Transport

Full reference: CJEU, 1st chamber, 18th of November 2020, decision C‑519/19, Ryanair DAC vs DelayFix Read the decision   Summary of the decision This decision of the CJEU of 18th of November 2020 is about the jurisdiction clause for any dispute in air transport contracts, here those of Ryanair. This decision is especially interesting about the question to know whether the professional assignee (collection company) of a debt whose holder was a consumer may or may not avail itself of the consumer protection provisions, canceling the scope of this type of clause.  The Court takes back the criteria and the solution already used in 2019 about a credit contract: the protection applies by the criterion of the parties to the contract and not of the parties to the disputes. Such a clause is effective only if the integrality of the contract is transferred to the professional, and not only some of the stipulations. This Regulatory decision, through "private enforcement", incentivizes consumers to transfer their compensation claim (around 250 euros) to collection companies which, in turn, discipline airlines to stay on schedule.

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Judge between Platform and Regulator: current example of Uber case in U.K., Newsletter MAFR – Law, Compliance, Regulation, 29th of September 2020 Read by freely subscribing the other news of the Newsletter MAFR – Law, Compliance, Regulation   Summary of the news: On 22nd of September 2017, Transport of London (TFL), London Transport Regulator, refused to renew the licence, granted on 31st of May 2012 for 5 years, authorizing Uber to transport people because of criminal offenses committed by Uber's drivers. On 26th of June 2018, The Westminster Court prolonged Uber's licence for 15 months under the condition that the platform prevent the reproachable behaviors of its drivers. After these 15 months, the TFL refused once again to prolonge Uber's licence because of the persistence of aggressions against passengers. Uber, once again, contest this decision before the Westminster Court.  In a decision of 28th of September 2020, the Court observes that during the 15 months, the platform implemented many measures to prevent aggressions, that the level of maturity of these measures has improved over time and that the number of offenses was reduced over the period (passing from 55 in 2018 to 4 in 2020). The Court estimated the the implementation of this actions is sufficient to grant a new licence to Uber.  We can learn three lessons from this decision:  The Compliance obligation is not a result obligation but a mean obligation, which means that it is not reasonable to expect from a crucial operator (Uber, for instance) that it prevent every cases of agression but that it is salient to judge it on the effort it deploys to try to be closer to this ideal situation. Moreover, the crucial operator must be proactive, that is going away from the figure of passive subject of Law who apply measures enacted by the regulator in terms of fighting against aggressions to be an actor of the research of the best way to fight abusive behaviors, internalizing this "monumental goal.  The judge appreciates the violation committed by those whose the firm is responsible "in context", that is evaluates the concrete situation in a reasonable way.  It is the judge who decides in last resort and like the crucial operator, it must be reasonable.    Read to go further: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Firm, Regulator and Judge: thinking Compliance through these three characters, 2018 The report of the Assemblée nationale (French Parliament chamber) on the question 

Full reference: Westminster Magistrates' Court, 28th of September 2020, Uber London Limited v. Transport for London  Read the decision Read Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's commentary in the Newsletter MAFR – Law, Regulation & Compliance 

Full reference: ARAFER, Opinion n°2019-083 relatif aux projets de décrets approuvant les statuts de la société nationale SNCF, de la société SNCF Réseau, de la filiale mentionnée au 5° de l’article L. 2111-9 du code des transports et de la société SNCF Voyageurs, et portant diverses dispositions relatives à ces mêmes entités (related to the project of decrees approving the status of the national societies SNCF, SNCF réseau, of the subsidy mentionnes at the 5° of the article L. 2111-9 du code des transports and of SNCF Voyageurs, and carrying some dispositions related to this bodies), 9th of December 2019 Read the opinion (in French) Read the décret approuvant les status de la société nationale SNCF (in French) Read the opinion of 9th of May 2019 having preceded the one of 9th of December 2019

Full reference : ARAFER, Opinion n°2019-028 relatif au projet d'ordonnance portant diverses dispositions relatives à la nouvelle SNCF (related to the project of ordinance carrying some dispositions related to the new SNCF), 9th of May 2019 Read the opinion (in French) Read the ordonnance portant diverses dispositions relatives à la nouvelle SNCF (in French) Read the opinion of 9th of December 2019 following the one of 9th of May 2019

