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► Full reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "La définition juridique du Contrat de compliance (The legal definition of the compliance contract)", in Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) published by the Centre for Research on Justice and Conflict Resolution (CRJ) and the Centre for Research in Economics and Law (CRED) at Panthéon-Assas University (Paris II), Le "Contrat de compliance" (The "Compliance Contract"),  Paris II Lecture Theatre -  82 Rue Notre Dame des Champs, Paris, 12 June  2026.

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🧮view the full programme for the event

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📶view the slides (in French)

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🌐read the presentation made on LinkedIn

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🚧Read the bilingual working paper on which this conference is based

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📝This lecture will form the basis of a contribution to the book, 📕Compliance et Contrat (Compliance and Contracts), 

To be published in the 📚Regulations & Compliance series, a book co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz.

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► Overview of this lecture : The lecture is divided into three parts.

In the first part, the aim is to describe the reality of the “Compliance Contract”, which can be defined as the decision taken by an entity subject to a “Compliance Obligation” (most often a company, but it may also be a administrative organisation) to entrust the fulfilment of that obligation to a third party. This does not diminish the entity’s obligation to be accountable for the compliance structure, nor for its ability to produce the expected outcomes, in particular the behaviours that will contribute to achieving the Monumental Systemic Goals for which the compliance frameworks were adopted. This outsourcing is lawful; its contractual form falls under Contract Law and the principle of contractual freedom.

Even if one considers that, since the subject matter of the contract is Compliance itself, it would constitute a ‘Systemic Contract’—just as Compliance Litigation is ‘Systemic Litigation’—its fundamental nature is indeed a bilateral relationship between a client and a professional (who is often subject to professional rules and codes of conduct).

Indeed, there are legal consequences to this practice of “Compliance Contracts”, because it is the Compliance System that is thereby served: on the one hand, “regulatory clauses” will be inserted, whilst others will be removed (“deemed unwritten”). Contractual freedom remains the guiding principle, however.

In Contract Law, it would be appropriate for the contracting parties to refer to this contribution to the Monumental Goals, which constitute the  fundamental legal norm of the Compliance System, if only to guide the contract Judge who may be called upon in the event of a dispute, as the interpretation of the parties’ intentions must be carried out in a teleological manner.

In the second part, the relationship between this "Compliance Contract" and the various "Compliance Clauses" is analysed. The two should certainly not be confused, since, quite apart from these highly specific contracts through which the various compliance techniques are entrusted, in their drafting and management, to third parties, who thus become the experts, there are also clauses inserted into numerous contracts (sales, distribution, manufacturing, service, etc.), clauses which aim, amongst many other clauses serving different purposes, to incorporate compliance considerations into the contract.

But first and foremost, the Compliance Contract contains numerous clauses specific to it, which often derive from compliance system, since Compliance concretisation is the very purpose of this specific contract, et nothing else: it is therefore logical that, by way of a ‘transparency effect’, the legal Compliance Systemic requirements should be incorporated into the isolated contract.

Secondly, and more significantly, many various contracts contain clauses that provide for the triggering of a “Compliance Ccontract”. For example, when an audit clause is linked to a specific event and the provision stipulates that a contract will then be entered into with a particular expertal body or person, this will generate a Compliance Contract in a second time. The link between the two may give one of the contracting parties control over the other, notably if the expert is close to them. If the links between Compliance Contracts and Compliance Clauses are developping, this could lead to a return to vertical integration. Competition Law may be justified in looking into this. 

It appears that, once we have distinguished between Compliance Contracts and Compliance Clauses, and then linked them together, we can arrive at a Contractual Compliance Strategy that is both legitimate and effective, provided that it contributes to the achievement of the Compliance Monumental Goals set by the political and public authorities. 

Indeed, as soon as we distinguish between “conformity” – which is intended solely to compel the operator to obey all applicable regulations blindly and mechanically – and “Compliance Law”, which is legally guided by Monumental Systemic Goals, this contractual strategy becomes essential.

Part Three sets out to clarify the scope of this Compliance Contract.

The first implication concerns the Compliance System itself, of which it forms a part; the Compliance Contract having the welcome effect of increasing the operator’s contribution to the achievement of the Monumental Systemic Goals (ensuring that systems – banking, financial, transport, energy, climate, digital, etc.—do not collapse and do not crush human beings, but rather benefit the human beings who are involved in them, whether willingly or not).

