This working paper is the support for the article to appear in the collective book dedicated to our very dear friend and colleague Philippe Néau-Leduc.
It uses the Bilingual Dictionary of the Regulatory and Compliance Law.
Compliance Law has the same teleological functioning as the Economic Law to which it belongs, which consists in placing the normativity of rules, decisions and reasoning in the aims pursued. Once we know what the goals of compliance techniques are, then we know who should be responsible for them, who must be subject to them, who must activate the rules: compliance rules must be activated by those who are in the best position to achieve the outcome in order to achieve the goal sought by the authority which designed the compliance mechanism. The "circles" are thus plotted in a rational and pragmatic way. That, all of it ("useful effect"), but not beyond that. The notion of efficiency does not always imply balancing: on the contrary, it can involve drawing circles which designate those who are "placed" to carry the burden of the rules because they are capable of producing them the desired effects. Within these circles, the rules must apply without restriction and without compromise, but they must not apply beyond these circles.
Drawing such circles requires defining the Law of Compliance itself, since on the one hand the choice of those who must implement the Compliance depends on the aims of the Compliance and on the other hand the definition of the Law of Compliance is itself teleological in nature. This is why, contrary to the assertion that the exercise of definition would be useless in these matters, which would be above all on a case-by-case basis, this effort to define and determine the purposes is, on the contrary, necessary in practice to show which enterprise must bear the obligations of compliance and which must not.
But it is enough to have posed this to reveal the major difficulty of the Compliance, that explains resistances, and even gives the impression that one is confronted with an aporia. If, as a matter of principle, what is expected of the "users" of the Compliance mechanisms must be articulated to the aim that is affected by the authors of the compliance mechanisms to them, we must have a minimum correspondence between the aims of these authors (Legislators and Regulators) and the aims pursued by those who are responsible for implementing them: companies. However, this correspondence does not exist at first sight, because the compliance mechanisms are found to be uniquely based on "monumental goals" which the public authorities have a legitimate concern, whereas companies have for their own interest . The two circles do not match. The internationalization of concern for these aims in companies would therefore be only a mechanism of violence of which enterprises are the object, violence felt as such. (I).
To resolve this violence, it is better to stop confusing the State and enterprises, whose goals are not the same, and draw the circle of subjects of law "eligible" for Compliance. It is highly legitimate to target certain entities, in particular this category of companies, which are the "crucial operators", in a binding way, as it is legitimate to govern companies that have expressed a desire to surpass their own interests. These circles of a different nature can overlap on a concrete operator: for example, if a bank – alway a crucial operator that is structural because it is systemic – is also international – a crucial operator because of its activity – decides to worry about others by commitments verified by the authorities to overcome their own interest (social responsibility), but these different circles are not confused. In any case, companies may belong to only one circle, or even belong to none. In the latter case, they must therefore remain beyond the reach of the pressure and cost of Compliance Law, in particular because they are not objectively required to realize the "monumental goals" aimed at effectiveness and do not want it: in a liberal system, it is for the public authorities to aim at the general interest, the ordinary people indirectly participating in it by paying the tax. (II).
It is by making these "Compliance Circles" of eligible subjects of this specific Law to implement the heavy but justified and controlled burden of Compliance with regard to the monumental goals that this new system aims, that then opens a royal way in order to find a uniqueness and to increase the "monumental function" of the Compliance Law by a relation of Trust towards the global general interest, rather than the mechanical application of rules whose meaning is not understood and whose perception is no longer perceived than violence.
- V. dans cette perspective technique, Juvigny, B., La compliance bras armé de la régulation financière, 2017.
- Sur cette diversité, v. par exemple Frison-Roche, M.-A., Le Droit de la Compliance, 2016, La Cotardière, A. de, Le rôle de l'avocat en matière de compliance, 2017.
- L'évaluation du Droit est l'objet d'études multiples, plutôt désormais de nature économiques, par exemple sur l'emploi. L'observation des "usages" du Droit étant précédemment plutôt opérée dans une perspective sociologique. Mais cela, c'était avant.
