Person

► Full reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, “La supériorité du système de l’Internet sur le système algorithmique, car le premier est ouvert et le second ne l’est pas” (The superiority of the Internet system over the algorithmic system, because the first is open and the second is not), LinkedIn post, 23 January 2026. - read the original post on LinkedIn (in French), commenting on the World Economic Forum debate “Internet up for Grabs” (Davos, 23 January 2026) 🧱 read the French version of this post - follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law subscribe to the Video Newsletter MAFR Surplomb subscribe to the Newsletter MaFR Droit & Art

► Full Reference: R. Sève, “L’Obligation de Compliance et les mutations de la souveraineté et de la citoyenneté” (“Compliance Obligation and changes in Sovereignty and Citizenship”), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L’obligation de Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz, coll. “Régulations & Compliance“, 2025, pp. 97-107. - read the general presentation of the book, L’obligation de Compliance, in which this article is published. - ► This article is written in French. English summary of this contribution (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC): The contribution describes “the changes in legal philosophy that the notion of Compliance may imply in relation to the modern representation of the State ensuring the effectiveness of laws resulting from the general will, while respecting the fundamental freedoms that constitute the essence of the legal subject” (free translation; the original French text alone is authoritative: « les changements de philosophie du droit que la notion de compliance peut impliquer par rapport à la représentation moderne de l’Etat assurant l’effectivité des lois issues de la volonté générale, dans le respect des libertés fondamentales qui constituent l’essence du sujet de droit. »). The contributor believes that the definition of Compliance is due to authors who “play a role in illuminating and structuring a vast set of ideas and phenomena previously considered in a disjointed manner. For our purposes, this is certainly the case with the theory of Compliance, developed in France by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche in the tradition of great economists (Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole), whose first form lay in the Professor’s well-known work on Regulation Law” (free translation; the original French text alone is authoritative: « jouer un rôle d’éclairage et de structuration d’un vaste ensemble d’idées et de phénomènes précédemment envisagés de manière disjointe. Pour ce qui nous occupe, c’est sûrement le cas de la théorie de la compliance, développée en France par Marie-Anne Frison-Roche dans la lignée de grands économistes (Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole) et dont la première forme résidait dans les travaux bien connus de la Professeure sur le droit de la régulation. »). Drawing on the Principles of the Law of the American Law Institute, which considers Compliance to be a “set of rules, principles, controls, authorities, offices and practices designed to ensure that an organisation conforms to external and internal norms”, he stresses that Compliance thus appears to be a neutral mechanism aimed at efficiency through a move towards Ex Ante. But he stresses that the novelty lies in the fact that it is aimed “only” at future events, by “refounding” and “monumentalising” the matter through the notion of “Monumental Goals” conceived by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, giving rise to a new jus commune. Thus, “Compliance is the permanent idea of Law applied to new contexts and challenges” (free translation; the original French text alone is authoritative: « la compliance c’est l’idée permanente du droit appliquée à de nouveaux contextes et défis. »). So it’s not a question of making budget savings, but rather of continuing to apply the philosophy of the Social Contract to complex issues, particularly environmental issues. This renews the place occupied by the Citizen, who appears not only as an individual, as in the classical Greek concept and that of Rousseau, but also through entities such as NGOs, while large companies, because they alone have the means to pursue the Compliance Monumental Goals, would be like “super-citizens”, something that the digital space is beginning to experience, at the risk of the individuals themselves disappearing as a result of “surveillance capitalism”. But in the same way that thinking about the Social Contract is linked to thinking about capitalism, Compliance is part of a logical historical extension, without any fundamental break: “It is the development and complexity of capitalism that force the introduction into private entities of procedural mechanisms of a bureaucratic nature, in order to discipline employees, contain internal and external criticism, and support the managers in place” (free translation; the original French text alone is authoritative: « C’est le développement et la complexité du capitalisme qui forcent à introduire dans les entités privées des mécanismes procéduraux d’essence bureaucratique, pour discipliner les salariés, contenir les critiques internes et externes, soutenir les managers en place »), by forcing them to justify remuneration, benefits, and so on. Furthermore, in the words of the author, “With the Monumental Goals – taking into account the distant, diffuse effects, aggregated across borders, the interests of future generations, of all living beings – we move, so to speak, to an industrial dimension of ethics, which only vast information processing systems make it possible to envisage effectively” (free translation; the original French text alone is authoritative: « Avec les buts monumentaux, – la prise en compte des effets lointains, diffus, agrégés par delà les frontières, de l’intérêt des générations futures, de tous les êtres vivants – , on passe, pour ainsi dire, à une dimension industrielle de l’éthique, que seuls de vastes systèmes de traitement de l’information permettent d’envisager effectivement. »). This is how we can find a division between artificial intelligence and human beings in organisations, particularly companies, or in decision-making processes. In the same way, individual freedom does not disappear with Compliance, because it is precisely one of its Monumental Goals to enable individuals to make choices in a complex environment, particularly in the digital space where the democratic system is now at stake, while technical mechanisms such as early warning will revive the right to civil disobedience, invalidating the complaint of “surveillance capitalism”. The author concludes that the stakes are so high that Compliance, which has already overcome the distinctions between Private and Public Law and between national and international law, must also overcome the distinction between Information and secrecy, particularly in view of cyber-risks, which requires the State to develop and implement non-public Compliance strategies to safeguard the future. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche’s courses

