Conferences
► Full reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, “En quoi le contrat fait part à la stratégie dans les entreprises saisies par la Compliance” (How Contracts Take Part in Strategy in Companies Seized by Compliance), in Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Université Paris Cité (Faculty of Law, Economics and Management – Centre de Droit des Affaires et de Gestion, CEDAG), Compliance et stratégies d’entreprise dans l’organisation contractuelle des chaînes de valeur (Compliance and corporate strategies in the contractual organisation of value chains), Malakoff, 16 November 2026. - 🧮read the full programme of the event 🏗️This colloquium is part of the 2026 cycle of colloquia Compliance and Contract. 🎤 see the slides of the talk (PDF, in French) - ► Presentation of this conference: This intervention opens the colloquium, for which Marie-Anne Frison-Roche shares scientific responsibility with Étienne Maclouf and Véronique Chanut, and which gives as much room to management science as to Law. “Value chains” have always existed, long before the legal system took hold of this reality, at once economic, financial and managerial. Distribution Law hardly identifies them as such, and one could consider that their entry into the legal order is rather linked to the so-called “Vigilance” Act of 2017, the expression now appearing expressly in European Union texts; but it is still hazardous to say that it is a legal notion. Within this managerial reality, Law has nevertheless always been present as a strategic instrument, through the natural use of contract, an instrument of stability and organisation by which companies deploy their strategies. The introduction first sets out the three questions that structure the colloquium: how do companies, through the contractual organisation of value chains, deploy and enhance their strategies? This leads to taking up again the hypothesis, proposed elsewhere, of the category of the “regulatory contract”. These are not exchange contracts but contracts whose purpose is to structure the chain, as an alternative to the market. In this respect, the contract (which is by nature a “little law” for the parties) changes dimension. As Distribution Law has shown, the contract, which is bilateral by nature, ends up, through the effect of groups and cascades, reaching more, further and for rather longer than laws do. It is therefore framework contracts and the mirror effects of commitments that form the legal architecture of value chains. Faced with this, how do legal systems react, more or less, to these strategies, depending on whether they know them, approve them more or less, or rely on them? How, finally, can the company’s strategy be articulated with the Monumental Goals that underpin Compliance Law, when the contract becomes the instrument through which the company implements its Compliance Obligation, which is moreover imbued with a legislative source that is not of the same nature as the contractual source? This last question requires a return to the very sources of Law. It is also a matter of extending earlier reflections on “Obligation sur Obligation vaut” (Obligation upon Obligation), an article published in 2025 in L’Obligation de Compliance. Indeed, in a classical conception, which still structures our legal systems, the will of Legislators stands above the will of ordinary legal persons (companies being among them), the contract being the source of long-term obligations with their partners, deployed on the principle of freedom and binding force as long as this does not conflict with the legislative (and regulatory) will, which is superior to them. But in Compliance Law, an Ex Ante and teleological Law, normativity lies in the Monumental Goals: it can therefore itself be described as a “strategic Law”. One then observes that regulations and Authorities enter contracts in order to use them as vehicles, because these are more effective than the traditional unilateral modes. We are moving away from the Kelsenian model. This is particularly clear for all the spaces that States cannot grasp through their administrative arm, including its repressive arm. This is the case of the digital space and of value chains. Two essential practical questions then arise. First, within the contract itself, if one considers that the will of the Legislator is present in it, where will the will of the contracting parties be located? Does it remain primary, as in the classical system? Second, when it comes to interpreting the contract, which will should be followed? This is where one must return to what Compliance Law is: an alliance to strive towards the realisation of the Monumental Goals, which are the preservation of systems so that the human beings involved in them are not crushed by them but benefit from them. In this alliance between States (and European and international public organisations) and companies, wills must, moving away from the hierarchical model, converge towards goals of common interest, thereby giving rise to common strategies. We will then be able to leave behind this kind of tax in kind constituted by all these clauses written by regulations, which the judge would interpret in their light, and to consider the contract in the light of its object, which has points of contact with the will of the Legislator, thus returning to the classical Law of contract, by positing that regulation may be its very object.