Référence complète: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Difficulté de la Compliance dans le système d'auto-régulation: exemple des réunions de l'été 2020 de l'OPEP à propos de la "conformité" pour la stabilité des marchés du pétrole (Difficulty of Compliance in Self-Regulation system: example of the Summer 2020 meetings of OPEC about the "conformity"​ for Oil Market Stability​), Newsletter MAFR - Law, Compliance, Regulation, 26 août 2020

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Résumé de la news

La production mondiale de pétrole brut est largement coordonnée par l'Organisation des Pays Exportateurs de Pétrole (OPEP) et en particulier par son Comité Ministériel de Suivi (JMMC). Le 15 juillet 2020, ce Comité s'est réuni une première fois pour décider de la réduction de la production mondiale de pétrole brut afin de maintenir une certaine stabilité des prix dans un contexte de demande réduite en raison de la pandémie de COVID-19.

Cependant, une telle stabilité ne peut être maintenue que si chacun des pays membre de l'OPEP respecte cette décision et baisse effectivement son niveau de production. Cette réunion du 15 juillet 2020 avait donc également pour objectif d'obtenir la "conformité" de ses membres . Afin d'obtenir cette conformité, le JMMC a donc déclaré qu'elle utiliserait un outil de "name and shame", blâmant les pays n'ayant pas respecté la déclaration du Comité et encensant ceux qui l'auront appliqué. Une seconde réunion, le 19 août 2020, a visé à rappeler aux pays n'ayant pas suffisamment baissé leur volume de production leurs obligations et à les exhorter à se conformer avant le 28 août. 

On peut noter deux choses:

• Le terme utilisé par le Comité est "conformité" et non "compliance", ce qui suppose moins une adhésion à des "buts monumentaux que le respect mécanique de règles formelles.
• Dans un système d'auto-régulation où il n'est pas censé y avoir besoin de "conformité", la nécessité de celle-ci est un indice que cette auto-régulation fonctionne mal.

This interview was conducted in French with Olivia Dufour, for an article published in French in the digital publication Actualité Juridique.

Its subject is  the confrontation between the current health crisis situation and the Compliance Law. 

Summary. After defining Compliance Law, distinguishing the procedural and poor definition and the substantial and rich definition, the starting point is to admit the aporia: the type of health crisis caused by Covid-19 will be renewed and it is imperative to prevent it, even to manage it, then to organize the crisis exit. Public Authorities are legitimate to do so, but because this type of crisis being global and the State being consubstantially linked to borders, States are hardly powerful. Their traditional International Law shows their  limits in this current crisis and one cannot hope that this configulration will improve radically.

In contrast, some companies and markets, notably the financial markets, are global. But the markets are not legitimate to carry out such missions and counting on the generosity of certain large companies is far too fragile in front of the "monumental goal" that is the prevention of the next health crisis, crisis which must never happen.

How to get out of this aporia?

By Compliance Law, basis of, in a literal and strong sense, the "Law of the Future". 

We need to be inspired by the Banking and Financial Compliance Law. Designed in the United States after the 1929 crisis to tend towards the "monumental goal" of the absence of a new devastating crisis in the country and the world,  this set of new legal mechanisms gave duty and power of supervision, regulation and compliance to market authorities and central bankers. These are independent of governments but in constant contact with them. Today, they claim to have as first priority the fight against climate change. Now and for the future, they must also be given the responsibility and the powers to prevent a global health disaster, similar to a global ecological disaster, similar to a global financial disaster. This does not require a modification of the texts because their mandate consists in fighting instability. Stability must become a primary legal principle, of which the fight against monetary instability was only a first example. By the new use that central banks must make of it by preventing and managing health crises, Compliance Law will ensure that the future will be not catastrophic.

Référence complète: Bolton, P., Desprez, L.A, Pereira da Silva, F., Samama, F., Swartzman, The green swan: central banking and financial stability in the age of climate change, Banque des Règlements Internationaux, Janvier 2020.

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Résumé (fait par les auteurs) :

"Climate change poses new challenges to central banks, regulators and supervisors. This book reviews ways of addressing these new risks within central banks’ financial stability mandate. However, integrating climate-related risk analysis into financial stability monitoring is particularly challenging because of the radical uncertainty associated with a physical, social and economic phenomenon that is constantly changing and involves complex dynamics and chain reactions. Traditional backward-looking risk assessments and existing climate-economic models cannot anticipate accurately enough the form that climate-related risks will take. These include what we call “green swan” risks: potentially extremely financially disruptive events that could be behind the next systemic financial crisis. Central banks have a role to play in avoiding such an outcome, including by seeking to improve their understanding of climaterelated risks through the development of forward-looking scenario-based analysis. But central banks alone cannot mitigate climate change. This complex collective action problem requires coordinating actions among many players including governments, the private sector, civil society and the international community. Central banks can therefore have an additional role to play in helping coordinate the measures to fight climate change. Those include climate mitigation policies such as carbon pricing, the integration of sustainability into financial practices and accounting frameworks, the search for appropriate policy mixes, and the development of new financial mechanisms at the international level. All these actions will be complex to coordinate and could have significant redistributive consequences that should be adequately handled, yet they are essential to preserve long-term financial (and price) stability in the age of climate change."