To this end, the contract must enable the operator – where necessary by means of express provisions – to demonstrate its credibility in contributing to the achievement of these Monumental Goals. Reliable pathways and credible structures must be established. In the cas of technical implementation is outsourced by a Compliance Contract, this obligation to provide evidence may be undermined. To compensate for this, the Compliance Contract may itself include provisions relating to portable technical information, support available through the client's accountability mechanism, or even in the event of legal proceedings.

The second aspect concerns the contractors themselves, who adapt their intentions and are bound, above all, by this “little law” which is any contract for the parties. This perspective is surprisingly underdeveloped in practice, no doubt because in Law, when considering Compliance, reference is made to unilateral “regulations” and the vertical relationship of obedience that it engenders in the operator.  This changes with the transformation of "conformity" (which is that) in "Compliance Law" (which is based on Monumental Systemic Goals and justifies contracts).

The third aspect concerns third parties, namely the stakedholders (and competitors...). These third parties benefit from Compliance Contracts because they are integrated into the Compliance System and because of the transparency between this system and the Compliance Contracts. In fact, and more technically speaking, this specific Cgreement provides them not only with a accountable(the company, the public body, the State), but also with a contractual debtor. Stakeholders may assert rights against the latter.

However, because the contracts themselves are also enforceable against third parties, they can anticipate these relationships with third parties – not only the competitors of the entity subject to the Compliance Obligation, but also its own relationship with stakeholders, and even its relationship with public authorities. Indeed, the object (and effect) of the Compliance Contract is to produce and build up Information that is of interest to everyone. The result is a ‘treasure trove of evidence’. A key question is how, and whether, this treasure trove can remain within the circle of the contracting parties or not.

Indeed, the fourth area concerns Public Authorities. As the bodies that “uphold” the compliance system, they consider the Compliance Contract to be legitimate and one of the most effective means of ensuring that regulations are effective, efficient and properly enforced; however, they also wish to benefit from the outcome of the contract’s implementation: to access the systemic information it generates. The contracting parties do not always share this view, but the Compliance Contract is not a means of “obeying” regulations. It is the Judge who will certainly address this question of principle, which relates to the very definition of Compliance Law.

This brings us to the fifth area of application, which concerns the Courts. Indeed, a number of courts are responsible for hearing such cases: the contract courts, the competition courts, the courts overseeing the various systems whose sustainability is thus safeguarded, and the courts specialising in vigilance legal duty  (which is the cutting edge of Compliance Law). 

The issue of the “natural judge” was examined at the symposium held on 29 May 2026 on: Contractual litigation involving compliance: procedural and jurisdictional aspects. The judge hearing the contract case (civil or commercial judge) will tend to refer first and foremost to the contract. This is also why the Compliance Contract conceptor would be well advised to include provisions in its terms regarding its relationship with the Compliance System, so that it is not the authorities of that system who do so in a too much discretionary manner.

In understanding the "Compliance Contract", as Iit was emphasised in 2022, in the judge’s interpretation of the contract, the judge is required to reconcile the parties’ intentions with a teleological approach, that is to say, to establish that the parties intended to serve the purpose of the expertise thus requested and developed (for the operator and ultimately for the stakeholders and for the system itself). 

By establishing this convergence, the judge gives full effect to the Cmpliance Contract. Rather than framing the issue, as is so often done when reasoning in terms of ‘conformity’, as a conflict between contractual freedom and public policy (conformity serving a public policy that would be contrary to the contract, inferior norm in the vertical normative hiercharchy). 

It must be accepted as a fundamental principle that contractual freedom, freedom of contract and a competitive market for compliance expertise are the most effective means of developing a Compliance System that will safeguard interconnected  different systems and protect the people involved in them.

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⛏️Find out more  :

🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Compliance contract, compliance clauses, 2022

🕴🏻M.-A. Frison-Roche, ⚙️Compliance and Contracts,

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► Complete reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Yes to the principle of the will, No to the pure consents, working document for an article written in French Oui au principe de volonté, Non aux consentements purs, to Mélanges dedicated to Pierre Godé, 2018, available at http://mafr.fr/ en / article / yes-in-principle-of-the-desire-not in the consent /

► Summary: Pierre Godé devoted his thesis to defend the freedom of the human being, freedom that the person exercises by showing his will. This will manifests itself, even tacitly, by this trace of "consent". In a liberal society, politically and economically, that is to say a society based on the principle of the will of the person, consent must always be defined as the manifestation of the will, this link between consent and will being indivisible ( I). But by a perversion of liberalism, "consent" has become an autonomous object of the freedom of the person, mechanical consent that has made it possible to transform human beings into machines, machines to desire  and machines to be desired, in a world of " pure consents","where we keep clicking, consenting to all without ever wanting. This consent, which has been split from the free will of the person, is the basis of the markets of the Human and the illiberal democracies, threats against human beings (II). The future of Law, in which Pierre Godé believed, is to continue to aspire to protect the human being and, without countering the free will of the human being as the movement of the law of the consumption had been tempted to, to renew with a liberal movement of Law and to fight against these systems of pure consents (III).

