📧Dans les causes systémiques : "délibérer" plutôt que "se disputer"

To open the lettre d'avril 2023 de la Première Chambre civile de la Cour de cassation (April 2023 issue of the French First Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation), Hugues Fulchiron, a university professor who is now a counsellor in extraordinary service, explains his discovery of the Court's work.

He states that: "Dans le traitement du dossier, depuis sa première lecture jusqu’à la signature de l’arrêt, l’universitaire redécouvre également l’art de l’argumentation. Il doit non seulement construire un raisonnement, mais aussi mettre en place les arguments qui, dans un dossier particulier et dans un cadre particulier, celui du pourvoi, n’aient pas uniquement vocation à donner une réponse à la question de droit posée, mais, au-delà, à faire le droit, qu’il s’agisse d’un rejet, d’une cassation, d’un « simple » rejet non spécialement motivé ou d’une non-admission. Ce travail sur l’argumentation se fonde à la fois sur la doctrine et sur la jurisprudence, et sur le dialogue qui s’est établi entre eux au fil des décisions. Il est d’autant plus important qu’il n’est pas univoque : il s’agit de donner aux autres conseillers la matière à partir de laquelle ils construiront leur propre raisonnement. Certes, le conseiller rapporteur indique dans son avis l’orientation qu’il propose. Mais ce n’est qu’une proposition. Il se peut d’ailleurs qu’il fasse des propositions multiples, compte tenu de la complexité du sujet, de sa nouveauté ou, au contraire, de l’existence de précédents dont est envisagé l’affinement… ou l’abandon. Pour celui qui serait encore attaché au dogme de la solution unique, la désillusion risque d’être grande. Tout comme l’étonnement de qui sous-estimerait l’importance du précédent. La mise en place de l’argumentation trouve son prolongement dans le délibéré, i.e. dans la discussion à trois voix (pour les dossiers de non-admission ou de formation restreinte) ou à au moins douze voix (pour les dossiers de formation de section), qui se développe à partir des éléments (rapport, avis, projets d’arrêts) fournis par le rapporteur : un débat de fond dans lequel chacun opine librement et qui, par les éclairages théoriques et pratiques qu’il apporte, par le rappel des grandes lignes jurisprudentielles (de la ratio jurisprudentiae, si l’on ose dire), par l’analyse des implications théoriques et pratiques que pourrait avoir telle ou telle solution, peut, jusqu’au dernier moment, faire pencher la balance d’un côté ou de l’autre. Pour un universitaire plus habitué à discuter, au sens noble de la disputatio, qu’à délibérer, l’expérience est, là aussi, passionnante.".

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This continuum between the 'dispute', the joint reflection and the solution finally reached by the decision (because a 'ruling' must be made, a 'decision' must be taken) is an example of what must be done in a more general way in complex cases. There are indeed causes submitted to judges, whether they are judges of the Law or judges of the merits, which require a shift from "dispute" to "deliberation".

The rejection of the opposition between "dispute" and "deliberation" must be made, on the model of what is described here in the Cour de cassation (French Court of Cassation) when the case examined by the Judge is complex.

When the case submitted to a judge is simple, as regards the facts and the applicable Law, the task between the parties and the judge can be divided according to the traditional distinction: the parties "dispute", according to the principle of contradictory, the contradiction relating as much to the facts of the case as to the rules of Law which are applicable to it, then the judge "deliberates": instructed of this debate, he confronts, by not having interest in the cause, on the best qualification of the facts, the most adequate interpretation of the Law, in order to judge well.

But if we have a complex case, especially because beyond the "dispute" between the parties, which constitutes the "litigation" between them, a complete system is involved in the case submitted to the Judge, whether he is a judge of the merits or a judge of the Law, this presentation does not produce optimal results: because a system is involved (for example, banking, financial, digital, climatic, sanitary, etc.), it has to be present in the proceedings and be considered in the judgment. The resulting complexity should not be hidden.

🔴M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🎤L'hypothèse des causes systémiques (The hypothesis of systemic causes), in L'office du juge et les causes systémiques, in Cycle of conferences, Penser l'office du juge, Grand Chambre de la Cour de cassation (French Court of Cassation), 9 May 2021, and its underlying Working Paper: 🚧The hypothesis of the category of systemic causes brought before the judge

The judge's office must therefore be transformed, right from the procedural stage, so that the technique of dispute is transformed as far as possible into a technique of deliberation.

This must be done in four main ways:

Firstly, the judge and the parties to the proceedings must come closer together from the outset, so that the terms of the dispute are agreed: the adversarial method is more appropriate in systemic causes, even if the public order involved is very high. The determination of the elements of the case, through a debate between the judge and the parties, is the most effective. Preliminary hearings, including before the judges of the Law, instructions at the bar, orality, are the most productive methods. In this way, the parties, among themselves and with the judge, participate in the determination of the terms on which the deliberation must concern.

Secondly, the judge must bring into the proceedings people who are not involved in the dispute but who can express the interest of the system since it is involved in the case. In this respect, the Regulatory Authorities, the market place bodies or the European Commission are well placed to express their opinions in a deliberative way in a discussion process, thus reducing the frontal opposition implied by the situated interests expressed by the dispute.

Thirdly, the judge must be able to 'actively reflect' during the proceedings, if deliberation can be defined in this way. This is why the judge of the merits or of the Law must, at the same time, instruct himself during the proceedings on his own initiative, not depending solely on the parties' written submissions and on the expert opinions provided by them. The opinions that he himself requests enable him to feed his deliberations.

🔴N. Cayrol, 📝L'amicus curiae, mesure d'instruction ordinaire, 2022

Fourthly, the judge must be able to ask questions directly to the parties and their experts, with the hearing at the bar transforming the hearing into a working meeting in a continuum between contradiction and deliberation. The more this is practiced, the more the parties will find in the decision subsequently adopted that their arguments and the answers given to the deliberative method have been taken into consideration.

This method of moving from dispute to deliberation, which allows a judge faced with a "systemic cause", is particularly appropriate in cases involving Compliance Law.

It also corresponds to the democratic method that must be preserved today:

🔴M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📧La "rationalité délibérative" et l'usage adéquat de l'impératif de vigilance ("Deliberative rationality" and the proper use of the vigilance imperative), 2023

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