Translated Summaries ENGLISH : This article provides an economic perspective on the role played by competition policy in the development of competition in various transport sectors. After a brief reminder of some economic features that are shared by different transport modes, it mainly examines the principles and practical underpinnings of merger control as it is implemented in the present context of rapid consolidation in some transport sectors. Thereby, it stresses some potential shortcomings of the traditional merger regula tion approach in the particular context of transportation services, pointing to an excessive attention paid to potential competition issues on overly narrow relevant markets while largely ignoring global efficiency-enhancing effects of mergers and alliances. ITALIAN Articolo: Trasporti, concorrenza e politica in material di concorrenza. Questo articolo delinea una prospettiva economica del ruolo della politica in materia di concorrenza nello sviluppo della libera concorrenza in vari settori dei trasporti. Dopo un breve richiamo ad alcuni aspetti economici, comuni a diversi tipi di trasporto, l’articolo passa in esame i principi e le pratiche fondamentali del controllo delle concentrazione cosi come applicato nell’attuale contesto di consolidamento di alcuni settori dell’industria dei trasporti. Tuttavia, l’articolo mette in rilievo ugualmente alcune carenze potenziali di un approccio classico della regolazione delle concentrazioni nello specifico settore dei trasporti, tra cui l’eccessiva attenzione data alle questioni di concorrenza potenziale su mercati di dimensioni ridotte e la noncuranza generalizzata degli effetti di alleanze e fusioni in materia di efficacia e di progresso. SPANISH Artículo: Transporte, competencia y política competitiva Este artículo da una perspectiva económica sobre el rol jugador por la política de la competencia y el desarrollo de la competencia en varios sectores de transporte. Después de un breve recordatorio sobre las características económicas compartidas por diferentes modales de transporte, examina principalmente los principios y detalles prácticos de la implementación de control de uniones en el contexto presente de consolidación rápida en algunos sectores de transporte. El artículo pone énfasis algunos de los defectos potenciales del la regulación tradicional de uniones, particularmente en el contexto de los servicios de transporte, indicando un enfoque excesivo a cuestiones de competencia potencial en mercados demasiado estrechos y a la vez ignorando los efectos del mejoramiento de eficacia global de las uniones y las alianzas.    PORTUGUESE Artigo: Transporte, concorrência e política concorrencial Este artigo fornece uma perspectiva econômica sobre o papel exercido pela política concorrencial no desenvolvimento da concorrência em diversos setores de transporte. Após uma breve retomada de conceitos econômicos compartilhados por modos de transporte diferentes, ele examina principalmente os princípios e os problemas práticos do controle como implementado no contexto presente de rápida consolidação em alguns setores de transporte. Assim, ele sublinha alguns potenciais conflitos no enfoque da regulação tradicional no contexto particular de serviços de transporte, apontando para uma atenção excessiva concedida para problemas de concorrência potencial em muito relevantes mercados enquanto são amplamente ignorados os efeitos na eficiência global. Transporte aéreo – Avião – Aeroporto – Aliança – Comportamento anti-concorrencial – Falência – Concorrência – Autoridade de concorrência – Política de concorrência – Concentração – Contrato – Subsídios cruzados – Economia de escala – Eficiência – Ganho de eficiência – Barreiras de entrada – Equilíbrio – Comissão Europeia – Custo fixo – França – Londres – Incentivo – Operador incumbente – Infraestrutura – Interconexão – Investimento – Monopólio legal – Liberalização – Rede de longa distância – Estrutura de mercado – Controle – Firma de multiprodução – Rede – Mercado oligopolístico – Concorrência potencial – Preço – Elasticidade de preço – Trilho – Transporte por trilhos – Mercado relevante – Transporte rodoviário – Segmento – Serviço – Tempo – Transporte – Reino Unido – Comunidade urbana – Veículo.* * Em The Journal of Regulation, estas palavras-chave são fornecidas pelo Editor e não pelo Autor. ………………… Other translations forthcoming.