► Full Reference : A. Marais, Droit des personnes (Law of Persons), 5th ed., 2021, Dalloz, “Cours Dalloz-Série Droit privé” Series, 349 p. - ► General presentation of this Course (written in French) : Since the first edition of her book, Professor Astrid Marais has opened it with these words: « Everything is either a thing or a person ». Starting from this essential principle, the textbook describes how the law determines the two categories of persons, natural persons and legal persons, how it individualises them and how it protects them. The concern for natural persons is all the greater today as the law takes into account the bodies of human beings. This is notably why the book sets out the « Law of Persons » through the various branches of Law, all of which are now concerned by it. - 📚See the entire collection in which the book is published. - 📚See the presentation of the Courses related to this one : 🕴️D. Fenouillet, 📕Droit de la famille (Family Law) 🕴️Ch. André, 📕Droit pénal spécial (Special Criminal Law) 🕴️A.-M. Leroyer, 📕Droit des successions (Law of Succession) -

► Full Reference: R. Sève, "Compliance Obligation and changes in Sovereignty and Citizenship", in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Compliance Obligation, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, "Compliance & Regulation" Serie, to be published - 📘read a general presentation of the book, Compliance Obligation, in which this article is published - ► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance – JoRC):  The contribution describes "les changements de philosophie du droit que la notion de compliance peut impliquer par rapport à la représentation moderne de l’Etat assurant l’effectivité des lois issues de la volonté générale, dans le respect des libertés fondamentales qui constituent l’essence du sujet de droit." ("the changes in legal philosophy that the notion of Compliance may imply in relation to the modern representation of the State ensuring the effectiveness of laws resulting from the general will, while respecting the fundamental freedoms that constitute the essence of the subject of law"). The contributor believes that the definition of Compliance is due to authors who « jouer un rôle d’éclairage et de structuration d’un vaste ensemble d’idées et de phénomènes précédemment envisagés de manière disjointe.  Pour ce qui nous occupe, c’est sûrement le cas de la théorie de la compliance, développée en France par Marie-Anne Frison-Roche dans la lignée de grands économistes (Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole) et dont la première forme résidait dans les travaux bien connus de la Professeure sur le droit de la régulation. » ( "play a role in illuminating and structuring a vast set of ideas and phenomena previously considered in a disjointed manner.  For our purposes, this is certainly the case with the theory of Compliance, developed in France by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche in the tradition of great economists (Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole) and whose first form was in her well-known work on Regulatory Law"). Drawing on the Principles of the Law of the American Law Institute, which considers compliance to be a "set of rules, principles, controls, authorities, offices and practices designed to ensure that an organisation conforms to external and internal norms", he stresses that Compliance thus appears to be a neutral mechanism aimed at efficiency through a move towards Ex Ante. But he stresses that the novelty lies in the fact that it is aimed 'only' at future events, by 'refounding' and 'monumentalising' the matter through the notion of 'monumental goals' conceived by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, giving rise to a new jus comune. Thus, "la compliance c’est l’idée permanente du droit appliquée à de nouveaux contextes et défis." ("Compliance is the permanent idea of Law applied to new contexts and challenges").  So it's not a question of making budget savings, but rather of continuing to apply the philosophy of the Social Contract to complex issues, particularly environmental issues.  This renews the place occupied by the Citizen, who appears not only as an individual, as in the classical Greek concept and that of Rousseau, but also through entities such as NGOs, while large companies, because they alone have the means to pursue the Compliance Monumental Goals, would be like "super-citizens", something that the digital space is beginning to experience, at the risk of the individuals themselves disappearing as a result of "surveillance capitalism". But in the same way that thinking about the Social Contract is linked to thinking about capitalism, Compliance is part of a logical historical extension, without any fundamental break: "C’est le développement et la complexité du capitalisme qui forcent à introduire dans les entités privées des mécanismes procéduraux d’essence bureaucratique, pour discipliner les salariés, contenir les critiques internes et externes, soutenir les managers en place" ("It is the development and complexity of capitalism that forces us to introduce procedural mechanisms of a bureaucratic nature into private entities, in order to discipline employees, contain internal and external criticism, and support the managers in place") by forcing them to justify remuneration, benefits, and so on. Furthermore, in the words of the author, "Avec les buts monumentaux, – la prise en compte des effets lointains, diffus, agrégés par delà les frontières, de l’intérêt des générations futures, de tous les êtres vivants – ,  on