published.
This collective book is published in French but summaries of every article are available in English
Book presentation in English :
Regulation. Supervision. Compliance.
Three terms almost unknown to legal systems. Or at least considered as peculiar to Anglo-American legal systems: Regulation, Supervision, Compliance. So many expressions that would constitute Trojan horses by which the Common Law and american mechanisms would seize the other legal traditions to better bend European companies, especially banks, appropriating institutions, imposing strange methods.
Three words by which the invasion is carried out. Through the violence of repression and penalties of compliance, by the mildness of codes of conduct and corporate social responsibility. By laws as new as strange such as in France the law known as "Sapin 2" or the law instituting a "duty of vigilance" to companies whose failure would be to have successfully deployed internationally their activities.
One can have this defensive conception of Compliance, generating a "Compliance Law", produced by internalization in global economic operators of the Regulation Law, which are then subject to Supervision by Regulators, even though these firms are not regulated, as the Compliance does extend beyond supervised sectors (banks and insurance companies).
We can (and maybe must) have a more welcoming, and therefore more offensive, concept of Compliance. This can be the crucible of a relationship of supra-national Trust between these operators and regulators, the former being able to contribute as the latter to serving goals that all exceed them and whose fight against corruption and money laundering are only examples.
In this way, the issue is the construction of the European Compliance Law.
Voir la présentation du cycle de conférences sur lesquelles s'est construit l'ouvrage.
Dec. 11, 2014
Documentary Base : Doctrine
Référence complète : Roussel Galle, Ph. et Douaoui-Chamseddine, M., Les défaillances bancaires et financières : un droit spécial ?, Revue de droit bancaire et financier, déc. 2014, p.64-65.
Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent lire l'article par le drive dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation"
Aug. 31, 2014
L'ouvrage de Stéphane Voisard est très intéressant car il montre que des personnes privées sont intégrées par la puissance publique pour que le système de supervision des banques soit efficace. Il faut mais il suffit que ces personnes soient des experts fiables et crédibles.
Il montre tout à la fois que c'est une conception assez générale du droit administratif.
Son ouvrage démontre que cet état du droit et de sa pratique dépasse la distinction du droit public et du droit privé.
Oct. 15, 2013
Documentary Base : 06.1. Textes de l'Union Européenne
Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of the Council of 15 October 2013 entrusting the European Central Bank with specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions
March 2, 2011
Documentary Base : Doctrine
Cet article est paru dans le numéro que la Revue d'Economie Financière a consacré à "La supervision" en 2011 que la crise financière conduit à repenser au regard du risque systémique.
Le numéro précédent de la Revue avait été consacré au thème de la Régulation.
Pourtant, cet article dans le numéro consacré à la supervision porte sur la régulation bancaire et financière. Cela tient au fait qu'ici le terme de "régulation" est utilisé dans le sens de "réglementation", l'article visant aussi bien les comportements de marché, les instruments de marché que les exigences de fonds propres.
March 2, 2011
Documentary Base : Doctrine
Paru en 2011, ce numéro thématique porte sur "La supervision" au regard du risque systémique, tandis que le précédent portait sur "La régulation" au regard de ce même thème.
Il en ressort, pour éviter la prochaine crise, la volonté d'étendre la supervision, notamment aux "non-banques", comme les compagnies d'assurance, et de la renforcer, notamment quant aux moyens de contrôle, de surveillance et de sanction des Autorités de supervision.