🔻read the article below (in French).

Référence complète : Cuzacq, N., Le périmètre du devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères du fait de leurs filiales et des donneurs d'ordre du fait de leurs sous-traitants ou fournisseurs, in Études en l'honneur de Philippe Neau-Leduc, Le juriste dans la cité, coll. « Les mélanges », LGDJ- Lextenso,  2018, pp.287-296.

Lire une présentation générale dans lequel l'article est publié.

Le Code civil de 1804 a présenté le contrat comme un mode de transmission de la propriété. Le XIXième siècle en a fait l'instrument majeur de deux volontés particulières qui s'accordent. En cela, l'individu montre son autonomie et sa puissance par son aptitude à s'engager. Aujourd'hui, le contrat est davantage l'expression juridique du marché. Mais les deux sont l'expression d'une vision libérale du monde, dans lequel les agents atomisés rentrent dans des relations bilatérales, dont l'addition fait le bonheur de tous.

Ainsi ressort la définition subjective du contrat comme rencontre de deux volontés qui échangent leurs consentements. Dès lors, l'essentiel tient dans la rencontre des consentements et dans la qualité de ceux-ci, qui doivent être libres et non-viciés. La puissance de l'autonomie de la volonté fait que si les consentements ont cette qualité, alors le contrat est juste et qu'il est inutile de prévoir une vigilance juridique pour veiller à l'équilibre des prestations. En outre, le contrat répond aussi à une définition objective, étant le double neutre et préalable d'une opération économique, définition qui monte en puissance. Ainsi, le droit est davantage attentif à l'exécution du contrat, à son inexécution et aux responsabilités contractuelles. Les deux définitions, subjectifs et objectives, mais toujours individualistes, ne cessent de se renforcer, soit à travers les libertés fondamentales, soit à travers le droit économiques.

Cela engendre l'alliance paradoxale de la toute-puissance de la volonté individuelle et l'instrumentalisation massive des comportements. Le contrat devient le modèle de l'action et remplace les formes traditionnelles d'organisation et d'action de groupe. Cela est également vrai pour l'action publique, le procès, la famille ou l'intimité.

Accéder au plan de la leçon.

Accéder à la problématique de la leçon.

Accéder aux slides de la leçon.

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Remarques sur la distinction entre la volonté et le consentement en droit des contrats" ("Remarks on the distinction between will and consent in Contract Law"), Revue trimestrielle de droit civil, 1995, p. 573 s.

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📝read the article (in French)

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► Référence complète ; Fr. Terré,  L'influence de la volonté individuelle sur les qualifications, préface de Robert Le Balle, coll. "Anthologie du Droit", LGDJ Lextenso éditions, éd. 1957 - réimpression 2014, 570 p.

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► Résumé de l'ouvrage : Il s'agit du travail de référence en matière de qualification, même s'il aborde la question de la qualification sous un angle particulier, à savoir le pouvoir que les personnes ont d'infléchir l'appréciation par le droit d'une situation, ce qui a pour effet de la soumettre à tel ou tel régime juridique.

François Terré montre que pour les personnes, notamment les contractants, le déclenchement du régime juridique n'est plus alors l'effet de la qualification, mais l'objet recherché par la volonté individuelle, qui choisira telle ou telle qualification afin d'atteindre le régime juridique qui convient à la personne ou de se soustraire à celui qui ne lui convient pas.

La qualification est alors un "biais" pour atteindre un résultat, ici la satisfaction de l'intérêt personnel. Mais le système juridique peut refuser une telle flexibilité au nom de l'ordre public.

François Terré montre l'efficacité de la volonté pour disposer des éléments objectifs qui constituent la structure d'une qualification, afin que ce mécanisme satisfasse les buts recherchés par les personnes, le caractère objectif de cette structure n'entravant pas cette utilisation par les parties de la qualification pour obtenir le résultat qu'elles ont posé.

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