passe, pour ainsi dire, à une dimension industrielle de l’éthique, que seuls de vastes systèmes de traitement de l’information permettent d’envisager effectivement." ("With the Monumental Goals – taking into account the distant, diffuse effects, aggregated across borders, the interests of future generations, of all living beings – we move, so to speak, to an industrial dimension of ethics, which only vast information processing systems can effectively envisage"). This is how we can find a division between artificial intelligence and human beings in organisations, particularly companies, or in decision-making processes. In the same way, individual freedom does not disappear with Compliance, because it is precisely one of its monumental goals to enable individuals to make choices in a complex environment, particularly in the digital space where the democratic system is now at stake, while technical mechanisms such as early warning will revive the right to civil disobedience, invalidating the complaint of "surveillance capitalism". The author concludes that the stakes are so high that Compliance, which has already overcome the distinctions between Private and Public Law and between national and international law, must also overcome the distinction between Information and secrecy, particularly in view of cyber-risks, which requires the State to develop and implement non-public Compliance strategies to safeguard the future. - 🦉This article is available in full text to those registered for Professor Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's courses -

► Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Quand on s'intéresse à la Compliance, lire "La Haine"​ de Günther Anders, 1ier août 2022. - ► Introduction de l'article : Philosophe allemand, Günter Anders connut la Seconde Guerre mondiale, dût quitter l'Allemagne et vécut dans plusieurs pays. C'est avant tout un philosophe moral, habité par le pessimisme et l'idée que le nazisme n'était qu'une répétition générale, plutôt artisanale, de ce que nous attend : L'obsolescence de l'homme, son livre-maître qui en 1956 décrit le système économique comme ce qui broie les êtres humains en les réduisant à n'être plus que des êtres qui entretiennent des machines qui produisent des produits inutiles qu'ils consomment, les humains n'étant eux-mêmes que des machines désirantes. En 1985 dans un volume paru en langue allemande et composé d'articles tous consacrés au thème de La haine, il donna comme contribution les éléments de travail de ce qu'il avait conçu comme dernière partie de son oeuvre démontrant l'appareillage obtenant "l'obsolescence de l'homme", dernier livre qu'il ne publia jamais. Extrait de ce volume, ces documents de travail furent traduits en français et présentés par Philippe Ivernel : le titre en est La Haine. I. LA FABRIQUE DE LA "HAINE COMME PRODUIT DE CONSOMMATION" POUR ENGENDRER DES COMBATS, PRODUCTEURS A LEUR TOUR DE HAINE : L'ARTICULATION DES DEUX HAINES Anders est un penseur de la technique, de la technologie (comme l'est Jacques Ellul), expliquant qu'elle n'appartiendra plus à une élite mais au contraire à chacun dans notre vie quotidienne, se mettant ainsi au centre de tout, remplaçant notamment la politique, les êtres humains mécanisés devenant la matière première des machines. Le titre original, La Haine à l'état d'antiquité désigne le fait que la société de consommation réduisant l'être humain à son aptitude à entretenir des machines et à se comporter lui-même comme une machine consommant les produits fabriqués par des machines, l'être humain ayant pour seul fonction de désirer consommer ce que produisent les machines, et désirant donc finalement rien d'autres qu'entretenir et développer les machines qui l'engloutissent sous tous ces biens, n'a plus de pensée que pour ce monde entièrement voué aux machines. L'Amour et la Haine sont ainsi reléguées "à l'état d'antiquité" car pour trouver sa place dans ce système de désirs qui convergent vers les machines, il n'est besoin ni d'Amour ni de Haine. Il expose que cela se passe dans deux temps. Dans un premier temps, la Haine est fabriquée pour amener les humains à se battre contre des ennemis qu'ils ne connaissent même pas ; dans un second temps, ils sont suffisamment mécanisés pour attaquer sans que l'énergie de la Haine soit même nécessaire. Le premier fragment de ses documents de travail expose la façon dont les êtres humains "aiment la Haine" car cela donne à chacun le sentiment d'exister : la Haine. "Je hais, donc je suis. Ou plus précisément : Donc je suis quelqu'un" (p. 33). Il reprend cette idée dans le deuxième fragment dont le titre est (en français dans l'édition allemande) : L'appétit vient en mangeant. Il expose que la Haine n'est pas au départ contre une personne particulière et pousse à l'attaquer. La Haine est à l'état pur, mais c'est plutôt l'atmosphère de haine et "l'amour de la haine". Il suffit de la cultiver et la tourner ensuite à volonté contre un tel ou un tel. Il évoque ainsi une sorte d'industrie de la haine, en des termes qu'il met dans la bouche du personnage qui dirige la cité : "Sans doute est-il exact qu'ils combattent "leurs ennemis" parce qu'ils les haïssent. Sauf que cette haine envers "leurs ennemis" n'explose précisément pas en s'allumant d'elle-même-meme, ni parce que les premiers leur auraient fait quoi que ce soit. Mais uniquement par ceci que (et donc parce que) je leur livre la haine à chaque fois exigible. Ils la reçoivent de moi gratuitement à domicile. Exactement comme l'eau, le gaz et la TV. Et cette haine qui leur est acheminée, ils la consomment alors, et dans tout à fait dans mon sens à moi : car ils s'engagent, en effet, pleins de haine dans la lutte politiquement opportune. Après quoi commence aussi réellement ce dont vous venez de parler : la deuxième phase de la haine. Car à présent ils haïssent réellement du fait qu'ils combattent. La règle de la haine s'énonce comme suite : "Je combats quelqu'un – de ce fait je me mets à le haïr. L'appétit vient en mangeant, la haine vient en luttant". Ils se battent ainsi "avec appétence" et sont persuadés le faire "avec dignité", devant rester dans l'ignorance de l'absence de raison du combat (qui est la pure volonté de celui qui leur a envoyé la Haine). Günther Anders fait ensuite expliquer par le personnage politique qu'il fait cela par moralité car il ne veut pas que les hommes en tuent d'autres juste par obéissance à ses