- Frison-Roche, M.-A., Le Droit de la Compliance, 2016 ; D'où vient la Compliance ? Où va la Compliance ?, 2017.
- V. par ex. Parance, B. ..., 2017.
- V. Audit, M. , ....
- Gaudemet, A.
- Article 16 de la loi
- Frison-Roche, M.-A., Les trois Noëls de la Responsabilité sociale des entreprises, 2014.
- V. par exemple une description complète du dispositif du Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Br
- Supiot, A., ..., in L'entreprise dans une économie globalisée, 2015.
- Drummond, La société holding, thèse Paris II, ...
- Selon la définition si fameuse du Droit par Max Weber comme "violence légitime" exercée par l'État".
- Par exemple l'entreprise ne pourrait que commettre des délits d'initiés dès l'instant qu'elle détient une information d'une façon privilégiée.
- Sur cette définition téléologique, v. supra.
- Sur la description du "monde d'hier" au regard du Droit de la compliance, v. Frison-Roche, M.-A., Du Droit de la Régulation au Droit de la Compliance, 2017.
- Sur la neutralisation de l'entreprise publique et l'immense sujet politique et technique de "l'État-actionnaire, v.
- Frison-Roche, M.-A., Du Droit de la Régulation au Droit de la Compliance, 2017.
- Sur cette notion, Frison-Roche, M.-A., Pour une proposition : l'opérateur cruciale, 2006 ; L'entreprise régulée, 2014.
- Motulsky, Principes de réalisation méthodique du droit. Éléments générateurs des droits subjectifs, 1948.
- Jhering, La lutte pour le droit, ....
- V. not. les travaux fondamentaux de Samuel Jubé, par ex. ..., in Supiot, A., ....
- Supiot, A., ..., Mélanges Pélisser, ...
- Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance et Confiance, 2017.
- Teubner, G., ....
- Farjat, G., ... Mélanges Sayag, ...
- V. par exemple Frison-Roche, M.-A., Le Droit de la Compliance, 2016, et la bibliographie.
- La Rosière, J. de, ...
- Audit, M., ....
- Sur la loi du 27 mars 2017 sur le devoir de vigilance, v. infra.
- La jurisprudence refusa elle-même cette réduction de l'entreprise au profit, lorsqu'elle affirma qu'une société purement financière (la "holding") ne pouvait exister puisqu'elle ne faisait rien et ne pouvait donc pas exister, avant que la loi n'insère un tel instrument dans la palette des instruments sociétaires.
- Frison-Roche, M.-A., Proposition pour une notion : l'opérateur crucial, 2006 ; L'entreprise régulée, 2014.
- V., par ex., Barbant, P., ....
- "toutes les entreprises ayant leur siège social en France et employant au moins 5000 salariés en leur sein ou leurs filiales françaises, ou au moins 10.000 salariés en leur sein dans leurs filiales françaises et étrangères".
- V. l'ensemble des travaux d'Alain Supiot dans ce sens.
- Directive 2012 ....
- V.. supra.
- Parce que eux-mêmes, cessant d'être l'objet d'une branche particulière, voire "auxiliaire" du Droit,pourraient être "l'avenir du Droit". V. Gutmann, Les droits de l'homme sont-ils l'avenir du Droit ?, 1992.
- Par exemple, dans la présentation même qu'Antoine Gaudemet fait de la notion, reprenant ainsi la définition fournie par le Oxford Dictionary of Finances : "ensemble des processus qui permettent d'assurer la conformité des comportements de l'entreprise, de ses dirigeants et de ses salariés aux normes juridiques et éthiques qui leur sont applicables".
- V. par ex. Badie, F., Le "syndrome d'Azincourt" ou De la nécessité pour les entreprise de s'adapter au nouvel environnement international en matière de prévention de la corruption", 2017.
- Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Department of Justice (DoJ) of the United States, Settlement Agreemet - BNP Paribas SA, 30 juin 2014