ordres, ce qu'ils trouveraient immoral. Il leur fabrique alors de la Haine, de la Haine qu'ils aiment, qu'il dirige ensuite sur des groupes de personnes et ainsi dotés de cette première haine, ils attaquent ceux qu'ils haïssent, le combat accroissant par une seconde haine la première, et tout le système fonctionne bien. Il lui fait ainsi conclure : "C'est pourquoi ils ont besoin de haïr. C'est pourquoi je leur accorde de haïr. C'est pourquoi je leur ordonne de haïr.". Le troisième fragment porte sur la guerre proprement dite. Anders expose que la Haine n'y est aujourd'hui plus requise parce que la technique permet aux soldats de n'être plus en contact avec les personnes qu'ils combattent, ni même d'être confrontés aux cadavres. La fabrique de la Haine serait donc devenue inutile. C'est pour cela aussi qu'elle aurait vocation à être rangée dans les antiquités… Les soldats sont devenus comme des robots. Le quatrième fragment développe ce point, sur des soldats "aveugles en telos", au point qu'on pourrait davantage les qualifier "d'employés" des armées que de soldats, exécutant leur travail sans savoir sur qui ou quoi ils larguent les bombes, chacun étant désormais comme à l'arrière du front. Anders souligne que dans ce combat sans haine, mené par les ordinateurs, le combat ne prend jamais fin.   II. UNE EXTRAORDINAIRE ANTICIPATION DU SYSTEME COMMERCIALE ET POLITIQUE E DE HAINE   A. DISTINCTION DES DEUX HAINES ET ROBOTISATION DES ETRES HUMAINS L'œuvre de Gunther Anders est particulièrement profitable pour comprendre le monde dans lequel nous vivons. Dans cette ébauche d'ouvrage, retenons l'idée d'une double haine : la Haine fabriquée comme un objet et apportée gratuitement à tout le monde car il y a chez chacun un "amour de la haine" qui est en soi, puisqu'en haïssant, on se sent exister. La Haine est un objet économique pur, car elle n'a pas d'objet particulier. Elle est fabriquée, cultivée, diffusée, accrue, partagée. Ce n'est que dans un second temps, après avoir ainsi inséré de la Haine pure dans l'esprit des amoureux de la Haine, que l'on peut lui affecter un objet, une personne ou un groupe de personnes et qu'un combat contre ceux-ci peut commencer, producteur d'un second type de Haine. Les deux Haines s'accroissent l'une l'autre. Le premier intérêt de cette conception est d'isoler ce premier temps de la Haine : une Haine à l'état pur, celle qui existe car haïr permet d'exister, indépendamment de l'objet de la haine. Ce n'est pas donc pas l'objet qui fait naître la Haine, mais l'amour de soi qui fait naître la Haine. Dans un second temps, c'est le hasard ou la manipulation d'un tiers (dans l'exemple pris par Anders le dirigeant politique, mais nous connaissons des influenceurs en dehors du cercle politique) qui offre à la Haine son objet. Mais Anders insiste sur le fait que ces objets sont substituables. Par cette Haine fabriquée, les êtres humains ont donc l'impression d'exister. C'est alors un stade pire et paradoxal qui s'annonce : celui des êtres humains sans haine, parce qu'on leur aura ôté l'objet de Haine, alors même qu'on leur commande (comme à des "employés") de tuer des semblables, en les mettant technologiquement à distance de l'objet à détruire (Anders prend l'exemple du lancer de bombe). Ils deviennent des robots, et la déshumanisation est ainsi achevée. C'est en cela que les 4 fragments constituent pleinement la dernière partie de l'œuvre centrale qu'est L'obsolescence de l'Homme. B. LE MONDE NUMERIQUE, LES RÉSEAUX SOCIAUX ET L' "INTELLIGENCE ARTIFICIELLE" Le travail publié en 1985 correspond à des réflexions élaborées juste après la Seconde Guerre mondiale et puisant dans les leçons de la Première. Mais si l'on regarde le monde numérique dans lequel nous vivons, il est en premier lieu construit sur des technologies "neutres", une industrie de l'information qui transforme les êtres humains en consommateurs d'information et en source d'information, constituant eux-mêmes une masse de micro-informations. En deuxième lieu, les plateformes, et plus particulièrement les réseaux sociaux, sont des espaces neutres, les entreprises qui les tiennent ne sont pas des éditeurs, et le produit pur qui y circulent le mieux est de la "Haine pure", qui est ce qui rapporte à ces entreprises le plus de revenus, les différents objets de haines étant interchangeables. La Haine est devenue un objet qui est délivré à domicile et dont nous sommes abreuvés en permanence, notre "amour de la Haine" étant alimentée en continu, et sans doute accru. En troisième lieu, les algorithmes sont présentés comme "intelligents", c'est-à-dire dotés d'une capacité non seulement d'apprentissage mais de choix et de discernement. L'intelligence artificielle serait le progrès, c'est-à-dire la disparation de la haine pour exemple pour prononcer les sanctions les plus adéquates. Les chiffres ont donc remplacé les êtres humains, ce qu'Anders visait à travers les "ordinateurs".   III. LE PROFIT QUE LE DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE PEUT FAIRE DE LA PENSÉE DE GUNTHER ANDERS A. LE DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE, DROIT AYANT LA PRÉTENTION DE RÉDUIRE LA HAINE DANS L'ESPACE NUMÉRIQUE Le Droit de la Compliance est une branche du Droit construit sur des prétentions politiques qui visent à concrétiser des "buts monumentaux". 🔴Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, 📝Les Buts Monumentaux, cœur battant du Droit de la Compliance, in Marie-Anne Frison-Roche (dir.),  Les buts monumentaux de la compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance et Dalloz, coll. 📚Régulations & Compliance, 2022, pp. 21-44. La lutte contre la diffusion de ce qu'il est pertinent de désigner comme l'amour naturel de la haine pure, qui se répand d'une façon virale dans l'espace numérique permettant à la haine d'être "portée à domicile" est une des objets majeurs du Droit de la Compliance. Le Digital Services Act est imprégné de techniques de Compliance pour y parvenir. Il ne s'agit pas de compter sur la moralité des personnes, puisque le cœur des humains est d'aimer la haine, ni de les remplacer par des machines car le remède est pire que le mal (la déshumanisation) mais sur la performance technique de ceux qui tiennent ce système économique-là : les plateformes elles-mêmes. 🔴M.-A. Frison-Roche, 📝Se tenir bien dans l'espace numérique, in Mélanges en l'honneur de Michel Vivant, Penser le droit de la pensée, Dalloz et Lexis Nexis, 2020, pp. 155-168. En combattant le feu par le feu, c'est-à-dire en obligeant ceux qui ont construit les techniques par lesquelles se diffusent la Haine à construire et à utiliser les techniques de contrôle, de détection et de prévention de celle-ci, le Droit de la Compliance, notamment grâce à son effet naturellement extraterritorial, exprime la prétention de ne pas laisser la Haine régner. En outre, les Autorités publiques non seulement régulent mais encore supervisent les entreprises et leurs technologies, en l'espèce l'Arcom et la CNIL, dont les pouvoirs Ex Ante s'accroissent. 🔴R.-O. Maistre, Quels buts monumentaux pour le Régulateur dans un paysage audiovisuel et numérique en pleine mutation ?, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), Les buts monumentaux de la Compliance, série "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) et Dalloz, 2022. B. LA DÉFINITION TÉLÉOLOGIQUE DU DROIT DE LA COMPLIANCE L'œuvre d'Anders est parcourue par le désespoir moral d'êtres humains "sans telos", c'est-à-dire sans finalités qui leur soit propres. C'est ainsi qu'ils peuvent être saisis aisément par l'amour de la Haine, puisqu'aucun projet propre n'occupe leur temps et leur force. Il peut en être de même pour la force du Droit. Si le Droit ne devait être qu'une technique "réglementaire", "neutre", visant à "l'efficacité" des désirs de chacun et des réglementations accumulées, alors le Droit ne ferait qu'ajouter à la déshumanisation décrite par Anders. Mais le Droit de la Compliance est par nature une branche du Droit téléologique : elle se définit par ses buts. Et ceux-ci sont "monumentaux". Ces buts monumentaux ponctuels peuvent tous se ramener à ceci : protéger les êtres humains, afin que la description d'Anders ne soit pas exacte en son cœur désespéré. 🔴M.-A. Frison-Roche, 🚧 Fonder la Compliance, 2022

►  An article published on July 14, 2021 by The Wall Street Journal, "Brain Implant Lets Man 'Speak' After Being Silent for More Than a Decade", relays the information that it is now possible, on an experimental basis, to implant in the brain a device allowing a person deprived by a neurological accident to speak to be able to express himself again by writing his thoughts directly on a computer screen, on which the words thought are displayed in sentences. - Several years of "fundamental" research, notably on the part of Facebook, which, in particular by subsidizing the French professor of neurosciences Stanislas Dehaene, in a comparison between the learning development of the brain and the development of "deep learning", have been successful. to allow people who have lost the use of the voice to write directly on screens without this vocal medium by going directly from thought to writing. This leads to three reflections, putting Law and Technology at the center: 1. at first glance, speech being only a medium between thought and expression, it would be conceivable to do without it; 2. However, it is required to draw a parallel with the new technology of "emotional recognition" by which thoughts are accessible to third parties, which thwarts the fundamental right to make one's thoughts inaccessible to others;  The news has shown precisely that this technology, making possible to capture the true thoughts of others despite feigned facial expressions, poses a problem with regard to the fundamental right to lie or to remain silent (see in this regard 📧 MaFR, "Compliance and Ethics Technologies may be inadmissible "in themselves" and conceiving of their "ethical use" is therefore not admissible: practical case on the control of workers' emotions "). 3. By anticipating the possible use of this new technology and the legal reaction to this potentiality, the same question raises whether, per se, such an implantation of a tool for "capturing thoughts directly in the brain" to obtain their "direct translation on a screen" should not be considered as the equivalent of capturing thoughts, just as infringing on everyone's fundamental right to keep their thoughts inaccessible. Here again, the fact that in one or two cases, this made it possible to cure a person does not legitimize the technology in itself. Likewise, the fact that the person "consents" is not sufficient to legitimize what may be a per se attack on the dignity of the human person if the technology has the effect of capturing thoughts with a loss of control. the person concerned. For the moment, in the description given by the researchers according to the article which relates the innovation, it is the transmitter who controls the technology but the elimination of the medium of speech or writing deserves to be conceptualized, in the loss of isolation of the individual, isolation to which the Western tradition has often associated Freedom. - ► s'inscrire à la Newsletter MaFR ComplianceTech®

► An article from March 3, 2021, Smile for the camera: the dark side of China's emotion-recognition tech, then an article from June 16, 2021, "Every smile you fake" – an AI emotion – recognition system can assess how "happy" China's workers are in the office describes how a new technology of emotional recognition is able, through what will soon be out of fashion to call "facial recognition", to distinguish a smile that reflects a mind state of real satisfaction from a smile which does not correspond to it. This allows the employer to measure the suitability of the human being for his or her work. It is promised that it will be used in an ethical way, to improve well-being at work. But isn't it in itself that this technology is incompatible with any compensation through ethical support? The technology developed by a Chinese technology company and acquired by other Chinese companies with many employees, allows to have information on the actual state of mind of the person through and beyond his or her facial expressions and bodily behavior. Previously, the technology of emotional recognition had been developed to ensure security, by fighting against people with hostile plans, public authorities using it for example in the controls at airports to detect the criminal plans which some passengers could have. It is now affirmed that it is not about fighting against some evil people ("dangerousness") to protect the group before the act is committed ("social defense”) but that it is about helping all workers. Indeed, the use that will be made of it will be ethical, because first the people who work for these Chinese companies with global activity, like Huawaï, do it freely and have accepted the operation of these artificial intelligence tools (which is not the case with people who travel, control being then a kind of necessary evil that they do not have to accept, which is imposed on them for the protection of the group), but even and above all, the purpose is itself ethical: if it turns out that the person does not feel well at work, that they are not happy there, even before they are perhaps aware, the company can assist. Let’s take this practical case from the perspective of Law and let’s imagine that it is contested before a judge applying the principles of Western Law. Would this be acceptable? No, and for three reasons. 1. An "ethical use" cannot justify an unethical process in itself 2. The first freedoms are negative 3. "Consent" should not be the only principle governing the technological and digital space   I. AN "ETHICAL USE" CAN NEVER LEGITIMATE AN UNETHICAL PROCESS IN ITSELF These unethical processes in themselves cannot be made "acceptable" by an "ethical use" which will be made of them. This principle was especially reminded by Sylviane Agacinski in bioethics: if one cannot dispose of another through a disposition of his or her body which makes his or her very person available (see not. Agacinski, S., ➡️📗Le tiers-corps. Réflexions sur le don d’organes, 2018). Except to make the person reduced to the thing that his or her body is, which is not ethically admissible in itself, that is excluded, and Law is there in order to this is not possible. This is even why the legal notion of "person", which is not a notion that goes without saying, which is a notion built by Western thought, acts as a bulwark so that human beings cannot be fully available to others, for example by placing their bodies on the market (see Frison-Roche, M.-A., ➡️📝To protect human beings, the ethical imperative of the legal notion of person, 2018). This is why, for example, as Sylviane Agacinski emphasizes, there is no ethical slavery (a slave who cannot be beaten, who must be well fed, etc.). That the human being agrees ("and what about if it pleases me to be beaten?") does not change anything.   II. THE FIRST FREEDOM IS THE ONE TO SAY NO, FOR EXAMPLE BY REFUSING TO REVEAL YOUR EMOTIONS: FOR EXAMPLE HIDING IF YOU ARE HAPPY OR NOT TO WORK The first freedom is not positive (being free to say Yes); it is negative (being free to say No). For example, the freedom of marriage is having the freedom not to marry before having the freedom to marry: if one does not have the freedom not to marry, then the freedom to marry loses any value. Likewise, the freedom to contract implies the freedom not to contract, etc. Thus, freedom in the company can take the form of freedom of speech, which allows people, according to procedures established by Law, to express their emotions, for example their anger or their disapproval, through the strike. But this freedom of speech, which is a positive freedom, has no value unless the worker has the fundamental freedom not to express his or her emotions. For example if he or she is not happy with his or her job, because he or she does not appreciate what he or she does, or he or she does not like the place where he or she works, or he or she does not like people with whom he or she works, his or her freedom of speech demands that he or she have the right not to express it. If the employer has a tool that allows him or her to obtain information about what the worker likes and dislikes, then the employee loses this first freedom. In the Western legal order, we must be able to consider that it is at the constitutional level that the infringement is carried out through Law of Persons (on the intimacy between the Law of Persons and the Constitutional Law, see Marais , A., ➡️📕Le Droit des personnes, 2021).   III. CONSENT SHOULD NOT BE THE ONLY PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE TECHNOLOGICAL AND DIGITAL SPACE   We could consider that the case of the company is different from the case of the controls operated by the State for the monitoring of airports, because in the first case observed people are consenting. "Consent" is today the central notion, often presented as the future of what everyone wants: the "regulation" of technology, especially when it takes the form of algorithms ("artificial intelligence"), especially in digital space. "Consent" would allow "ethical use" and could establish the whole (on these issues, see Frison-Roche, M.-A., ➡️📝Having a good behavior in the digital space, 2019). "Consent" is a notion from which Law is today moving away in Law of Persons, in particular as regards the "consent" given by adolescents on the availability of their body, but not yet on digital. No doubt because in Contract Law, "consent" is almost synonymous with "free will", whereas they must be distinguished (see Frison-Roche, M.-A., ➡️📝Remarques sur la distinction entre la volonté et le consentement en Droit des contrats, 1995). But we see through this case, which precisely takes place in China, that "consent" is in Law as elsewhere a sign of submission. It is only in a probative way that it can constitute proof of a free will; this proof must not turn into an irrebuttable presumption. The Data Regulatory Authorities (for example in France the CNIL) seek to reconstitute this probative link between "consent" and "freedom to say No" so that technology does not allow by "mechanical consents", cut off from any connection with the principle of freedom which protects human beings, from dispossessing themselves (see Frison-Roche, M.-A., Yes to the principle of will, No to pure consents, 2018). The more the notion of consent will be peripheral, the more human beings will be able to be active and protected. -

Full reference: Vergnolle, S., L'effectivité de la protection des personnes par le droit des données à caractère personnel (The effectiveness of the protection of people by personal data Law (our translation)), Passa, J. (dir.), thesis, Law, Panthéon-Assas University (Paris II), 2020, 531 p.   Read the thesis (in French) Read directly and only the table of contents (in French)     To go further about regulation of personal data, read:  Frison-Roche, M.-A., Rethinking the world from the notion of data, 2016 Frison-Roche, M.-A., The regulatory conséquences of a world redesigned from the concept of data, 2016. 

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Facebook: Quand le Droit de la Compliance démontre sa capacité à protéger les personnes (Facebook: When Compliance Law proves its ability to protect people), interview with Olivia Dufour, Actu-juridiques Lextenso, 23rd of November 2020 Read the interview (in French) Read the news of the Newsletter MAFR – Law, Compliance, Regulation about this question

Full reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, Se tenir bien dans l'espace numérique, in Penser le droit de la pensée. Mélanges en l'honneur de Michel Vivant, Lexis Nexis and Dalloz, 2020, pp. 155-168. - 📝Read the article (in French) - 🚧Read the working paper, written in English, on which this article is based, with additional developments, technical references, and hyperlinks   English summary of the article: The digital space is one of the scarce spaces not framed by a specific branch of Law, Freedom also offering opportunity to its actors to not "behave well", that is to express and diffuse broadly and immediately hateful thoughts through Hate speechs, which remained before in private or limited circles. The intimacy of Law and of the legal notion of Person is broken: Digital permits to individuals or organizations to act as demultiplied and anonymous characters, digital depersonalized actors who carry behaviors that are hurtful to other's dignity.  Against that, Compliance Law offers an appropriate solution: internalizing in digital crucial operators the mission to disciplinary and substantially hold the digital space. The digital space has been structured by powerful firms able to maintain order. Because Law must not reduce digital space to be only a neutral market of digital prestations, these crucial operators, like social networks or search engines, must be forced to substantially control behaviors. It could be about an obligation of internet users to act with their face uncover, "real identity" policy controlled by firms, and to respect others' rights, privacy rights, dignity, intellectual property rights. In their Regulatory function, digital crucial firms must be supervised by public authorities.  Thus, Compliance law substantially defined is the protector of the person as "subject of law" in the digital space, by the respect that others must have, this space passing from the status of free space to the one of civilized space, in which everyone is obliged to behave well.  -   Read to go further:  Frison-Roche, M.-A., L'apport du Droit de la Compliance à la gouvernance d'Internet, 2019 Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), Internet, un espace d'interrégulation, 2016 - 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on LinkedIn 🌐follow Marie-Anne Frison-Roche on Instagram 🌐subscribe to the Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 

►  Complete reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Having a good behavior in the digital space, working paper, April 2019. - 📝  This working document serves as a basis for a contribution to the collective book dedicated to Professor Michel Vivant, article written en French.   Summary: The jurist sees the world through the way he learns to speak¹Cornu, G., Linguistique juridique, 2005. , legal vocabulary build by Law itself, whether in common law or in civil law. Thus, we think we are dealing with the human being who does not move, taken by the legal notion expressed by the term "person", their body and their biological development in time, from the birth to the death, holding entirely in this hollow of that word "person", while the behavior of the human being with regard to the world, others and things, are grouped in other branches of Law: the Contract and Tort Law and the Property Law, which are only what people do with and about things. The Law of the Environment has already come to blur this distinction, so finally so strange because this classical conception refers to a person taken firstly in his immobility (Law of individuals), and then in his only actions (Contrats and Tort Law, Property Law). Indeed, the very notion of "environment" implies that the person is not isolated, that he/she is "surrounded", that he/she is what he/she is and will become because of what surrounds him/her ; in return the world is permanently affected by his/her personal action. On second thought, when once "Law of Individuals" was not distinguished from Family Law, the human being was more fully restored by this division in the legal system that not only followed him/her from birth to death but also in him/her most valuable interactions: parents, siblings, couples, children. Thus Family Law was finer and more faithful to what is the life of a human being. To have instituted Law of Individuals, it is thus to have promoted of the human being a vision certainly more concrete, because it is above all of their identity and their body about what Law speaks, astonishing that we have not noticed before that women are not men like the others. To have instituted the Law of the people, it is thus to have promoted of the human being a vision certainly more concrete, because it is above all of his identity and his body that one speaks to us, astonishing that the we have not noticed before that women are not men like the others²Frison-Roche, M.-A. & Sève, R., Le Droit au féminin (ed.), 2003. without however remembering that abstraction is sometimes the best of protections³Under this "mask" of the "subject of Law", we are all equal. S. Archives de Philosophie du Droit, Le sujet de droit, 1989..  But it is also to have isolated human beings, split from what they do, what they touch, what they say to others. It is by taking legally a static perception of a "man without relationship". We have gone from the legal individualism of the Law of the sole man. From this concrete vision, we have all the benefits but Law, much more than in the eighteenth century, perceives the human being as an isolated subject, whose corporeality ceases to be veiled by Law⁴Baud, J.P., L'affaire de la main volée. Histoire juridique du corps humain, 1993. , but for whom the relation to others or to things does not define him or her. Which brings the human being a lot closer to things. An human being who is a legal subject who does what they wants, as they can, limited by the force of things. But in fact things are so powerful and the human being, in fact, so weak. For example, the marks people leave are erased by time. Their grip on the world stops at the extent of their knowledge, the time and money they have, building to use better their own time and to reach projects that they designed, In this conception, Person and Liberty are one, returning the subject to their solitude. This freedom will come into conflict with the need for order, expressed by society, social contract, state, law, which imposes limits on freedom of one to preserve freedom of the other, as recalled by the French Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme  of 1789. Thus, it is not possible de jure to transform every desire in action,, even though the means would be within reach of the person in question, because certain behaviors are prohibited in that they would cause too much disorder and if they are nevertheless committed, they are punished for order to return. Thus, what could be called "law of behavior", obligations to do and not to be put in criminal, civil and administrative Law, national and international Law, substantial Law and procedural Law :they will protect the human being in movment pushed by the principle of freedom forward others and thing, movement inherent in their status as a Person.  The human being is therefore limited in what they want to do. In the first place by the fact: their exhausting forces, their death that will come, the time counted, the money that is lacking, the knowledge that they does not even know not holding, all that is to say by their very humanity; Secondly, by the Law which forbids so many actions …: not to kill, not to steal, not to take the spouse of others, not to pass as true what is false, etc. For the human being on the move, full of life and projects, Law has always had a "rabat-joy" side. It is for that reason often ridiculous and criticized because of all its restraining regulations, even hated or feared in that it would prevent to live according to our desire, which is always my "good pleasure", good since it is mine. Isolated and all-powerful, the human being alone not wanting to consider other than its desire alone. Psychoanalysis, however, has shown that Law, in that it sets limits, assigns to the human being a place and a way of being held with respect to things and other persons. If one no longer stands themselves by the prohibition of the satisfaction of all desire (the first of which is the death of the other), social life is no longer possible⁵On neurosis as a constitutive mode of child sociability, s. Lebovici, S., "C'est pas juste", in La justice. L'obligation impossible, 1994. . Thank to the Law, everyone follows the same Rule at the table, from which a discussion can take place between guests and without which it can not⁶Read the article of Alain Supiot about the idée of Rule common of all, under the discussion between all, presented by this author through the artwork of Kafka : "Kafka, artiste de la loi", 2019; Kafka is very present in the work of Alain Supiot, for example in his First Lesson in the Collège de France, 2012, or in an Introduction of La Gouvernance par les nombres ; This latter book is now available in English : Governance by numbers. The making a legal model of allegiance, 2017 (translated by S. Brown). . You stand straight in your chair, you do not eat with your fingers, you do not speak with your mouth full, you do not interrupt the speaker. Admittedly, one often learns at the beginning of the learning of the Law that one should not confuse "politeness" and Law. That these rules are politeness and that this is not Law … But this presentation aims to make it possible to admit that the criterion of Law would be in the effectiveness of a sanction by the public power: the fine, the prison, the confiscation of a good, which the rudeness does not trigger whereas Law would imply it: by this way we are thus persuaded of the intimacy between the public power (the State) and Law… But later, after this first lesson learned, the doubt comes from the consubstansuality between Law and State. Is it not rather appropriate to consider that Law is what must lead everyone to "behave well" with regard to things and people around them? The question of punishment is important, but it is second, it is not the very definition of Law. The French author Carbonnier pointed out that the gendarme's "kepi" is the "Law sign", that is to say what it is recognized without hesitation, but it is not its definition. The first issue dealt with by Law is then not so much the freedom of the person as the presence of others. How to use one's freedom and the associated deployment of forces in the presence of others? How could I not using it when I would like to harm them, or if the nuisance created for them by the use of my free strength is indifferent to me⁷That's why splitting Persons Law and Family Law masks another reality: the family is not made up of third parties. The links are there. They pre-exist. Starting from the only Persons Law pushes to think one can "build" his/her  family by links drawn on white paper: the contracting of the families made up of individuals becomes thinkable, even natural. How can Law lead me to use my means for their benefit while our interests do not converge?  We do not use our force against others because we have interest or desire, we do not give him the support of our strength while he indifferent us, because Law holds us. If the superego was not enough. If Law and the "parental function of the States" did not make alliance. We do it because we hold ourselves Or rather we were holding ourselves. Because today a new world has appeared: the digital world that allows everyone not to "hold" himself, that is to say to constantly abuse others, never to take them into consideration, to attack massively. It's a new experience. It is not a pathological phenomenon, as is delinquency (which simply leads to punishment), nor a structural failure in a principle otherwise admitted (which leads to regulatory remedies) but rather a new use, which would be a new rule: in the digital space, one can do anything to everyone, one is not held by anything or anyone, one can "let go" (I). This lack of "good behavior" is incompatible with the idea of ​​Law, in that Law is made for human beings and protect those who can not afford to protect themselves; that is why this general situation must be remedied  (II).

► Full Reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance et personnalité, in Recueil Dalloz, n°11/7812, avril 2019, pp. 604-606 -   ► Chronique English Summary: Compliance is often presented as a set of mechanical procedures, in which human beings are absent. It's the opposite. It is an Information Law, in its function of preventing systemic risks and a markets protection Law, which poses the requirement of knowing “truly” the person who is “relevant”, generalizing what Company or Competition Law had partially admitted. Even more, beyond systems, Compliance Law, insofar as it is a Protection Law, aims to protect human beings, directly or indirectly concerned, establishing them as legal persons, true final subjects of law of this new branch of Law. - 📝read the chronique (in French). - 🚧  read the bilingual Working paper, Compliance and Personality, basis of this chronique,    working paper including footnotes, technical references and hyperlink - 📖 read the other chroniques Chronique MAFR Droit de la Compliance -

► Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Competition Law & Compliance Law , Working Paper, October 2018. -   ► this Working Paper has served as basis for an Article published later in French in the Review Concurrences  ; read the presentation in English of this Article.  -   ► Summary and introduction : Compliance Law is a new branch of Law, still under construction. One can have a "narrow definition" of seeing it as the obligation of businesses to show that they are constantly and actively complying with the law. One can have a richer definition, of a substantive nature, defining it as the obligation or the own will of certain companies to achieve "monumental goals" that go beyond economic and financial performance.The Competition Law partly integrates its two conceptions of Compliance: Precursor, the Competition Law concretizes dynamically the first conception of the Compliance Law (I) It is with more difficulties but also much more future that the Competition Law can express in dialectic the second conception of the Compliance Law as internationalization of these "monumental goals", especially in the digital space (II).